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PREFACE 
 
This thesis begins with a simple coincidence. On 12 December 1799, George Washington 
rode out across his Virginian plantation. Despite the harshening winter weather, which had 
blanketed Mount Vernon in snow, he persevered with his tour, returning several hours later 
with sleet “hanging upon his hair.” On 13 December, he complained about “a hoarseness” in 
his throat that seemed to “increase with the evening.” By the following morning, Washington 
was bedbound, gulping for breath, and convinced that his condition was “mortal.”1 Several 
hours earlier, on 23 frimaire Year VIII, the latest French Revolutionary regime – the 
Directory – was finally declared defunct. Barely a month since the coup of 18 Brumaire, a 
new constitution had already been devised, concentrating executive authority in a First 
Consul: Napoleon Bonaparte. Had news travelled faster, of course, the ailing American 
president might have been made aware of this event.2 Instead, Washington spent his last night 
alive idly scanning a newspaper that made no mention of either the new constitution or the 
recent coup. Despite their separate time systems, these events were separated by mere hours. 
On the morning of 13 December 1799, Napoleon was made First Consul of France; by the 
evening of 14 December 1799, Washington was dead. The rise and demise of the two most 
prominent protagonists in the two greatest revolutionary convulsions of the eighteenth-
century occurred almost simultaneously.  
This thesis was supposed to begin with a simple comparison.3 It is perhaps this solitary 
micro-moment of overlap that has discouraged historians from investigating the parallels 
between George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte.4 Their interaction was minimal: there 
are no letters, of course, and their careers, both military and civil, are barely 
                                                
1 Tobias Lear, Letters and Recollections of George Washington, Being letters to Tobias Lear and others between 
1790 and 1799, showing the First American in the management of his estate and domestic affairs. With a diary of 
Washington’s last days, kept by Mr. Lear (London, Doubleday, Page & Company, 1906), pp.129-30. 
2 It was not until mid-February 1800 that news of the coup arrived in America: “We see by the late papers that a 
new scene is presented on the French Theatre,” observed James Madison, “[and] melancholy evidence appears that 
the destiny of the Revolution is transferred from the civil to the military authority”: James Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson (14 February, 1800), in David B. Mattern, J. C. A. Stagg, Jeanne K. Cross, Susan Holbrook, eds., The 
Papers of James Madison. Congressional Series (17. vols., Charlottesville, VA., University Press of Virginia, 
1991), XVII, pp.363. 
3 Until recently, the only parallel study of Washington and Napoleon was a twelve page “fragment” of a larger 
article entitled, ‘Was Napoleon a Dictator?’ by the Prussian-born political theorist, Franz Lieber. Predictably, its 
conclusions are equal parts hagiographic and condemnatory: “Washington was modest, Napoleon came to ruin by 
untameable pride”; “Washington obeyed the law, Napoleon constantly broke the law when it appeared necessary 
to him,” etc: Franz Lieber, ‘Washington and Napoleon: A fragment’ (New York, NY., 1864), p.4. Only two 
hundred copies were ever printed, for the Metropolitan Fair of New York. 
4 There were sporadic comparisons made during the mid-nineteenth century, none of which offer a reinterpretation 
the standard hero and villain thesis: Henry Brougham, ‘Napoleon and Washington, from Lord Brougham’s Article 
in the Edinburgh Review,’ Atkinson’s Saturday Evening Post (23 March, 1839); William Warren offers a 
comparison of Washington and Napoleon in The Rover: A Weekly Magazine of Tales, Poetry, and Engravings, 
Also Sketches of Travel, History… (2 October, 1844), p.93; James K. Paulding, ‘Washington and Napoleon,’ The 
New World; a Weekly Family Journal of Popular Literature, Science, Art and News (27 July, 1844). 
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contemporaneous. Indeed, Washington was scarcely aware of General Bonaparte’s existence.5 
My intention was therefore to rectify the biographical blank; and yet, I could not escape this 
coincidence in time.6 The strangeness of this simultaneity, however, may only have been 
apparent to me: after all, there were no formal time zones or meridian lines, no high-speed 
circulating media criss-crossing the late-eighteenth century Atlantic – the time at Mount 
Vernon in Virginia bore little reference to the time at the Luxembourg Palace in Paris.7 If 
these events could occur outside any form of chronometric correspondence, and their 
coincidence could pass without any apparent commentary, perhaps the experience of time 
diverged too: in fact, there may have been more than a difference between the time at 
Washington’s deathbed and Napoleon’s inauguration; time itself may have been different.  
There are, then, two further figures who have influenced this thesis: Reinhart Koselleck 
and Mona Ozouf. For Koselleck, the end of the eighteenth century ushered in the 
“temporalisation” of historical experience.8 By devising the interactive ontological spheres of 
the “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation,” he argued that the previously static 
structure of past, present and future became sensitised to different tempos of change.9 Writing 
this type of history – “time history,” in effect – becomes illuminating with practical 
application. Whilst Koselleck relied upon anecdotal and theoretical abstraction, the creativity 
and empirical force of Mona Ozouf’s work – her study on the “spacetime” of the fêtes 
révolutionnaires, for example, appeared in 1976 – demonstrates how time, an often intangible 
concept, can be applied as an analytic tool without losing sense of the historical narrative.10 
                                                
5 In his entire collection of papers there are only two passing references made to Bonaparte, both by the marquis de 
Lafayette in letters outlining contemporary military manoeuvres in Europe: Lafayette to George Washington on 
20-21 August, 1798, and 5 September, 1798, in W. W. Abbot, The Papers of George Washington. Retirement 
Series (4 vols., Charlottesville, VA., University Press of Virginia, 1998), II, p.540-41, and II, pp.586-87. 
6 The blank no longer exists; the first, full-length contemporary study of Washington and Napoleon appeared in 
2012: Matthew J. Flynn and Stephen E. Griffin, Washington and Napoleon: Leadership in the Age of 
Enlightenment (Washington, DC., Potomac Books, 2012). Flynn and Griffin seek to emphasize the potential 
interchangeability of Washington and Napoleon, portraying both as products of their respective revolutions; thus, 
as Napoleon is supposed to have told Las Cases, his amanuensis in exile, on St. Helena: “he would have been a 
Washington had he been in Washington’s place, and that Washington himself would have been a Napoleon had he 
lived in France”: p.xii. 
7 Vanessa Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time: 1870-1950 (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 
2015), esp. ch.3; Simon Schaffer, ‘Chronometers, charts, charisma: on histories of longitude,’ Science Museum 
Group Journal 2 (Autumn 2014): http://dx.doi.org/10.15180/140203 [accessed: 20/09/2016]; William B. Warner, 
Protocols of Liberty: Communication Innovation and the American Revolution (Chicago, IL., University of 
Chicago Press, 2013), p.148.  
8 Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Modernity and the Planes of Historicity,’ in Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical 
Time (trans. Keith Tribe), (New York, NY., Columbia University Press, 2004), pp.9-25.  
9 “Our ancestors stuck to the lessons they received in their youth; but we have to relearn things every five years,” 
lamented Goethe: Koselleck, ‘Time and History,’ in The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing 
Concepts (trans. Todd Samuel Presner), (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 2002), pp.100-114 here: p.113. 
10 Mona Ozouf, La fête révolutionnaire (1789-1799) (Paris, Gallimard, 1976), republished in, Mona Ozouf, De 
Révolution en République: les chemins de la France (Paris, Gallimard, 2015), pp.337-615, on festive “spacetime” 
in particular, see: pp.456-527; Ozouf has woven throughout her entire œuvre a sensitivity to the peculiar temporal 
experiences of the French Revolution, see: ‘La Révolution française et l’homme régénéré,’ ‘La Révolution 
française et l’aléatoire: l’exemple de Varennes,’ and ‘La Révolution française au tribunal de l’utopie,’ in L’Homme 
Régénéré: Essais sur la Révolution française (Paris, Gallimard, 1989), pp.116-57, 67-92, 211-39. 
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“Revolutionizing time”: this was the central ambition of the revolutionary generation.11 My 
ambition is to demonstrate how time – in particular, the perception of time – governed the 
political actions of contemporary actors. There is, moreover, an inbuilt originality to this 
thesis, since in the very few studies of temporality and the American Revolution – never mind 
its interaction with French Revolutionary temporalities – Koselleck’s fingerprint is barely 
detectable.12  
This thesis is therefore about time and power. It is not a study in biography; nor can it 
be a study of every aspect of life and time in North American and France during the late-
eighteenth century. Significant areas, such as confessional belief or military tactics, have, by 
necessity, received less attention than a more extensive study might afford. The parallel 
between Washington and Napoleon, which was its accidental inspiration, does not disappear: 
it has simply become its culminating argument. I contend that the legitimacy of their authority 
is incomprehensible without reference to the way in which the revolutionary disruption in the 
lived experience of time degraded the exercise of political power – and thus how regulating 
the former resuscitated the latter. A dissertation of this length, and a topic of this scale, cannot 
be exhaustive: instead, it is telescopic, scanning the historical horizon of the revolutionary 
era, from the Boston Tea Party in 1773 to the Battle of Leipzig in 1813, occasionally zooming 
in upon moments of intersect, where contemporary considerations of temporality underpinned 
(and often undermined) the exercise of political authority. 
 
 
  
                                                
11 Mona Ozouf, ‘Passé, Présent, Avenir: À travers les textes administratifs de l’époque révolutionnaire,’ in L’École 
de la France (Paris, Gallimard, 1984), pp.55-73, here: p.55: “Révolutionner le temps: telle a été l’ambition des 
hommes de la Révolution française.” 
12 Koselleck is entirely absent, for example, from, Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, the 
Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 
1988), and Greg Weiner, Madison’s Metronome: The Constitution, Majority Rule, and the Tempo of American 
Politics (Lawrence, KS., University Press of Kansas, 2012): it is possible that this absence may be legitimately 
explained; my point is that Koselleck’s approach, in particular his dual analytic categories of the “space of 
experience” and “horizon of expectation,” has seldom been instrumentalised in the historiography of the American 
Revolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis explores perceptions of time and history during the American and French 
Revolutions, 1774-1815. During this period – before the dissemination of the publications of 
Kant or Hegel – the primary “theorists” of time and temporality were practical figures: 
journalists, soldiers, chancers, adventurers. Their perception of time was derived almost 
entirely from real-world reflection, from lived experience, from having participated in the 
historical events themselves – not from libraries or treatises; their conclusions were not the 
product of incomprehensible philosophical wanderings. Time was tangible, palpable – it was 
central to the ways in which people did politics and how they made decisions. I aim to 
reconstruct this experience of time from a practical, not a philosophical vantage point: to ask 
whether historical events reflect the historical theory, whether the former validates the latter. 
In short, I aim to inject context into the work of Reinhart Koselleck, who largely depended 
upon anecdotal abstractions and disjointed narratives to illustrate his theoretical 
disquisitions.13 What follows is, in effect, a practical history of time during the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries. 
 
≈ 
 
In December 1798, the Greenfield Gazette, a Massachusetts periodical, counselled its readers 
against drawing idle comparisons between the American and French Revolutions.14 Citing the 
Connecticut poet and Francophile, Joel Barlow, who was made a French citizen in 1792 and 
later supported the decapitation of Louis XVI, the Gazette drew a clear contrast between the 
temporality of American and French revolutionary societies.15 America was now peopled by 
“patriots” who, in the course of “the time which tried men’s souls,” had reached “the full 
strength and vigor of their faculties.” Barlow “ought to remember, that in our national 
legislature and executive, there is age and experience” – a constancy of characters in contrast 
to the mere “sub-successors” who formed “the present directors” of the French Republic, and 
                                                
13 The essential texts, which are acknowledged throughout this thesis, are: Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On 
the Semantics of Historical Time (trans. Keith Tribe), (New York, NY., Columbia University Press, 2004); the 
essays included in, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (trans. Todd Samuel 
Presner), (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 2002); Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the 
Pathogenesis of Modern Society (Cambridge, MA., MIT Press, 1988); ‘Is There an Acceleration of History?’ in 
Hartmut Rosa and William E. Scheuerman, eds., High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity 
(Philadelphia, PA., Pennsylvania State University, 2009), pp.113-134; see, also: David Carr, ‘Review: Futures 
Past,’ History and Theory 26 (1, 1987), pp.197-204. 
14 The Greenfield Gazette (Greenfield, MA., 10 December, 1798), Volume VII, Issue 359, pp.1-2; see: Jeffrey A. 
Smith, Printers and Press Freedom: The Ideology of Early American Journalism (Oxford, OUP, 1988). 
15 Richard Buel Jr., Joel Barlow: American Citizen in a Revolutionary World (Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2011), pp.215-236; Annie Jourdan, ‘A Tale of Three Patriots in a Revolutionary World: 
Théophile Cazenove, Jacques-Pierre Brissot, Joel Barlow (1788-1811),’ Early American Studies 10 (2, Spring 
2012), pp.360-81. 
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whose predecessors had “been all long since swept away by the guillotine.” This rebuke 
coincided with the disintegration of Franco-American relations.16 As the French Revolution 
had radicalised, fraternity degenerated into antipathy: in 1793 the Genêt mission threatened to 
import the popular spontaneity of Jacobin democracy, and undermine the basis of American 
constitutionalism; in 1795, the consternation occasioned by the Jay Treaty, which orientated 
American diplomatic and commercial interests towards Britain, demonstrated the extent to 
which the controversies of the French Revolution had infested partisan tensions in America; 
by 1798, France and the United States were all but at war – the so-called Quasi-War – along 
the Atlantic seaboard.17  
By paraphrasing the mantra of Thomas Paine’s revolutionary pamphlet, The 
American Crisis, published during the harsh winter of 1776, the Gazette depicted the 
American Revolution – the “time” that had “tried men’s souls” – as a period of maturation, as 
a progressive, uninterrupted accumulation of “age and experience.”18 In America, the tutelage 
of revolution had imbued new national institutions with “strength and vigor.” In France, by 
contrast, the transmission of experience had been sequestered by the guillotine, robbing an 
entire generation of the capacity to act “as a mentor to future successors.” Indeed, during the 
‘XYZ’ Affair, in which French diplomats had demanded bribes from their American 
counterparts before engaging in peace negotiations, Talleyrand – never far from the stench of 
corruption – admitted that he could grant only secret, informal audiences with United States 
commissioners because, following the Directorial coup of 18 Fructidor, the government 
remained unsteadily established, having undergone yet another “succession.”19 The perennial 
interruptions of French political life – unlike the patriotic practice of American politics, 
“whose worth has been long since known” – created the impression of temporal 
abbreviation.20 As the Gazette observed: “Political successions do not hasten on with such 
rapidity as in France, since we have no poignards or guillotines to accelerate their course.” 
                                                
16 On the changing nature of domestic American opinion concerning the French Revolution, see: Charles Downer 
Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution (Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins Press, 1897), 
pp.139-277. 
17 Harry Ammon, ‘The Genet Mission and the Development of American Political Parties,’ Journal of American 
History 52 (March 1966), pp.725-41; Todd Estes, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of 
Early American Political Culture (Amherst, MA., University of Massachusetts Press, 2006), pp.33-68; Alexander 
DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy Under George Washington (Durham, NC., Duke University 
Press, 1958), and The Quasi-War: the Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801 
(New York, NY., Charles Scribner, 1966); Nathan Perl-Rosenthal, ‘Private Letters and Public Diplomacy: The 
Adams Network and the Quasi-War, 1797-1798,’ Journal of the Early Republic 31 (2, Summer 2011), pp.283-311. 
18 Thomas Paine, ‘The American Crisis, I’ (1776), in Mark Philp, ed., Thomas Paine: Rights of Man, Common 
Sense, and Other Political Writings (Oxford, OUP, 2008), pp.61-70, p.61. 
19 Stanley Elkins, Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800 (Oxford, 
OUP, 1993), see: pp.561-67; Matthew Rainbow Hale, ‘“Many Who Wandered in Darkness”: The Contest over 
American National Identity, 1795-1798,’ Early American Studies 1 (1, Spring 2003), pp.127-75; Thomas M. Ray, 
‘“Not One Cent for Tribute”: The Public Addresses and American Popular Reaction to the XYZ Affair, 1798-
1799,’ Journal of the Early Republic 3 (4, Winter 1983), pp.389-412; Stephen John Hartness, Jennifer Rose 
Mercieca, ‘“Has Your Courage Rusted?”: National Security and the Contested Rhetorical Norms of Republicanism 
in Post-Revolutionary America, 1798-1801,’ Rhetoric and Public Affairs 9 (1, Spring 2006), pp.79-112. 
20 On revolutionary temporal “abbreviations,” see: Koselleck, Futures Past, p.5, 22, 50. 
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This betrays the central methodological problem of evaluating a modality of time 
that, in historical context, existed outside the measurement of mere clock-time. To observe 
how events “hasten on” or move with “rapidity” is to stress a perceived or experiential shift in 
the dynamics of historical time; to cite the operations of the guillotine or the rate of 
assassination as event “accelerators” suggests that the pace of political “successions” cannot 
be recorded by simple reference to the clock or calendar. Indeed, it is to perceive a general 
divergence between history and time. A common facet of the revolutionary discourse on time 
was the way in which contemporaries expressed their appreciation of temporality by invoking 
clock and calendrical metrics as a means of demonstrating their uselessness. The speed and 
scale of transformative events, writes Peter Fritzsche, overhauled “previously authoritative 
structures of temporality by redrawing the horizon of historical possibility.”21 Years, months, 
days, hours, minutes: all degraded as meaningful units of time under the history-bending 
pressures of revolution.22  
All of which underscores the challenge of writing “time history.”23 Indeed, no such 
defined discipline exists, although studies seeking to excavate the sensation, or lived 
experience, of temporal and historical change have recently proliferated.24 Even the 
nomenclature here can be confusing, since it elides the two properties – time and history – 
that historians often accept as invariable and which are here under investigation. If history has 
its own time – if, as Reinhart Koselleck argued, there emerged a form of historical time 
during the late-eighteenth century, in which “different layers of the tempos of change” came 
                                                
21 Peter Fritzsche, Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History (Cambridge, MA., 
Harvard University Press, 2004), p.18.  
22 As Henry Brougham observed of Mirabeau in his Historical Sketches of Statesmen who flourished in the time of 
George III, to which is added Remarks on Party, and an Appendix (Paris, A. and W. Galignani, 1839), p.360: “he 
lived in times when each week staggered under the load of events that had formerly made centuries to bend.” 
Hannah Spahn further observes that it was the “late Enlightenment sense of a discrepancy between a rational and a 
sentimental time perception” that resided at “the root of the collective experience of an ‘acceleration’ of time”: 
Thomas Jefferson, Time and History, p.74. 
23 The following thesis might be termed “time history,” or “chronohistory,” although this appears tautological; it is 
useful in the context of this dissertation on time and power to refer to some of the defining properties of 
“chronopolitics,” which George W. Wallis defines as “a term descriptive of the relation of time-perspectives to 
political decision-making,” in ‘Chronopolitics: The Impact of Time Perspectives on the Dynamics of Change,’ 
Social Forces 49 (1, September 1970), pp.102-08, here: p.102; see, also: Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: 
Modernity and the Avant-garde (London, Verso, 1995); I. Klinke, ‘Chronopolitics: A Conceptual Matrix,’ 
Progress in Human Geography 37 (2012), pp.673-90; on the contemporary importance of chronopolitically-
conditioned deliberative processes, see: R. Stahl, ‘A Clock War: Rhetorics of Time in a Time of Terror,’ Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 94 (2008), pp.73-99. 
24 For the best analysis of the origins and operations of the Revolutionary Calendar, see: Sanja Perovic, The 
Calendar in Revolutionary France: Perceptions of Time in Literature, Culture, Politics (Cambridge, CUP, 2012), 
pp.179-181; on the considerations of historical time central to the formulation of the Constitution of Year III, see: 
Andrew Jainchill, Reimagining Politics after the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism (Ithaca, 
NY., Cornell University Press, 2008), pp.26-61; on time and the post-revolutionary problem of American slavery, 
see: William W. Freehling, ‘The Louisiana Purchase and the Coming of the Civil War,’ in Sanford Levinson and 
Bartholomew H. Sparrow, eds., The Louisiana Purchase and American Expansion, 1803-1898 (New York, NY., 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp.69-82; on the construction of the United States Constitution and the 
politics of time, see: Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of 
American Political Thought (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.63-81; Greg Weiner, Madison’s 
Metronome: The constitution, majority rule, and the tempo of American politics (Lawrence, KS., University Press 
of Kansas, 2012), pp.ix-xi. 
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to characterise the human historical experience, – then time also has its own history.25 For 
Koselleck, this shift heralded the advent of “modernity.” “What is taking place is a 
temporalisation of history, leading to the special kind of acceleration that characterises our 
modern world.” This shift defined the Sattelzeit, a change epoch in human history, which 
Koselleck approximately dated 1750 to 1850.26 In order to better explain this process, 
Koselleck developed a set of twin ontological categories: the “space of experience” 
(Erfahrungrsraum) and the “horizon of expectation” (Erwartungshorizont). They moved in 
lock-step: the former, which classified the past as a warehouse of traditions, habits, 
experiences, guided the latter, the future, as a slowly approaching “horizon” – knowable, 
predictable. This lessened any sense of transition between past to future, which made the 
present appear stable. But during the Sattelzeit, a radical and dynamicized asymmetry 
emerged between these categories: they ceased to look similar. Experience – or historical 
knowledge – no longer provided a foundation upon which to base future expectations. Thus 
“modernity,” as an historical epoch, witnessed the discontinuity of “the past” (experienced as 
tradition) and “the future” (now an unpredictable arena of human activity). This activated a 
sense of “temporalisation” because historically epochal events could, in the course of a few 
hours, appear to affect enormous rupture between past and future, in turn destabilising the 
experience of the present.  
The critiques of Koselleck’s thesis are manifold.27 And yet these twin categories of 
the “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation” have proved remarkably useful – 
either as a theoretical support or theoretical straw-man – for historians interested in accessing 
past perceptions of time.28 This thesis seeks to practically apply Koselleck’s models and his 
vocabulary – the “semantics” of historical time – to revolutionary events. More than merely 
glossing the aphoristic observations of select philosophers, it seeks to understand how 
temporal perceptions impacted upon or determined decision-making. In that sense, it as much 
about real-time as historical time: considerations of temporality were central to the way in 
which revolutionary events unfolded. 
                                                
25 Koselleck, ‘Modernity and the Planes of Historicity,’ in Futures Past, pp.9-25. 
26 Koselleck, ‘Einleitung,’ in Otto Brunner, Wenrer Conze, Reinhart Koselleck, eds., Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1972), 
Vol. I, p.xiii-xxiii. 
27 John Zammito, ‘Koselleck’s Philosophy of Historical Time(s) and the Practice of History,’ History and Theory 
43 (2004), pp.124-35; Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (London, Verso, 2011); 
Kathleen Davis, Periodization & Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism & Secularization Govern the Politics of 
Time (Philadelphia, PA., University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); and for the defence (and nuance of Neuzeit), 
see: Helge Jordheim, ‘Against Periodization: Koselleck’s Theory of Multiple Temporalities,’ History and Theory 
51 (2012), 151-171. 
28 See, for example, Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedächtnisses 
(Munich, C. H. Beck, 1999); Svetlana Boym, The Future of Nostalgia (New York, NY., Basic Books, 2001); and 
Andreas Huyssen, Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 
2003). 
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This nevertheless betrays a methodological problem: there is no fixed set of “time” 
sources, as there might be state papers for the diplomatic historian, or etiquette handbooks for 
the cultural historian. As such, past perceptions of time must be assessed under erasure: they 
are only readable in a secondary – a barely legible – frame of reference, almost as if they are 
hidden beneath the words themselves. This is because contemporaries allude to, but seldom 
explicitly identify, the operations of time. The time historian, then, must search everywhere 
for temporal reflections: as the Greenfield Gazette illustrates, even in the materiality of 
revolution, amidst the “poignards or guillotines” of Paris, the artefacts – the stuff – used to 
“accelerate” the “course” of political “successions.” This thesis, which is grounded in primary 
and archival material, trawls egodocuments – diaries, memoirs, letters – to assess subjective 
experiences of time, before attempting to reconstruct broader, collective experiences of time 
by calibrating these individual reflections with the observations of publicly produced 
documentation – legislative records, newspapers, journals, police reports. It is concerned 
primarily with political time – that is, with the temporal reflections that most prominently 
impacted upon the practice of politics.  
This thesis interrogates – as far as possible – the precise meaning and intent of the 
primary protagonists’ writings and declarations. To denounce contemporary observations as 
mere rhetoric would be to reduce the linguistic expression of the revolutionaries themselves 
to the position of ephemera.29 The ways in which they wrote and deliberated also 
communicated the ways in which they felt, the ways in which they experienced the new and 
unanticipated. This was, after all, an epoch in which exhortative rhetoric conditioned political 
activity. “When speech transforms the communications system,” writes John Pocock, “the 
utterance becomes a ‘happening’ in its own right.”30 For François Furet, the force of 
revolutionary rhetoric underwrote political competition: “speech substitutes itself for power,” 
meaning that “the semiotic circuit is the absolute master of politics.”31 Lynn Hunt agrees: 
“Language became an expression of power,” testifying to the sense of political rupture, and to 
the consequent competition for authority. “The inordinate importance of language in the 
Revolution was a sign of how untracked French society had become.”32 
The same is so for the American Revolution. Where possible this thesis outlines the 
divergent time temperaments of different groups by analysing their deployment of political 
language: for example, the discussion in chapter 2 regarding the different temporalities 
                                                
29 On revolutionary ‘ephemera’ and its temporality, see: Richard Taws, The Politics of the Provisional: Art and 
Ephemera in Revolutionary France (Philadelphia, PA., Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013), pp.119-142. 
30 J.G.A. Pocock, ‘On the Non-Revolutionary Character of Pradigms: A Self-Criticism and Afterpiece,’ in Politics, 
Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (London, Methuen & Co, 1972), pp.273-91, here: 
p.280. 
31 François Furet, Penser la Révolution française (Paris, Gallimard, 1978), pp.72-3. 
32 Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley, CA., University of California Press, 
1984), p.23. 
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experienced by the delegates to the Continental Congress and the ‘outside’ committees of 
correspondence – sometimes labelled ‘the mob,’ or more specifically, ‘the Mobility,’ a term 
possessed of obvious temporal qualities. In any case, descriptive language was not only a 
means of reflecting upon historical events; it also came to condition the ways in which 
historical events were understood and rationalised. It was a way of making sense of a shifting 
world.33 “Historical events are not possible without linguistic activity,” writes Koselleck: “the 
experience gained from these events cannot be communicated except through language.” 
After all, how else could a perception of a subjective experience of historical time be 
expressed? 
Excavating the lived experience of time – what Hannah Spahn has elsewhere termed 
“sentimental time,” in order to distinguish it from absolute or clock-time – necessitates a 
privileging of its sensory appreciation.34 As such, each chapter broadly addresses a different 
emotional regime – from boredom and delirium to patience and anxiety – each of which 
evoke the sensory peculiarities of different and distinct temporalities. This allows the 
discussion to include, but also to move beyond temporal and historical velocities – the 
fixation with acceleration, the study of “the change in the pace of change,” that has largely 
dominated the historiography of modern time regimes.35 This period, after all, constitutes a 
transition towards modernity; this thesis investigates temporal perceptions in flux: the 
“behaviour” of time therefore conforms to neither early modern nor modern patterns – it is 
revolutionary time. This thesis evaluates the changes in temporality as the processes of global 
standardisation and synchronicity were taking effect, but before E.P. Thompson’s modern 
industrial-capitalist clock-time had displaced the primacy of the collective perceptions of time 
that underscored pre-modern economic, commercial and political regimes.36 Instead, 
extricating the “sentimental” responses to contemporary events illuminates the textures – the 
tones, lacunae, perforations – of temporal experience, more than merely their dynamics. It 
reveals the way in which time can feel “empty” or “heavy,” “liquid” or “solid,” as well as 
                                                
33 Peter Gay, ‘Rhetoric and Politics in the French Revolution,’ The American Historical Review 66 (No. 3, April, 
1961), pp.664-676; see Ann Rigney, The Rhetoric of Historical Interpretation: Three Narrative Histories of the 
French Revolution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.63-70. 
34 Hannah Spahn, Thomas Jefferson, Time and History (Charlottesville, VA., University of Virginia Press, 2011), 
pp.73-106, see: p.74: “Sentimental time was,” Spahn writes, “the time of human perceptions, feelings and actions, 
a time structured by the aesthetic experience of irretrievable moments rather than by the predictive aims of the 
natural sciences,” and, as such, “time perception was at the root of the collective experience of an ‘acceleration’ of 
time,” which, for Jefferson, “became relevant…in both his personal life and his historical experience.” 
35 Aleida Assmann, ‘Transformation of the Modern Time Regime,’ in Chris Lorenz and Berber Beverange, eds., 
Breaking Up Time: Negotiating the Borders between Present, Past, and Future (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2013), pp.39-56, here: p.50; Lynn Hunt, ‘Modernity: Are Modern Times Different?’ Historia Critica 54 
(264, September-December 2014), pp.107-24. 
36 E. P. Thompson, ‘Time, work-discipline, and industrial capitalism,’ Past & Present 38 (1, 1967), pp.56-97; on 
the industrial and technological transformations of time during the nineteenth century: Wolfgang Schivelbusch, 
The Railway Journey: The Industrialisation and Perception of Time and Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley, CA., 
University of California Press, 1986). 
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“fast” or “slow.”37 This thesis therefore instrumentalises the history of emotions, not in an 
attempt to trace the cultural contours of dominant emotional regimes, but as a means of 
teasing out the temporal perceptions inscribed into contemporary emotional responses to 
political events.  
This thesis examines the manipulation of temporal perceptions as the means of 
establishing political hegemony and legitimacy.38 Time as a category of historical 
investigation has gathered significant and wide-ranging attention, yet temporal perception as a 
conceptual or analytical category has seldom been put to use: it has rarely been deployed in 
order to explain extraneous phenomenon. The purpose of the present thesis is to employ time 
as a tool with which to explain revolutionary decision-making, to better understand the 
exercise of revolutionary power.  
 
≈ 
 
Exclusivist historiographies, which restrained the American and French Revolutions to their 
national, ‘natural’ boundaries, have long since been challenged. In the works of R. R. Palmer 
and Jacques Godechot, for example, the observation of political and intellectual 
commonalities contributed to the creation a revolutionary “era,” a meta-venue of 
revolutionary history – what became the late-eighteenth century Atlantic world – that 
flourished as social interpretations of the French Revolution faded.39 As the context of 
                                                
37 On the emotional regimes of the French Revolution, see: William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A 
Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge, CUP, 2001), pp.173-210; Barry M. Shapiro, Traumatic 
Politics: The Deputies and the King in the Early French Revolution (Philadelphia, PA., Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2009); on emotion and the American Revolution, see: Peter Charles Hoffer, Sensory Worlds in 
Early America (Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp.189-251; Sarah Pearsall, ‘“The Power 
of Feeling?” Emotion, Sensibility, and the American Revolution,’ Modern Intellectual History 8 (3, November 
2011), pp.659-72, who observes that emotional typologies of American history have seldom focused on “high 
politics,” and tended to deal more with “the domestic, the feminine, and the literary” aspects of the Revolution; 
see, also: Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC., University of North Carolina 
Press, 2009); and Nicole Eustace, Passion Is the Gale: Emotion, Power, and the Coming of the American 
Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC., University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Marshall Smelser, ‘The Federalist Period 
as an Age of Passion,’ American Quarterly 10 (4, 1958), p.391-419; more generally, see: Jan Plamper, The History 
of Emotions: An Introduction (Oxford, OUP, 2015), pp.1-39; Ute Frevert, Emotions in History – Lost and Found 
(Budapest, Central European University Press, 2011), pp.3-18. 
38 This thesis does not attempt to offer a new reading of clock or calendrical reform during this period, which has 
already been exhaustively examined; see: Gerhard Dorhn-van Rossum, History of the Hour: Clocks and Modern 
Temporal Orders (trans. T. Dunlap) (Chicago, IL., University of Chicago Press, 1996); David Landes, Revolution 
in Time: Clock and the Making of the Modern World (Cambridge, MA., Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2000); in a specifically American context, see: M. O’Malley, Keeping Watch: A History of American Time 
(Washington, DC., Smithsonian, 1990); it likewise moves away from the typically cited “time”-specific sources, 
such as the National Convention debates on the Republican Calendar: Marie-Hélène Froeschle-Chopard, Michel 
Froeschle-Chopard, ‘Le Calendrier Républicain, une nécessité idéologique et/ou scientifique?’ in Philippe Joutard, 
dir., L’Espace et le Temps Reconstruits: La Révolution française, une Révolution des mentalités et des cultures? 
Actes du colloque organisé à Marseille par la Commission Scientifique régionale pour le Bicentenaire de la 
Révolution française (Aix-en-Provence, Université de Provence, 1990), pp.169-79.  
39 R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution (2 vols., 1959-64); and, Jacques Godechot, France and the 
Atlantic Revolution of the Eighteenth Century, 1770-1799 (trans. Herbert H. Rowen), (New York, NY., The Free 
Press, 1965), which resembles a parallel history that largely confines its comparative force to moments of intersect 
between the various “Atlantic” revolutions; see, also: Patrice Higonnet, Sister Republics: The Origins of French 
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revolutionary political historiography globalised, however, cultural approaches were localised 
in response to the post-colonial weakening of universalised analyses.40 The reflexivity 
brought to bear upon the intellectual intersections of the Revolutions was thus accompanied 
by a simultaneously fragmentation of cultural knowledge, which served to estrange the 
Revolutions and to suggest that their political cultures were essentially irreconcilable. As 
David Andress has recently stated, however, the “closed-border national evaluations of 
revolutionary situations amidst a group of states that all had complex transatlantic and 
interregional ties and exchanges are and must be inadequate.”41 Despite their chronological 
proximity, there remains no single study that comprehensively approaches the 
transformations in the perception of time and history affected by the American and French 
Revolutions. This thesis re-examines one of the central political problems that these 
Revolutions exposed, then confronted, and later bequeathed to historians – namely, the 
question of legitimacy: its disintegration, re-articulation, and instability. It does so with the 
tool of time, which privileges a diversity of epistemological models – financial, visual, 
emotional, administrative, military histories, amongst others, all help to inform an often 
intangible object of analysis: temporal perceptions.42  
This thesis is therefore not a comparative history or transfer history, both of which 
typically offer a framework of analysis for terms and phenomena that cohere chronologically 
or share a specified geography, such as a sea.43 It is better understood as an intersecting or 
                                                
and American Republicanism (Cambridge MA., Harvard University Press, 1988); James H. Hutson, The Sister 
Republics: Switzerland and the United States from 1776 to the Present (Washington DC., Library of Congress, 
1991). 
40 Stefan Helgesson, ‘Radicalizing Temporal Difference: Anthropology, Postcolonial Theory, and Literary Time,’ 
History and Theory 53 (2014), pp.545-62; on extra-European revolutions and temporal shifts, see: Andrus Ers, 
‘Year Zero: The temporality of revolution studied through the example of the Khmer Rouge,’ in Hans Ruin, 
Andrus Ers, eds., Rethinking Time: History, Memory and Representation (Södertörn, Philosophical Studies, 9, 
2011), pp.155-65. 
41 David Andress, ‘Atlantic Entanglements: Comparing the French and American Revolutions,’ in Alan Forrest, 
Matthias Middell, eds., The Routledge Companion to the French Revolution in World History (London, Routledge, 
2015), pp.159-74, p.159. 
42 On financial, monetary and material time: Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 
Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1600-1870 (Chicago, IL., University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), pp.156-70; Richard Taws, The Politics of the Provisional: Art and Ephemera in Revolutionary 
France (Philadelphia, PA., Pennsylvania State University Press, 2013), pp.119-42; Manuela Albertone, ‘Une 
histoire oubliée: les assignats dans l’historiographie,’ Annales historiques de la Révolution française 287 (1, 
1992), pp.87-104; J. G. A. Pocock, ‘Modes of Political and Historical Time in Early Eighteenth-Century England,’ 
in J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the 
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, CUP, 1985), pp.91-102; Jennifer J. Baker, Securing the Commonwealth: Debt, 
Speculation and Writing in the Making of Early America (Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 
pp.63-118; on literature and temporality, see: Lynn Hunt, ‘“No Longer an Evenly Flowing River”: Time, History, 
and the Novel,’ American Historical Review 103 (5, December 1998), pp.1517-21; James Noggie, The 
Temporality of Taste in Eighteenth-Century British Writing (Oxford, OUP, 2012), pp.1-39; on military 
temporalities during the Napoleonic wars, see: Alan Liu, Wordsworth, The Sense of History (Stanford, CA., 
Stanford University Press, 1989), pp.401-06; Luis Lobo-Guerrero, ‘Maritime insurance, the security of credit and 
the British state at war during the Napoleonic period,’ in Luis Lobo-Guerrero, Insuring War: Sovereignty, Security 
and Risk (Oxford, Routledge, 2012), pp.21-56. 
43 David Armitage, ‘Three Concepts of Atlantic History,’ in David Armitage, Michael J. Braddick, eds., The 
British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (Basingstoke, Houndsmill, 2002), p.22: “The potential for comparative trans-
Atlantic histories along an east-west axis remains largely unexplored.” 
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entangled history, as an historical account that darts, or criss-crosses, back-and-forth through 
time and space – as histoire croisée.44 The concepts under observation – namely, time and 
history – are not considered in comparative contexts; they are in some sense interactive, 
continually shifting. Unlike comparison, histoire croisée allows historical events to retain 
their exceptional qualities, whilst enabling the historian to view those events as iterations of a 
common, ongoing process. The reflexivity of this methodological approach illuminates the 
ways in which contemporary constructions of temporal perceptions shifted across multiple 
time frames. The practical and intellectual moments of analytical intersection rely upon the 
very commonality of a shifting temporality. I do not intend to simply equate the temporal 
regimes of revolutionary America and France; but rather, to demonstrate how similar 
processes of rupture actualised similar responses. In the second chapter, for example, the 
experience of historical compression and its impact upon the revolutionary deliberative 
process is examined in two non-contemporaneous, yet conceptually comparable contexts: the 
Continental Congress, 1774-1776, and the National Assembly, 1789-1791.45 This can be 
disorientating: the framework of histoire croisée, unlike the oceanic forum of Atlantic history, 
ceaselessly decentres the object of analysis, relying instead upon the similarity of the constant 
divergences in the process of generating conceptual meaning.  
It is easy to get lost in this meta-clutter. An adequate historicisation of time 
perspectives both between and across the American and French Revolutions is not possible in 
a comparative framework. As Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann have observed, 
the comparative approach can give rise to “conflicts” between a synchronic and diachronic 
logic of analysis. By valorising the predetermined over the processual, comparative history 
assumes the existence of a synchronic cross-section – “a pause in the flow of time” – where 
                                                
44 As Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann have argued, the “historicization” of entangled concepts 
“means articulating the essential aspect of reflexivity and the multiple time frames that enter into the construction 
of an object to the extent that it is envisaged as a production situated in time and space”; consequently, histoire 
croisée “plays a role in this undertaking by opening up lines of inquiry that encourage a rethinking, in historical 
time, of the relationship among observation, the object of study, and the analytical instruments used”: ‘Beyond 
Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the challenge of reflexivity,’ History and Theory 45 (February, 2006), pp.30-50, 
here: p.45. This is, in part, the methodological approach outlined and used by Philipp Ziesche in his assessment of 
the American revolutionaries who witnessed and participated in the French Revolution during the late 1780s 
through to the Napoleonic Empire: Cosmopolitan Patriots: Americans in Paris in the Age of Revolution 
(University of Virginia Press, 2010), see: p.10. 
45 On the Continental Congress, the essential literature includes: Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress 
(New York, NY., Macmillan, 1941); Lynn Montross, The Reluctant Rebels: the Story of the Continental Congress: 
1774-1789 (New York, NY., Harper and Brothers, 1970); H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental 
Congress (New York, NY., McGraw-Hill, 1974); Jack N. Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An 
Interpretive History of the Continental Congress (New York, NY., Knopf, 1979); on the Estates-General and the 
National Assembly, see: Timothy Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary: The Deputies of the French National 
Assembly and the Emergence of a Revolutionary Culture (1789-1790) (Philadelphia, PA., Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1996); the surrounding media of the Estates-General may be found in, Armand Brette, Recueil de 
documents relatifs à la convocation des Etats généraux de 1789 (4 vols., Paris, 1894-1915); Henry Heller, The 
Bourgeois Revolution in France, 1789-1815 (New York, NY., Berghahn Books, 2006), pp.65-82; Paul R. Hanson, 
Contesting the French Revolution (London, Wiley and Blackwell, 2009), pp.10-34. 
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the objects of comparison sit fixed, or suspended, and evaluation may take place.46 Histoire 
croisée, by contrast, allows for the flexibility necessary to investigate “relational 
configurations” that are active or asymmetrical, to trace the qualitative or experiential 
dimension of “labile” situations.47 It is a form of historical analysis that is, like the 
phenomena it seeks to analyse, mobile. It therefore provides an appropriate methodological 
framework for a thesis that aims, in effect, at a non-contemporaneous cross-evaluation. It 
likewise testifies to the contemporary collapse in the intellectual authority of comparison 
(especially historical comparison), which buckled beneath the sense of historical singularity 
inherent to revolutionary experience. In February 1775, the Pennsylvania Evening Post 
scanned the historical horizon, observing that the “wheel of politics, in its revolutions, 
naturally brings about a similarity of circumstances and events happening at distant periods.” 
By invoking a cyclical metaphor – the “wheel” of events – the Post could point to a 
fundamental similitude in the structure of human history, one that would “pass unnoticed” if 
the colonists failed to glance through the “mirrour of comparison.”48 By June 1776, 
revolutionary events seemed to move faster than the construction of comparison would allow: 
America was now “in the very midst of revolution,” as John Adams was forced to conclude, 
perhaps the most “unexpected, and remarkable of any in the history of the world.” There was 
no doubting the historic scale of this revolution: “Objects of the most Stupendous Magnitude, 
Measures in which the Lives and Liberties of Millions, born & unborn are most essentially 
interested, are now before Us.”49 
Beyond the non-contemporaneous, however, this thesis works at an additional level 
of remove: after all, I am not trying to establish chronological similarity between the 
revolutions, but to assess the similar ways in which fractures emerged in the experience of 
chronology itself.50 This thesis therefore moves somewhat beyond Verflechtungsgeschichte, 
or entangled history; it could almost be termed a Zeitverschmolzenegeschichte: a time-melted-
history, that stretches historical analysis not merely across time – that is, across the non-
contemporaneous – but across the interactions of different modalities of time.51 Articulating 
                                                
46 Werner and Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison,’ p.35; on the methodological challenges of histoire croisée in 
practice, see: Eliga H. Gould, ‘Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a 
Spanish Periphery,’ American Historical Review 112 (3, 2007), pp.764-86; Renaud Morieux, The Channel: 
England, France and the Construction of a Maritime Border in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, CUP, 2016), 
pp.1-28. 
47 Werner and Zimmermann, ‘Beyond Comparison,’ p.38, see also, p.45: “Histoire croisée plays a role in this 
undertaking by opening up lines of inquiry that encourage a rethinking, in historical time, of the relationship 
among observations, the object of study, and the analytical instruments used.” 
48 The Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia, PA., 9 February, 1775), Volume I, Issue 8, p.29. 
49 John Adams to William Cushing (9 June, 1776), in Paul H. Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774-
1789 (25 vols., Washington, DC., Library of Congress, 1976-2000), IV, p.178; on the growing inapplicability of 
historical exemplar, see Koselleck, ‘Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the Perspective of 
a Modernized Historical Process,’ in Futures Past, pp.26-42. 
50 Göran Therborn, ‘Entangled Modernities,’ European Journal of Social Theory 6 (3, August, 2003), pp.293-305. 
51 The term ‘Zeitverschmolzenegeschichte’ is my coinage. Felicitas Becker, ‘Netzwerke vs. Gesamtgesellschaft: 
ein Gegensatz? Anregungen für Verflechtungsgeschichte,’ Geschichte und Gesellschaft 30 (2, April-June 2004), 
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the reflexivity of the experiences and perceptions of time and history allows for the free-flow 
analysis of concepts such as ‘revolution’ that were themselves in a contemporary state of flux. 
It also blurs cause and effect: did revolutionary conditions alter historical time, or did an 
earlier alteration in historical time create revolutionary conditions? The answer is not binary, 
but interactive, it varies – once again – across time and space. 
 
≈ 
 
In the preface to his translation of Friedrich von Gentz’s The Origin and Principles of the 
American Revolution. Compared with the Origin and Principles of the French Revolution 
(1800), John Quincy Adams attempted to avert cross-contamination “between right and 
wrong,” between the “plain sense of mankind,” which he believed characterised the American 
cause, and the French Revolution, which, like a “highwayman who murders a traveller,” had 
been an abhorrent, almost criminal enterprise.52 Gentz had attempted to construct an Atlantic 
firewall between the revolutions because, as he saw it, the narrative of the American 
Revolution had been dragged into the vortex of French Revolutionary historical time: 
 
It may justly be taken for granted, that since the last ten years have almost exhausted 
all the powers of attention and of memory, the characteristic features of the origin and 
first progress of that [American] revolution are no longer distinctly present in the 
minds even of many of its cotemporaries.53 
 
It was during the period demarcated by this thesis that the semantic shift in the concept of 
‘revolution’ took place.54 Previously a transhistorical expression derived from the rhythms of 
nature, such as planetary or seasonal rotations, it was increasingly employed to describe 
sudden, irreversible breaks in the otherwise iterative pattern of human life.55 Between the 
                                                
pp.314-24; Marten Düring, Ulrich Eumann, ‘Historische Netzwerkforschung: Ein neuer Ansatz in den 
Geschichtswissenschaften,’ Geschichte und Gesellschaft 39 (3, July-September 2013), pp.369-90; Margrit Pernau, 
‘Whither Conceptual History? From National to Entangled Histories,’ Contributions to the History of Concepts 7 
(1, Summer 2012), pp.1-11; Juliane Schiel, ‘Crossing Paths between East and West. The Use of Counterfactual 
Thinking for the Concept of ‘Entangled Histories,’ Historical Social Research/Historische Sozialforschung 34 (2, 
2009), pp.161-83. 
52 John Quincy Adams, ‘Preface,’ in Friedrich von Gentz, The Origin and Principles of the American Revolution, 
Compared with the Origins and Principles of the French Revolution, ed. Peter Koslowski (trans. John Quincy 
Adams), (Indianapolis, IN., Liberty Fund, 2010), pp.3-5, here: p.3. 
53 Gentz, The Origin and Principles, p.10; on historicity and periodicity in the French revolutionary press, see: 
Pierre Rétat, ‘Forme et discours d’un journal révolutionnaire: Les Révolutions de Paris en 1789,’ in Claude 
Labrosse, Pierre Rétat, Henri Duranton, eds., L’Instrument Périodique: La fonction de la presse au XVIIIe siècle 
(Lyon, 1986), pp.139-78. 
54 My thesis condenses Koselleck’s Sattelzeit of 1750 to 1850, limiting the field of study to the activity of 
revolution itself; see: Kari Palonen, ‘An Application of Conceptual History to itself: from method to theory in 
Reinhart Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte,’ Redescriptions (Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought), 1, pp.39-69. 
55 I. Bernard Cohen, Revolution in Science (Cambridge, MA., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 
pp.51-76; Christopher Hill, ‘The Word ‘Revolution’ in Seventeenth-Century England,’ in Richard Ollard, Pamela 
Tudor-Craig, For Veronica Wedgewood These: Studies in Seventeenth Century History (London, Harper Collins, 
1986), pp.134-51. 
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outbreak of the American Revolution and the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars the 
dynamics of history were “denaturalized,” stripped of their natural limits and freed from 
quasi-objective spatial metaphors; but history did not yet correspond to the ever-accelerating 
modality of technological advance.56 It was instead motored by the newly limitless 
possibilities of political revolution. As Koselleck explains, in the century spanning 1750 to 
1850, revolution becomes “a regulative principle of knowledge” once it begins to coordinate 
the conditions and possibilities of all political participation: it makes “the revolutionary 
process, and a consciousness which is both conditioned by it and reciprocally affects it, 
belong inseparably together.”57 ‘Revolution’ became the legitimising mechanism of political 
activity because, having been responsible for overturning legitimate authority, it was now 
appealed to as its substitute. Simultaneously conceived as a “coefficient of movement” and as 
the validator of political activity, ‘revolution’ trapped the conceptualisation of legitimacy 
within its own impermanence, within the same system of spontaneity and flux that 
characterised its ongoing temporal characteristics. ‘Revolution’ possessed no “warranty in 
permanence” – it could not by definition invoke historical precedent as a means of securing 
its continuity; it demanded historical movement, even destruction, in order to sustain its 
voracious need for new sources of legitimacy.58 When it became a source of legitimacy in 
itself, the very concept of legitimacy degraded. As Dan Edelstein observed, when ‘revolution’ 
burst the bounds of constitutionalism in France after 1793, it began providing a vocabulary of 
legitimate authority in its own right.59 ‘Revolution’ became coterminous with rupture; its 
function was the delegitimisation of any claim to political legitimacy that emerged from any 
source extraneous to the phenomenological reality, the lived experience, of revolution itself – 
its purpose was to destroy constituted authority, not to sustain it. 
This definition of political ‘revolution’ – and, by implication, this revision of 
‘legitimate’ authority – appears to preclude the American example. According to Keith 
Michael Baker, it was only after 1789 that the notion of “revolution as fact gave way to a 
conceptualisation of revolution as ongoing act.” Before 1789, asserts Baker, “[r]evolutions 
happened, they were not made,” they were understood ex-post-facto, they were completed 
                                                
56 Hartmut Rosa, ‘Social Acceleration: Ethical and Political Consequences of a Desynchronized High-Speed 
Society,’ and Reinhart Koselleck, ‘Is There an Acceleration of History?’ in Hartmut Rosa and William E. 
Scheuerman, eds., High-Speed Society: Social Acceleration, Power, and Modernity (Philadelphia, PA., 
Pennsylvania State University, 2009), pp.77-112, 113-134; Jeremy Stein, ‘Reflections on Time, Time-Space 
Compression, and Technology in the Nineteenth Century,’ in Jon May, Nigel Thrift, Timespace: Geographies of 
Temporality (London, Routledge, 2001), pp.105-32; Kari Palonen, The Struggle with Time: A conceptual history 
of ‘politics’ as an activity (Berlin, Verlag, 2014), pp.17-18. 
57 Koselleck, Futures Past, p.50. 
58 Ibid, pp.50-51. 
59 See Dan Edelstein’s articles, ‘From Constitutional to Permanent Revolution: 1649 and 1793,’ in Baker and 
Edelstein, eds., Scripting Revolution, pp.118-130, and ‘Do We Want a Revolution Without a Revolution? 
Reflections on Political Authority,’ French Historical Studies 35 (Spring 2012), pp.269-89, and ‘Revolution in 
Permanence and the Fall of Popular Sovereignty,’ in Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, Stefanos Geroulanos, Nicole Jerr, eds., 
The Scaffold of Sovereignty (New York, NY., Columbia University Press, forthcoming). 
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occurrences, an always-already finished process.60 The American Revolution (capitalised by 
its historians, not its participants) complies with this categorisation.61 It was only after the 
French Revolution that the term came to “designate a domain of ongoing struggle, a space of 
action expanding toward an indefinite political horizon, a moment of rupture constantly 
extended and energized by the urgency of a new conception of time.”62 
This is untrue. The American experience of revolution had begun to fracture the 
fact/act dichotomy before a single brick was plundered from the walls of the Bastille. In a 
letter of 21 May 1775, the Virginian politician Richard Henry Lee wrote that there had 
“never” been “a more total revolution at any place than at New York.” In a semantic sense, 
the “totality” of this “revolution” did not refer to its relative completion, but its sheer scale. In 
fact, events continued to proceed in real time: “The Tory’s have been obliged to fly, the 
Province is arming, and the Governor dares not call his prostituted Assembly to receive Ld. 
Norths foolish plan!”63 Writing in the present tense, Lee observed how New York society was 
being upended before his very eyes: the narrative time of this “total revolution” was now. 
Lee’s letters from this period, for example, are replete with temporally sensitive phrases – 
“We just hear that…”; “We have just seen a petition from London…”; “I am so hurried that I 
scarcely know what I write…” – almost as if the events relative to the Revolution were 
unfolding faster than his quill could copy them.64 By May 1779 there had been little let-up: 
attached to a bundle of congressional papers that he sent to Jefferson, Lee included a letter 
outlining “the progress of our revolution,” a documentary account of ongoing events, which 
he hoped his recipient might find useful.65 The Revolution demanded an ongoing 
engagement; Lee, in particular, viewed its “progress” as if from within the process; not as a 
passive observer, but as an active participant – as a revolutionary. 
                                                
60 Baker, ‘Revolutionizing Revolution,’ in Baker, Edelstein, eds., Scripting Revolution, p.71. 
61 It was the French Revolution, observes Roger Griffin, that formed the time-bridge to modernity since for 
contemporaries its American precursor was “still intelligible as an archetypal popular revolt against tyranny with 
classical precedents”: ‘Fixing Solutions: Fascist Temporalities as Remedies for Liquid Modernity,’ Journal of 
Modern European History 13 (2015), pp.5-23, here: p.11; America did not experience, as Bernard Bailyn writes, 
any “great social shock,” which, in France, obliterated ancient institutions and hierarchies. Whilst loyalists 
certainly lost property, traditions of land ownership or social hierarchies were not as historically entrenched as in 
France; revolutionary reverberations were relatively restricted: referenced in Gary B. Nash, ‘Sparks from the Altar 
of ’76: International Repercussions and Reconsiderations of the American Revolution,’ in David Armitage, Sanjai 
Subrahmanyam, eds., The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c.1760-1840 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), ch.1. These distinctions are discussed in depth in the second chapter of this thesis. 
62 Baker, ‘Revolutionizing Revolution,’ p.80. 
63 Richard Henry Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee (21 May, 1775), in Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, I, 
p.367. 
64 Lee to Robert Carter (1 July, 1775); Lee to Landon Carter (2 June 1776); Lee to Charles Lee (22 April 1776), in 
Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, I, p.569; IV, p.118; III, p.571; on Lee’s early involvement in the 
Revolution see: J. Kent McGaughy, Richard Henry Lee of Virginia: A Portrait of an American Revolutionary 
(Lanham, MD., Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp.95-120; on the domestic lives of the revolutionaries, and how the 
Revolution disrupted that tranquility, in particular the Lees, see: Myron Magnet, The Founders at Home: The 
Building of America, 1735-1817 (New York, NY., W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), pp.50-9; Thomas Patrick 
Chorlton, The First American Republic, 1774-1789: The First Fourteen American Presidents Before Washington 
(Bloomington, IN., AuthorHouse, 2011), pp.401-28. 
65 Lee to Thomas Jefferson (3 May 1779), in Smith, ed., Letters of Delegates to Congress, XII, p.421. 
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Yet, as Baker contends, “there were no ‘revolutionaries’ before the Bastille fell.”66 
Tying the terminology of revolution to its peculiar temporality, however, inaugurates an 
entire generation of pre-Bastille “revolutionaries.”67 Thus in 1780 both James Madison and 
Benjamin Rush could refer to “the course” and “the present stage of the American 
Revolution” respectively, characterising it as a continuous historical happening, a process 
advancing across an uncertain historical horizon towards an open future.68 It was this 
uncertainty – the shifting internal measurements, dynamics and immediacy of the Revolution 
– that imbued the revolutionary process with “its own accelerated conception of time.”69 This 
was not an exclusively French phenomenon. In his Abrégé de la révolution de l’Amérique 
Angloise (1778), the dramatist and historian Pierre-Ulric du Buisson, recently returned from 
revolutionary America, referred to its participants as “coopérateurs” engaged in “the current 
revolution [la révolution actuelle].”70 A decade after the Declaration of Independence, 
Edmund Randolph observed that, “every day dawns with perils for the United States,” none 
of which could be adequately foreseen, so that even “the present moment may terminate in 
the destruction of Confederate America.”71 He now called upon “those who first kindled the 
Revolution” to come to its aid. Might the individuals responsible for fomenting the (ongoing) 
revolutionary drama – “those who first kindled” it, as Randolph labelled them – also be 
termed ‘revolutionaries’? It scarcely seems outrageous or anachronistic to suggest so.72 
                                                
66 Baker, ‘Revolutionizing Revolution,’ p.71; on the political controversies that divided the Revolutions, see: 
Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink, ‘Controverses transatlantique: contenus, enjeux et impact international de la Letter to the 
abbé Raynal (1782) de Thomas Paine,’ in Cecil Courtney, Jenny Mander, eds., Raynal’s Histoire des deux Indes: 
colonialism, networks and global exchange (Oxford, Voltaire Foundation, 2015), pp.235-46. 
67 On the circulation of news and iconography relating to the storming of the Bastille in America, see: Hans-Jürgen 
Lüsebrink, Rolf Reichardt, The Bastille: A History of a Symbol of Despotism and Freedom (Durham, NC., Duke 
University Press, 1997), p.212; Anne C. Loveland, Emblem of Liberty: The Image of Lafayette in the American 
Mind (Baton Rouge, LA., Louisiana State University Press, 1971), pp.133-60. 
68 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (27 March, 1780), in William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, eds., 
The Papers of James Madison. Congressional Series (17 vols., Chicago, IL., University of Chicago Press, 1962-
91), II, p.5: “Among the various conjunctures of alarm and distress which have arisen in the course of the 
Revolution, it is with pain I affirm to you sir, that no one can be singled out more truly critical than the present.” 
Benjamin Rush, The Letters of Benjamin Rush: 1761-1792, ed., L. H. Butterfield (Philadelphia, PA., American 
Philosophical Society, 1951), p.260. 
69 Baker, ‘Revolutionizing Revolution,’ p.96. 
70 Pierre Ulric Du Buisson, Abrégé de la révolution de l’Amérique Angloise: depuis le commencement de l’année 
1774, jusqu’au 1 janvier 1778 (Paris, Cellot & Jombert, 1778), p.1, p.3. 
71 Edmund Randolph to Patrick Henry (6 December 1786), in William Wirt Henry, ed., Patrick Henry: Life, 
Correspondence and Speeches (3 vols., New York, NY., Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891), II, pp.310-11; as late as 
1799, the congressman Abraham Baldwin observed how the United States had “still not got beyond the reach and 
influence” of the “causes peculiar” to its revolutionary origins: cited in Douglas Bradburn, The Citizenship 
Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804 (University of Virginia Press, 2009), 
p.273. 
72 There remains an inherent contradiction in the modern definition of revolution: for whilst revolutions no longer 
occur without human volition, the rapidity of their onset – the perceived dynamic of their temporality – also 
frustrates political premonition; and contradictions such as these found their place in the reflections of the 
American revolutionaries: in 1774, for example, John Adams could predict that “Our Children may see 
Revolutions,” but that the colonies would continue to “oscilate like a Pendulum,” perhaps “for many Years to 
come,” ceaselessly preparing for, but never actually achieving, revolution: John Adams to James Warren (9 April, 
1774), in Robert J. Taylor, ed., The Adams Papers (16 vols., Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1977–), 
II, p.84; by 1776, he confessed himself “surprized at the Suddenness” of the “chain of Causes and Effects,” which 
seldom seemed like a linear “chain” at all, which had fomented “this Revolution”: John Adams to Abigail Adams 
(3 July, 1776), in L. H. Butterfield, The Adams Papers. Adams Family Correspondence (11 vols., Cambridge, 
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Even before 1789, then, ‘revolution’ had already emerged as a conceptual category 
both deriving from, and giving meaning to, an historically charged concatenation of 
contemporaneous events. It was understood as act of human-historical agency, existing 
almost exclusively within a malleable present, and increasingly detached from a relatable past 
or a foreseeable future. Temporally derived definitions have persisted into the present. Hanan 
Sabea has characterised the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, for example, as a “time out of 
time,” where the “openness, fluidity and contingency of [the] temporal boundaries of Tahrir 
Square,” created experiences “excised from the every day.” Over the course of eighteen days 
– eighteen journées, in effect – ordinary Egyptians were empowered to “reconfigure the 
political.” The third chapter of this thesis examines the time-bending properties of the 
revolutionary journée in French context, locating the suspension of the monarchy on 10 
August 1792, in particular, as a site of limitless possibilities, as the supreme political 
imaginarium of the Revolution, so kairotically charged that the very materials of history were 
open to refashioning.73 As a nod to the temporality of modern revolutions, no sooner had 
Sabea completed her article than it too was overtaken by events: in the summer of 2013, an 
estimated fourteen million Egyptians swelled the streets of Cairo, exercising their claims to 
the illimitable popular sovereignty that exists within the “ongoing” revolutionary present, and 
demanding the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi.74 During the late-eighteenth century, this 
conceptual transformation of ‘revolution’ entangled American and French historical contexts, 
for whilst this process of conceptual change, as Koselleck and Baker have established, points 
to simultaneous changes in the perception of historical time, it also makes the “scripts” of the 
American and French Revolution interactive.75  
                                                
MA., Harvard University Press, 1963-2013), II, p.29; as du Buisson wrote, the “Revolution” had moved with such 
surprising speed, and taken in so many separate scenes, that its “contemporaries” and “even its coopérateurs” 
could not, “for the most part,” profess “any clear or precise idea of those [events] which had prepared it”: Abrégé, 
p.430: “la Révolution,” p.1: “ses coopérateurs même, n’avoient pour la plûpart, aucune idée nette & précise de 
ceux qui l’on préparé.” 
73 Hanan Sabea, ‘A “Time out of Time”: Tahrir, the Political and the Imaginary in the context of the January 25th 
Revolution in Egypt,’ Fieldsights – Hot Spots, Cultural Anthropology Online (9 May, 2013): 
https://culanth.org/fieldsights/211 [accessed 26/07/2016]; see, also, Silvana Toska, ‘The Multiple Scripts of the 
Arab Revolutions,’ in Baker and Edelstein, eds., Scripting Revolution, pp.325-44. 
74 ‘Millions flood Egypt’s streets to demand Mursi quit,’ Reuters (30 June, 2013): http://reut.rs/1aXWXh6 
[accessed 26/07/2016]; see: Jillian Schwedler, ‘Taking Time Seriously: Temporality and the Arab Uprisings,’ 
Paper delivered at the workshop, ‘From Mobilization to Counter-Revolution: The Arab Spring in Comparative 
Perspective’ (3-4 May, 2016): http://pomeps.org/2016/06/10/taking-time-seriously-temporality-and-the-arab-
uprisings/ [accessed 26/07/2016]; Doug McAdam, William H. Sewell, Jr., ‘It’s About Time: Temporality in the 
Study of Social Movements and Revolutions,’ in Ronald R. Aminzade, ed., Silence and Voice in the Study of 
Contentious Politics (Cambridge, CUP, 2001), pp.89-125; Wendy Pearlman, ‘Emotions and the Microfoundations 
of the Arab Uprisings,’ Perspectives on Politics 11 (2, June 2013), pp.387-409. This conceptualization of popular 
sovereign participation is discussed in depth in chapters 2 and 4; see: Jason Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting 
the People in Post-Revolutionary America (Durham, NC., Duke University Press, 2010), pp.1-40; Jürgen 
Habermas, ‘Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?’ Political Theory 29 (6, 
2001), pp.766-81; Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Transnational Constitutions: Social Foundations of the Post-
National Legal Structure (Cambridge, CUP, 2016), pp.42-44; on Thomas Paine, constituent power and 
revolutionary trans-Atlanticism, see: Georgina Green, The Majesty of the People: Popular Sovereignty and the 
Role of the Writer in the 1790s (Oxford, OUP, 2014), pp.65-88.  
75 David A. Bell, ‘Afterword,’ in Baker, Edelstein, eds., Scripting Revolution, pp.345-53. 
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This thesis proposes a panoramic analysis of historical time during the era of the American 
and French Revolutions. It is not – and cannot be – an exhaustive account. There is no 
detailed dissection here of slave-holding practices in colonial America, for example, or the 
battlefield strategies of Napoleonic marshals; in terms of sources, this thesis does not embrace 
the maritime or commercial log-books of trans-Atlantic voyages, for example, nor does it 
pretend to offer a precise dissection of how the historian may extract time perceptions from 
source material, not at least beyond the discussion already included in this introduction. If 
there does seem to be a superabundance of divergent source matter, taken from disparate 
places and times, then these are only summoned as the impressions of a general mentalité – as 
an attempt to grasp, as broadly as possible, the impact of time on deliberative reasoning, but 
strictly in its relation to contemporary politics. In this sense, I am adding time perceptions as 
a category of explanatory power to the historian’s toolkit, not switching-out others, such as 
religious or material explanations for political action. I am arguing for the relevancy – not the 
primacy – of time. But I am also arguing that other explanatory categories may have 
possessed a significant time dimension. The conceptualisations of crisis were interactive: 
political, fiscal, social, imperial crises conditioned new perceptions of time just as these new 
perceptions informed the responses to these crises.  
This thesis contends that ruptures in the ways in which time and history were 
experienced undermined the political legitimacy of constituted authority and repeatedly 
frustrated its re-assemblage. The chronological construction is fungible. Whilst chapters 
proceed in a broadly historical sequence, from colonial America and ancien regime France to 
the period of the Washington Presidency and the Napoleonic Empire, the venues of historical 
analysis leap backwards and forwards in time, alighting upon conceptual, not 
contemporaneous, intersections. Chapter 1 contextualises the experience of time culturally 
and intellectually in colonial America and the court society of pre-revolutionary France, 
situating “monotony” or “ennui” as constitutive elements of a pre-modern temporal regime.76 
This chapter explains how the time temperament of the French ancien regime inhibited the 
crown from confronting the twin crises of political authority and financial indebtedness, 
creating an atmosphere in which they could acquire historic, and ultimately revolutionary, 
proportions.  
                                                
76 Boredom has often been seen as a modern phenomenon, see: Barbara Dalle Pezze, Carlo Salzani, ‘The Delicate 
Monster: Modernity and Boredom,’ and Isis I. Leslie, ‘From Idleness to Boredom: On the Historical Development 
of Modern Boredom,’ in Barbara Dalle Pezze, Carlo Salzani, ed., Essays on Boredom and Modernity (Amsterdam, 
Rodopi, 2009), pp.5-34, 35-60; Véronique Léonard-Roques, Versailles dans la littérature mémoire et imaginaire 
aux XIXe et XXe siècles (Clermont-Ferrand, Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, 2005), pp.149-50. 
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Chapter 2 enters the revolutionary period by demonstrating how novel temporal and 
historical experiences undermined pre-existing deliberative processes. It juxtaposes two 
periods: the convocation of the Continental Congress, from the Boston Tea Party in 1773 to 
the Declaration of Independence in 1776, and the transformation of the Estates-General in the 
National Assembly from the fall of the Bastille in July, 1789, to the removal of the royal 
family from Versailles in October.77 These episodes illustrate how the initial course of these 
revolutions was determined by the way in which the perceived time pressures operating upon 
the delegates and deputies to these bodies were invested with immense historical magnitude. 
Beyond that, this chapter argues that the relative radicalisations of the American and French 
Revolutions may be attributed to contemporary perceptions of the historicities of the pre-
revolutionary regimes: whereas the supposed newness of the American Republic, the 
lightness of its historical pedigree, enabled – at least in the immediate term – an 
uncomplicated acceleration of historical and political development, French Revolutionaries 
repeatedly reached for more extreme solutions to lifting the “drag-weight” of French history 
that was supposed to be inhibiting revolutionary completion.   
Chapter 3 challenges the long-established notion that the idea of the modern 
revolution reconfigured the architecture of time by affecting a shift from cyclicality to 
linearity. In fact, the impact of revolution rendered the shape of history hopelessly malleable. 
During this transitional period, Newtonian assumptions concerning the homogeneity, 
universality, uniformity, and ultimately the linearity of time were relentlessly undermined.78 
Contemporary discussions of historically significant issues – the construction of constitutions, 
the eradication of debt, the efficacy of constituent power, even the printing of paper money – 
became enmeshed in the resulting temporal disarray. This chapter spans the years delineated 
by the Articles of Confederation and pre-Thermidorean France, roughly 1783-1787 and 1791-
1794, and both are characterised as periods of imaginative experimentation with the new 
fluidity of temporal and historical experience – from literary engagements with time travel, 
and the prevalence of liquid metaphors in temporal discourse, to the political resonance of 
popular impatience. Ultimately, it was an inability to “control” historical time that 
undermined the stable exercise of revolutionary power. 
                                                
77 Calvin Jillson, Rick K. Wilson, Congressional Dynamics: Structure, Coordination and Choice in the First 
American Congress, 1774-1789 (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 1994); Neil Longley York, ‘The First 
Continental Congress and the Problem of American Rights,’ Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 
122 (1998), pp.353-83. 
78 Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins University, 
1957), pp.159-89; Donald J. Wilcox, The Measure of Times Past: Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and the Rhetoric 
of Relative Time (Chicago, IL., University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp.251-58; reflections on temporal change are 
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in Beethoven’s Music (London, Gordon and Breach, 1982), pp.16-19; and: Karol Berger, ‘Time’s Arrow and the 
Advent of Musical Modernity,’ in Karol Berger, Anthony Newcomb, eds., Music and the Aesthetics of Modernity: 
Essays (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 2005), p.3-22; Benedict Taylor, Mendelssohn, Time and 
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 Stability is restored in chapter 4 with the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and the 
coup of Brumaire in 1799, both of which are framed as quasi-legal efforts to de-temporalise 
the practice of political legitimacy. The desire to “end the Revolution,” a theme that 
permeates the pronouncements of the protagonists, is depicted as an intervention into political 
time, as a desire to make revolutionary temporality – and the construction of the future – 
governable. During the period prior to these interventions, which begin with the conclusion of 
the Revolutionary War and the end of the Terror, the “temporalisation of history” that 
Koselleck believed was productive of a perceived historical acceleration, actually resulted in 
a sensation akin to a continuous historical happening.79 Progress towards political stability 
appeared to stall as American and French society, confronted by constitutional breakdown, 
rural uprisings and economic disintegration, produced an overwhelming sense of contingency 
and anxiety that appeared, at every moment, to forebode sudden, unseen annihilation. This 
chapter locates these perceptions as factors that motivated, and were later used to legitimise, 
both the Convention and the coup. 
Chapter 5 concludes with a comparative account of the political and intellectual 
strategies devised during the post-revolutionary period, under the presidency of George 
Washington and the Napoleonic Empire. Such juxta-positioning has been almost entirely 
unexplored. Whilst certain “parallels” have been uncovered by Matthew Flynn and Stephen 
Griffin, this thesis does not seek to investigate how a dual biography might “serve to 
humanise both figures” – how, for example, this comparison attenuates the historiographical 
“acclaim” that surrounds Washington, whilst offering Napoleon a “reprieve.”80 Instead, it 
seeks to demonstrate how similarities in the experience of the revolutionary rupture of time 
contributed to similar processes of post-revolutionary temporal reconstruction. I conclude that 
Washington and Napoleon devised a series of similar political and rhetorical practices that 
helped establish a common “meantime,” during which the accelerative, saturated time of 
political life could be readjusted to the tempo at which newly conceived political institutions 
accumulated their own legitimising history. This, in turn, brought both time and history back 
into an experiential and dynamic correspondence: whilst it lessened the ceaseless sense of 
rupture common to revolutionary politics, and enabled the exercise of “legitimate” power, it 
also underscored the modern interdependence of political legitimacy and historical 
                                                
79 Koselleck, ‘Historical Time and Social History,’ in Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing 
History, Spacing Concepts (trans. Todd Samuel Presner, et al), (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 2002) 
p.115-30; this sense of historical happening is similar to Hartmut Rosa’s term “frenetic standstill,” which he 
borrows from Paul Virilio – “interie polaire,” see: Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity 
(trans. Jonathan Trejo-Mathys), (New York, NY., Columbia University Press, 2015), pp.15, 89, 93. This 
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80 The only modern parallel of Washington and Napoleon is, Matthew J. Flynn, Stephen E. Griffin, Washington 
and Napoleon: Leadership in the Age of Revolution (Washington DC., Potomac Books, 2012), here: p.181, see: 
pp.193-98. 
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temporality. The thesis then draws to a dual conclusion, in both 1803 with the Louisiana 
Purchase, and in 1813-14 as the Napoleonic Empire disintegrated. 
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1: The Pre-Revolutionary Time Temperament, 1774-1789 
 
“Not in the last ten centuries,” observed the Parisian lawyer, Adrien-Joseph Colson, in the 
mid-winter of 1789, “has there been such a crisis that, before the end of the year, will either 
take France to the summit of power and grandeur, or reduce her to utter calamity and 
destruction.”81 When Louis XVI reluctantly convened the Estates-General in January 1789, he 
scarcely displayed the same sense of historical hyperconsciousness that so troubled Colson: in 
fact, when the Third Estate, on 17 June, announced its sovereign metamorphoses into the 
National Assembly, the king went hunting.82 This chapter illustrates how pre-revolutionary 
perceptions of historical time incapacitated the French ancien regime in the face of mounting 
political and fiscal crises, and how these crises acquired historic proportions when they began 
to threaten the continued existence of regal legitimacy and authority.83  
The French crown was afflicted by a habit of “temporisation,” an inability – which 
emerged from its own peculiar temporal and historical consciousness – to meet unfamiliar or 
unforeseen emergencies with timely responses. The material environment and intellectual 
atmosphere of the Versailles court and the Parisian salon conditioned this consciousness.84 
The temporality of the regime was premised upon an extreme form of continuity derived from 
the ceaseless reiteration of tradition, suffusing the late ancien regime with an overwhelming 
sense of ennui, or boredom. The events of the pre-revolutionary period, starting with the onset 
                                                
81 Adrien-Joseph Colson (17 February, 1789), Chantal Plantier-Sanson, ed., in Lettres d’un bourgeois de Paris à 
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(Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 2014), pp.53-71; Ambrogio A. Caiani, Louis XVI and the French 
Revolution, 1789-1792 (Cambridge, CUP, 2012), pp.1-26; a neat introduction to the Estates-General may be found 
in, Alison Johnson, Louis XVI and the French Revolution (Jefferson, NC., McFarland & Company, 2013), p.55-65. 
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Ralph Kingston, Bureaucrats and Bourgeois Society: Office Politics and Individual Credit in France, 1798-1848 
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of the American Revolutionary War in 1776 and the presence of Benjamin Franklin at 
Versailles, demonstrate how novel experiences of urgency undermined the traditional 
functionality of the state, in particular the treasury and court society. As historical events 
appeared to undergo a process of temporalisation, the legitimacy of the French monarchy, 
steeped in the static, unchanging historicity of Bourbon kingship, shed its authority. Failure to 
resolve the pre-revolutionary crisis is attributable to the temporal and historical consciousness 
of the French ancien regime itself; indeed, this consciousness contributed to the 
temporalisation of historical experience that is characteristic of revolution. 
 
I. Franklin at Versailles 
 
On 21 March 1778, the New World was introduced to the Old. Upon the marble courtyard of 
the palace of Versailles stepped Benjamin Franklin, ambassador of the twenty-month-old 
United States of America. Charged with forging an alliance with France against a mutual 
enemy, England, Franklin created an immediate sensation. Appearing at court “in the dress of 
an American farmer,” remarked Mme de Campan, the queen’s lady-in-waiting, Franklin’s 
“lank, unpowdered hair, his round hat, his brown cloth coat, all contrasted with the sequined, 
embroidered garments, the powdered and perfumed coiffures of the courtiers of Versailles.”85 
The marquise de Créquy marvelled at his morose table manners: Franklin would eat 
asparagus with his fingers – “in a savage way” – and regularly confected a “ragoût 
philadelphique,” which comprised several fresh eggs, butter, salt, pepper and mustard, all 
blitzed in his wine goblet, which he gleefully consumed “with a teaspoon.”86 His presence at 
Versailles, where he became a fixed feature of court society, offered a visual juxtaposition of 
the natural and naïve virtues of America and the perceived artificiality and decrepitude of 
French aristocracy. In fact, Franklin seemed to incarnate an entirely different temporality. The 
rusticity of his appearance and the popular philosophical fascination for American 
agrarianism combined in his public persona, confirming a widely held belief that his fellow 
Americans, despite their contemporaneity, lived in a time apart.87 “These people,” observed 
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the abbé Robin, “are still in the happy age where the distinctions of birth and rank are 
ignored.”88 Franklin had not merely arrived from a different country, but a different place in 
history. His homespun charms and white marten fur cap – a reminiscence of Rousseau, or was 
it a symbol of American liberty, mused the salonnière Mme du Deffand – evoked a youthful 
vigour seemingly absent amongst the decaying and increasingly purposeless routines of court 
society [Fig.1.].   
Fortunately for Franklin, it was the very vices of the ancien regime that helped soften 
sympathies for the American cause. In the wake of the Seven Years’ War, a conflict largely 
waged in the British colonies, France had come to understand its humiliation as part of 
process of historical degradation.89 In revised editions of his Histoire des Deux Indes (1770-
1820), Guillaume-Thomas-François, l’abbé Raynal, who had once subscribed to the 
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climatological interpretations of the western hemisphere as a site of “degeneration,” now 
framed defeat as part of a trajectory of French degeneracy, one initiated by the wasteful 
“imbecility” of Louis XIV.90 In America, French observers did not merely find the trace 
essence of virtue and political simplicity; they began finding refractions of their own creeping 
civic decrepitude.91 The prospect of American Independence therefore offered the opportunity 
for both vengeance and regeneration, though some, like the former Controller-General 
Turgot, counselled caution, citing the probable consequences of financing a further war. The 
duc de Croÿ later recorded a conversation with Franklin, in which the American ambassador 
explained with amazement how the colonies, “established less than a hundred years ago, had 
already reached the height of science, power and commerce.” To which Croÿ added: “how 
little time is necessary to form a great empire when it is founded by great and learned men!”92 
The clear implication was that if France was ready to harness a modicum of American vigour 
then it too might witness a similarly rapid renovation.93 The mission nevertheless remained 
immense: Franklin was charged with calling upon all the energies of the ancien regime to 
enable the birth of a new order.  
Matters were hindered by the extreme lack of urgency that radiated from Versailles. 
Franklin was understandably impatient and conceived of his urgency in historical terms. At 
the outbreak of the American Revolution, he had depicted the continued oppression of the 
colonies under the British as a source of creeping decrepitude: This “old rotten State” mired 
in “extream Corruption,” Franklin wrote, threw into relief “the glorious Virtue so 
predominant in our rising Country.” He prophesised that “more Mischief than Benefit” would 
result if a rupture was not rapidly realised: “I fear They will drag us after them in all the 
plundering Wars their desperate Circumstance, Injustice and Rapacity, may prompt them to 
undertake.”94 Ensuring the material support of the French monarchy was therefore vital to 
securing the innocence and virtue of the American colonies. In a secret memorandum sent to 
                                                
90 Raynal retracted his “degeneration” thesis after the 1781 edition of his Histoire; for the impact of Raynal’s work 
upon the French Revolution, see: Anatole Feugère, Un précurseur de la Révolution; l’abbé Raynal, 1713-1796 
(Geneva, Slatkine Reprints, 1970). Raynal’s ideas on time and the American Revolution are discussed below. 
91 As Echeverria observes, French visions of American concerned their own “domestic preoccupations” and 
frustrations with “an antiquated and inefficient social and political order”: Mirage, p.71, 78; it was precisely to 
these concerns that Franklin spoke, dismissing American colleagues who sought to ensure French assistance with 
the prize of commercial gain: “Trade is not the admiration of their noblesse,” observed Franklin, “who always 
govern here” – and who, consequently, were more interested by their (imperilled) civilizational and historical 
prestige: Ellen R. Cohn, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (40 vols., New Haven, CT., Yale University Press, 
1978), XXXVI, p.645. 
92 Emmanuel de Croÿ-Solre, Journal inédit du duc de Croÿ (4 vols., Paris, Flammarion, 1906-21), III, p.301: “ce 
pays et cette colonie, établie il n’y avait pas cent ans…fût déjà parvenue à ce comble de science, de force et de 
commerce et on voit, par là, combien il faut peu de temps pour former un grand Empire, quand le début a de 
grands hommes instruits.” 
93 John Shovlin, The Political Economy of Virtue: Luxury, Patriotism and the Origins of the French Revolution 
(Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press, 2011), pp.80-117; for Franklin’s interactions with physiocratic thought, 
see: Alfred Owen Aldridge, Franklin and His French Contemporaries (New York, NY., 1957), pp.23-30. 
94 Benjamin Franklin to Joseph Galloway (25 February, 1775), in William B. Willcox, ed., The Papers of 
Benjamin Franklin, XXI, pp.508-9; Drew McCoy, ‘Benjamin Franklin’s Vision of a Republican Political 
Economy for America,’ The William and Mary Quarterly 35 (3, 1978), pp.605-628. 
  
32 
the Congressional Committee of Foreign Affairs in May 1777, Franklin characterised the 
matter as a race against time. “Every day’s experience confirms us, what is indeed pointed out 
by nature itself, of rendering America independent in every sense of the word.” Swift success 
in the War of Independence, he contested, would provide the necessary escape velocity for 
the republic: “The present glorious tho’ trying contest, will do more to render this 
independence fixed and certain, if circumstances are favourably improved, than would 
otherwise have been effected in an age.”95 It was only through a man-made acceleration of the 
revolutionary effort, achieved in the white heat of war, that the colonies could escape the 
corrupting orbit of British despotism, “breaking one link of the chains which have heretofore 
bound the two world together.” 
His purposes were impeded, however, by the ponderousness of ancien regime 
decision-making processes. When Franklin first appeared at Versailles, he had already been in 
France for two years and still failed to achieve recognition of the fledgling United States. In 
his appeals to the French foreign minister, the comte de Vergennes, Franklin redeployed 
many of the temporal tropes he had rehearsed in his secret memorandum, stressing that, in the 
rapidly abbreviating schema of events unfolding in the colonies, the opportunity for France to 
revenge itself upon the British, and to address the haunting sense of decline detailed by 
Raynal, would soon dissolve. “[I]f the English are suffer’d once to recover that Country, such 
an Opportunity of effectual Separation as the present, may not occur again in the Course of 
Ages…” “I am grown old,” Franklin complained, under the “delay” of royal deliberation.96 
Whilst he may certainly have been growing old, some wondered whether Franklin 
was also growing indolent. In late 1777 Congress replaced Silas Deane with John Adams as 
envoy to France. Irked by the stifling snobbery of Versailles, and increasingly impatient with 
the progress of negotiations, Adams was also staggered to find Franklin luxuriating in all the 
old world charms of court society. At Passy, Franklin lavishly decorated his drawing rooms 
and boudoirs with rococo furniture and enthusiastically embraced the gossip-mongers of the 
Parisian salons. Whilst the “Uncandor, the Prejudices, the Rage, among several Persons here, 
make me Sick as Death,” Adams confined in his diary, it was Franklin’s “Love of Ease” and 
leisurely diplomacy that was liable to “prevent any thorough Reformation of any Thing.” 
Exposure to the court of Versailles, he concluded, had led to Franklin’s “Dissipation,” 
robbing him of any sense of urgency.97 This perhaps overlooked the fact that his entire public 
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image was a fabrication. “Figure me in your mind,” Franklin wrote to a friend, “very plainly 
dress’d, wearing my thin grey straight Hair, that peeps out under my only Coiffure, a fine Fur 
Cap…Think how this must appear among the Powder’d Heads of Paris.”98 “It is a common 
observation here,” remarked Franklin, “that our cause is the cause of all mankind, and that we 
are fighting for their liberty in defending our own.”99 It was a consequence of Franklin’s 
carefully contrived public appearance that American “liberty” became a category of historical 
regeneration, one capable of reinvigorating (or demolishing) decaying institutions.100 When 
the French “spoke of him,” Adams observed, “they seemed to think he was to restore the 
golden age.”101  
The idea that the “savage” Franklin had gone native at court was plainly nonsense – 
he remained indisputably dedicated to the task, even if his methods sometimes pandered to 
the languid pace of ancien regime politics. Like Adams, Franklin was aware that their cause 
was running out of time. Without material or diplomatic assistance from the French, the rebel 
colonies would be forced to face the welter of the British empire alone. In the spring of 1778, 
the temporal urgency stressed by the American delegation and the historical perceptions of 
the French aristocracy combined to precipitate an alliance. Responding to a British suggestion 
“that times may mend” the natural affinity of the colonies and the crown, Franklin expressed 
incredulity: “when your nation is hiring all the cut-throats it can collect, of all countries and 
colours to destroy us, it is hard to persuade us not to ask or accept aid from any power that 
may be prevailed with to grant it; and this only from the hope, that though you now thirst for 
our blood, and pursue us with fire and sword, you may in some future time treat us kindly.” 
“This,” he robustly concluded, “is too much patience to be expected of us.”102 The demands 
that Franklin and Adams made therefore came to exert novel financial and temporal pressure 
upon the unhurried political culture of the late ancien regime.103  
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II. Etiquette and ennui  
 
The sensation that surrounded Franklin was partly the product of boredom. “Everybody is 
bored,” wrote Mme du Deffand in 1771, informing her doting correspondent, Horace 
Walpole, that it was “this hateful ennui which haunts each one of us and which we all wish to 
avoid.”104 Deffand herself suffered from a particularly pernicious form of boredom, which 
induced insomnia and melancholia, often reducing her to a bedridden state of compulsive 
letter writing. Whilst her experience of ennui was a private trauma, boredom had become all 
but institutionalised at Versailles. In the very same year, the sixteen-year old dauphine of 
France sent a letter to her sister, Marie-Christine, complaining of her excruciatingly 
uneventful existence at court. “Our life here is truly monotonous.”105 The luxurious self-
indulgence that would later come to consume Marie-Antoinette was symptomatic of her 
desire for distraction.106 Removing herself to the hameau of the Petit Trianon provided 
temporary exile, but evading ennui entirely was impossible since its organising principle was 
underpinned by the regulation and routine of court etiquette.107 Ennui was thus the evocation 
of a peculiar perception of time: it was an inevitable emotional response to the predictable, 
foreseeable, and interminable experience of daily life under the ancien regime.  
Although royal etiquette had been largely established during the reign of Louis XIV, 
the intervening century had occasioned few alterations in the ceaseless regularity of court 
procedure and protocol. Louis XVI still observed the lever and coucher; he still dined 
publicly – and with traditional Bourbon gusto – at the grand couvert. Every minute of every 
hour of every day remained minutely pre-prepared. Nothing was unpredicted because nothing 
was permitted to change. Proximity to the monarchy, like the movement of the monarch 
himself, was governed by temporal as much as spatial imperatives.108 Court ritual was 
premised upon both a quotidian and a more profound, ahistorical iteration. “Etiquette still 
existed at court with all the forms it had acquired under Louis XIV,” recalled Mme de 
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Campan – although, during the reign of Louis XVI, it was gradually robbed of its “dignity” 
and “gaiety.” The continuities of court etiquette therefore prevented the possible divergence 
of past and future, reducing the passage of time to both a structural and historical 
insignificance.109 The experience of historical time at Versailles, which was anchored to 
social, cultural and institutional units of action that derived meaning and authority from the 
routines of etiquette, eternalised the processes of the present. Unlike state ceremonials, such 
as the coronation or lit de justice, in which the monarch emulated the traditional authority of 
his ancestors and thereby situated himself within the arc of regal history, court etiquette 
suspended history. Louis XIV had stymied the post-mortem power of his predecessors by 
shifting temporal focus onto the charismatic comportment and daily movements of his royal 
person.110 King and courtier remained nominally bound to these rhythms of daily experience 
because the time structures they implied continued to confirm the “prestige-character” 
associated with the dispensation of sinecures and the distribution of power.  
A consequence of this temporal micromanagement was ennui, which gradually 
assailed the late ancien regime. As the abbé de Véri noted in 1774, “kings are more 
susceptible to ennui than other men and the etiquette of every minute is in part the cause.”111 
In consequence, observed de Campan, Versailles was no longer “the place at which to seek 
for assemblies where French spirit and grace were displayed. The focus of wit and wisdom 
was Paris.”112 The nobility gradually decamped to the capital under the burdens of boredom, 
only to grudgingly return for occasional festivities. “We only went [there],” remarked the 
comtesse de Genlis, “complaining and moaning, repeating that there was nothing as boring as 
Versailles and the court.’”113 It was to boredom that Adams attributed the lackadaisical 
progress of Franco-American diplomacy. On 28 March, 1778, he jotted in his diary how 
“nothing could be more tedious to me than this idle Life,” in which a “Love of Ease” trumped 
the urgency of action. “I had not yet learned the French Word, Ennui, but I felt enough of 
it.”114  
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The perception of historical time in colonial America was also conditioned by the 
sensation of tedium.115 Prior to the Revolution, observed Thomas Jefferson, “the quiet & 
monotonous course of colonial life had been disturbed by no alarm.”116 History proceeded at 
an uneventful pace, obviating political innovation. Like the link between court etiquette and 
the culture of ennui, colonial monotony was the experiential corollary of “habit.”117 The 
political “difficulties,” Jefferson surmised, which eventually produced a revolutionary 
confrontation between the colonies and “our representatives,” were derived from “habit and 
despair,” not “reflection and conviction.” In his Autobiography, he recalled how, in 1769, the 
colonial mind was still “circumscribed within narrow limits,” confining political imagination 
to “an habitual belief that it was our duty to be subordinate to the mother country in all 
matters of government…”118 In the Virginia House of Burgesses, for example, the “dull 
monotony of colonial subservience” was reinforced by the “negative” that the King’s Council 
held over all colonial deliberations. For Jefferson, the matter was also indissoluble from 
another established form of authority: slavery.119 Colonial subjects had been “nursed and 
educated in the daily habit of seeing the degraded condition, both bodily & mental, of those 
unfortunate beings, not reflecting that that degradation was very much the work of themselves 
& their fathers.” The “monotony” that permeated colonial life was therefore sustained by 
extreme hierarchies of power. The dynamics of time and history were locked in place by the 
“daily habit” of observing the operations of slavery, an institution perpetuated by “the work” 
of multiple generations that bound the experiences of contemporaries to those of their 
predecessors, to “themselves & their fathers.” This endless iterability of historical experience 
inhibited the political imagination since, without the possibility of disruption, there could 
emerge “little reflection on the value of liberty,” either for enslaved blacks or indentured 
white colonists. Before the Revolution, America seemed unhindered by history: “disturbed by 
no alarm” and governed exclusively by “habit,” the temporality of colonial life was “quiet” 
because it seemed to stretch across such a “monotonous,” featureless expanse of history.120 
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At Versailles, the permanence of regal spectacle and the endlessness of court 
ceremony had created a similar elongation in the experience of time.121 During the reign of 
Louis XIV, this had served to stress the interminability of monarchical gloire. In L’Apollon 
François (1684), Antoine Bauderon de Sénecé depicted royal authority as existing beyond the 
bounds of time and history. The king “is infinite in time, since his renown as well as his 
empire will equal the duration of centuries.”122 Past and future were subsumed within the 
person of the king who, in turn, erected a complimentary cultural apparatus – the court – that 
operated within a static, unchanging present. This was the essence of Absolutist temporality. 
The affairs of state, the orchestration of war, and the signing of treaties were all restricted to 
the sole participation of the sovereign protagonist, which naturally mitigated political 
unpredictability and thus stabilised the structure of history.123 The Roi-Soleil, like the body at 
the centre of the solar system, radiated authority and fixed the orbit of his courtiers by 
adhering to a cyclical, celestial, predictable temporal regime. The perception of permanency 
created by the Absolutist state was further underpinned by the diurnal predictability of court 
routine.124 “With an almanac and a watch,” remarked the duc de Saint-Simon, “one could tell, 
three hundred leagues away, what [the king] was doing.”125  
The early-modern French court, rigidified by etiquette, the pursuit of privilege and 
the temporal infinitude of monarchical authority, therefore ensured “the guaranteed futurity of 
the past.”126 For Louis XIV, the brilliancy and legitimacy of power was sustained by this 
ahistoricity – even the ravages of old age were effaced, as in Hyacinth Rigaud’s time-turning 
portrait of the sexagenarian king: witness the lithe, ballet-ready legs (which concealed royal 
infirmity), the luscious locks (despite the absence of a single hair on the king’s head), and the 
plump, proud lips (hiding a toothless, sunken mouth).127 Under his successors, a sensual court 
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Louis XIV. La Fronde, Le Roi, Colbert (Paris, Hachette, 1905), VII, p.124. 
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aesthetic constructed for the idle passing of time had become a crushingly tedious routine of 
repetitive and increasingly meaningless gestures and customs.128 Yet those routines persisted. 
By the time Louis XVI ascended the throne, this system was not merely archaic – it was 
palpably anachronistic.129 The passage of merely a few years of revolutionary history seemed 
to situate his reign at an historical distance of centuries. The customs of the “ancient court,” 
recalled the comte d’Hézecques in 1804, had been swept aside “under the scythe of time,” 
and seemed “already to be of the Middle Ages.”130 
 
 
III. The clockwork court 
 
During the reign of Louis XVI, in the salon de Mercure, the official bedchamber of the king, 
there sat a clock. Encased within a glass-panelled rosewood box, the mechanism, decorated 
with chiselled bronze ornaments and installed in 1706, was more than a mere timekeeper: it 
was a baroque objet du pouvoir [Fig.2]. On the hour, the clock would clink into function. 
Above the face, gilded cockerels “crowed and flapped their wings,” a miniaturised Louis XIV 
“emerged from a temple, and Fame, in a cloud, came and crowned the monarch to the sound 
                                                
society,” but now her existence was a source of “fearful emptiness, an anxiety, a lassitude…”: Nancy Mitford, The 
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of a chime.”131 The king, situated literally above the passage of time, was the master of the 
mechanism. Under Louis XIV, the court, like the clock itself, operated according to his 
personal authority. He was, as Saint-Simon remarked, “la mécanique” – both engineer and 
inventor of the imposing machine. As such, the temporal consciousness of every courtier 
ticked in time with his every movement.132 The ceremonial durations of dressing, feasting, 
waking and even sleeping that surrounded the monarch were timed meticulously. Louis XIV 
was the mobilizing force at the centre of the entire mechanism and, by implication, the entire 
disciplinary apparatus of his kingdom.133 The rhythms of court routine therefore became 
simulacra of the royal control over time. Every morning, during the ceremony of the lever, a 
valet de chambre would publicly wind-up the royal watch, before placing it back into the 
pocket of the king.134 It was a symbolic reminder that the events of the forthcoming day were, 
like those of yesterday and tomorrow, foreordained and regulated by the chronometric power 
of the monarch.  
As Norbert Elias has observed, during the final decades of the ancien regime the 
court became, “a ghostly perpetuum mobile that continued to operate regardless of any direct 
use-value, being impelled, as by an inexhaustible motor, by the competition for status and 
power of the people enmeshed in it.” Privilege and preferment remained central indices for 
the French nobility, and they “submitted to them, even while criticising them, because they 
accorded with tradition.” During his declining years, Louis XIV, aged and infirm, gradually 
released his grip on the court; yet whilst he had “to a certain extent shaped and controlled the 
court tradition,” under the last Bourbon kings “the tradition controlled the people, none of 
whom was in a position to transform or develop it in keeping with the changes that were 
slowly taking place in French society.”135 Whilst ennui became epidemic during the late 
eighteenth-century, the temporal experience of court society had not always been beyond 
monarchical manipulation. According to André Félibien, court historian to Louis XIV, it was 
the éclat of the monarch that enabled him to regulate the speed of time. “[A]s only the king 
can assemble great armies in such little time and conquer with the rapidity that we have seen, 
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[…] it is also this great prince who can, with similar promptitude, gather together so many 
musicians, dancers and instrument players…”136 Regal spectacle, in contrast to court 
ceremony, developed a celebratory velocity that created “surprise” and “admiration” amongst 
an otherwise bored nobility. The occasional reorganisation of time, experienced here as an 
instantaneous exposition of Absolutist authority, further reinforced the stratification of power 
at Versailles. The temperamental timidity of Louis XVI, however, meant that the delicate, 
mechanistic equilibrium of noble privileges, court etiquette and royal governance was 
allowed to ossify. The machine had come to control the mechanic. 
Within the clockwork confines of the court, individuals were already reduced to mere 
mechanisms. Courtiers became the components of a much larger apparatus of privilege-
dispensation, dedicating themselves to a single analogue task: self-advancement. As they 
encircled the mainspring monarch, they were obliged, in return for their proximity, to offer 
their fealty. The regularity with which this process proceeded enabled the historian Jacob-
Nicolas Moreau to ridicule the French nobility as “mute automatons.” In 1775, he warned the 
recently crowned king that, 
 
at your lever, inside your palace, and on those frequent occasions where so many of 
those who only present themselves before you…seeking with such attention to spy 
upon your slightest movement, and to read in your eyes their interests, their hopes, 
and even their duties, yes, sire, it is amidst this insidious crowd that you will, 
unfortunately, be under constant siege…137 
 
Whilst his purpose was to counsel the king against undue influence, Moreau had implicitly 
contained Louis within the conceptual categorisation of the court machine. By citing the 
attention awarded to the “slightest movement” of every royal gesture – from the flickering of 
his eyes, to the dressing of his person, – Moreau presented a king who operated, like his 
courtiers, according to automatic impulses. The parallel, however, had not been chosen at 
random. During the previous decades, the courts of Europe had surveyed a parade of man-
machines, of automata – mechanical devices that mimicked human and animal behaviour 
according to pre-set clockwork codes and components.138 Mechanisms such as the Flute 
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Player and Defecating Duck, presented to the Académie des Sciences by Jacques Vaucanson 
in 1738, were soon displayed for the amusement of the nobility.139 The exhibition of these 
automata, however, remained largely restricted to royal palaces. Even public demonstrations, 
such as those of the watchmaker Pierre Jaquet-Droz in Paris in 1775, charged such exorbitant 
admission fees that they became exclusive, elitist events. The closed world of the court and 
the environment in which the automaton operated became increasingly synonymous. In fact, 
as the courtiers gazed upon these mechanical marvels, many observers wondered whether the 
two were interchangeable.140 
This perception was made tangible by exposure to court etiquette. The comtesse de 
Noailles, lady of honour to Marie-Antoinette, was mockingly renamed ‘Madame Etiquette’ 
on account of her fastidious attention to royal routine. In her journal, the princess de Lamballe 
compared the comtesse to an automaton, marvelling at the predictability and measurability of 
her every movement: 
 
Her motions were regulated like clockwork. So methodical was she in all her 
operations of mind and body, that from the beginning of the year to its end, she never 
deviated a moment. Every hour has its peculiar occupation. Her element was 
etiquette, […] she had her rules even for the width of petticoats, that the queens and 
princesses might have no temptation to straddle over a rivulet, or crossing, of unroyal 
size.141 
 
The parameters of acceptable behaviour, which she observed meticulously, confined the 
comtesse de Noailles to a temporality that was as unchanging on a daily basis as it was from 
one year to the next. This refusal to deviate from prefigured routines rendered the idea of 
progress or change unintelligible. If “every hour” possessed prescribed procedures of action 
already informed by the procedures of previous hours, then the time horizon of the court was 
infinite. Etiquette was therefore premised upon non-finality, which naturally accorded with 
clockwork because it too proceeded ceaselessly. The internal periodization of this experiential 
space reproduced itself automatically.142 Court society moved forward from event to event 
through time not history, insofar as horary, diurnal and annual experiences were collapsed 
into a single, contiguous, undifferentiated category. The experiential temporality of the 
Versailles court was thus empty, or timeless. Of course, once these routines had been 
established the figurations of tradition could not be broken, since, as Moreau noticed, their 
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automatic observance satisfied the ambitions of prestige-hungry courtiers.143 In other words, 
the clock could not be dismantled – and the ancien regime could not be reformed – without 
also smashing the mechanism.  
Stifled by her rigid supervision, Marie-Antoinette soon dismissed the comtesse. The 
young, fancy-free queen, however, had already acquired the air of an automaton.144 In 1785, 
the comparison was reinforced by the appearance at court of a two-foot tall, dulcimer-playing 
girl. The machine, devised by the artisans Peter Kintzing and David Roentgen, sat before a 
wooden sounding-board and, when wound, would strike the metal strings with small 
hammers, producing several preprogrammed tunes. When contemporaries detailed their 
observations of automata, they, like Moreau, also recorded with special care the moments of 
anthropological accuracy. According to the records of François Lassone, médecin to the 
queen, the dulcimer player exhibited “movements of the head and a varied expression in her 
eyes and gaze, which are very pleasant and a surprising illusion.”145 Of course, once the first 
moments of surprise faded, the gestures quickly became repetitive; and however miraculous 
its intricate movements, the repertoire of the automaton could exhibit nothing unforeseen, 
unpredictable or accidental. Its future actions were indistinguishable from those already 
undertaken. Dressed in pearl and embroidered lace, the coiffured machine bore remarkable 
resemblance to the queen, for whom it was created. Marie-Antoinette, however, seemed to 
share both visual and kinematic similarity with the music-making android. Her movements 
appeared mechanical; even those designed to mimic natural, human sentiments – such as 
anticipation or surprise – often seemed contrived, insincere, or laced with boredom. In 1778, 
John Adams had observed Marie-Antoinette during the grand couvert. As he gazed upon “the 
magnificent Spectacle of a great Queen swallowing her Royal Supper in a single Spoonful,” 
Adams was struck by her automatism: “This was all performed like perfect Clockwork, not a 
feature of her face, nor a Motion of any part of her Person, especially her Arm and her hand 
could be criticised as out of order.”146 Though she reviled the cloying necessities of etiquette, 
Marie-Antoinette was also hostage to them: within the context of Versailles, she too became 
another gear in the great machine, apparently devoid of personal volition, trapped by the rigid 
temporal regime of the court.  
Beyond Versailles, the ancien regime was populated by human-automata. At her 
salon, Mme du Deffand found herself surrounded by individuals resembling “spring-wound 
                                                
143 Elias, The Court Society, p.95-6. 
144 On Marie-Antoinette and contemporary scientific and pseudo-scientific discoveries, see: Charles Coulston 
Gillespie, Science and Polity in France: The End of the Old Regime (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 
1980), p.247, 275; and on female automatons, see: Julie Wosk, My Fair Ladies: Female Robots, Androids, and 
Other Artificial Eves (New Brunswick, Rutger University Press, 2015), pp.31-54. 
145 Cited in Adelheid Voskuhl, Androids in the Enlightenment: Mechanics, Artisans, and Cultures of the Self 
(Chiacgo, IL., University of Chicago Press, 2013), p.119. 
146 Adams, Diary, IV, p.133. 
  
43 
machines [machines à ressort], who went, came, spoke, laughed, all without thinking, without 
reflecting, without feeling.” Whilst outwardly similar to other humans, the inhabitants of 
polite society seemed to operate according to internal, hidden devices, which, like the 
dulcimer player, denied them the capacity for spontaneous thought, action or sentiment. 
“[E]ach played their role out of habit.”147 After all, there was no need for an alteration in the 
patterns or performance of sociability because, beyond the content of court gossip, nothing 
ever changed. Since salon conversation still largely depended upon the rumour mill 
emanating from Versailles, the salonnières also rotated around court rituals. And when news 
was not forthcoming, ennui radiated outwards like concentric waves from the centre of 
French society. In 1766, Horace Walpole was left benumbed by his experience of the Parisian 
salon. “I that am used to the rapidity of events in London,” he wrote, “am astonished at the 
dearth of Paris.” “They have no occurrencies but deaths and marriages and promotions, no 
revolutions, no separations, no horse races, nothing that constitutes history.” And yet the 
chatter continued regardless, eking out every last minute of potential news or gossip: “they 
lived nine or ten weeks upon the Dauphin’s death.”148  
Although the comte d’Artois would later introduce the French to horse-racing (in a 
bid to subvert his own boredom), the social pursuits of the ancien regime were easily 
condemned as mere distraction, as a “puerile and destructive luxury.” A fact that, as Louis-
Sébastien Mercier observed in his time travelling novel, L’An 2440, rêve s’il en fut jamais 
(1770), had clearly addled the brains of the nobility: “a body without a soul was covered with 
lace; and the automaton then resembled a man.” Glancing beyond the court, Mercier furtively 
asked: “How many automata, with human faces, do we see at court, at the bar, in the 
academies, who owe their speech to the breath of invisible agents; when they cease, the 
machines remain dumb.” It is highly instructive that Mercier, in order to envisage a society 
denuded of its aristocratic “set of automatons,” would need to abruptly escape into a utopian 
future, to evacuate a present atrophied by inequality.149 
Whilst machine metaphors had long generated ideas of social hierarchy, during the 
final decades of the eighteenth century the intellectual and cultural associations of the 
automaton shifted in descriptive detail. The presence of mechanics and clockmakers at the 
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court of Louis XIV had reinforced the image of the monarch as the mainspring of power. But 
to investigate the machine under his successors, to discover that the supposedly dynamic 
force of royal authority was itself regulated by the escapements of etiquette, a component that 
could easily be replicated or replaced, obliterated monarchical mystique. The technical 
demonstrations of Jacquet-Droz, Roentgen and others therefore exposed the inherent 
irrationalism of court routine, subverting the political and cultural machinery that undergirded 
it. For their American contemporaries, the objective was strictly transparency and elucidation. 
The supreme craftsman of the early Republic was David Rittenhouse, whose orreries – hand-
operated, heliocentric planetary displays that replicated, in miniature, the cosmic architecture 
of the solar system – were designed, he wrote, to “astonish the skilful and curious 
examiner.”150 Rittenhouse devised orreries that, unlike their predecessors, sat vertically, like a 
clock, and were designed to prominently display the internal gears and cogs, thereby 
juxtaposing the visible and hidden. These orreries were also objects of power. Actuated by 
carefully constructed clockwork mechanisms, it was possible for anyone to pre-programme 
the device via a hand-crank that would instruct the orrery to reproduce the cosmic phenomena 
of a given future date. For American lexicographer, Noah Webster, the mechanical metaphor 
possessed obvious political ramifications. In 1787, he cited integrity and public virtue – the 
“principles and manners” of the American people – as the true “springs of government.” 
According to this formulation, it was the citizen, not the monarch, who was the sovereign 
mechanic of the state. Later, in 1791, Thomas Paine would make this distinction absolute: “It 
requires some talents to be a common mechanic; but to be a king requires only the animal 
figure of a man – a sort of breathing automaton.”  
In France, meanwhile, automatic machines that resembled members of the royal 
family heightened the possibility that the king and his courtiers might be nothing more than 
automata themselves. These intellectual associations would be put to polemical effect during 
the Revolution. According to one radical broadsheet, published weeks before the monarchy 
was abolished in 1792, the queen was reported to have yelled at her ineffective monarch: 
“shut up! if I put your crown on the head of an automaton, it would do a lot more than 
you!”151 A month after the royal escape to Varennes in 1791, with the future viability of the 
monarchy in doubt, the philosophe and mathematician, the marquis de Condorcet, posed as a 
“young mechanic,” boasting of his ability to fashion within fifteen days a replacement 
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automata court. As a student of Vaucanson, the mechanic claimed he could create a king 
indistinguishable from the present monarch: “He will sustain, as well as any other king, 
conversation with his great officials. An automaton chamberlain will present him with his 
shirt, a master of the wardrobe will place it over his neck.” Component parts could be 
replaced if, for example, there was “a change of religion,” or if a state occasion demanded it. 
The mechanic even claimed that his automata would eliminate the most significant source of 
political uncertainty that afflicted the crown: the hereditary succession. “My king would not 
be dangerous to liberty, and yet, in repairing him with care, he would be eternal, which is 
even nicer than being hereditary. We could even declare him inviolable without injustice, and 
call him infallible without absurdity.”152 With Voltairean verve, Condorcet had demonstrated 
that if the monarchy could be understood as a machine, assembled on the premise of 
clockwork functionality, then it could also be disassembled like a machine, and the clock 
suspended. Moreover, since the automaton derived movement and purpose via mechanical 
means, so the legitimacy of the ancien regime could also be seen as the result of a motion 
already imparted – of habit, routine, historical tradition; all of which compounded the 
“injustice” and “absurdity” of a monarchy that operated without any reference to reason. 
Recasting the king as an automaton, as a clockwork mechanism, was implicitly to suggest that 
he did not control time, but that time controlled him.  
 
 
IV. The temporising crown  
 
On 22 June 1789, a mob gathered outside Versailles. Lunching with the duc de Liancourt was 
the English traveller Arthur Young, who discovered, despite the external ruckus, that an 
atmosphere of perfect insouciance dominated the dining table. “In the streets,” wrote Young, 
“such anxiety was on every face, that the importance of the moment was written in the 
physiognomy; […] but amongst a class so much higher as those I dined with, I was struck 
with the difference. There were not in thirty persons five in whose countenances you could 
guess that any extraordinary event was going forward…” Echoing Mme du Deffand, Young 
observed his fellow diners function like automata, seemingly unaware of exterior events: 
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“they ate, and drank, and sat, and walked, loitered and smirked and smiled, and chatter with 
the easy indifference, that made me stare at their insipidity.” There was no “attention in 
conversation to the crisis” since polite etiquette forbade the discussion of politics at the dining 
table. The “nonchalance that is natural to people of fashion from long habit” had prohibited 
the aristocracy from confronting the significance of “the present moment, which is beyond all 
question the most critical that France has seen from the foundation of the monarchy.” Four 
days later, as events gathered pace, the contrasting temporalities within and without the court 
reached a climax. “Every hour that passes seems to give the people fresh spirit,” Young 
wrote, yet the “supineness, and even stupidity of the court, is without example: the moment 
demands the greatest decision…”153  
The temporal consciousness of the ancien regime, for so long cocooned from the 
unforeseen or unexpected, seemed incapable of comprehending, let alone combatting, the 
advancing crisis. Yet the onset of crisis was, in part, a consequence of this temporal 
consciousness, for as the financial and political questions confronting the crown acquired 
unexpected historical significance, the ancien regime procrastinated.154 According to the 
comte de Maurepas, chief minister to Louis XVI until 1781, royal government was assailed 
by what he termed “temporisation.” Daily decisions were delayed or deferred by the total 
absence of determination or urgency at the centre of the state. “Whoever the ministers are, all 
the force of government can only come from the king,” Maurepas remarked in 1777: “Ours 
deforms itself every day […] and I am not alone in remarking upon it, because other ministers 
have said as much to me.” The operation of the royal will seemed like a merely reflexive 
action: “If I have his entire trust, it is by a continuity of habit,” the chief minister complained, 
“not by the force of reason or character.”155 As governance became an increasingly 
perfunctory, even automatic process, the mechanics of the Absolutist state began juddering to 
a halt. As early as August 1774, when Maurepas confronted Louis over the matter of the 
dismissal of the controversial finance ministers Maupeou and Terray, the king stalled. Having 
already dithered for more than a month, Maurepas remarked that it was now, “a question of 
your honour.” “[I]f you do not want to retain your ministers, declare it…” “Yes,” Louis 
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replied, “I have decided to change them,” before adding that it would “be this Saturday, after 
the conseil des dépêches.” At this further expression of hesitation, the minister erupted:  
 
No, this will not do, sire, this is not how one governs a state! Time, I repeat, is not a 
commodity you can squander at whim! You have already lost too much of it for the 
good of affairs. And you must make a decision before I leave here.156 
 
Like a scolded schoolboy, Louis duly dismissed his ministers, and the Parlements – 
suspended under Louis XV – were reinstated.157 This brought about a brief revival of royal 
activity, and Louis engaged seriously in discussions relative to the recall of the recalcitrant 
law courts; but, as Véri noted, when they were concluded, “boredom appeared to overcome 
him.”158 It is unsurprising, of course, that Louis should have regarded time as merely a 
“commodity.” In the context of the endless socio-cultural rhythms of Versailles, time was 
plentiful, even inexhaustible. It was a routine possibility for the king to delay daily decision-
making because, beyond the declaration of war or the observance of state ceremonials, daily 
life seemed to possess no global-historical significance.  
Temporisation, then, was more than a consequence of the languid royal temperament: 
the entire political culture of Versailles – from court to conseil – seemed to preclude the 
prompt exercise of power. When Louis appointed Anne-Robert Turgot as Controller-General 
in 1775, the excitable reformist told the king that, “ten years from now your nation [will] be 
unrecognizable…and infinitely superior to all other peoples past and present.”159 Yet even 
Turgot, who eagerly pursued “the rapid operations of administration, of which speed and 
accuracy most often achieve merit and effect,” succumbed to the ponderousness of royal 
government. Turgot was soon reduced to dithering over court protocol, and, according to the 
intendant des finances, the marquis d’Ormesson, would often “hesitate for whole hours on a 
simple procedure of letters.”160 There was, then, a haphazard overlap between the historically 
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significant – the administration of state finances, for example – and the temporally banal – 
such as the rigid observance of court tradition. This made it difficult to identify the relative 
historical magnitudes of political events. Later, when the National Assembly began drawing 
up a new constitution in 1790, the magistrate Duval d’Emprémesnil sought to reassure his 
fretful fellow monarchiens: “It will all end with a decree of parlement,” he confidently 
claimed, “just wait and see.”161 By portraying the process as intelligible within the 
expectations of past experience, d’Emprémesnil failed to identify – or perhaps chose to 
wilfully ignore – the historical significance of the situation. Waiting would allow the 
transitory political excitement to pass, and enable a predictable course of events to resume. 
Four years later, d’Emprémesnil found himself before the Revolutionary Tribunal, awaiting 
execution on charges of counterrevolution.162 The crisis in which the monarchy found itself 
after 1790, and which intensified until its abolition, would not end with a decree of parlement. 
Nor, however, did it suddenly begin in 1789. The vision of time as a plentiful “commodity” 
underwent rapid devaluation as the health of royal finances deteriorated – a situation that had 
become serious by 1786, if not before.  
In ancien regime France, debt structured the relationship between time and royal 
finance. The class of rentiers and financiers, for example, who regularly financed government 
borrowing, were enveloped within extensive and durable temporal relationships sustained by 
credit transactions and debt obligations. Financial calculation was premised upon intuition 
and experience, bolstered by a common expectation that the future would resemble the past, 
and that investment outcomes could, to some extent, be predicted. These financial predictive 
powers were anchored by credit, a concept that blurred the distinction between money 
borrowed and social cache. When Jacques Necker, the intermittent French finance minister, 
held a party during the 1780s, for example, one attendee noted that, “this celebration brought 
him more credit, favour and stability than all his financial operations.” These forms of credit 
also possessed distinct, yet interactive temporalities. “People only spoke for a day about his 
latest arrangement concerning the vingtième, while they are still talking at this moment of the 
party he gave.”163 In terms of debt-trust relationships, the greater the social standing of the 
investor, the greater the capacity to acquire monetary credit, and, consequently, the greater 
the duration of time allotted in the expectation of repayment upon that debt. For many noble 
families, the timescale of debt amelioration could continue for decades, and whilst a shortage 
of social credit naturally minimised the repayment window, even the poorest could defer their 
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debts for years. Debt obligations therefore stretched far into the past and often continued for 
generations into the future, stabilising socio-financial relations over time.164 When uncertainty 
arose, of course, payment schedules could be curtailed, debts abruptly recalled and 
bankruptcies declared. Although unanticipated, credit crises under the ancien regime were 
often alleviated through debt default or repudiation, the public burden of which could be 
borne by the immense social credit of the crown. The market could sustain confidence in 
royal finances since, as the volcanologist and diplomat, Jean-Louis Giraud-Soulavie, 
observed, the lending practices of the financers were so closely “tied to the maintenance of 
the machine.”165  
Following the last partial default of the French monarchy in 1770, the rentier class 
had expanded enormously – a consequence of the extended borrowing programmes that 
underwrote the American war effort. The prospect of bankruptcy therefore entailed financial 
ruin for a growing pool of government investors, which made it politically difficult for the 
government itself. After the ascension of Louis XVI default was decisively ruled out, a tacit 
acknowledgment that the damage done to the social credit of the crown by the defeat of the 
Seven Years’ War – and the Maupeou reforms that followed it – had also weakened its 
financial credit capacity.166 In 1774 the expenditure cycle of ancien regime fiscal policy was 
interrupted: where once the monarchy had borrowed to fund war, struggled to increase tax 
revenues to meet debt obligations, borrowed yet more to service its debt, and finally defaulted 
in order to restore budgetary equilibrium, it would henceforth turn its face against 
bankruptcy.167 It was no longer feasible to perpetuate the traditional rhythms of raising 
revenue for even ordinary government expenditure. Levying taxes incurred the ire of the 
revived parlements and encouraged charges of ministerial despotism; defaulting on debt 
raised the prospect of the historical degradation of the ancient constitution. The functional 
social capital of monarchical gloire was therefore perceived to have diminished as royal 
indebtedness expanded, a situation made graphically real in 1787 when financial liability 
prevented the crown from lending support to the patriotic cause in the Netherlands.168  
As a repetition of previous defaults became politically sensitive, strict schedules of 
debt repayment began exerting unfamiliar temporal pressures. According to Jacques Pierre 
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Brissot, future luminary of the French Republic, the “only way to plug the enormous deficit 
that terrifies us,” was for France to “disengage herself from all those foreign interests” – as 
she had done during the Dutch crisis – “which have cost her so much blood, so much treasure, 
and her tranquillity.” By eradicating her debts and averting default, France would “repair all 
the interior ills caused by the erroneous system of past centuries.” Such regeneration, 
however, was time sensitive: failure to reform royal finance would not, as in the past, 
occasion temporary bankruptcy; financial collapse would now presage a disintegration of the 
monarchy itself. Downgrading the social credit of the crown, Brissot warned, was “the only 
way to gain enough time to reform all the branches of administration.”169 Of course, 
retrenchment on this scale would require a kind of devaluation of the monarchy itself.170 It 
likewise injected the political economy of the ancien regime with a radical urgency entirely 
incompatible with the traditional political processes of the crown.171  
With tactical bankruptcy no longer viable, the king turned towards the money 
markets, and, like a reluctant gambler, ceded much of his financial future to their 
unpredictable operation. Unlike England, which had bound the fiscal state in perpetuity to its 
creditors, France took the decision to automatically amortize government debt over time. 
After the Seven Years’ War, the French state became increasingly dependent upon rentes 
viagères, or lifetime annuities, a fiscal instrument that raised short-term capital from investors 
in exchange for a semi-annual percentile return on the original lump-sum loan.172 In contrast 
to rentes perpetuélles, lifetime annuities were finite and expired with the investor, or 
designated “head,” at the moment of death.173 Whilst rentes viagères prioritised redemption of 
principal, and may therefore have seemed like a useful method of precipitating budgetary 
balance, they further undermined the long-term debt relations upon which the temporal 
stability of ancien regime finance was structured. Since the government could no longer 
predict the duration of its debt repayments, schedules of amortization were reduced to a 
                                                
169 Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, Point de banqueroute: ou Lettres à un créancier de l’état… (London, 
1788), pp.103-4: “se dégager de tous ces intérêts extérieurs qui lui ont coûté tant de sang, tant de trésors & sa 
tranquillité, qu’elle va concentrer dans elle-même ses forces & ses richesses, pour réparer tous les maux qu’a 
causés dans son intérieur le systême [sic] erroné des siècles passés.” “C’est au moins le seul moyen de combler cet 
énorme déficit qui nous épouvante. C’est le seul moyen de se procurer le tems nécessaire pour porter la réforme 
dans toutes les branches de l’administration.” 
170 On royal retrenchment, see: Marcel Marion, Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715 (6 vols., Paris, 
Rousseau, 1927-31), I, pp.386-431; Gail Bossenga, The Politics of Privilege: Old Regime and Revolution in Lille 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1991), pp.168-77; on government expenditure and the revenues from the sale of venal offices, 
see: Doyle, Venality: The Sale of Offices in Eighteenth-Century France, pp.157-8. 
171 Jean-Yves Grenir, L’Économie d’ancien régime: Une mode de l’échange et de l’incertitude (Paris, Albin 
Michel, 1996); Laurence Fontaine, ‘Antonio and Shylock: Credit and Trust in France, c.1680-c.1780,’ The 
Economic History Review 54 (1, February 2001), pp.39-57. 
172 Gail Bossenga, ‘Financial Origins of the French Revolution,’ in Thomas E. Kaiser, Dale K. Van Kley, From 
Deficit to Deluge: The Origins of the French Revolution (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 2011), pp.37-
66, see: p.50-55; on contemporary market speculation, see: George V. Taylor, ‘The Paris Bourse on the Eve of the 
French Revolution, 1781-1789,’ American Historical Review 67 (4, 1962), pp.951-77.  
173 Spang, Stuff and Money, p.20-31; Lorraine Daston, Classical Probability in the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ., 
Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.112-16. 
  
51 
matter of speculation. This aleatory method of borrowing entailed obvious risk for investors, 
but the servicing of rentes viagères also introduced a destabilising unpredictability into 
French fiscal forecasts.174 Far from strengthening market confidence in the crown, lifetime 
annuities reaffirmed the annual burden of capital repayments. In 1784, Necker concluded that 
the “wealth of the sovereign” was now almost completely dependent upon fluctuating annual 
revenues.175 Meanwhile, the generous yields of lifetime annuities – which were valued at 
10%, excessive even by the speculative nature of the investment, and twice the 5% rate of 
rentes perpetuélles – introduced further imbalance between the short-term liabilities of the 
state and the revenue generated to satisfy them.  
Although unpredictable, the repayment schedules of the rentes viagères were at least 
finite. By the 1770s, however, even this was no longer a certainty. The act of splitting the 
“heads” upon which the rente contract depended, a particularly common practice amongst 
Genevan financiers, meant that the annuity could outlive the investor. Young girls, often 
chosen on the basis of their probable longevity, became the so-called “immortals of Geneva.” 
Many contemporaries viewed this practice as financially ruinous, but the French crown, 
desperate for quick cash, seemed reluctant to intervene.176 Indeed, of the fourteen major life 
annuity loans raised between 1757 and 1787, only three had any age gradations attached to 
them; the rest were premised upon flat-rate interest formulae, all of which assumed that 
European demographics had remained largely stable since the late-seventeenth century. This 
manipulation of the rentes viagères was damaging because whilst it extended amortization 
schedules and exacerbated the unpredictable duration of government loan repayments, the 
generous yields attached to the loans simultaneously quickened the accumulation of present-
value government debt. The sense of urgency this created conditioned both the financial 
considerations and, consequently, the temporal perceptions of the late ancien regime. The real 
impact of the rentes viagères therefore lay in their subversion of the long-term debt 
obligations once common to ancien regime financing.  
After 1781, the temporal chain connecting the fiscal future to the fiscal past was 
further fractured by the pressures of war expenditure. Prevented from expanding tax revenues 
by the intransigence of the parlements, the monarchy sought to cover the costs of warfare 
through further borrowing – in particular, through a vast expansion of the rentes viagères. 
Necker proposed that interest payments accrued on new debt would be financed by a 
meantime reduction in domestic expenditures and cutbacks at court. This would result in a 
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small surplus in the government budget when war was eventually concluded. Retrenchment, 
however, required reform, and reform set the monarchy on collision course with the nobility. 
In 1781, Necker was dismissed – expenditure restraint and any consequent hope of a post-war 
budget surplus were dismissed with him. In a bid to repair the damage done to court 
splendour and to restore confidence in crown finances, his successor, Charles-Alexandre de 
Calonne, primed the pump, writing off royal debts and sanctioning lavish palace 
renovations.177 He was particularly determined to see annuity arrears honoured at term, even 
if timely repayments required further loans with even more burdensome interest rates. But 
using financial credit to effectively purchase royal credit was a dangerous game. In fact, 
Calonne had unwittingly bolted the longevity of monarchical gloire to the rigid time-scale of 
government debt repayment, which, if transgressed, would precipitate the instant insolvency 
of the French crown. From 1783, the court was quite literally living on borrowed time.  
As this undisciplined fiscal policy raised the prospect of a permanent peacetime 
deficit, the present-value borrowing constraint of the crown – at least as it was envisaged by 
Necker – was violated since the current value of government debt no longer equalled 
anticipated future surpluses exclusive of interest payments.178 As long as present expenditure 
was being resourced by future revenue, the government possessed no firm means of 
honouring its debt obligations. Averse to default and unable to levy new taxes, Calonne 
continued to borrow, determined to repay past debts according to inflexible deadlines whilst 
accumulating even greater future burdens, the growth of which was now entirely 
unforeseeable. The predicted state of French finances had become a matter of pure 
speculation. Yet as the deficit continued to grow, the timeframe for repayment shortened. 
This was partly the result of an over-reliance upon anticipations – the act of borrowing 
against future tax revenues in order to pay for present expenditure.179 By 1787, government 
anticipations had amassed an unprecedented 280m livres. Whilst they were a necessary 
consequence of the archaic and ponderous administration of ancien regime tax collection, the 
viability of this system relied upon predictability. The venal officers who administered 
directed taxes, for example, often deposited less than they collected into treasury coffers on 
the agreement that they would pay an agreed sum in advance of anticipated revenues, 
especially on taxes such as the taille, since full collection could take up to two years. As the 
pressures of war expenditure grew, the crown was forced to mortgage state revenues several 
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years in advance. This dependency upon anticipations of increasingly distant future tax 
receipts had the effect of foreshortening the repayment window of government debt since it 
widened the gap between ordinary revenue and the capacity of the government to meet annual 
fixed charges on its debt. The lag-time between tax collection, expected revenues and receipt 
of anticipations grew whilst the time pressures to meet ever-larger debt obligations shrank. 
This overwhelmed the monarchy. According to Mercy-d’Argenteau, by the spring of 1788, 
the king “came each day to the queen’s apartments and was so crushed by the conditions in 
which he found his kingdom that he burst into tears.”180 By late summer, bankruptcy seemed 
not only inevitable, but imminent.  
When the crown was forced into a suspension of payments on 16 August, and to 
capitulate to calls for the Estates-General, the aggravating factor was a bundle of loans – 
including the rentes viagères – upon which the crown had offered conspicuously high interest 
rates and which it had committed itself to redeeming in a short period of time, often fewer 
than 8 years. Finance ministers from Calonne to Brienne pleaded with the parlements and 
Assembly of Notables to extend the redemption period, but to no avail. Irrespective of their 
preponderant size, the real importance of the rentes viagères – which, by January 1789, were 
adding an annual interest charge of 101.7 million livres to the royal debt – was in the 
conditioning of a particular perception of financial time. As government debt seemed to 
acquire a new urgency, the act of borrowing to meet approaching repayment deadlines 
appeared to bring about the imbrication of future and present, compressing the temporal 
experience of the present. “What fatal funds,” the comte d’Antraigues later declared, “which 
present no other purpose than to devour the future!”181 Of course, a causal chain of crisis that 
linked financial meltdown and the issuing of life annuities – a position posited by Honoré-
Gabriel Mirabeau – may have been “patent nonsense.” Yet when Mirabeau condemned 
government dependence upon life annuity borrowing in general, and Necker’s loans of March 
1781 in particular, he specified not only the scale but also the speed of issue. The sudden 
shock of the financial burden created by lifetime annuities was overwhelming the fiscal 
architecture of the ancien regime. “Note in passing,” he remarked, “that it is this ruinous 
accumulation of two life annuity loans made within only two months of each other & a few 
weeks before the resignation of M. Necker, that mean one hundred million livres are due to be 
found at this time in the royal treasury.”182  
It was Mirabeau père, Victor de Riqueti, who had earlier condemned rentes viagères 
as a foreclosure upon the future. The practice of government borrowing based upon lifetime 
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annuities, he wrote, was little more than an expropriation of future revenues, designed to fund 
present indebtedness “at the expense of our heirs.” This “malign sentiment” was the 
prefiguration of his fateful phrase, “après moi le déluge.” Unlike capital investment, which 
did “not measure its own duration, which carries our firm ideas beyond our own existence,” 
the rentes viagères deranged the fiscal relationship between present and future.183 Successive 
finance ministers, many of whom had been forced to borrow against future revenues, and 
often several years in advance, watched as the redemption of principal on lifetime annuities 
disappeared precipitously into the future, just as the gathering scale of the deficit abbreviated 
the onset of default. For Mirabeau père, it was public credit that fuelled the temptations of 
indebtedness, heightening the prospect of state bankruptcy, and inciting “the future-orientated 
speculation” characteristic of the late eighteenth century.184 For Mirabeau fils, the rentes 
viagères modified this deluge mentality, which had emerged after the expensive humiliation 
of the Seven Years’ War, by seeming to accelerate its onset. Once languid but now urgent, 
debt relations placed the French crown in a race against both historical and real time. The first 
was experienced as an epochal collapse of royal credit, the second as an almost daily 
disintegration of governmental financial capacities.185 The crisis, then, was not eventuated by 
the scale of government indebtedness, which, though imposing, was insignificant in the 
context of the eighteenth century. The crisis was occasioned by the temporalisation of 
government debt.186 It was the time-scale – not the financial scale – of repayment that would 
turn philosophical dispute into political panic. 
Between the summoning of the Assembly of Notables in 1787 and the convocation of 
the Estates-General in 1789, the future approached at a torrential pace.187 With the annual 
state deficit running in excess of 100m livres and the third and final levy of the vingtième due 
to elapse, as scheduled, in 1787, Calonne performed a complete policy reversal. As austerity 
replaced profligacy, the controller-general soon realised that to subject any reform package to 
the delaying tactics of the parlements would be to endanger the existence of monarchy. In the 
                                                
183 Victor Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau, Entretiens d’un jeune prince avec son gouverneur, ouvrage divisé en 
trois… (4 vols., Paris, 1785), II, p.252: “loin d’être pris aux dépens de nos héritiers,” “ne mesure point sa propre 
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184 Michael Sonenscher, Before the Deluge: Public Debt, Inequality, and the Intellectual Origins of the French 
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Assembly of Notables he saw a smoother, speedier means of crisis resolution. He was 
mistaken. Outraged by the declaration of a deficit, when only several years before Necker had 
presented a budget surplus, the Notables blocked his package of tax extensions. By 
confronting them with the imminent prospect of bankruptcy, Calonne may have been seeking 
to hasten a decisive reform of crown finances. Instead, he merely provoked his own dismissal 
and disgrace. In April, the financial markets went into free-fall, royal bonds sank 
precipitously and government anticipations were not renewed. From the office of the 
controller-general there came reports that, “if all the measures necessary to revive 
government credit were not effected in the course of the month, there would be no longer any 
funds and the service could not continue.”188  
Stability was momentarily restored in April 1787 with the appointment of the 
archbishop of Toulouse, Loménie de Brienne, as finance minister. The opening salvos of the 
Assembly of Notables had nevertheless extended the sense of urgency beyond the confines of 
the conseil du roi to the wider ancien regime. Retrenchment in the royal household – firmly 
back on the agenda under the Brienne ministry – was altering the languid pace of life at court 
and reinforcing the disconnect between fiscal urgency and the temporal experience of 
Versailles. When the duc de Coigny had his stables forcibly downsized, an indignant baron de 
Besenval complained to the queen: “It is frightful to live in a country where one cannot be 
sure of possessing tomorrow what he owns today.”189 Noble privileges, established over 
centuries and enjoyed for generations, were suddenly consumed in an accelerating 
programme of retrenchment. When Brienne was finally prevailed upon to call the Estates-
General, he temporised. By offering no definite date for its convocation, but instead stating 
that it would meet no later than 1792, he calculated that time would ameliorate the financial 
crisis. Extraordinary annual expenditures such as extant loan repayments were predicted to 
ease after 1790, whilst domestic savings were projected to return an annual estimate of 50m 
livres to the treasury. The Estates-General would therefore meet at a moment when the 
potential for political explosion would have decreased in proportion to the improved financial 
outlook. In the preamble to Edits du mois de novembre 1787, the king declared his desire “to 
reach without shocks and crisis…that era which cannot be far distant, that must inevitably 
restore the balance between revenue and expenses.”190 As the financial credit of the crown 
slowly readjusted itself, so the monarchy would regain political influence by acquiring more 
time in which to deliberate on financial reform. This was a remarkable gamble. The 
temporality of the crisis now moved centre stage: an aghast Marie-Antoinette wrote to her 
                                                
188 Egret, The French Prerevolution, pp.28-9. 
189 Ibid, p.43. 
190 Louis XVI, ‘Edit du mois de novembre 1787, portant création d’Emprunts graduels & successifs pendant cinq 
ans,’ in Mercure de France (No.18, 3 November, 1787), (Paris, rue des Poitevins, 1787) p.82. 
  
56 
brother, Joseph II, arguing that if the king chose to “forestall any direct demand” for the 
Estates-General, if he should “take his own measures, and make himself master of time, he 
could inhibit the risks [les inconvénients] of these assemblies.”191  
In November 1787, in exchange for vague promises to convene the Estates-General, 
Brienne had successfully forced the registration of a substantial loan. It was raised in vain. 
Nine months later, and with almost half of all government tax receipts mortgaged by 
anticipations, repayments shuddered to a halt. The demands of ordinary present expenditures 
had eaten so far into projected revenues that, in August 1788, the future arrived at an 
overwhelming speed. In a casual admission of insolvency, the inept premier commis to the 
treasury, Achille-Joseph Gojard, declared that government coffers were empty. Fewer than 
half a million francs – or, “enough money for state expenses for a quarter of a day,” as the 
économiste Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours later noted – was all that remained.192 Debt 
repayments had even begun to consume the money set aside for relieving provinces damaged 
                                                
191 Marie-Antoinette to Joseph II (23 November, 1788), their letter is cited in Florimond de Mercy-Argenteau, 
Correspondance secrète du comte de Mercy-Argenteau avec l’Empereur Joseph II et le prince de Kauntiz (eds., A. 
Ritter von Arneth, Jules Flammermont), (2 vols., Paris, l’Imprimerie nationale, 1889-1891), II, p.141: “Ce qui me 
fait beaucoup de peine, c’est que le Roi a annoncé qu’il tiendrait les États généraux d’ici à cinq ans. Il y a sur ce 
point une fermentation générale et telle qu’on a cru que le Roi devait prévenir une demande directe et qu’en 
prenant ses mesures et se rendant maître du temps, il pourrait empêcher les inconvénients de ces assemblées.” 
192 Du Pont de Nemours, cited in Egret, French Prerevolution, p.184. 
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by hailstorms. Royal credit had evaporated. The convocation of the Estates-General was 
hastily brought forward and slated for 1 May, 1789. In the margins of a memorandum 
prepared for the Notables, Brienne later lamented the inability of his ministry to decelerate 
crisis. If reform had been granted on “the bases I then provided,” there “would have been less 
trouble.” “The future generation might have gained less in the end,” he scribbled, “but the 
present one would have had more peace, fewer shocks, less pain. Perhaps even little by little 
what has been established abruptly might have been introduced slowly, without upheavals.” It 
was the failure of the ancien regime to absorb the novel temporal pressures of the financial 
crisis that had allowed the radical, uncontrolled restructuring of historical time to ensue: 
“there was no way at the time of thinking about what has happened since,” because to 
prognosticate about the ways in which events subsequently transpired “would have been 
considered impossible.”193 
Brienne had gambled and lost. Necker was now recalled for one final throw of the 
dice. “If I could only have had the fifteen months of the archbishop,” he later lamented: “now 
it is very late.”194 The new debt-time urgency of the crisis had unveiled an entirely open 
future, completely unmoored from the expectations of past experience. According to 
Dominique-Joseph Garat, a deputy from Labourd, by granting an assembly of the Estates-
General the monarchy had “entered and advanced down pathways [les routes] where one 
could not see any trace of centuries” [Fig. 3].195 The royal government was now behaving in 
ways unfamiliar even to itself; it was reaching decisions that, in ordinary times, it would 
never have countenanced. Whilst the opportunity cost of convening the Estates-General 
would prove colossal, the option of further hesitation – of buying time by borrowing yet more 
money in increasingly unfavourable circumstances – may have proved instantly fatal. It was 
Franklin who, in his Advice to a Young Tradesman (1748), had asserted that “time is 
money.”196 By May 1789, the French king had run out of both. 
 
* 
 
                                                
193 Brienne, cited in Egret, p.216. 
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Representations 134 (1, Spring, 2016), pp.29-63. 
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The crisis that engulfed pre-revolutionary political authority in France is indissociable from 
the crisis of pre-revolutionary historical time. With the convocation of the Estates-General, 
which had not been summoned into being since 1614, the principle of continuity was 
sacrificed to contingency. Paradoxically, it was the anachronistic attributes of the assembly – 
the unfamiliarity of its composition and operation, the incoherence of the demands contained 
within the cahiers de doléances – that made the content of its future deliberations seem so 
potentially unpredictable.197 It was to be “made up of so many peasants used to feudalism,” 
remarked Mirabeau, and “so many townsfolk thinking only of money,” that “one would 
tremble if the opening of the Estates put them in the same chamber with our lords of all 
kinds.”198 Without the bulwark of historically-entrenched institutions, the limitations on 
political imagination were lifted. This process was experienced as a form of collective 
historical exhilaration, in which the sensation of acceleration effaced that of boredom, 
unveiling the unbounded possibilities of human historical agency.  Consequently, as the 
Bastille was plundered on 14 July 1789, time intervened in history. “One is struck with 
wonder,” wrote the Russian minister plenipotentiary to Paris, Ivan Simolin, “in considering 
that, within the space of thirty-six hours, the French monarchy is annihilated,” and the king 
“reduced to subscribing to everything a frantic, cruel and barbarous people demand with an 
insolence and an imperative tone…”199 The historically significant (the “annihilation” of the 
monarchy) was compressed into the temporally truncated (into “thirty-six hours” of popular 
violence): the disjuncture in the experience of historical time emerged from the disintegration 
in the legitimacy, and basic functionality, of regal authority. It was the imperviousness of the 
ancien regime, and the French crown in particular, to the temporality of the gathering political 
and financial crises that robbed it of its capacity for timely action.  
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2: Revolutionary Deliberation and Temporal Pressures: from the Continental Congress, 
1774-1776, to the National Assembly, May-October 1789 
 
“The French National Assembly did not mean to go as far as they did,” observed the Mainz 
radical, Georg Forster, in 1791: what “compelled them,” was “the iron necessity of time.” 
Revolution made time a force of history.200 This process might best be understood as the 
divergence between chronos and kairos. In contrast to chronos, which connotes the 
measurement of time, kairos refers to the qualitative, experiential dimension of time, to the 
special moments of deliberation, decision-making, and historical action.201 As the medium of 
temporal perception, kairos is open to manipulation. By foregrounding the kairotic qualities 
of revolution, this chapter situates the unfamiliar experiences of historical time that 
accompanied the onset of revolution as a determining factor in revolutionary decision-
making.  
For Forster, who journeyed to Paris in 1793 to observe he advent of the Jacobin 
Republic, what “compelled” the National Assembly was not merely the chronos of what he 
perceived to be the pace of Enlightenment progress – to the “boast of reason,” the “rights of 
men,” and “metaphysical theories” that were “now at hand” – but to the kairos of fleeting 
opportunity, to the pressure – “the iron necessity” – of an ever-shrinking moment of action.202 
The kairotic power of lived revolutionary history – the way in which chronological 
assumptions were temporalised, how centuries of change could seem squeezed into the hours 
of a single afternoon – directly influenced the processes of revolutionary deliberation. “As 
soon as arms were taken up, as soon the first drop of blood was spilt,” remarked the abbé 
Raynal in his worldwide best-seller, Révolution de l’Amérique (1781), “the time of discussion 
is no more.” As news begins to circulate in 1774 that the British are preparing to place Boston 
harbour under martial order, “dispositions to a general insurrection augment,” writes Raynal, 
who frames collective deliberation characteristic of the American Revolution within a 
simultaneously ongoing and truncating present: “Soon the disquiet communicates itself from 
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one house to the next,” as “the inhabitants assemble and converse in public places.” “Here, 
finally, the time of an important revolution has arrived, the outcome [événement] of which, 
happy or fatal, will forever fix the regret or admiration of posterity.”  
With chronos subjected to kairos, the present became saturated with historically 
charged potentialities. “One day has borne a revolution,” surmised Raynal: “One day has 
transported us into a new century.”203 Such experiences produced a variety of response 
mechanisms, from the sensation of temporal claustrophobia prevalent at the Continental 
Congress, to the paralysing experience of synchronicity – of “pile-up” – that assailed the 
National Assembly during the hot summer months of 1789. This chapter therefore contends 
that the early stages of the American and French Revolutions did not merely contribute to 
alterations in the perceptions of historical time; they proceeded as they did because of those 
alterations.204  
 
 
I. Year(s) I  
 
Almost two decades before the Jacobin Republic formally redrew time – when Gilbert 
Romme and Fabre d’Églantine finalised the republican calendar, replacing the months of the 
year with natural allegory, from the summer heat of Thermidor to the autumnal fog of 
Brumaire, – the almanac authors of the American Republic were, in an admittedly less 
systematic way, realigning human time in accordance with the political rupture of 
revolution.205 One of the most widely circulated almanacs of the early Republic was 
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de curé Meslier, a Parisian almanac, acclaimed the fall of Bastille as the beginning of the Year I of Liberty; see: 
Perovic, The Calendar, ch.1 and ch.2. 
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Nathanael Low’s Astronomical Diary, published in Boston. In his first edition following the 
Declaration of Independence, Low announced that 1777 was no longer “the seventeenth in the 
reign of George III;” rather, it would henceforth be remembered as “the First Year of 
American independence, which began July fourth, 1776.”206 Separation from the British 
Empire had not only precipitated a revolutionary war but also a rupture in American 
chronology: alongside its religious demarcation – “the Year of the Christian Era, 1777” – 
American history was now also calculable according to the unfolding time of human events.  
In reforming their chronological nomenclature, numerous almanacs, north and south, 
followed suit. This new system proved resilient, even as the historical moment of 
Independence receded into the past. In his New-England Almanack of 1784, Isaac Bickerstaff 
hailed the year as “the Eighth of American Independence,” a new epoch, he observed, “which 
commenced July 4, 1776.”207 As late as 1790, Ellicott’s Maryland and Virginia Almanac 
perpetuated the practice, declaring “the Fourteenth Year of American Independence.”208 
Indeed, when the first Congress under the Constitution met in Philadelphia, its legal register 
[Fig.2] announced that it had done so in the year 1789, “and of the Independence of the 
United States, the Thirteenth.” If almanac literature was central to the construction of an 
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emergent American identity, then they were also pivotal in producing an American 
appreciation of historical time.209 Since the early seventeenth century, the almanac was a 
common feature to every colonial household, rivalling only the Bible for shelf-space. 
Containing calendars, astronomical prognostications, and proverbial or even political 
pronouncements, almanacs helped coordinate festive and civic life, and in the process created 
a common sense of time. 
Since the start of the imperial crisis, many almanacs began publishing calendars that 
cited the major dates of dispute – from the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1765, to the Boston 
Massacre of 1770, and eventually the Battles of Lexington and Concord in 1775 – as the 
essential chronological parameters of a new, politicised American identity.210 This 
Americanization of commemoration competed with a more traditional demarcation of 
colonial history, which had hitherto unfolded according to a regnal dating system. The 
colonies, now a self-consciously operating body of united independent states, were detached 
from British authority because they no longer chronologically cohered to the “time” of the 
crown. In pre-revolutionary America, commemorative culture telescoped British oppression, 
inculcating recently liberated citizens into “a practice of national time” that not only 
promoted an alternative vision of the future, but a radically revised understanding of the 
past.211 The genealogy of the British crown and the chronology of British oppression began to 
blend on the pages of the almanacs. In 1776, the Freebetter’s New-England Almanack, 
published by Nathan Daboll, offered a reinterpretation of regal lineage. Beginning with the 
present monarch, “George the Third,” who was the “grandson of George 2d, the son of 
George the First, who was cousin to Queen Anne,” and “the daughter to King James,” the 
recollection reached back almost a millennium, until it finally concluded with “Henry the 2d, 
the cousin of Stephen, who was nephew to Henry the First, the son of William the Conqueror, 
who was a SON OF A WHORE.”212 Despite the elongated set-up, the punch-line was 
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devastating: by inverting the logic of historical heritage, Daboll delegitimised the British 
crown, depicting its genealogical authority as little more than a reiteration of immorality. 
Unlike the pristine conception – the newness – of the American Republic, the entire lineage of 
the British monarchy could be characterised as fetid – corrupt at its ancestral core.213 A restart 
was essential: American history therefore unfolded from a necessary break point, a Year I of 
Independence, which, as Low observed, could be calendrically located on “July fourth, 
1776.” 
Almanacs that altered their dating systems, like the French republican calendar, 
testify to the reality of revolutionary rupture, not merely in the measurement of time, but in its 
lived experience. These artefacts nevertheless fulfilled very different temporal operations. 
Whilst American almanacs measured the historical rupture of Revolution, the calendar sought 
erroneously to regulate it. This was a fundamental error since it was not possible for a 
calendrical or chronometric artefact to re-impose order on a sensory disruption to historical 
time. In other words, repairing the rupture in the lived experience of time – what has 
elsewhere been termed “sentimental time” – could not be achieved with reference to absolute 
time. As Benjamin Vaughan, a confidant to Franklin, observed in 1795 with respect the 
course of the American Revolution: “the chronologer has slowly counted months, where the 
philosopher has computed ages.” This perceived disjuncture in time and history, whereby 
“ages” unfolded in mere “months,” rendered ordinary units of calendar time meaningless.214 
The almanacs, unlike the calendar, allowed for a panoramic vision of American 
history, more observational than regulatory, in which the future could be embraced by means 
of optimistic prognostication without being undermined by the horror of historical 
accumulation.215 As Sanja Perovic has illuminatingly argued, the calendar was never intended 
to be a gauge of continual rupture, but a device for “framing” linear time, for giving 
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“revolutionary history a semblance of unity it otherwise lacked,” and enabling the Revolution 
“to take into account its own historicity.”216 In fact, it was the temporal violence required to 
squeeze revolutionary history back into the computational grid of a calendar – an effort that 
repeatedly buckled under the incursions of momentous events – that provoked, in particular, 
religious and cultural grievances.217  
The revolutionaries had more luck in creating a unified time for the Republic by 
requisitioning church bells, which, after 1792, were melted down to provide material for 
cannonry and infantry. Like the calendar, this was an essential plank in the programme of 
Dechristianisation.218 The Convention, and later the Directory, hoped to free the Republic 
from the sensory ascendancy of ecclesiastical authority, which regulated the rhythms of rural, 
Catholic France, and which undermined the civic time of the Republic by providing an 
alternative temporality. Church bells, after all, did not merely summon congregations to mass; 
they punctured the temporality of local sound spaces, governing the time of waking, resting, 
feasting and rejoicing.219 Repressing and repurposing bells, as Alain Corbin observes, 
profoundly altered the “auditory environment” of rural France, overhauled “the systems for 
transmitting information,” and ultimately undermined traditional means of telling time.220 
Revolutionary governments achieved far more by tampering with sensory perceptions of time 
than by instituting the arid fêtes décadaires adumbrated by the calendar. Indeed, when the 
brigadier Nicholas-Joseph Desenfans was assigned in 1799 to inspect the Hautes-Pyrénées, a 
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peripheral département that had remained largely shielded from the revolutionary assault on 
ecclesiastical time, it was, he wrote, like journeying back into the past: he was startled to 
“hear that people were ringing the Angelus, as if it were twelve years ago.”221 
The creators of the calendar nevertheless hoped to incorporate the sensory 
atmosphere of rural and agricultural France. If the months were seasonal, the days were 
pastoral: the seventh day of the second décade of Ventôse, for example, was the day of the 
elderberry (sureau), whilst the eighth day of the first décade of Nivôse was – remarkably – 
the day of manure (fumier). This bid to re-naturalize French time was a doomed enterprise. 
Revolutionary events and conditions no longer adhered to a naturally derived chronology; 
historical temporalities, as Koselleck identifies, “follow a sequence different from the 
temporal rhythms given in nature.”222 As the diplomat Charles-Frédéric Reinhard observed in 
1791, the expectation-shattering developments of the French Revolution had forced history 
and nature out of sync:  
 
The French form of government developed fast and without warning. There were 
moments in those past two years when it was well-nigh possible to say that the sun 
shone upon an entirely different nation after only one single turn around the earth.223 
 
The “twelve years” cited by Desenfans might have seemed like a millennium, such was the 
scale of historical compression wrought by revolution. In this sense, it was the speed of 
political life, not the technological advance characteristic of the nineteenth century, which 
initially denaturalized the historical space of action. Indeed, the transportation technologies of 
the subsequent century – in particular, the railway – would make absolute time grids essential. 
The rupture in “sentimental time” was affected by political revolution, not by technological or 
industrial change; reordering historical time would therefore necessitate political remedies. 
All of which further testifies to the calendar’s failure to territorialize the multiple temporal 
textures of France. The rhythm of revolutionary history, its constant kairotic quality, would 
repeatedly explode the parameters of calendrical, chronological temporality.224 
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II. The circulation of speculation 
 
   At the hour, 
The most important of each day, in which 
The public News was read, the fever came,  
A punctual visitant, to shake this Man 
 
   ‘Twas in truth an hour 
Of universal ferment; mildest men 
Were agitated, and commotions, strife 
Of passion and opinion fill’d the walls 
 
    William Wordsworth, The Prelude, Book IX (1804-1805)225 
 
Revolutionary events broke the news. As William Wordsworth observed, the reception of 
daily news resembled “earthquakes, shocks repeated day by day.” The reportage of the 
Revolutions, meanwhile, repeatedly referred to the improbability of their proceedings.226 
Contemporaries consequently searched for alternative means of comprehending and 
navigating events: they began to speculate.227 What emerged was “a period of political 
paranoia,” in which the temporalised experience of history invested “visions of conspiracy” 
were a new explanatory power. As Gordon Wood notes, in a “political world that was 
expanding and changing faster than the available rational modes of explanation could 
handle,” and where “outcomes appeared to be disconnected from intentions,” rumour rushed 
to fill the void.228 There was simply no time to verify information that seemed so pregnant 
with such imminent possibilities. Time lags began emerging between cause and consequence, 
between “intentions” and “outcomes,” creating delay periods in which the need for historical 
meaning could only be satisfied by conspiratorial explanation.229 And when every day seemed 
                                                
225 William Wordsworth, The Prelude; or Growth of a Poet’s Mind, ed., E. de Selincourt (Oxford, OUP, 1959), 
163-9; on Wordsworth’s time-consciousness as a reflection of French Revolutionary history, see: Herbert 
Lindenberger, On Wordsworth’s Prelude (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.131-204. 
226 For America, see: Matthew Rainbow Hale, ‘On Their Tiptoes: Political Time and Newspapers during the 
Advent of the Radicalized French Revolution, c.1791-1793,’ in Journal of the Early Republic 29 (Summer 2009), 
pp.191-218; for France, see: Lynn Hunt, ‘The World We Have Gained: The Future of the French Revolution,’ The 
American Historical Review 108 (1, February 2003), pp.1-19. 
227 As early as October 1789, Le Courrier de Provence, could argue that even speculation and rumour held 
insufficient explanatory power, since the progress of the Revolution repeatedly proved more unbelievable: “It is 
useless to speculate on the thousands of rumours that have more or less the appearance of truth. […] Recent events 
are a new proof that, in times of unrest, there is nothing which is unimportant, or trivial in itself. An incident 
verging on the comic, an impropriety committed by drunken men, a ribbon of a particular colour, can bring about a 
revolution: a meal given on 1 October by the Royal Bodyguard to the Flanders Regiment has caused the capital to 
explode”: cited in John Thomas Gilchrist, William J. Murray, The Press in the French Revolution: A Selection of 
Documents Taken from the Press of the Revolution for the Years 1789-1794 (New York, NY., St. Martin’s Press, 
1971), p.76. 
228 Gordon S. Wood, ‘Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the Eighteenth Century’, The 
William and Mary Quarterly 39 (3, July 1982), pp.401-41, here: p.429. 
229 As Michael Lienesch observes, “the French Revolution had let loose a flood of events that were so earth-
shattering and extraordinary as to defy any explanation short of an intricately interconnected conspiracy to 
  
67 
to announce the appearance of new dangers, the need for ready information became 
imperative – it became a matter of life and death. After all, in the time lag within which 
speculation might mature into fact, anything could happen: the seemingly epic historical 
consequences of revolutionary events afforded little waiting time. 
A belief in the prevalence of plots was nothing new. The eighteenth century had been 
dominated by conspiratorial thought: whilst “intentions” were often nefarious, the possible 
“outcomes” of perceived conspiracy were contained by the regulated information network 
and the iterative historicity of the absolutist state, which appeared to preclude the 
unforeseen.230 One consequence of the municipal transformations of the Revolution, was the 
institutionalisation of the circulation of partial information, through the sections, clubs and, 
later, the insurrectionary Commune.231 Where once rumour and gossip flowed at a steady 
pace, slowly trickling through court and salon, passing by simple word of mouth, 
revolutionary rumour was now writ large in the décrets of the sections, and impatiently 
transmitted to the Convention as a matter of extreme urgency.232 A recently freed press, 
meanwhile, reproduced – often on the same day and at the speed of the printing press – the 
idle denunciations overheard on street corners and coffee houses, enrolling an increasingly 
literate urban population into a rampant economy of rumour.233  
The experience of revolution exposed this time lag. Conspiracy acquired its special 
force as a consequence of the cleavage that opened between the speed with which information 
was disseminated and the tempo of historical events. Living in a time when historically 
saturated occurrences seemed so rapidly to tumble one after another rendered the unthinkable 
thinkable, the impossible probable. The entirely unexpected became a constitutive element of 
everyday experience. This made a willingness to believe in the wildest predictions look like a 
reasonable psychological procedure for satisfying a need to prepare for every imaginable 
eventuality.234 The future was not therefore completely beyond prognostication; rather the 
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experience of revolutionary history – from the fall of the Bastille to the flight of the king – 
emboldened those who forecasted a future filled with once implausible treachery.235 
Conspiracies therefore offered temporal structure to the apparently structureless nature of 
history and the orderless appearance of events. 
During the American and French Revolutions, conspiracies were constant, though 
they often lay dormant: their activating agent was rumour, which appeared in order to fill the 
time lag between specious news and verified information. Rumours are statements that 
circulate at moments of ambiguity, enabling individuals to comprehend the blurry origins of 
circumstances, to offer meaning to accelerated history. The concept of “crisis” – as in, la 
patrie en danger or “the times that try men’s souls” – derived its political momentum from 
the banalities of the speed of circulating information, or speculation.236 Rumour was the 
temporalisation of non-knowledge.237 In the early American Republic, gossip satisfied a 
similar function. The very materiality of the Anas testifies to the transience of political 
rumour – the memoranda that Jefferson kept, scrawled “on loose scraps of paper,” often 
“taken out of my pocket in the moment,” were “ragged, rubbed, & scribbled,” the hastily 
jotted records of the fleeting “passions of the time.”238 In a wider, historical sense, political 
gossip acquired its “urgent” character, explains Joanne Freeman, because it seemingly 
“disclosed hidden threats to the republic” before their actualisation.239 
As a consequence, the time lag between the initial report of an actual occurrence and 
the subsequent dissemination of verified information was a fecund period of swirling 
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rumour.240 The September Massacres of 1792 are a case in point.241 In the four days after 
Paris heard of the fall of Verdun, the battle that saw Prussian forces under the Duke of 
Brunswick gain an unobstructed pathway to the French capital, all restrictions on the 
immediate term possibilities of the future were exploded. Since news did not travel at a 
regularised, predictable pace, it was not clear how much of a headstart the information 
relating to the battle had upon the pace to the oncoming Prussians. As one observer, Adelaïde 
Mareux, recorded: “One receives news at every moment,” much of it was conflicting, some of 
it later contradicted; and “[a]s to the affairs of the war,” she added, “we do not know what is 
going to happen.”242 The time available in which to adequately respond to perceived threats 
was therefore entirely unknown: in the time taken to receive news of the Prussian march, 
Brunswick might be mere hours from the gates of Paris, ready to enact his “ever memorable 
vengeance.” A disjuncture in the relative temporalities of rumour and verified news had 
already opened up in late August when Prussian forces successful captured the fortress town 
of Longwy. Although the French garrison surrendered in the early hours on 23 August, news 
of the defeat did not circulate amongst Parisians until at least the evening of 26 August.243 By 
29 August, observed Rosalie Jullien, royalists had begun to openly anticipate “the invasion of 
Paris in fewer than eight days.” Whilst frightening, such speculations made no account of the 
innumerable variables that now infested the near-term future: the marching speed of the 
Prussian troops, for example, or the fact that the prediction of “eight days” had been made a 
full seven days after the end of the siege itself.244 
In a context where events outpaced the circulation of information, rumour moved 
faster than fact. Fear of imminent Prussian invasion activated the long-standing conspiracy 
that the prisons of Paris were festooned with plotting priests and aristocrats. Brunswick, it 
was claimed, planned to let them loose, freeing them to murder and maim their captors. As 
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early as 19 August, the deputy Sylvain Codet had compared the prisons, already engorged 
with traitors, to “a crowd of conspirators.” They presented an imminent threat to all true 
patriots, he declared, predicting that, in “under eight days, many heads will fall.”245 The 
inchoate deliberative capacity of the crowd – labouring under the simultaneous absence of 
news and abundance of rumour – had necessarily to respond in an instant, even pre-emptive 
fashion. Thus as word of Verdun reached Paris, the sansculottes began their murderous 
frenzy. “How sad it is to be obliged to come to such extremities,” wrote the diarist Célestin 
Guittard de Floriban, before pointedly adding that, “it is far better to kill the devil before he 
kills us.”246 The denunciation culture incubated by the fall of the monarchy on 10 August 
1792 – and that would reach full throttle in the Convention – was, in part, built upon this 
desire to outmanoeuvre the enemies of the people, to strike at them before they could strike at 
the Revolution.247 This tactic necessarily placed a premium upon speed since in the time taken 
for the reception of news to turn speculation into certain knowledge, counterrevolutionary 
forces might have overwhelmed the state.248 The politics of treason and denunciation was thus 
premised upon a basic time calculus, one conditioned by the peculiar temporal dynamics of 
the Revolution itself. 
Unlike the epidemic of finger-pointing that afflicted the French Revolution, the 
American Revolution is often noted for its relative fraternal harmony. In fact, the need to 
identify hidden internal enemies was a similarly pressing problem. In July 1776, Joseph 
Hawley, a veteran of the Stamp Act protests, wrote a letter to Elbridge Gerry, who, at that 
time, was a delegate to the Continental Congress, and thus involved in administering for the 
general safety of the rebellious colonies. Hawley conjured an image of a Republic sinking 
under the weight of its own internal enemies:  
 
I have often said that I supposed a declaration of independence would be 
accompanied with a declaration of high treason: most certainly it must immediately 
and without the least delay follow it. Can we subsist? Did any state ever subsist 
without exterminating traitors? I never desire to see high treason extended further 
than it is now extended in Britain. But an act of high treason we must have instantly. 
No one thing made the declaration of independence indispensably necessary more 
than cutting off traitors. It is amazingly wonderful, that having no capital punishment 
for our intestine enemies, we have not been utterly ruined before now. For God’s 
sake, let us not run such risks a day longer. […] Dear sir, this matter admits of no 
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delay…Our whole cause is every moment in amazing danger for want of it. The 
common understanding of the people (like unerring instinct) has long declared this; 
and from the clear discerning which they have had of it, they have been long in 
agonies about it...249 
 
Treason had acquired such historic proportions because all forms of political betrayal could 
suddenly be conceived as potentially fatal threats to the Revolution.250 The “whole cause” of 
the Republic, Hawley observed, was in the most “amazing danger” from a want of the means 
to promptly punish traitors. The imminence of the danger filled “every moment” with risks 
that could not be run even “a day longer.”  
 An “act of high treason” would operate with the alacrity of those it was destined to 
protect: the people, whose judgement, “like unerring instinct,” could instantly intuit guilt or 
innocence. This political instantaneity, however, was also problematic. The radical 
changeability of political sympathies was one manifestation of the revolutionary demolition 
of absolutist historicity, which had restricted future political possibilities to static dimensions, 
such as the number of sovereign rulers or the scale of standing armies.251 It was not merely 
that the Revolution had increased the number of potential historical actors; rather, the 
vicissitudes of the Revolution itself constantly rearranged the fealties of those actors. When 
Sir William Howe led a successful British expedition to capture Philadelphia in 1777, many 
of the city inhabitants once considered loyal to the American cause suddenly switched sides. 
Aghast, the Pennsylvania General Assembly tightened its test oaths; later, an Assembly 
committed would observe how there were “many persons amongst us,” who, though 
“preferring a slavish dependence on the British King,” had, “by a professed neutrality,” 
succeeded in “screening themselves from the notice of Government.” Yet, “as soon as 
opportunity offered,” many had “declared themselves in favour of our Enemies, and became 
active against the Liberties of America.”252 Treasonable acts, like conspiracy, were often 
perpetrated suddenly, as if out of nowhere – as if out of a future that could not be foreseen. It 
was this essential non-knowledge of potential threats – this speculative engagement with 
politics – that conditioned revolutionary deliberative reasoning. Compounding this problem 
was the fact that even the outwardly authentic could – at a moment’s notice – be exposed as 
disloyal or traitorous. Many radicals in North Carolina, for example, demanded the total 
extirpation of all those opposed to the Revolution, since only by “hanging traitors,” and by 
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executing Loyalists in particular, would it be possible to “give stability to the new 
government.”253  
  
≈ 
 
The problem with rumour is the simultaneous promiscuity and passivity of its circulation. It is 
unclear where it comes from, who is transmitting it, and where it is going. In the context of 
revolutionary crisis, however, rumour satisfied a vital psychotemporal need: it made history 
make sense. It gave the increasingly shapeless, disfigured horizon of expectation some 
coordinating contours – and it did so within the accelerated time frame of revolutionary crisis. 
The remarkable concatenation and compression of events scrambled the linearity of intent, 
experience and outcome, in the process deranging the time of history. Rumour, by contrast, 
could morph itself in real time, almost as if to make up for the way in which verifiable 
knowledge constantly fell behind the pace of reported events. Conspiratorial explanandum 
therefore substituted for what, in the meantime, was the inefficacy of historical explanation. 
Furthermore, by adhering to a fictive “horizon of expectation” – to a future conceived in 
hearsay – individuals could believe themselves to be operating rationally in the present 
without any need for reference to a “space of experience,” especially as the unprecedented 
nature and speed of revolutionary events had already undermined the cognitive coordinating 
function of past events.  
 
  
III. Temporal claustrophobia: the Continental Congress, 1774-1776 
 
In January 1776, along the margins of an unfinished petition to the king, Pennsylvanian 
delegate to the second Continental Congress John Dickinson, scrawled a resume of recent 
events. “On January 8 the text of George III’s speech from the throne of October 26, 1775, 
reached Philadelphia,” in which the monarch had dismissed a previous petition – the Olive 
Branch – and accused his colonial subjects of “a desperate conspiracy.” “[A]lmost 
immediately several delegates began a move in Congress to secure passage of a resolution 
denying the king’s charge that the colonies were waging a rebellious war ‘for the purposes of 
establishing an independent Empire.’” The task of articulating the response fell to James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania, a conciliatory voice who called upon Congress to clarify its 
intentions with respect independence. An announcement was momentarily delayed and 
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subsequently consigned to a committee. When the motion of disavowal eventually emerged a 
month later, on 12 February, one dismayed delegate wrote in his diary that it was “very long, 
badly written and full against Independency.”254 It was now also irrelevant. During the 
intervening weeks the moderate sentiments that had largely dominated the Congress were 
entirely overtaken by events. “A succession of events that followed quickly upon arrival of 
the king’s speech,” wrote Dickinson, “ultimately undermined any hope that men of Wilson’s 
principles might have had to put Congress on record against independence.” According to the 
marginalia, details of the royal reply had arrived on “the very day Thomas Paine’s Common 
Sense was published in Philadelphia,” and “only the evening before letters had been received 
from Virginia bearing news of Lord Dunmore’s devastating attack on Norfolk on January 
1.”255 Over the course of a single day, the political patience required to issue a petition – and 
await a response – became suddenly intolerable. It seemed as though events were closing in 
upon the present, compressing the timescale of deliberation, and intensifying the dangers of 
delay. When Congress was later told, “on January 17, of Montgomery’s repulse at Quebec, 
the mood of the delegates changed decisively.”256  
Since its initial convocation in 1774, the Continental Congress was assailed by a 
crushing sense of temporal claustrophobia. As the volume and magnitude of political events 
increased, the time spans available to comprehend them diminished: the present was 
consequently deprived of its constancy by the hurried onset of the future, which truncated the 
spaces of experience, and created a sensation of compression.257 Whilst this undermined the 
predictive capacity of contemporaries, the future was not entirely unknowable, for despite the 
rapidity of its onset, the colonists largely assumed that it promised oppression and 
enslavement. This experience of accelerated time narrowed the space of deliberation. In this 
context, delay became unendurable.258 It forced congressional delegates into contemplating 
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schemes that would enable the colonies to break out of the tightening historical confines 
impressed upon them by the imperial crisis. Temporal claustrophobia not merely 
accompanied the onset of revolution; it created the conditions in which revolution would 
become unavoidable. Responses to changes in the perception of historical time governed the 
activities of the Continental Congress.  
 
≈ 
 
Despite a decade and more of escalating political tensions many colonial leaders seemed 
content to consign their conflict with the imperial metropole to a process of gradual 
resolution. As late as 1773, Dickinson had firmly advocated a policy of temporization. Hasty 
precipitation of a political crisis, he concluded, would set American purposes at nought: far 
better to wait “till Time shall ripen the Period for asserting more successfully the Liberties of 
these Colonies.”259 If the struggle were ever to occasion separation, then historical 
developments would naturally unfold according to familiar chronological coordinates. In the 
two centuries since the first settlers had landed on American soil, the colonies had progressed 
in terms of population, agriculture, civility – there seemed little reason to assume that this 
pattern would not continue across a similar timescale. “Our natural increase in wealth and 
population,” observed Thomas Cushing, the governor of Massachusetts, in September 1773, 
“will in a course of years, settle this dispute in our favour.” The alternative, “a rupture fatal to 
both countries,” was undesirable not least because it was unprecedented, and therefore 
unintelligible.260 For Dickinson, as for others, the imperial dispute – it was scarcely a 
rebellion, let alone a revolution – was situated within a foreseeable, pre-charted trajectory of 
colonial history. Patience was therefore essential. If the colonists were to properly pursue the 
path of “our future greatness,” remarked one New York pamphleteer, then “posterity” would 
need to “wait for those materials that may be furnished by the hand of Time.”261  
It was at a relatively late hour in the imperial crisis that the hand of time seemed to 
shift speeds. For several decades, the ideological concerns of classical precedent – in which 
once youthful, robust republics morphed over time into decadent and ultimately decrepit 
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empires – had organised the historical prognostications of colonial society.262 According to 
this cyclical vision of history, Great Britain may be a great empire at present, but it would, at 
some future point, inevitably succumb to decay. Given the sparsity of mid-eighteenth century 
perceptions of historical time, this remained, as late as 1771, a distinctly distant prospect.263 
Indeed, according to one time-travelling tale, entitled ‘Curious REMARKS by North-
American travellers, in 1994,’ the process of deterioration was predicted to proceed at a fixed 
rate for several centuries. Set two hundred and three years in the future, two bewildered 
Americans arrive in London and recall their “astonishment” at finding that “this once imperial 
city,” whose “trade was extended round the globe, and whose conquering arms had subdued a 
great part” of it, had “fallen to a familiar decay and ruin,” just like “Athens and Rome.”264 
Whilst the city was overgrown “with trees possessed by rock,” and Parliament had been 
reduced to “an old wall,” the once mighty centre of British power – Whitehall – was now a 
mere “field of turnips.”265  
During the thirty-one months that separated the Boston Tea Party and the Declaration 
of Independence, this gradualist conception of historical change disintegrated. Americans had 
long pondered the unnerving possibility that, if the British Empire were to collapse under the 
accumulated weight of its own decadence, if it were to degenerate into luxury and tyranny as 
classical precedent suggested, then the resulting economic and political catastrophe might see 
the colonies dragged down with it.266 In 1745, the governor of Massachusetts, William 
Shirley, could scoff at ideas of colonial rebellion or separation: “if ever there should a time 
come when they should grow restive and dispos’d to shake off their Dependency upon their 
Mother Country,” then such a “possibility” seemed at “the Distance of some Centuries.”267 By 
1776, however, the Welsh radical pamphleteer, Richard Price, presented the British Empire as 
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“enervated by luxury; encumbered with debts; and hanging by a thread.”268 The colonies were 
thus ripe for revolt, for whilst the Stamp Act (1765) and Townshend Acts (1767) had alerted 
many to the British capacity for tyranny, it was the imperial response to a violation of the Tea 
Act (1773) – and the Boston Tea Party, in particular – that accelerated fears of dissipation and 
tyranny.269  
 
≈ 
 
As several tons of tea filtered to the bottom of Boston harbour in December 1773, news of the 
destruction of East India Company property – a treasonable offence – reached London.270 
Incensed, Parliament decided upon revenge, and retaliated with the so-called ‘Intolerable 
Acts,’ closing the port and all but abolishing the Massachusetts executive council [Fig. 5]. In 
the space of several weeks Boston came to resemble an internment camp. It was only in 
retrospect, once the rapid concatenation of events unleashed in December 1773 could be 
properly apprehended, that Samuel Adams realised the extent to which these Acts had 
accelerated the onset of revolution. “The Boston Port Bill,” he wrote in April 1776, “suddenly 
wrought a Union of the Colonies which could not be brot about by the Industry of years.”271 
In September 1774 that “Union” – the First Continental Congress – assembled at the 
Carpenters’ Hall in Philadelphia, determined to defend “the welfare of our common country.” 
Quite what this involved, however, remained unclear.272 
From the very beginning the Continental Congress was divided between a radical 
desire to precipitate political change – in essence, to overhaul the constitutional relationship 
between the colonies and Great Britain, not merely to see the ‘Intolerable Acts’ revoked – and 
a moderate wish to preserve the historic ties between colonial periphery and imperial centre. 
Nobody wanted independence (at least, not yet). This delicate balance was dramatically 
exposed when, on 16 September 1774, Paul Revere rode into Philadelphia carrying the 
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Suffolk Resolves. In a nod to the galloping pace of events, Revere completed the three 
hundred and fifty mile ride from Suffolk County, Massachusetts, in a possibly recording-
breaking five days.273 The demands laid before the Congress by the Committees of 
Correspondence in the Suffolk, Worcester, Essex and Middlesex counties were firm if 
relatively unspectacular – a boycott of British goods, a campaign of non-compliance with the 
Boston Port Bill, the raising of a colonial militia. The tone, however, was incendiary. As the 
preamble declared, 
 
On the fortitude, on the wisdom and on the exertions of this important day, is 
suspended the fate of this new world, and of unborn millions. If a boundless extent of 
continent, swarming with millions, will tamely submit to live, move and have their being 
at the arbitrary will of a licentious minister, they basely yield to voluntary slavery, and 
future generations shall load their memories with incessant execrations. 
 
By claiming that the future liberties of the colonies were “suspended” upon the deliberations 
of a single day, the Suffolk Resolves underscored the immediacy of the historic moment.274 
This rhetoric of historical instantaneity placed the First Continental Congress within an 
accelerating flow of time, since, according to the authors, the future appeared to be folding 
itself in upon the present, visibly contracting the space of deliberation. That the “suspended” 
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time adumbrated in the Resolves was restricted to a single “important day” further heightened 
the need for speed. A moment lost and the cause would be lost; failure by the delegates to act 
instantly would swiftly entail “the endless and numberless curses of slavery upon us, our heirs 
and their heirs forever.” Boston, in fact, already “thronged with military executioners.”275 
Thus the colonies could no longer proceed forward in time, since the future – once thought to 
be predetermined – was now fraught with danger and hurtling towards the present at an 
unprecedented speed.  
 The Resolves were met with rapturous applause by the radicals; the moderates, 
meanwhile, were reduced to a few muted mutterings (and, in the case of John Dickinson, 
actual tears). The proposals were nevertheless adopted with immediate effect and with only 
partial dissent. Faced by a spontaneous and unsolicited petition from the aggrieved citizens of 
Massachusetts, many delegates realised that they were in danger of ceding the political 
initiative to the Committees. The authors of the Resolves had situated themselves as the true 
representatives of the public will, since they, unlike the dawdling Congress, were unshackled 
by the legal and historical conventions of colonial governance, and capable of spontaneously 
expressing popular indignation.276 By claiming to have momentarily stopped time, the authors 
sequestered the present moment from both past and future, enabling themselves to make an 
unmediated, instant identification between the demands outlined in the Resolves and the 
popular will as they saw it.277 This, in turn, would allow America – “this new world” – to 
reconfigure its historical trajectory, and thus to avoid the accelerated decrepitude that a 
continued, unbroken bond to the colonial past surely promised.  
The delegates were therefore trapped, both by the delegitimising slowness of their 
deliberations and by a “republican faction in Congress,” which, as Joseph Galloway observed, 
“had provided a mob, ready to execute their secret orders.” The “cruel practice of tarring and 
feathering had been long since introduce,” he added, which rather “lessened the firmness of 
some of the loyalists.”278 A month later, on 21 October, the Congress pushed back against the 
rhetoric of suspended time and issued a ‘memorandum’ to the colonies in which they pleaded 
for patience. The “situation of publick affairs grows daily more and more alarming,” the 
delegates admitted, yet despite “the violence with which affairs have been impelled,” they 
had “not yet reached that fatal point.” 
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We do not incline to accelerate their motion, already alarmingly rapid; we have chosen 
a method of opposition that does not preclude a hearty reconciliation with our   
fellow-citizens on the other side of the Atlantic. We deeply deplore the urgent necessity 
that presses us to an immediate interruption of commerce that may prove injurious to 
them.279 
 
Four days later, in a petition addressed directly to George III, the delegates bound the future 
of the colonies to the historic wisdom of the British crown, assuring the king of American 
loyalty “’til time shall be no more.”280 The First Continental Congress, which adjourned the 
very next day, narrowly outmanoeuvred the propulsion of the popular will by appealing to 
this static, iterable vision of history. Reconciliation with a benevolent monarchy, it was 
claimed, would not only ameliorate political tensions, it would avert the prospect of rupture 
by re-anchoring the future – now replete with uncertainty – to a vision of a verifiable and 
repetitious colonial past. In other words, the Congress believed itself to be capable of making 
political time slow down. They were to be swiftly disabused of this belief. 
 
≈ 
 
In February 1775, Parliament declared Massachusetts to be in a state of rebellion, trashing the 
loyal petition and vindicating the fears of the Suffolk Resolves. Events once again re-
accelerated.281 “As our publick affairs are now situated,” declared the anonymous author of 
one New England pamphlet, “almost every day opens new scenes, […] when not only our 
welfare, but [the] prosperity of future generations, seem to turn upon a critical period.”282 
Two months later, following the battles of Lexington and Concord, the political crisis, which 
now clearly threatened war, seemed to become unmoored from the ordinary calculation of 
dates and events. “All plans, proposals, &c. prior to the nineteenth of April, i.e. to the 
commencement of hostilities,” cautioned Paine, “are like the almanacks of the last year; 
which, though proper then, are superceded and useless now.”283 The apparent impetuosity of 
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the present had fractured the capacity of past experiences to arrange political expectations, 
rendering every passing moment both historic and unrecognisable.   
A second Congress was hastily convened. During the intervening months, however, 
the space of representation had expanded, enrolling an ever-greater number of potential actors 
into the political drama. Extra-legal Committees of Safety and Committees of Observance 
proliferated across the colonies, wresting control from local institutions of government, and 
justifying their actions by claiming to act in the name of the people.284 In May, the lieutenant 
governor of New York, Cadwallader Colden, expressed surprise at finding “how entirely the 
legal authority of Government is now superseded in this Place, where only a few Months ago 
the prospect of public affairs gave so much satisfaction to the Friends of Government.” The 
“affair” at Lexington and Concord, moreover, seemed to have “hurried people into violences 
tenfold greater than ever.” As deliberative power began rapidly devolving from the 
Congressional centre, the strata of mediation that separated the popular will and political 
action grew fewer. The precise location of authority was thrown into flux, yet the speed with 
which that authority could operate, at least on a local level, became more immediate. “We 
have got the rampant lion by the beard,” cried the New England pamphleteer: “by keeping the 
hold we may demolish his strength,” but should “we yield to his force, he will rend us to 
atoms.” If the inhabitants of the colonies were therefore to escape “the vociferous, sanguinary 
jaws” of British despotism, then time, far from slowing down, would need to be speeded up. 
A future fraught with oppression necessitated immediate rupture. Thus the almighty task of 
acceleration would confirm both the historical agency and political presence of the people. 
“Let us not only oppose, but make effectual opposition,” the pamphleteer concluded: “Let us 
do it in time. It is in our power!”285  
The possibility of compressing and contorting history, of squeezing immense political 
change into a comparatively narrow ambit of time, confirmed a significant, though often 
overlooked, consequence of the American Revolution: history would no longer unfold within 
time; time would now be restructured according to history. “As the greatest Events are 
Swiftly impelling each other upon us,” observed James Sullivan, “each moment in the present 
[is] worth an age in any other Time.”286 Within the revolutionary moment, moreover, the 
pace, pattern and proportions of human history had necessarily to be taken into consideration 
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because time was now perceived to be racing out of control, “Such [was] the celerity of the 
American world.”287 Time had become “metaphorically dynamicized into a force of history 
itself.”288 This perception of temporal contraction, in which a single present “moment” 
seemed to acquire the historical equivalence of “an age,” occasioned a divergence in the 
relative velocities of time and history. As such, it became possible to experience an 
immensity of historical change within miniscule units of time.  
In The Rights of British America (1774), Thomas Jefferson alluded to this 
temporalisation of history. “Scarcely have our minds been able to emerge from the 
astonishment into which one stroke of parliamentary thunder has involved us, before another 
more heavy, and more alarming, is fallen on us.” Whilst “single acts of tyranny” might be 
ascribed “to the accidental opinion of a day,” a prolonged “series of oppressions” pointed to 
“a deliberate and systematical plan of reducing us to slavery.” The onset of tyranny, a clear 
manifestation of imperial degeneration, now approached at an unfamiliar, accelerating pace. 
America may have “hastened through the reigns which preceded” the present monarchy, but 
“the violations of our rights were less alarming” then because they had been “repeated at 
more distant intervals than that rapid and bold succession of injuries” which would probably 
“distinguish the present from all other periods of [the] American story.”289 Thus whilst the 
future remained foreseeable, the time span that seemed to separate it from the present 
underwent foreshortening. In order to avert this rapidly advancing future, the delegates would 
need to smash the cycle of history, to devise a different historical trajectory, one that would 
embrace the unforeseeable.290 “There are many among us,” wrote Sullivan in 1776, who 
“stand Trembling on the brink and fear to launch away,” dumbfounded by the historical void 
that had opened itself before them. The Declaration of Independence was therefore 
experienced as an immense act of temporal violence.291 A fracture in the “connexion” 
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between Britain and her colonies, Mercy Otis Warren later observed, had also occasioned a 
rupture in the shape of history, with “the sword drawn, and the scabbard thrown down the 
gulf of time.”292 Quite when peace would return was therefore “an event enwrapped in the 
womb of futurity.”293  
Whilst reconfiguring the dimensions of human history, of altering the disconcerting 
content of the future, appeared possible, this could only truly be realised, as Paine constantly 
reiterated, within the contracting time flow – the “now” – of the Revolution. “The present 
winter,” he observed in late 1775, was “worth an age if rightly employed,” since the future-
historical redirection of America following independence would be so immense; but if it were 
“lost or neglected,” then “the whole continent” would likely “partake of the evil.”294 The task 
was thus simultaneously liberating and onerous: the time available in which to reshape the 
future, after all, constantly depleted. The “progress and changeability of times and things” 
exerted novel pressures upon contemporaries since one false move might jeopardise the shape 
of the American future. “Every one who has a hand in this glorious Revolution,” wrote the 
New Hampshire delegate, William Whipple, “will consider that the Happiness of future 
Generations, as well as the present, depend on their doings.” The problem was that failure 
would not only entail trans-historical consequences, it would also be “our own fault.”295 In the 
months preceding independence, the temporal scope of the present shrank even further under 
the stresses of this open future. In his fourth ‘Forester Letter,’ Paine illustrated how, within 
the accelerating stream of the revolutionary “now,” the formation of swathes of future 
historical time might be formed – or wrecked. By citing the loyalist delegates returned to the 
Pennsylvanian State Assembly in early 1776, Paine characterised those still seeking 
reconciliation as having “travelled to the summit of inconsistency, and that, with such 
accelerated rapidity as to acquire autumnal ripeness by the first of May.” “Back to the first 
plain path of nature,” he instructed, “and begin anew, for in this business your first footsteps 
were wrong.”296 The anxiety that accompanied temporal claustrophobia confronted the 
delegates of the Continental Congress with the finitude of cyclical time. If America 
squandered the political potential of the accelerating present, it would very swiftly confront 
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its “rotting time,” and be dragged to decay by the crumbling moral edifice of the British 
Empire. 
 
≈ 
 
As the crisis continued to gather pace, the deliberations of Congress and the will of the people 
– as interpreted by the Committees – began moving at different speeds.297 During an alleged 
interrogation of “a loyal Constitutionalist” by a New York Committee, one member extolled 
the primacy of popular action by pointing to its velocity: “What, do you drink Tea? Take care 
what you do…for you are to know the Committee command the mob, and can in an instant 
let them loose upon any man who opposes their decrees, and complete his destruction.”298 
Serious discussion and due diligence were all very well, the Committee member argued, but 
the patience of the people was almost exhausted. “At a time when Slavery is clanking her 
infernal chains,” read one handbill, stuffed through the letter-boxes and beneath the doormats 
of every house in New York city, “when Oppression, with gigantick strides is approaching 
your once happy retreats…will you supinely fold your arms, and calmly see your weapons of 
defence torn from you, by a band of ruffians?” “How long will ye patiently bear insult and 
wrong?”299 In Congress, meanwhile, the discarded petitions and pleas piled up. On 3 May, the 
Massachusetts provincial congress beseeched delegates to “stem the rapid Progress of a 
tyrannical Ministry.” Resolute to ensure reconciliation with “the mother country,” Dickinson, 
James Duane, Edward Rutledge and other moderates played for time. “[I]f they were to be 
regarded,” Samuel Adams later complained, “they would continue the conflict a century.”300 
Still, when moderate delegates proposed that a further petition – an Olive Branch – be sent to 
the king, a critical number of radicals relented. Congress had signalled “their indulgence of 
Mr. Dickinson,” recalled Jefferson, a consequence “of their great desire not to go too fast for 
any respectable part of our body.”  
As the leaves turned and the rough winter winds chilled Philadelphia, the gathering 
sense of temporal claustrophobia became intolerable. Bouts of panic regularly threatened to 
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reduce Congressional sittings to chaos. When a resolution was passed in May, inviting those 
colonies without “a government sufficient to the exigencies of their affairs” to take matters 
into their own hands, Duane erupted: “Why all this haste? why this urging? why this 
driving?”301 Outpaced by the hyperactivity of the Committees, and rebuffed by the 
indifference of the British crown, Congress underwent a disorientating experience of 
historical time. “Questions of Importance,” were now, “continuously arising,” confronting 
delegates with a confusing, non-diachronic event flow.302 The ordering of history – the entire 
notion of a trajectory, sequence, or classical “taxonomy” of beginnings and endings – was 
being decisively overturned.303 “It has ever appeared to me,” observed Adams, “that the 
natural course and order of things was this;” 
 
…for every colony to institute a government; for all the colonies to confederate, and 
define the limits of the continental Constitution; then to declare the colonies a 
sovereign state, or a number of confederated sovereign states; and last of all, to form 
treaties with foreign powers. But I fear we cannt proceed systematically, and that we 
shall be obliged to declare ourselves independent States, before we confederate, and 
indeed before all the colonies have established their governments…304 
 
The synchronic intensity of the crisis thus exerted further temporal stress upon the 
deliberative capacity of the Congress.305 For Adams, it had become “pretty clear, that all these 
Measures will follow one another in a rapid Succession, and it may not perhaps be of much 
Importance which is done first.” Speed nevertheless remained vital: “Events of such 
Magnitude as those which present themselves now in such quick Succession, require constant 
Attention…” By April 1776, decisive action was desperately urgent. In a series of letters sent 
to John and Samuel Adams, the lawyer Benjamin Kent upbraided the failures of their 
dawdling fellow delegates: “What in the name of common sense, are you Gentlemen of the 
Continentall Congress about,” fumed Kent, citing how his fellow Bostonians had become 
“quiet Impatient under your delay of an open declaration.”306 Proposals for petitions to the 
king continued to proliferate. Yet as Paine had previously observed, within the abbreviating 
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temporal schema of the Revolution, this means of reconciliation had voided its validity: 
 
To be always running three or four thousand miles with a tale or a petition, waiting 
four or five months for an answer, which when obtained requires five or six more to 
explain it in, will in a few years be looked upon as folly and childishness –. There 
was a time when it was proper, and there is a proper time for it to cease.307 
 
That time was “now.”308 Remarkably, the moderate delegates were able to hold out until the 
late spring, when – finally – the patience of the people snapped.  
The scene was set on 6 May at the Virginia Convention in Williamsburg. “Ages yet 
unborn, and millions existing at present” would depend upon its deliberations, remarked 
Richard Henry Lee.309 Four days later, with proceedings barely underway, the doors of the 
Convention swung open and a troop of petitioners filed in. A delegation from Augusta 
County reached the front, eager to express the “necessity of making the Confederacy of the 
United Colonies the most perfect, independent, and lasting.” Fearful that the pyrotechnic 
vengeance recently exacted upon the inhabitants of Norfolk would soon be replicated across 
the colony, they called for a government that would “bear the test of all future ages.”310 
Oppression under the British appeared to shimmer along the time horizon like a grotesque 
mirage, advancing with a pace inversely proportional to the slowness of Congressional 
deliberation. As the embattled citizens of Virginia had come to realise, the only means of 
effacing the future was to frame it for themselves.311 On 15 May the colony seceded from the 
British Empire, unilaterally declared independence, and called upon the Continental Congress 
to do the same.  
On the very same day, in Philadelphia, John Adams secured the passage of a 
resolution demanding all authority derived from the crown “be totally suppressed,” instead 
placing government “under the authority of the people.” Back in June 1775, Adams had been 
portrayed America as “a vast, unwieldy machine,” resigned to the fact that “our liberty and 
felicity will be preserved in the end, though not in the speediest and surest manner.” “We 
cannot force Events.”312 Now, in the late spring of 1776, Adams was actively seeking to 
foment internal revolution amongst the most moderate colonies. The “exigencies” of the 
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present moment, after all, demanded it. Convinced that the resolution would spare their own 
colonial assembly, the Pennsylvanian delegates blithely voted in favour, ignoring Duane’s 
protestation that “this preamble” was merely a “mechanism” for independence.313 Duane was 
right: Adams had placed the “unwieldy machine” into motion. In fewer than four hours, a 
group of radicals led by Paine and Benjamin Rush descended upon the Philosophical Society 
Hall and announced their intention of enacting “the resolve of Congress on the fifteenth 
instant.” Within weeks the Pennsylvania Assembly was abolished and a Provincial 
Convention established in its place.  “The revolution is now began,” this new body declared 
on 25 June, “and must be supported.”314 
 
≈ 
 
The sensation of claustrophobia was often informed by the absence, not the abundance, of 
information relative to enclosing future events. During the late-eighteenth century, trans-
Atlantic news networks were sluggish, or simply unpredictable, still bound by the rhythms of 
nature.315 “A ship in 7 weeks from London, brings us pretty perfect intelligence of the infernal 
designs of our Ministerial enemies,” observed Richard Henry Lee in October 1775. This is a 
telling statement: at the height of the crisis, “intelligence” could take up to “7 weeks” to reach 
America; yet, upon arrival, news merely confirmed rebel suspicions – their future predictions 
– that “infernal designs” were being hatched in London. In normal times this might not have 
matter; but as a superabundance of historically significant events unfolded, a trans-oceanic 
and inter-colonial backlog of information built up, as the reports of 8 January 1776 
demonstrate. This, in turn, created disorientating time lags between event occurrence and 
information reception. 
James Hutson has described the advent of the American Revolution as the “triumph 
of a delusion,” since so many of its protagonists appeared to be labouring under the effects of 
mental ill-health. Franklin considered John Adams, who was to suffer three nervous 
breakdowns before 1783, as “absolutely out of his senses.” In the early 1770s, James Otis was 
actually sent to confinement – “bound hand and foot” – as a certified “Lunatick.” Alice Lee 
Shippen, meanwhile, declared that her “imagination” had been “disorder’d” by the 
Revolution, and was subsequently confined for her own safety in a Pennsylvanian asylum.316 
The use of terminology derived from clinical psychology – such as claustrophobia – is not 
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intended to proffer an actual diagnosis of the collective state of mind of the congressional 
delegates. Whilst it is employed here as primarily a literary device, it also conforms to the 
psychological landscape of the early Revolution, which was marked by delusions, neuroses, 
and paranoia. These responses were conditioned by the experience of revolutionary historical 
time. In September 1774, one Falmouth minister observed how his congregation had begun 
evincing “a discontent bordering upon madness,” a response, he deduced, to “the late 
Proceedings of Parliament respecting America,” which “spreads fast amongst them.”317  
The primary rhetorical gestures of the period, meanwhile, emphasised enclosure: the 
colonists, it was claimed, were being placed “in shackles,” they were to be “enslaved” and 
ensnared by the forces of British ministerial, and later monarchical, despotism. Washington 
collapsed these two fixations – enslavement and temporality – when, in a letter of August 
1774, he wrote that, “the Crisis is arrivd” when the colonists would need to decide between 
“our Rights” or to a train of events – a new historical trajectory, in effect – that “will make us 
as tame, & abject Slave, as the Blacks we Rule over…”318 This sensation of suffocation – 
translated into a fixation with the political future of the colonies – was a commonplace 
amongst the revolutionaries. As Hutson concludes – contra Bernard Bailyn – the conviction 
that “the British ministry was conspiring to enslave America” was not a realistic response to 
recent history; it is instead “explicable by the principles of psychology rather than a theme in 
intellectual history.”319 If viewed as a response to contemporary experiences of historical 
time, however, the category of claustrophobia synthesises these two perspectives. The belief 
that their “Ministerial enemies” were conspiring to enslave them was patently ridiculous and 
borne of colonial paranoia.320 This paranoia, however, was fostered within a system of slowly 
disseminating information and rapidly accelerating events. The sense of historical 
compression this occasioned was not so much a response to the contents of recent history as 
to its dynamics. A disruption in traditional intellectual appreciations of historical structure and 
sequence occasioned a psychotemporal response akin to claustrophobia – an anxiety disorder 
activated by a fearful response to enclosed (or enclosing) spaces.321 
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≈ 
 
It was only when the conflicting speeds of popular and Congressional deliberation re-
converged on 4 July that the potential uncontrollability of revolutionary time was – for the 
moment – assuaged. In the immediate term, the spontaneous will of the people was subsumed 
by the urgencies of war. In a circular letter sent in December, John Hancock hoped to corral 
this energy in a bid to defend the besieged Fort of Ticonderoga: the “Affairs of our Country 
are in a Situation to admit of no Delay,” he wrote, expressing his hope that, “by your Regard 
for succeeding Generations, you will, without a Moment’s Delay, exert yourselves to forward 
the Troops for Ticonderoga from your States.”322 The imperial crisis and the onset of 
independence had nonetheless altered the perception of historical time. In less than two years, 
the colonies had overthrown a century-and-a-half of British authority and established an 
entirely new, albeit loosely confederated state. The historical duration of political chronology 
was consequently reduced from centuries and decades to weeks and days. “We have crowded 
the business of an age into the compass of a few months,” reflected Paine in 1777: “Truly 
may we say, that never did men grow old in so short a time!”323  
The decision to issue the Declaration offered no guarantee that the recently minted 
American republic would regain control over this torrential sense of time. The act of 
independence, after all, was also an act of improvisation. It was not a moment of political 
foresightedness, nor the culmination of a carefully calculated political programme. It was a 
response to the rush of events; it was a decision arrived at by a small group of panicked men, 
many of whom now found themselves behaving in unfamiliar ways. “What do you think must 
be my sensations, when I see the Congress now daily passing Resolutions which I most 
earnestly pressed for against Wind and Tide, Twelve Months ago?”324 Whilst the gathering 
imminence of the future would not be entirely effaced by the Declaration, it could now be 
freely confronted. 
 
III. Secular history, divine time 
 
The Declaration of Independence classified the United States as a Republic in time.325 
Conceived in “the course of human events,” it was the product of historical forces, many of 
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which seemed beyond its control.326 The urgent need of ensuring their own “future security” 
had forced the colonists to intervene in an historical “course” that seemed to be stretching 
towards one “direct object,” namely, “the establishment of an absolute Tyranny.” In an early 
draft, Jefferson depicted the temporal dynamics of this “course” as the product of the efforts 
of despotism, as a form of historical acceleration that, by endangering the future liberty of the 
colonies, had delegitimised the claims of the British crown: “Future ages would hardly 
believe that the hardiness of one man” – George III – “adventured, within the short compass 
of twelve years only, to lay a foundation so broad & undisguised for tyranny over a people 
fostered & fixed in principles of freedom.”327 Averting this trajectory towards “Tyranny,” 
however, did not simultaneously charterer an alternative “course.” Rather, as Paine wrote in 
April 1776, America now “hath a blank sheet to write upon.”328 Mercy Otis Warren agreed, 
observing how the leap towards independence had seemed like “an experiment of hazard,” an 
act that suddenly severed a connection and abolished a “protection” that the colonies “had 
claimed for more than a century and a half.”329 In July 1776, the future seemed entirely open.  
It was in this unsettling context of newness that Jefferson sketched the Declaration. 
By citing “human events” as the reason the “political band” binding the colonies to their king 
had “dissolved,” the Declaration might have seemed like a transitory document, a scrap of 
paper that would simply burn up in contact with the accelerated, ongoing history of the 
Revolution. By appealing to “the Laws of Nature” and “Nature’s God,” however, Jefferson 
attempted to invest the revolutionary undertaking with a divine immutability, to place it 
beyond the malignity of human history. It is almost as though Jefferson were seeking to 
address a Pocockian problem – the archetypical republican crisis of “temporal finitude,” 
experienced here as the onset of a radically open future – in Lockean language – by an 
“appeal to heaven,” derived from the Second Treatise on Government (1689), by John 
Locke.330 As Timothy Breen has demonstrated, this “Lockean moment,” which coincided 
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with the advent of independence, alerted the colonists to the fact that “God-given rights” were 
“not dependent on Common Law, Magna Carta, or the Glorious Revolution,” all which were 
historical in character.331 Jefferson had clung to the Second Treatise during his work on the 
Declaration, inscribing the text with the need, as Breen sees it, for the colonists “to leap out of 
history.”332 Independence was thus conceived as a rupture between time and history – as an 
action that would stabilise the future prospects of the Republic by locating the recently 
independent states within a stream of divine time, and by deriding “undisguised” despotism as 
the work of wicked men, the actors in a contingent, secular history.333 America, Jefferson 
declared, would escape “the history of the present King” – “a history of repeated injuries and 
usurpations” – and instead advance into the future “with a firm reliance on the protection of 
divine Providence.” 
The references to a divine temporality threaded throughout the preamble to the 
Declaration may be seen as part of a broader effort to portray the Revolution as an act of 
renewal or regeneration, a counterbalance to the view, prevalent during the preceding months, 
that independence would promise an entirely new beginning, unmoored from all historical 
precedent.334 Appealing to a divine temporality held out the possibility of unity across time, 
the victory of continuity over contingency: the “settlement of America,” Adams had long 
believed, was “the opening of a grand design in Providence,” one that would illuminate the 
ignorant and emancipate the enslaved.335 As Ruth Bloch has argued, religious time reassured 
the patriots’ “conviction that the secular history of the Revolution,” which appeared inchoate 
or explicable only by reference to human connivance, “had a higher, transhistorical meaning,” 
a vein of thought that could be traced back to the “settlement,” as Adams claimed, and the 
Puritanism of the seventeenth century.336 Central to this search for “transhistorical meaning” 
was the millennialism of contemporary Christianity.337 The carapace of millennialism 
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softened the abruptness of human historical rupture.338 This meant that the American 
Revolution, as the Connecticut Congregationalist minister David Tappan observed, could be 
viewed as part of “the grand chain of Providence,” a “principal link” that was “gradually 
drawing after it the most glorious consequences to mankind.” Its perceived historical speed, 
meanwhile, was comprehensible as the means of “hastening on the accomplishments of the 
scripture-prophecies relative to the Millenial State.”339 Millennial prefiguration illuminated 
the future pathways of the fledgling Republic. The “Light” of the Revolution “spreads,” 
observed John Adams, in an uncharacteristic fit of millennial fervour, after the victory at 
Yorktown: “may it shine more and more until the perfect day.” Attributing the speed of 
revolutionary events to a millennial temporality reassured those who gazed out upon a civic 
and political future that was seemed unnervingly open and unknowable. This also legitimised 
the Revolution since it imbued political rupture with a wider, global purpose: “The Emperor 
of Germany is adopting, as fast as he can, American ideas of toleration and religious liberty,” 
continued Adams, predicting that they would “very soon” become “the fashionable system of 
all Europe.”340 
Millennialism connoted completion in every sense. Whilst it enabled the 
rationalisation of acceleration towards finality, “the perfect day,” it also augured the approach 
of a period where time and history, forces that so maligned the late-eighteenth century mind, 
were themselves seen to conclude. Millennial thought did not merely anticipate ‘End Times’; 
it anticipated the end of time. In an oration delivered to the American Philosophical Society in 
1780, Timothy Matlack defined the “Milennium” as a time of timelessness, as “a Thousand 
Years of perfect Peace and Happiness,” a period unmolested by the intrusions of history.341 In 
particular, the divine temporality of the Declaration, which percolated throughout 
revolutionary discourse during the late-1770s and early-1780s, stood as a counterpoint to the 
fretful future visions of civic republican thought, literalising – and thereby neutralising – the 
“temporal finitude” promised by classical politics.342 Millennial temporality rejected the 
endless cyclicality, the rise and inevitable demise of liberty, of civic republicanism by 
seeming to invest history with a vector. The process of secularization, in which the prophetic 
anticipation of the end of times was prorogued for political aims, and which depended upon 
the incomprehensibility of progress, was not, in post-Independence America, transformed into 
an organising principle by the experience of accelerated historical time. The political 
                                                
338 These ideas are discussed in greater detail in, Ruth H. Bloch, Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in 
American Thought, 1756-1800 (Cambridge, CUP, 1985), pp.75-93 
339 David Tappan, A Discourse Delivered at the Third Parish in Newbury, on the first of May, 1783 (Salem, MA., 
Samuel Hall, 1783), pp.12-13. 
340 John Adams to Abigail Adams (18 December, 1781), in L. H. Butterfield, Marc Friedlaender, eds., The Adams 
Papers. Adams Family Correspondence (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 1973), IV, p.266. 
341 Timothy Matlack, cited in Bloch, Visionary Republic, p.97. 
342 Melvin B. Endy, Jr., ‘Just War, Holy War, and Millennialism in Revolutionary America,’ The William and 
Mary Quarterly 42 (1, 1985), pp.3-25. 
  
92 
developments of the late-eighteenth century occasioned ever-briefer intervals for the 
accumulation of historical experience, making anticipation and uncertainty coterminous; in 
America, by contrast, revolutionary acceleration, as the motor of millennial prognostications, 
seemed to offer a means of evading a classically-informed cycle of historical decay, and 
escaping time altogether.343 
As the unbounded promise of the Revolution soured after 1783, the globalising-
millennial perspective of American Christianity proved incapable of rationalising the 
increasingly imperilled secular future of the Republic. The “course” of history began to shed 
its millennial coherence as “human events” concatenated, transforming the present into a 
profusion of confusingly ordered, ominous occurrences.344 In 1779, David Rittenhouse had 
filled his Continental Almanac with a series of biblically inspired predictions for the near-
term future, amongst which featured the allegorical transformation of bayonets into 
plowshares.345 Despite the embrace of acceleration, the bounties of the divine progress of time 
consistently failed to materialise. Millennial expectations consequently elongated.346 Another 
Congregationalist minister and the seventh president of Yale, Ezra Stiles, in 1774 situated 
‘End Times’ at a distance of five hundred years; by 1785, he had already added an additional 
three hundred years to his prediction, since it was increasingly unclear where – if anywhere – 
the present was leading.347 Cyclical theories of deterioration and decay began displacing 
millennial expectations of future felicity as the Revolution, an historical phenomenon 
seemingly possessed of its own temporality, became interminable.  
 
≈ 
 
A change in the way history was experienced was reflected by a change in the way history 
was written.348 In William Gordon’s The History of the Rise, Progress and Establishment of 
the Independence of the United States of America (1788), David Ramsay’s The History of the 
American Revolution (1789) and Mercy Otis Warren’s The Rise, Progress and Termination of 
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the American Revolution (1805), amongst others, the subject matter of Revolution seemed to 
revolutionise the methodological approach.349  
The first casualty of revolutionary history writing was the explanatory capacity of 
Providence, for whilst providential history attributed causation to God, revolutionary history 
clearly belonged to humankind.350 Indeed, history now seemed unintelligible without the 
expatiation of human agency. The historical notion, contained within Puritanical histories of 
New England in particular, and later generalised by Samuel Davies, that God’s “hand” 
sustained “the great chain of causes and effects” throughout all time was voided by the 
experience of the Revolution.351 Extant theories of historical causation were overturned 
because revolutionary history was seen to appear with such rapid and unexpected force. In an 
excursus on 1775, Ramsay observed how at “the beggining of the year, the colonists were 
farmers, merchants, and mechanics,” yet by “its close, they had assumed the profession of 
soldiers,” ready to confront the British Empire. “So sudden a transformation of so numerous, 
and so dispersed a people, is without parallel.” In William Gordon’s The History of the Rise, 
Progress, and Establishment, of the Independence of the United States of America (1788), the 
first full-length historical account of the Revolution, matters often turn on tiny temporal 
moments – on hours or even minutes. At the final battle of Saratoga in 1777, vital information 
is relayed to the American brigadier general, John Nixon, which, had it been received “a 
quarter of an hour later, would probably have proved fatal to his whole brigade,” and 
endangered the Revolution itself.352 Such an account testifies to the narrowing time horizon of 
revolutionary events in which shrinking deliberative and experiential spaces are seen to 
engender a disorientating sense of hurry. 
These years, Warren concurred, would inevitably be “marked in the annals of time, as 
one of the most extraordinary eras in the history of man.”353 The centrality of contingency and 
immediacy, neither of which had featured in a providential historical reality where the actions 
of God negated the efficacy of human will, fractured the shape of history because they so 
clearly conflicted with an order and arc of human affairs governed by divine authority. As 
history thus happened at an accelerated rate, historians were forced to confine their accounts 
to the maelstrom of Paine’s “now.” For William Gordon, in particular, this involved abrupt 
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shifts in grammatical tense. He wrote many of his battle narratives in the present, which, 
whilst heightening the dramatic and rhetorical thrust, also pointed to a new historical 
consciousness. A quickening of the narrative pace is achieved through a blending of space 
and time, often to the edge of incoherence, which enhances the sense of synchronic urgency. 
“What scenes now offer to our view!” declares Gordon in his record of the Battle of Bunker 
Hill: 
 
Here, a large and noble town, consisting of about 300 dwelling houses, and near upon 
200 other buildings, in one great blaze, burning with amazing fury… There, in 
Boston, the steeples, houses, and heights, are covered with the inhabitants… Yonder, 
the hills around the country, and the fields, that afford a safe and distinct view of the 
momentous contest, are occupied by Americans of all ages and orders.354 
 
Since human efficacy and historical contingency were anathema to the divine lexicon, making 
sense of the Revolution became an increasingly problematic task. As Lester Cohen has 
observed, by locating contingency in the future – “in human time, not in the transmundane” – 
revolutionary historical writing implicitly acknowledged the loss of “cosmic consolation” 
inherent in the belief that the future always-already possessed a meaning and structure 
derived from divine sanction.355 The invocation of the divine in the preamble of the 
Declaration thus reintroduced transcendent meaning to independence, where it might 
otherwise have been seen as the consequence of mere happenstance.  
The fact that revolutionary histories also contained speculations as to what might 
have happened in other circumstances suggests many authors now saw an historical sphere 
replete with contingency and a past-future that had been hastily constructed within the ever-
narrowing timespan of the past-present. The speed of revolutionary history thus forced 
revolutionary historians to replace ideas of divine immanence with the experience of 
historical imminence. Mercy Warren described the Boston Massacre of 1770 as an 
“accident,” a mere “trivial circumstance.” Yet it was precisely from “these minute accidents” 
– which would ordinarily have been “beneath the dignity of history to record” – that, “the 
most important events” arose. For Jefferson, the entire revolutionary era was a history “of 
great events from small causes.” “So inscrutable is the arrangement of causes & consequences 
in this world that a two-penny duty on tea, unjustly imposed in a sequestered part of it, 
changes the condition of all its inhabitants.”356 This threw historical causality into chaos, for 
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within the revolutionary crucible, history seemed to appear as if from nowhere. Throughout 
the Revolution, observed John Marshall, “fresh difficulties” were perceived to have “unfolded 
themselves.”357 With once omnipotent despots overturned and Providence sidelined (often in 
favour of pure chance), history became a seemingly ungovernable sphere of multiple, 
unpredictable human activities. It was unclear what, if anything, the past could usefully 
transmit to the future. “With the intrusion of a qualitative concept of change,” which 
depended on contingent human actions and perceptions, “the homogenous metaphorical space 
of philosophical history threatened to collapse.”358  
 
 
III. Time “pile-ups”: The National Assembly, May–October 1789 
 
“As soon as the word had been pronounced, and the estates-general had been called by the 
parlement and promised by the king, events hurried on and piled-up [se pressèrent et 
s’entassèrent].”359 In his Précis de l’histoire de la Révolution Françoise (1792), Jacques-
Antoine Rabaut-Pommier, a deputy to the National Convention, recalled how the 
precariousness of royal authority in 1789 had presaged the compression of history. The “pile-
up” began in late-June when rural grain shortages threatened starvation in the capital.360 
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According to one observer, efforts to ensure a steady supply of grain meant that all the 
windmills around Versailles were ordered “to grind grain night and day,” since Paris was 
“menaced by the total dearth of this substance” if supplies “were delayed by even a few 
hours.”361 As the baron de Besenval later recalled, the “diminution of this essential 
commodity,” created “a fear of the future,” and “produced a general ferment.” Market places 
across France, like the elongating queues outside Parisian bakeries, became “scenes of 
violence” as impatience turned to hunger and then to outright panic.362  
Panic began to permeate political decision-making, notably in the National Assembly, 
which reached a state of high neurosis in early-July. With Necker unceremoniously 
dismissed, the Bastille unexpectedly sacked, and the severed heads of several government 
officials bobbing about the streets of Paris, rumours began to swirl amongst the deputies that 
the people were readying themselves to march upon Versailles, intent upon reclaiming their 
monarch and recalling their representatives. Sessions became tense and skittish: even the 
dimmest sound of gunshot would have deputies scrambling to the windows, eager to preview 
the scale of the oncoming onslaught. After 14 July almost every session opened with fevered 
reports of rural brigandage, aristocratic conspiracy, and imminent starvation; letters arrived 
on the floor of the Assembly beseeching the deputies to do something – anything – to 
alleviate the crisis of civil disorder. “We are all in a state of unbelievable agitation,” 
complained one deputy from Dijon; another, from Pontivy, confessed to having become 
“consumed by anxiety.”363  
By August, dearth and disorder in the countryside had created an overwhelming sense 
of simultaneity that seemed to scramble the sequential coherence of historical experience. 
“One cannot believe how the warnings were sounded, on the same day and at the same time, 
almost everywhere,” observed the deputy Michel-René Maupetit on 31 July: and “the 
warnings that have spread, almost on the same day, throughout the entire kingdom,” now 
threatened to “place all France aflame.”364 In order to satisfy popular impatience and to 
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navigate the revolutionary situation, the deputies of the National Assembly attempted a series 
of political manoeuvres designed to clear the piling-up of events, to comprehend the new 
synchrony of history. Their deliberations were determined by the temporal and historical 
dimensions of the gathering crisis; the decisions they took, however, merely exacerbated it.  
 
≈ 
 
“Thus closed the month of July,” observed one deputy from the Loire, a month “so stormy” 
that “it alone contains the events of a century.”365 For several weeks, the urgent fiscal and 
constitutional demands of the state had served to create a common sense of urgency amongst 
the deputies.366 As the panic sweeping the countryside engulfed the National Assembly, so the 
timeline of deliberation contracted.  
On the night of 4 August, time suddenly seemed to evaporate. In an unexpected 
intervention, the vicomte de Noailles made a dramatic allusion to the plight of the people, 
who, faced with continuing uncertainty, had “felt obliged to arm themselves,” and who “now 
know no break” upon their energies. “[T]he kingdom,” de Noailles warned, was “floating at 
this moment,” caught “between the alternative of the destruction of society or a government 
which will be admired and emulated throughout Europe.”367 France was in a state of temporal 
suspension; and unless immediate action was taken, the future integrity of the state could not 
be guaranteed. As a demonstration of patriotic fraternity, the vicomte proposed the instant 
abolition of seigneurial rights and the revocation all feudal dues, subject to their redemption. 
Atop this bonfire of privileges was soon piled clerical tithes, pecuniary immunities, taxation 
exemptions, and the ordinances of personal servitude, such the corvée. For Leguen de 
Kérangal, deputy from the Basse-Bretagne, these renunciations could not have come soon 
enough. “The people,” he announced, “impatient to obtain justice, and weary of oppression, 
hastens to destroy these titles, monuments to the barbarity of our ancestors.”  
 
For the sake of peace, hasten to make these promises to France: a general cry may 
now be heard; you have not a moment to lose; one day of delay occasions new 
embraces; the fall of empires were announced with less clatter! 
                                                
qui devaient mettre toute la France en feu. Car on ne peut imaginer que, dans le même jour et au même instant, 
presque partout, le tocsin ait résonné…” 
365 Antoine-François Delandine, Mémorial historiques des États-Généraux: Pendant le mois de Juillet, par un 
depute de troisième ordre (Paris, M. Delavigne, 1789), pp.270-71: “Ainsi s’est terminé le mois de juillet, si 
orageux, si digne d’être considéré attentivement par l’histoire. Lui seul renferme les événemens [sic] d’un siècle.”  
366 Michel Biard, La Révolution Française: Dynamiques, influences, débats, 1787-1804 (Paris, Armand Colin, 
2004), p.46. 
367 M. J. Mavidal, M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, Recueil complet des débats 
législatifs & politiques des chambres Françaises. First series (82 vols., Paris, P. Dupont, 1862-1913), VIII, p.343: 
“Elles ont cru devoir s’armer contre la force, et aujourd’hui elles ne connaissent plus de frein, […] le royaume 
flotte, dans ce moment, entre l’alternative de la destruction de la société, ou d’un gouvernement qui sera admiré et 
suivi de toute l’Europe.” 
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By collapsing the distinction between the immediate and the historical, Kérangal heightened 
the atmosphere of temporal urgency. Thus the Assembly “would have prevented the razing of 
chateaus,” for example, if it had “been more prompt in declaring that the terrible arms that 
they contain, and which have tormented the people for centuries, were to be destroyed by [a] 
compulsory reclamation.”368 Unrest in the countryside was given a retroactive rationale: 
popular clamour was the expression of an understandable impatience with the slowness of 
national renovation; it was legitimised by “centuries” of oppression [Fig. 6]. One by one, the 
haute noblesse – du Châtelet, d’Aiguillon, de Beauharnais – clambered to the rostrum to 
declare their own customary expiration. Delegations of deputies rose to renounce regional 
privileges, to offer their sympathies with the “impatience” of the people.369 The rate of 
                                                
368 AP, VIII, p.345: “Vous eussiez prévenu l’incendie des châteaux, si vous aviez été plus prompts à déclarer que 
les armes terribles qu’ils contenaient, et qui tourmentent le peuple depuis des siècles, allaient être anéanties par le 
rachat forcé que vous alliez ordonner.” “Le peuple, impatient d’obtenir justice et las de l’oppression, s’empresse à 
détruire ces titres, monuments de la barbarie de nos pères.” “Pour le bien de la paix, hâtez-vous de donner ces 
promesses à la France: un cri général se fait entendre; vous n’avez pas un moment à perdre; un jour de délai 
occasionne de nouveaux embrassements; la chute des empires est annoncée avec moins de fracas.” 
369 Ibid, p.347-8. 
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repudiation was intoxicating; Adrien-Marie Legendre sarcastically speculated that some of 
the orators were drunk.370  
Despite the prevalent sense of panic, the National Assembly had also demonstrated 
its potential power: the night of 4 August was a moment, perhaps the first in the entire 
Revolution, when the manipulation of time enabled the revolutionaries to unclog history. The 
sudden legislative velocity summoned by the Assembly – an expression of the unitary will of 
the people, which, on account of its immediacy, made their deliberative activity appear 
unmediated – sent a kairotic charge through the French state, reconfiguring its future 
trajectory.371 On the morning of 5 August, in a state of exhaustion and elation, the Breton 
deputy Joseph-Michel Pellerin declared that posterity itself would not “believe what the 
National Assembly did in the space of five hours.” Scribbling in his diary, he marvelled at the 
annihilation of “abuses which had existed for 900 years, and against which a century of 
philosophy had struggled in vain.”372 The awesome energy of the nation assembled, 
exercising a power liberated from the traditional restraints of regal supervision, meant that 
institutions and habits created across centuries now seemed reparable in real-time. “In a single 
day,” reflected Rabaut-Pommier, “the national assembly seemed to have repaired the 
slowness with which it had been forced to operate by the terrible crisis of the state.” In a letter 
to de Noailles, the publicist Giuseppe Cerutti lauded the night of 4 August as having 
“separated the present epoch from all those which had preceded it.” The vicomte himself had 
“hastened its march,” and personally inaugurated “a memorable epoch” which would “form, 
in the chain of time, one of those sublime years upon which is suspended the destiny of ten, of 
twenty, of thirty centuries!”373 This, in turn, created an ecstatic sense of historical 
distanciation, which seemed to blast the recent past into a distant oblivion.374 On 8 August, 
the Courrier de Provence invited its readers to transport themselves “to that time…when the 
most hideous of depredations formed the ordinary train of events; when, amidst the excess of 
evil, even the hope in our hearts was extinguished.” That “time” was barely four days ago. 
“[Now] consider at what distance is that event for which we have come to be witnesses!” It 
seemed entirely appropriate that the nobility and clergy be stripped so suddenly of their 
                                                
370 It was “une espèce d’ivresse,” he wrote on 5 August; Fèrrieres openly declared himself to be in a state of 
“patriotic drunkenness”: cited, in Simon Schama, Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution (London, 
Penguin Books, 1989), p.372. 
371 The relationship between deliberative speed, popular will and political legitimacy is explored in Perovic, The 
Calendar, pp.94-95. 
372 Tackett, Becoming a Revolutionary, p.174. 
373 Giuseppe Cerutti, Lettre à monsieur le vicomte de Noailles, sur sa motion du 4 août 1789 (Paris, Desenne, 
1789), p.8: “il a séparé l’époque présente de toutes celles qui l’ont précédée,” p.13: “Cette époque mémorable 
formera dans la chaîne des temps un de ces anneaux sublimes auxquels est suspendue la destinée de dix, de vingt, 
de trente siècles.” 
374 On the construction of “historical distance,” see: Mark Salber Phillips, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Historical 
Distance,’ in Mark Salber Phillips, Barbara Caine, Julie Adeney Thomas, eds., Rethinking Historical Distance 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp.1-20. 
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ancient privileges, since it was “Time,” as the Courier de Madon observed in November, 
“that has legitimated all their usurpations.”375  
This was a radical departure. Even within the novel political framework of the 
Revolution itself, and despite the sacking of the Bastille, the National Assembly had been 
content to make piecemeal progress. Although the body convened itself as a whole, the 
distinction of orders, for example, stood intact; in a report compiled by the Committee of the 
Constitution, delivered on 27 July, it was recommended that the legal registrations of the 
parlements be maintained; even the abolition of the hated lettres de cachet remained open to 
discussion. Within the space of several hours on 4 August all this was swept away.376 The 
impetus for this “patriotic delirium,” as Joseph-Ignace Guillotin termed it, was the creeping 
realisation that the National Assembly had too much to do and too little time in which to do it. 
As Guillotin observed, had similar resolutions been devised by more ordinary procedures – if 
they had been formulated, proposed, deliberated, amended, and perhaps ultimately obstructed 
– then the renovation of the state would have taken years, if not decades.377 Instead, France 
had been “regenerated in a single night.”378 
Delirium soon turned to despair.379 The Assembly became almost instantly unstuck in 
a quagmire of legal and technical detail: on 6 August, for example, deputies spent several 
hours debating the suppression of dovecotes and the dissolution of regional hunting rights. 
The abrogation of feudal privileges, meanwhile, had done little to alleviate the ongoing fiscal 
malaise. In fact, by repudiating the traditional tax regime on 4 August, the Assembly had 
actually voted to suspend vital streams of revenue. It was not until 25 September, when the 
new tax base, broadened by the dissolution of fiscal immunities, had received full legislative 
validation that the mechanisms of tax collection could restart. Receipts from taxes henceforth 
deemed “illegal,” such as the gabelles, which had been sliding since the midsummer revolts, 
largely due to the inability of the Fermiers généraux to supervise salt sales without the risk of 
violence, went into free-fall. When Necker appeared before the Assembly on 7 August, then, 
                                                
375 Courrier de Madon à l’Assemblée nationale permanente 1 (2 November, 1789), p.7. 
376 The transcript of the deliberations recorded that decisions were being taken at such immense speed that little 
time was available to work out how such “salutary projects” might actually implemented: “Les signes de transport 
et l’effusion de sentiments généraux dont l’Assemblée présentait le tableau, plus vif et plus animé d’heure en 
heure, n’ont pu qu’à peine laisser le temps de stipuler les mesures de prudence, avec lesquelles il convenait de 
réaliser ces projets salutaires,” cited in Jean-Pierre Hirsch, La nuit de 4 août (Paris, Gallimard, 1978), p.165. 
377 Cited in, Michael P. Fitzsimmons, The Night the Old Regime Ended: August 4, 1789, and the French 
Revolution (Philadelphia, PA., Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003), p.16. 
378 Rabaut-Pommier, Almanach historique, p.168: “Il sembloit qu’en une nuit la France alloit être régénérée.” 
379 Delirium may have been the problem in the first place; as Mary Kilbourne Matossian has argued, in Poisons of 
the Past: Molds, Epidemics, and History (New Haven, CN., Yale University Press, 1989), pp.81-84, the Grande 
Peur that swept the French countryside in 1789 may have been partly created by the consumption of “bad bread,” 
or, more specifically, by an hallucinogenic wheat fungus, ergot; in times of scarcity, the infected wheat, which 
would normally have been destroyed, was used to bake bread in order to avoid starvation. 
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tax payments to the royal treasury could barely cover daily operating costs.380 The rapidity of 
constitutional renovation had actually intensified the urgency of the fiscal crisis. 
The problem, as Necker had observed during his address on 5 May, lay in the cahiers, 
which instructed the deputies to postpone any discussion of the financial situation until the 
monarch had ratified a new constitutional settlement. “Several cahiers, certainly, demanded 
that the constitution be settled before any tax or any loan be consented to,” observed Necker, 
“yet could we have foreseen the difficulties that have slowed your work? Could we have 
foreseen the unprecedented revolution that has come about in the last three weeks?” The 
political mandates contained within the cahiers, which were now hopelessly out-of-date, 
entangled the multiplying dilemmas of the state. As the deputies soon discovered, attempting 
to address one component of this multivalent crisis sent all other components into motion, 
thereby upsetting the capacity of the Assembly to resolve one issue without simultaneously 
accelerating the urgency of the others. The time-ratios of these crises – that is, the relative 
rates at which they impeded or endangered their own resolution and thus the progress of the 
Revolution – were in a continual state of interactive change. As the threat of financial 
collapse quickened, so the time available to repair or replace the crumbling constitutional 
fabric of the ancien regime diminished. Yet the rapidity of the constitutional renovation 
attempted on the 4 August, which instantaneously sequestered traditional tax revenues and 
burdened the state with massive reimbursements, had simply quickened the prospect of 
insolvency. Whenever the deputies attempted to advance the Revolution towards its 
completion, the scale of the task expanded as the time-span available diminished. The 
Assembly now wore a permanent expression of exhaustion: Maupetit even suggested that 
unless he and his fellow deputies gave up eating, drinking and sleeping, they could not work 
any faster.381 “Everything has been loosened,” warned Necker, as France faced the real 
possibility of societal collapse. “You see the disorders which reign throughout the kingdom! 
These disorders will grow if you do not take, without delay, salutary and preservative action.” 
Unless the Assembly could discover some means of traversing the financial “interval,” then it 
would not be possible to satisfy even the basis needs of the state. A new loan of 30 million 
livres was therefore required: “There is not a moment to lose in collecting this sum.”382 
The debate that ensued was explosive. Pétion and Dupont de Nemours would later 
denounced the rate of interest, set by Necker at a generous 6.5% in order to induce uncertain 
                                                
380 P. M. Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution (Cambride, CUP, 1998), p.181-83. 
381  M.E. Quereau-Lamerie, ed., ‘Lettres de Michel René Maupetit, député à l’Assemblée national constituante 
(1789-1791),’ Bulletin de la commission historique et archéologique de la Mayenne, 2 (19, 1903), p.226-7. 
382 AP, VIII, p.362: “Tout est relâché,” “Ah! Messieurs, que ce terme est nécessaire! Qu’il est pressant! Vous 
voyez les désordres qui règnent de toutes parts dans le royaume: ces désordres s’accroîtront si vous n’y portez pas, 
sans délai, une main salutaire et conservatrice,” p.361: “Il est vraisemblable qu’avec 30 millions, il sera possible 
de pourvoir aux besoins indispensables pendant l’intervalle que je viens d’indiquer; mais il n’y a pas un instant à 
perdre pour rassembler cette somme.” 
  
102 
investors, which they saw as an unpatriotic rip-off. In response, the royalist marquis de Lally-
Tollendal, warned that interfering with the details of this “indispensible” loan would impair 
its viability and enact, with startling speed, the “destruction of society” presaged by de 
Noailles. “Contemplate that if this loan is refused, in eight days our cities could be without 
security, our frontiers without defence…” Lally-Tollendal then collapsed the temporally 
immediate with the historically massive, declaring that: “We could destroy in one hour the 
work of fourteen centuries.” The historical reverberations of the acceptance or rejection of 
this financial measure closed in upon the present. This loan “is for now,” Lally-Tollendal 
pleaded, “for this minute, it is for today not tomorrow, it is for this morning not this evening 
[and] it is prompt means that are needed, simple, recognised, even routine means.”383 With the 
deputies already surrounded by the ruins of seigneurialism, the temptation towards further 
destruction was palpable.384  
Lally-Tollendal, however, had invoked the prevalent perception of temporal 
compression in order to make financial stability and historical continuity coterminous. Since 
the alternative to the loan was so odious and the timescale so pressing, the deputies would 
have to rescue the collapsing financial architecture of the ancien regime – and, by implication, 
the ancien regime itself – and approve the loan. After all, the “materials” of the ancient 
“edifice” could not, as Necker had warned, “be dispersed or destroyed, whilst the most able 
architects are drafting a design.”385 By imitating the “routine means” of ancien regime 
borrowing practices, the Assembly would ensure the continued integrity of monarchical 
government, not least because a further extension of indebtedness over time would stretch the 
imminent dangers of collapse and stabilise the disjuncture between the fiscal past and fiscal 
future.386 
There was, then, a terrible paradox at the core of 4 August. Although the deputies had 
boldly, patriotically declared the dissolution of historical privileges, they had simultaneously 
assigned themselves the task of reconciling the Revolution with a swathe of French history. 
Determined to defend private property rights, the deputies had conditioned the abolition of 
feudal privilege – in particular, the purchase of venal offices – upon a respect for past 
property transactions. Thus the offices bought under the ancien regime, however corrupt, 
                                                
383 AP, VIII, p.367: “Songe-t-on enfin que si l’emprunt est refusé, dans huit jours nos villes peuvent être sans 
sûreté, nos frontières sans défense, et que nous pouvons détruire en une heure l’ouvrage de quatorze siècles,” 
“C’est pour le moment, Messieurs, c’est pour la minute, c’est aujourd’hui plutôt que demain, ce matin plutôt que 
ce soir…Ce sont des moyens prompts qu’il faut, des moyens simples, connus, routiniers même…” 
384 On 19 August, Nicolas Ruault wrote in his diary that, “L’Assemblée nationale…a fallu détruire pour réédifier 
ensuite; elle n’est pas au bout encore de la destruction”: Anne Vassal, ed., Gazette d’un Parisien sous la 
Révolution: lettres à son frère, 1783-1796 (Paris, Perrin, 1976), p.163. 
385 AP, VIII, p.362: “[I]l ne faut pas que les matériaux du bâtiment soient disperses ou anéantis, pendant que les 
plus habiles architects en composent le dessin.” 
386 Borrowing, as the comte d’Antraigues told the Assembly on 7 July, was “la plus désastreuse de toutes les 
ressources,” since “elle ruine l’État même dans les siècles à venir, elle écrase la génération présente, et prépare des 
malheurs à celles qui lui succéderont”: AP, VIII, p.366. 
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would necessarily need to be reimbursed.387 The indemnities accrued during those delirious 
five hours pushed the total level of payable national debt beyond one billion livres.388 No 
matter how quickly the National Assembly operated, the scale of its task seemed constantly to 
grow quicker. Lafayette could crow all he wanted about the need “to accelerate the 
formulation of the constitution,” which he believed was “the only means of arresting the 
troubles,” and “responding to the pressing wishes of the people.” But a constitution would 
count for little if, at the very hour of their liberation, the French found themselves lumbered 
with centuries worth of debt.389 
 
≈ 
 
By 24 September the deputies must have thought they were suffering from a collective 
episode of déjà-vu. Necker – the Revolution’s unofficial bearer of bad news – was back. “The 
public has waited with impatience for the National Assembly to attend to the finances,” he 
told the deputies; but progress, “necessarily slow in such a numerous legislative body, has so 
prolonged discussion that, after five months, the essential matters of finance have not yet been 
treated.”390 Thanks to Assembly interference, the loan packages proposed on 7 and 28 August 
had both failed to garner market interest; Necker therefore proposed a one-off national levy – 
a “patriotic contribution” – equivalent to one-quarter of all incomes, with an exemption for 
those of modest means. This would cover all immediate extraordinary expenditures, estimated 
at around 80 million livres for 1789-90, and prevent the state from drifting terminally into 
arrears.391  
 The plan was to be achieved promptly – not abruptly. Necker warned that, 
“everything must be simple in this matter; everything must be successional.” By meeting 
pressing present payments – which had arisen from past borrowing, and which would, in 
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390 Jacques Necker, Œuvres complètes de M. Necker, publiées par M. le Baron de Staël (15 vols., Paris, Treuttel 
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391 The best account of the financial crises of the National Assembly during the summer of 1789 is Harris, Necker 
and the Revolution of 1789, pp.675-701. 
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ordinary circumstances, have been met by borrowing against expected future income – the 
“patriotic gift” would restore market confidence, “such a necessary link between the present 
and the future,” which presently “denies us its assistance.”392 For Necker and his satellite of 
supporters, the rapid reestablishment of financial health was an essential element in 
reordering what they saw as the interlocking epistemological phenomena of past, present and 
future. They were not concerned with total debt repayment since the disappearance of the 
debt would simply loosen the financial chain of time that undergirded the transmission of 
regal legitimacy across time.393 
A fear of further delay found expression in the granting of the royal veto, a device 
that seemed to many like a political contrivance for forestalling the onset of national renewal. 
Indeed, if the expiring ancien regime had bequeathed the nation its outstanding debts, a fiscal 
obligation that seemed to slow constitutional renovation, then the conferral of a veto seemed 
like the National Assembly acquiescing to the time-drag of the monarchy, thereby enabling 
the king to obstruct the elusive process of national regeneration should it ever reach 
completion. Whilst an overwhelming number of the deputies denounced the “absolute” veto 
as constitutional despotism, the difference between “the absolute veto and the suspensive 
veto,” as Target observed on 4 September, was a “distinction between permanence and 
periodicity.”394 It was, as Lally-Tollendal acknowledged, a question of whether “a contract 
that has been sacred for so many generations can bind the present generation.”395 It is 
remarkable how reflections on temporality so thoroughly permeated contemporary political 
discourse. On 11 September, when the National Assembly voted overwhelmingly for the 
“suspensive” compromise, the traditional power of the French monarch was superficially 
stripped of its “permanence,” yet it vitally retained its capacity to “bind,” or slow, the pace of 
revolutionary time: to arbitrate its “periodicity.” Louis would soon flex his suspensive 
authority by remonstrating against the August Decrees. The people, Rabaut-Pommier 
recalled, were therefore forced to “prejudge the future on the basis of the present.”  
 
We imagined the king obstructing, through a denial without cause, the provisions 
most useful to the people, […] and since everyone awaited a grand regeneration, one 
that the court had an interest in delaying, we imagined that, if the king did have a 
veto, he would obstruct all the operations of the National Assembly, and regeneration 
would become impossible. 
 
                                                
392 Ibid, p.102: “tout doit être simple en ce genre, tout doit être au moins successif, surtout dans un moment où la 
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Whilst the suspensive veto would not be activated until the Assembly had formulated the 
constitution, this fact alone raised “alarm for the future.” “We saw that, in a given time, the 
king would be able to paralyse the legislative body at his pleasure.”396 This association of 
revolutionary historical time and the illegitimate incursions of royal power found material 
reality in the form of food. By early October, the escalating price of bread, as well as 
revulsion for the royal veto, were combined in the popular imagination to rapidly truncate this 
“given time.”397 On 4 October, Gouverneur Morris recorded the irate deliberations of a crowd 
gathered outside the Palais-Royal. “Gentlemen,” announced one speaker, “we are without 
bread, and here is the reason: it has only been three days since the king got his suspensive 
veto, and already the aristocrats have bought up the suspensions and sent grain out of the 
kingdom.”398  
Consequently, on the 5 October the popular march that many deputies had feared 
since July finally materialised.399 At around midday, Mirabeau received word of disturbances 
in the capital. Conscious of the impending threat that this presented to both the safety of the 
deputies and the Revolution, Mirabeau leapt from his seat and rushed towards the rostrum, 
instructing the presiding officer, Jean Joseph Mounier, that, “an army from Paris is marching 
on the assembly.” Mounier shrugged: “I know nothing of this.” “Believe me,” came the 
panicked response: “suspend this scandalous session; time is pressing, there is not a minute to 
lose!”400 Ahead one of the rain-soaked marching columns strode the radical journalist Jean 
Antoine Gorsas, who recalled the moment in his journal, Courrier de Versailles: 
 
It is seven in the evening: the strangest things have happened during this disastrous 
journée. Our Hôtel de Ville is pillaged! The disorder! The confusion! Armed women! 
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Paris marche sur nous. – J’en sais rien. – Croyez-moi ou ne me croyez pas, peu m’importe; mais Paris, vous dis-je, 
marche sur nous. Trouvez-vous mal ; montez au château; donnez-leur cet avis. Dites, si vous le voulez, que vous le 
tenez de moi, j’y consens. Mais faites cesser cette controverse scandaleuse; le temps presse, il n’y a pas une minute 
à perdre!” 
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The people raised against the people! […] Terror overcomes all spirits! Pale and 
trembling figures! A universal revolt! Thousands of armed, nervous citizens march 
without having predicted that they will march at all! […] Our king may be captured 
by his loyal subjects! Instantly! This evening! This night!401 
 
Amidst the forest of exclamation marks and the breathlessness of the description, Gorsas 
could not imbue ongoing events with any form of sequential coherence. The sense here is not 
that of acceleration, but of synchrony, of a layering, cascading experience of time. The shift 
to the present tense reinforces the way in which these micro-moments of historical immensity 
seemed to be occurring simultaneously and without prefiguration. “Such are the 
circumstances in which I write.” As Étienne Dumont would observe in the immediate 
aftermath of 5-6 October, “the rapidity of events was such that one sensation was already 
erased by another.”402 
To the sound of musket-fire, Mirabeau called upon the Assembly “to invite patriotism 
to second their measures” and to finally approve the patriotic gift.403 In the mere moments 
before the Assembly was besieged by the oncoming crowd, the delegates would either enable 
the nation to “raise itself to a most glorious destiny, or rush into a gulf of misfortune.” In this 
rapidly abbreviating temporal schema, the primary promise of the Revolution – “liberty” – 
“would have only a second in view before escaping us,” before being subsumed by the 
centuries to come. Unless state finances could be put in order, the Revolution itself would 
elapse even before regeneration had begun. Mirabeau therefore saw the “patriotic tax” as a 
financial and political panacea since it appeared to operate with such historical immediacy: 
“It only takes the sacrifice of a moment,” he declared, “this slight reparation of the errors and 
faults of an era marked by our political servitude.”404 This novel fiscal instrument, which 
seemed to obviate any recourse to borrowing whilst simultaneously evoking patriotic self-
sacrifice, could bridge the deficit at a single stroke, and would, in turn, tear through “the fiscal 
timeknot” inherited from the ancien regime.405 
 
≈ 
 
                                                
401 Jean Antoine Gorsas, Courrier de Versailles à Paris et de Paris à Versailles (6 October, 1789), pp.1-2. 
402 Dumont, Souvenir sur Mirabeau, p.184: “la rapidité des évènemens était telle qu’une impression était toujours 
effacée par un autre.” 
403 On gift-giving, morality and patriotism during the early Revolution, see: Charles Walton, ‘Reciprocity and the 
French Revolution,’ in Alex Fairfax-Cholmeley, Colin Jones, eds., ‘New Perspectives on the French Revolution,’ 
e-France 4 (2013), pp.25-30. 
404 AP, IX, p.352-53: “Les députés à l’Assemblée nationale suspendent, quelques instants, leur travaux, pour 
exposer à leurs commettants les besoins de l’Etat, et inviter le patriotisme à seconder des mesures réclamées au 
nom de la patrie en péril,” “la nation va s’élever aux plus glorieuses destinées, ou se précipiter dans un gouffre 
d’infortunes,” “La liberté n’aurait lui un instant à nos yeux que pour s’éloigner, en nous laissant le sentiment amer 
que nous ne somme pas dignes de la posséder!,” “il ne faut qu’un sacrifice d’un moment, […] cette légère 
expiation pour les erreurs et les fautes d’un temps marqué par notre servitude politique.”  
405 Spang, Money and Stuff, p.66. 
  
107 
The royal family were escorted from Versailles with such haste that they had scarcely time to 
take a change of clothes. According to the princess de Lamballe, they departed without 
consulting “any of the Ministers, military or civil, or the National Assembly, by whom they 
were followed.” After the slow drudgery of their procession to Paris, they were “obliged to 
ask permission” for their wardrobes to be transferred to the Tuileries. “What a situation for an 
absolute king and queen, which, but a few hours previous, they had been!”406  
When the National Assembly seemed incapable of expediting the Revolution, the 
people provided their own historical propulsion. Although the deputies were legally 
representative of the nation, they were not the nation incarnate. The spontaneous march of the 
Parisian crowds mirrored an emergent belief, which would quickly become incontrovertible, 
that the ambitions of the Revolution could be accelerated through the sudden manifestation of 
the unitary will of the people.407 “This revolution,” observed one deputy from Toulouse, 
referring to the events of 5-6 October, “has taken place in less than twenty-four hours.”408 
Four days later, a delegation from the Paris Commune interrupted a session of the Assembly 
to congratulate the people on their participation in “the memorable events that the past days 
have seen process [succéder] with such rapidity,” and which were responsible for placing 
France “in order.” Since the deliberative capacity of the National Assembly had proven too 
slow to alleviate the needs of the nation, the people had intervened to exert their own 
instantaneous will. The recent risk of dearth and despotism became a distant memory, for the 
forcible relocation of Louis, “the citizen king” – or le roi boulanger, as the crowds chanted – 
had seen “abundance restored amongst us.”409  
  
                                                
406 Madame du Hausset, Secret memoirs of the courts of Louis XV and Louis XVI, II, p.151-2. 
407 This is discussed with reference to the fall of the monarch on 10 August, 1792, in, Sanja Perovic, The 
Calendar, p.95; Kevin Olsen, Imagined Sovereignties: The Power of the People (Cambridge, CUP, 2016), pp.54-
92. 
408 Augustin Pous, Le Curé Pous: correspondance inédite d’un membre de l’assemblée constituante, 1789-1791 
(Lyon, Germain, 1880), p.32. “Cette révolution s’est faite dans moins de vingt-quatre heures.” 
409 AP, IX, p.405: “exprimer ses sentiments sur les mémorables événements que les jours passés ont vu succéder 
avec tant de rapidité.” “Tout paraît rentré dans l’ordre.” “L’abondance a reparu parmi nous, la paix l’accompagne: 
hâtez-vous, nous vous en conjurons; hâtez-vous de vous réunir à ce Roi citoyen, dont vous vous êtes déclarés 
inséparables, et vous comblerez nos espérances!” 
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3: Revolutionary Experimentation with Time and History: warpspeeds and time travel 
during the American Revolution, 1783-87, and the French Revolution, 1791-94 
 
In May 1794, Maximilien Robespierre appeared before the National Convention to 
congratulate his fellow deputies on having propelled the French Republic several centuries 
into the future. “The people of France,” he marveled, “seem to have advanced two thousands 
years beyond the rest of the human species.”410 Fourteen years earlier, in June 1780, John 
Adams was despatched to the Dutch Republic, charged with achieving diplomatic recognition 
and financial aid for the American cause. From his modest lodgings in Amsterdam, Adams 
observed how the advent of the American Revolution, though still precariously established, 
seemed to have overset the pace and pattern of history. “The progress of society,” he 
observed, “will be accelerated by centuries by this revolution.”411 
 It was R. R. Palmer who first alighted upon a comparison between Robespierre and 
Adams, arguing that a similar commitment to “the moral republic” may, in separate 
circumstances, have turned the “impatient” Adams into a Jacobin.412 These were not 
hyperbolic ramblings: they testify to the awesome sense of historical compression wrought by 
revolution. Yet such extreme conceptualisations of progress do not conform, as Koselleck 
contends, to a “self-accelerating temporality.” Rather, they seem to break it: Robespierre and 
Adams do not claim that their respective Revolutions “abbreviated the spaces of experience” 
so much as obliterated them altogether.413 This chapter demonstrates how revolutionary 
reconceptualizations of time and history frustrated the supposed shift towards linearity that is 
characteristic of modern temporality.414 This was less about the speed – or dynamics – of 
historical time, and more about its shape – or geometrics. The immediate-term experience of 
revolution did not see the arrow of time replace the cycle of history. Instead, the “timeline” of 
historical events appeared malleable, fungible, and open to experimentation. 
                                                
410 Maximilien Robespierre, Réimpression de l’Ancien Moniteur (7 May, 1794), XX, p.404: “Le peuple français 
semble avoir devancé de deux mille ans les reste de l’espèce humaine…” 
411 Viewed in temporal terms, the Revolution had also overset classical precedent: “The Romans never saw but one 
caudine forks in their whole history. Americans have shown the Britons two in one war”: John Adams to Abigail 
Adams (18 December, 1781), in Butterfield, Friedlaender, eds., The Adams Papers. Family Correspondence, IV, 
pp.256-66. 
412 R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800 (2 
vols., Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1959), II, pp.124-25: the reason for the divergence, Palmer 
argues is that, “Adams already lived in a kind of Arcadia, as contrasted, at least, with Europe. Robespierre did not. 
No doubt Adams had a saving grace of scepticism that would have held him back from Robespierre’s course, but it 
is intriguing to speculate on whether John Adams, an impatient, irritable, easily frustrated but very determined 
man, with no very high opinion of his contemporaries, was not the one among the American founders who, under 
pressures such as those in France, could have most easily turned into a ‘Jacobin.’” 
413 Koselleck, Futures Past, p.17. 
414 On the advent of modernity and non-linear time, see: Allegra Fryxell, ‘Split temporalities and conceptions of 
time in Western Europe and America, c.1890-1940’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2015), 
esp. introduction. 
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As the Revolutionary War reached its conclusion in 1783, many Americans 
reconceived the propulsive power of revolutionary politics as a malevolent, not a liberating 
force: by 1786, they had already engaged in a series of unsuccessful political experiments to 
de-temporalise the experience of history. As the French Revolution radicalised, overturning a 
millennium-old monarchy in 1792, factional disputes increasingly centred on the belief that 
the project was incapable of reaching a critical velocity, almost as though history were 
impeding time.415 In short, the considerations of history and time were indissociable from the 
complexion of revolutionary forms of power. Ultimately, the political programmes of the 
French and American Revolutionaries were designed to obviate the operations of time: either 
because its effects appeared too protracted, threatening to collapse the progress of the French 
Revolution into duration; or because the rapid onset of the new and unforeseen, which 
ceaselessly confronted the nascent American Republic with disintegration, appeared to 
liquefy the plane of historicity, enfeebling the operations of political power. This chapter 
therefore provides a brief history of the failed attempts to control historical time in the 
immediate aftermath of revolution. 
 
 
I. Instant Time:  
 
The task of devising a new French constitution was only supposed to take a few months.416 In 
fact, when Necker appeared before the National Assembly on 7 August 1789, he anticipated 
that two months would be sufficient. Two days later, Mounier seconded the sentiment, but set 
the duration in weeks. “We all believed,” observed the comtesse de Genlis, “that the work 
would be completed in under a month; it took very much longer.”417 It was the prevalence of 
this belief that helps to explain why so many of cahiers failed to stipulate a fixed term limit 
on the mandate of the Estates-General. It was only after the precipitous events of 14 July that 
the Assembly, increasingly wary of popular impatience, decided to sit in permanent session, 
debating “night and day until the Constitution is completed.” It would be in vain, for despite 
their hyperactivity, every time the deputies made progress, the duration of the Revolution 
appeared to expand. In an attempt to resolve the mounting constitutional and fiscal crisis 
confronting France, the deputies of the National Assembly began engaging in imaginative 
reconceptualizations of time and history. Fearful that the accumulated errors of several 
                                                
415 These contentions are elaborated below and are designed to contextualize, nuance and occasional contradict 
many of the ideas adumbrated by Reinhardt Kosseleck: see his Futures Past, pp.9-25, 43-57, 93-104, 255-75. 
416 Gilbert Shapiro, Timothy Tackett, Philip Dawson, John Markoff, Revolutionary Demands: A content analysis 
of the Cahiers de Doléances of 1789 (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 1998), 99-113. 
417 Necker and Mounier, cited in Bernard Adolphe Granier de Cassagnac, Histoire des causes de la révolution 
française (3 vols., Bruxelles, Auguste Pagny, 1850), II, p.202; Genlis, Œuvres complètes, III, p.83: “On croyoit 
alors que ce travail seroit terminé sous peu de mois; il fut beaucoup plus long.” 
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centuries of despotism and venality would require several further centuries of repair work, the 
deputies scrambled for shortcuts. Increasingly desperate to quicken the completion of their 
mandate, they decided that the Revolution would become interminable if it could not be 
concluded instantly. 
 The problem was outlined by the marquis de Montesquiou-Fézensac, a member of the 
Assembly’s Finance Committee, who, in 1790, detailed the constitutional and financial time-
bind inhibiting the completion of the Revolution. Unless the Assembly could find a means of 
recompensing defunct officeholders, could the state ever seek to “close its accounts with all 
the stakeholders in the public purse?” In his despair, Montesquiou asked: “How, finally, can 
we reach the point where order can be restored,” where personal and public safety could once 
again be guaranteed and the work of the constitution completed, “if our lack of funds forces 
us to live by our industry hitherto, and to arrive indebted on the very day of our liberation?” 
Freedom, in short, would not replace tyranny “when, at the moment we wish to change the 
regime, we will have before us an outstanding debt of 200 million livres.” Without the 
immediate reimbursement of the abolished sinecures, pensions, and offices – in effect, the 
entire architecture of ancien regime clientage – how could France hope to “emerge from the 
servitude in which we find ourselves?” As Montesquiou rightly recognised, this inherited 
indebtedness formed “an unbreakable chain” between the fiscal past and present. The 
duration of regeneration was therefore in direct proportion to the scale of French history: that 
is, the time period required to repay the royal debt and reinvent the constitutional basis of 
France would be protracted by the multiple errors of the past. In the form of the royal debt, 
the extent of this “pastness” appeared infinite. If the vestiges of feudalism – “the gabelle, the 
aides, and the reserved rights” – had necessarily to “cease to exist at the moment marked for 
our regeneration by your wisdom,” then the work of the Revolution would need to be 
accelerated beyond all previous comprehension.418  
 In the summer of 1789, the notion of instantaneous debt amortization seemed 
fanciful; twelve months later and the Assembly was placing it under active consideration. On 
27 August 1790, Montesquiou rose before the Assembly once again to deliver his findings on 
                                                
418 AP, X, p.91: “Comment mettre de l'ordre dans les dépenses si on manque d'argent comptant pour ses marchés, 
et si on ne peut jamais terminer ses comptes avec tous les dépositaires des deniers public?” “Comment enfin 
atteindre au moment où l'ordre pourra renaître, si faute de fonds il fallait vivre d'industrie jusque-là, et arriver 
obéré au jour de la libération?,” pp.91-92: “Comment mettre une administration paternelle à la place d’une 
administration tyrannique, lorsqu’on aura toujours devant les yeux une dette exigible de 200,000,000 livres au 
moment où l’on voudrait changer de régime?,” p.92: “La gabelle, les aides et les droits réservés doivent cesser 
d’exister à l’instant marqué par votre sagesse pour notre régénération, et nous ne vous proposerons de remplacer 
ces impôts…” On revolutionary debt disputes, see: Paul Cheney, Revolutionary Commerce: Globalization and the 
French Monarchy (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 2010), pp.1-20; Michael Sonenscher, ‘The 
Nation’s Debt and the Birth of the Modern Republic,’ Political Studies 42 (1994), pp.166-231; D. R. Weir, 
‘Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688-1789,’ Journal of Economic History 49 (1, 
March 1989), pp.95-124; Florian Schui, ‘Review: Les batailles de l’impôt: Consentement et résistance de 1789 à 
nos jours,’ The English Historical Review 127 (2012), p.1607-09. 
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the sale of the biens nationaux, the confiscated tracts of ecclesiastical, crown and émigré 
lands. During the previous November, the ci-devant bishop of Autun, Charles-Maurice 
Talleyrand, had argued that since the clergy no longer formed a privileged corporate body its 
properties had necessarily to be returned to state control and placed at the disposal of the 
nation.419 Conscious of the projected value of these properties, estimated in excess of three 
billion livres, Montesquiou made his case. If France were to resolve its debts gradually, “we 
would actually need to increase taxes,” he observed, in order to cover debt interest payments. 
As a consequence, the “primary goal” of the Revolution – “the relief of the people – “would 
prove only a chimerical fantasy,” an ambition eternally deferred into a financial future that 
would forever mirror the indebtedness of the feudal past. However, if “it were possible to 
exchange, in one instant, the greater part, or even all, of these domains against the entirety of 
the exigible debt, the state would no longer be constrained by forced repayments.” This act, 
Montesquiou continued, would beget such a sudden state of prosperity, “a prosperity that was 
far beyond our hopes,” that the financial burdens accumulated over centuries would be 
instantly lifted. The gradual liquidation of the debt and the protracted reimbursement of 
venality would cease to linger, acquiring further grievances by the day, enabling the 
Revolution to erase the institutional and customary claims of the past upon the present. “It is 
so to accelerate the sale of the national domains that you must attach yourselves with an 
obstinacy that overcomes all obstacles.” This, Montesquiou marvelled, “would have the 
singular advantage of terminating in a single day the work of half a century.”420 
 Such sentiments emerged from a sustained exposure to revolutionary time. On the 
night of 4 August, for example, the National Assembly had – however accidentally and 
haphazardly – affected a genuine sense of rupture in the historical development of the nation. 
As Bailly recalled, “[t]he feudal regime which weighed down the people for centuries had 
been destroyed in one fell swoop, in a single instant.” The Assembly “had, in a few hours, 
done more for the people than the wisest and most enlightened nations had done in several 
centuries.”421 As the second edition of the political journal Nouvelles éphémérides observed 
four days later, on 8 August 1789, the Revolution seemed to be proceeding through 
intermittent, instantaneous bolts of popular and legislative energy:  
 
                                                
419 Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution: From its Origins to 1793 (trans. Elizabeth Moss Evanson), 
(London, Routledge, 2001), p.154. 
420 AP, XVIII, pp.354-5. “S’il était possible d’échanger, dans un instant, la plus grande partie, ou même la totalité 
de ces domaines contre la totalité de la dette exigible, l’État ne serait plus astreint à des remboursements forcés.” 
“C’est donc à accélérer la vente des domaînes nationaux qu’il faut vous attacher avec cette obstination qui 
surmonte tous les obstacles.” “[I]l aurait le singulier avantage de terminer en un jour l’ouvrage d’un demi-siècle.” 
Emphasis added. 
421 Mémoires de Bailly, II, p.216: “Le régime féodal qui pesait sur le peuple et depuis des siècles, a été détruit d’un 
seul coup et en un instant. L’Assemblée nationale en quelques heures a plus fait pour le peuple que les nations les 
plus sages et les plus éclairées n’ont fait en plusieurs siècles.” 
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“One moment [4 August] saw despotism fall and liberty reborn; in a moment the 
Bastille was taken, and it took only a moment to return patriotism, harmony and 
generosity to a place where pride, discord and self-interest seemed to have affixed 
themselves never to leave.” 
 
These “rare events,” affected in such a bewilderingly brief span of time, seemed to “confound 
all human foresight.”422 Institutions, customs and habits that had been established over the 
course of centuries were being brushed aside in the course of mere “moments.” Feats of 
immense historical consequence, meanwhile, were reduced to almost insignificant temporal 
durations. The Revolution could be charted not by its gradual – or even its gradually 
accelerating – progress, but through its epic journées, single days of time-bending 
magnitude.423  
As Mirabeau observed, the partial sale of biens nationaux in December 1789 had 
been “only a passing remedy, and not a complete cure.” Yet, confronted with “the abyss,” 
France had nevertheless alighted upon a means that might “fill it.” Over the preceding year, 
many of the deputies had come to realise that selling the confiscated lands through ordinary 
market mechanisms was a cumbersome, time-consuming process: the issuing of assignats as, 
initially, a collateral quasi-currency would expedite matters by handing the government 
immediate control over the estimated value of the biens nationaux. The extension of “this 
exercise could no longer be delayed.” The reason, Mirabeau announced, was that “the general 
reestablishment” of government credit often produced “momentary embarrassments,” which 
naturally inhibited “credit from closely following expectation.”  
 
Thus, the time which elapses rapidly restores the same demands; these demands 
restore the same distress; and as long as we do not establish, on a recognised basis of 
strength, a vast operation, a general measure, which places us above events, we will 
become eternal playthings…424  
 
                                                
422 Nouvelles éphémérides de l’Assemblée nationale, ou, Correspondance d’un député à l’Assemblée nationale, 
avec un membre du parlement d’Angleterre 2 (8 August, 1789), p.18: “Un moment a vu tomber le despotisme et 
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423 Henry Brougham would later recall the Revolution as a time “when each week staggered under the load of 
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p.360. 
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‘The Ghost of Law: Speculating on Money, Memory and Mississippi in the French Constituent Assembly,’ 
Historical Reflections/Refléxions Historiques 31 (1, Spring 2005), pp.3-25. 
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The sale of the biens nationaux, and their rapid conversion into assignats, appeared to 
Mirabeau like a temporal panacea, a fiscal manoeuvre that would succeed where the “patriotic 
gift” had not. Here was a “simple” and “active” means of “placing in movement so many 
other means,” which would suddenly see France “pass” from “the deplorable state of the 
kingdom and the stagnation of all affairs” towards “the new order of things” – to “its slow 
and happy effects” – by “supporting our existence” in the immediate term, “and by 
prolonging public goodwill in favour of the Constitution, which does not hold for long against 
such misery.” Selling the biens nationaux would therefore buy time for the constitution; but it 
would also lift France “above events,” instantly transporting the nation outside ordinary time, 
and towards the conclusion of the Revolution – which, in late 1790, remained the completion 
of the constitution and the repayment of the royal debt. In this way, the nation would leapfrog 
the five decades of constitutional toil that Montesquiou had otherwise foreseen. The 
dichotomous relationship that many historians have observed between the early, moderate, 
and later, radical revolutionaries does not hold. It was not simply the case that whilst those 
such as Robespierre envisioned an “accelerated” Revolution capable of breaking “the bounds 
of the possible,” that others such as Mirabeau protested that it was beyond their capacity “to 
all of a sudden hatch a new race.”425   
Here were the mental materials – derived from the collective experience of 
revolutionary temporality – that would enable contemporaries to envisage a mode of 
revolutionary action that could affect vast yet instantaneous historical change. From the very 
first months of the Revolution, participants did not merely observe alterations in historical 
time; they actively sought to reshape it. The consequences of this conceptualisation of 
instantaneity were almost exclusively pitched in positive terms: the biens nationaux, claimed 
the Assembly, were to become “the salvation of the state,” whilst the assignats, the paper 
bonds issued against the confiscated properties, were described as the “saviour of France.” In 
her numismatic account of the Revolution, Rebecca Spang has rightly challenged the received 
wisdom that dismisses the assignats as simply “a debacle,” instead uncovering nuance in the 
ideas that motivated this policy. She nevertheless views the conversion of confiscated lands 
into currency as part of a broad “effort to stop, slow or stabilize a revolutionary situation.”426 
The undisputed desire, of course, was the timely completion of the Revolution. However, the 
fiscal measures enacted by the Assembly between 1789-91 actually seem to have been 
designed to quicken – not slow or stabilize – the Revolution. In fact, the discourse of the 
Revolution increasing became obsessed with the possibility of historical hyperspeed. 
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II. Time Travel 
 
“Why can I not see in anything other than a dream, this so desired Time that my wishes call! 
Hasten! Come enlighten the happiness of the world!” 
 
Louis-Sébastien Mercier, preface to L’An 2440; rêve, s’il en fût jamais (1771)427 
 
The Revolutionary era inaugurated a series of intellectual and literary experimentations with 
the possibility of time travel. In France, it was conceived as a potentially liberating 
opportunity to reshape the oppressive political conditions of the present; in America, it acted 
as a form of therapeutic escape, as a reassurance against the terrifying prospect of an entirely 
open future.428  
In L’An 2440; rêve, s’il en fût jamais (1771), the sensational, and eventually censored 
novel by Louis-Sébastien Mercier, the literary construct of time travel was born. The story is 
simple. Following a philosophical dispute about the contemporary iniquities of Parisian life, 
the unnamed protagonist of L’An 2440 falls into a deep sleep, only to awake in the Paris of 
the future, aged seven hundred. As a kindly stranger escorts the decrepit time traveller around 
the city, offering him a vision of pristine streets, civic virtue, and a society denuded of both 
poverty and aristocracy, Mercier titillated all the fantasies of the social and political reformers 
of his own time. Since seventeenth-century utopian fiction had eschewed temporal similarity 
in favour of spatial difference, taking readers on voyages imaginaires to distant and 
unfamiliar lands, it also seemed incapable of communicating with history. In L’An 2440, by 
contrast, time firmly takes the place of space: by trans-locating his protagonist to a future 
Paris, Mercier depicts the process of temporal, not topographical rupture; Mercier replaces 
utopia with uchronia.429 One consequence of this uchronic vision is that Mercier firmly 
situates the temporal zone of his political idealism inside history; indeed, the narrative conceit 
is “an extrapolation of the historical process itself.” This injection of historicity lifted the 
conceptual firewall separating the possible and the actual. Consequently, the ‘idealised’ future 
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and ‘oppressive’ present shared the same timestream, the latter leading inexorably – almost as 
a process of liberation – to the former.430 This temporalisation of utopia presupposed that 
contemporaries were living within a process directed towards beneficial future 
transformation. Devoid of any imaginative reference to scientific or technological innovation, 
however, Mercier chose to place especial emphasis upon the future political and socio-moral 
progress of mankind. What he envisions in L’An 2440, then, is “an ameliorated present” 
situated in a realisable future, the source of which exists “not only in the realm of the fictive 
but in the empirically redeemable present.”431  
Mercier does not merely alter the destination, however, but also the means of getting 
there. Though the reader remains unaware of how the slumbering protagonist arrives at the 
distant future, the journey itself cannot be located outside the flow of historical time. The 
distance between the temporal zones of present and future may be vast, but their connection 
remains chronologically comprehensible and thus causally connected, even though this 
process of temporal and historical dislocation remains occluded.432 L’An 2440 cannot 
therefore be properly classified under the category of enlightenment philosophical literature. 
It is something apart: Mercier, after all, entirely distorted one of its central tenets – the 
process of progress. At the Sorbonne in 1750, Turgot presented his Discours on the 
inexorable progress of human history. This histoire universelle, which he saw as proceeding 
along a single historical pathway towards a perfected future, was to be a slow march.433 
Although his temporal perception of progress was not fixed, alternating between “periods of 
rest and unrest,” he nevertheless believed that humankind would continue “advancing, 
although at a slow pace, towards greater perfection.” These “slow and successive 
progressions,” moreover, might meander “through a thousand detours,” altered occasionally 
and imperceptibly by “chance [and] circumstances” far more than by the “efforts of the 
human mind.”434 Time was the indisputable vector of progress, he insisted - its dimensions 
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could not be sidestepped, even if it was historically unidirectional.435 Over the course of the 
late-eighteenth century, and especially after the commencement of the French Revolution, 
this theorisation of perfectionnement underwent temporalisation.  
Contrast, for example, Turgot’s steady formulation from 1750 with Robespierre’s 
call-to-arms of 10 May, 1793: “The progress of human reason prepared this great revolution,” 
he told the National Convention, “and imposed upon you is the special task of accelerating 
it.” Whilst Robespierre heartily acknowledged the indebtedness of the Revolution to the 
“progress” that eighteenth century philosophical inquiry had “prepared” for “human reason,” 
the people of France – who, though “born for happiness and liberty,” remained “everywhere 
enslaved and miserable” – could wait no more. If society possessed, “as its aim,” the 
“perfection of its being,” then the “time had come” to complete this “duty,” to fulfil the “true 
destiny” of France.436 This was no longer a matter of awaiting the gradual amelioration of 
civic institutions; the perfection of humankind was an explicitly human task, one that would 
drift if left unattended.437 It would require a total restructuring of the objective experience of 
historical time. And whereas Turgot had insisted that, “all ages” were “linked one to the other 
by a chain of causes and effects, which tie the present state of the world to those which 
preceded it,” Robespierre rejected the entire premise of a “chain of time.”438 For Mercier, the 
“chain” is not smashed; it is simply foreshortened, and the protagonist blasted through a 
temporally truncated history towards the future. This imaginative coup de théâtre situates 
L’An 2440 outside the literary and philosophical genre of perfectionnement, at least as it was 
comprehended by Turgot, and later by Condorcet in his Tableau historique (1794).439  
As the novel raced through twenty-five editions, traversing even the Atlantic to reach 
the writing desks of Jefferson and Washington, L’An 2440 found an audience with an active 
appetite for future prognostication.440 In France, it seemed to satisfy a contemporary 
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frustration with the tedious gradations of historical time. At Passy, in 1783, Franklin 
expressed his disappointment at having been “born so soon, since I cannot have the happiness 
of knowing what will be known 100 years hence.”441 Mercier offered the French reading 
public the opportunity of imaginative time travel, and did so by explicitly making that journey 
a positive passage from present to future. For Franklin’s fellow Americans, by contrast, the 
future was filled not with promise, but foreboding.442 
In 1785 an anonymous prose poem, entitled The Golden Age; or, future glory of 
North American discovered, followed the time travels of Celadon, a simple American 
yeoman.443 Like Mercier’s unnamed explorer, Celadon slips into a “drowsy trance,” only to 
be awoken by an angelic figure who declares that his “business is to resolve certain doubts” 
with respect the “interests of American freedom and independency,” and to “give you 
intelligence respecting several as yet unknown events, whereby, you and others may be 
comforted.” Celadon, however, does not awake to find himself temporally trans-located, but 
is instead offered an alternative vision of the future. Escorted to “the top of an exceeding high 
mountain,” the Angel washes Celadon’s eyes with a “crystalline elixir” that so strengthens his 
“visive faculty” that he may “distinctly view the whole continent from shore to shore.” Whilst 
Celadon glimpses the “fertile fields,” “blooming forests,” and undiscovered lands reserved for 
the citizens of America, he is also the privileged witness to the the unfolding of the American 
future. He observes the construction of simple dwellings and the emigration of farmers; the 
land provides a means of corralling indigenous peoples, who “in due time” will become 
“polite, wealthy, and pious”; the problem of slavery, meanwhile, is parcelled out to a specific 
“tract of land,” for whilst “there must be time for their manumission,” this “cannot be done at 
once” – the process would thus occur gradually as America enveloped yet more space. In this 
sense, the anonymous author of The Golden Age construed space as a temporal category: the 
uchronic content was expressed topologically, as a space capable of absorbing the bundle of 
future problems that many Americans feared.444  
Although overawed by the spatial extent of future America, Celadon is also forced to 
reflect upon its dizzying historical progress thus far: “How rapid must have been the growth 
of my native country!” he observes, when “in that short space of time” – “scarce three 
hundred years” – America had risen “to bid defiance to Great-Britain itself.” Who was to say, 
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therefore, that America would not, unlike the nation from which it sprang, continue to 
accelerate towards a similar fate? Citing the long-established trope of British imperial and 
historical decline, whereby that “once flourishing kingdom, having reached the zenith of 
temporal grandeur” was now “lamentably degenerated,” the angel warns Celadon that 
America can expect no such “exemption from the usual vicissitudes fortune.” Yet in view of 
the natural beneficence of American space – plentiful, inexhaustible – “such a change is not 
likely to happen very soon.” Unlike the republics of classical antiquity and the degenerative 
precedents they set, America would defer the temptations of corruption, indigence and luxury 
by constantly recharging its resources of virtue through the recourse to virgin pastoral land.445 
This was a vision of an American future mapped out across the expanse of American 
terrain.446  
Thought experiments and comforting tales such as these were not merely the preserve 
of early republican prose poetry, nor were they confined to the imagination: in the early 
Republic, time travel – at least, into the past – seemed perfectly possible. During his exile in 
the United States between 1794 and 1796, Talleyrand undertook a tour of the nascent 
Republic. His journeys into the heart of the continent proved revelatory. Setting out west from 
the seaboard cities of New England, Talleyrand claimed to witness the “history” and 
“progress” of human life unfold – in reverse – before his eyes: 
 
It is a new spectacle for a traveller who, leaving one of the principal cities where 
society is perfected, to traverses successively all the stages of civilization and 
industry, which sink progressively lower and lower, until he arrives after a few days 
at the shapeless rude cabin constructed of newly felled logs. Such a trip is a sort of 
practical and living analysis of the origin of peoples and states: one departs from the 
most complex social organization to arrive amidst the elements of the most simple…  
 
Whilst this beguiling process occurred in real-time, the historical distance Talleyrand 
traversed seemed immense, enhancing his sense of time travelled. “[E]ach day,” he wrote: 
 
…one loses sight of some of those inventions which our needs, as they have 
multiplied, have made into necessities; it seems as though one were traveling 
backwards through the history of the progress of the human mind. 
 
For Talleyrand, routes through the Mid-West seemed like time tunnels leading towards a 
distant, primordial past.447 He also felt a palpable sense of dislocation since the “social links” 
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that connected “men who seem to belong so little to the same association,” existed 
simultaneously within the same nation. As such, the incomprehensible vastness of the 
continent enabled him “to rediscover in the succession of space what seemed to only belong 
to the succession of time.”448 
The publication of The Golden Age in particular coincided with a period of flux and 
uncertainty in American political life. The repeated elision of American space and time in the 
political and literary discourse that followed the conclusion of the Revolutionary War sought 
to make the future implicit in the present.449 It satisfied a desire to ameliorate a prevalent fear 
that the Revolution had rendered the future unforeseeable. It thus served to provide a 
reassuring glimpse of the inapprehensible – to “resolve certain doubts,” to comfort those 
“anxious” about their “future condition.” The re-spatialisation of the historical time of the 
Republic enabled contemporaries to plot out the future, to preview history as a fixed chain of 
evenly “spaced” events leading towards a preordained destination.450 As such, the intervening 
“time” between present and future could be apprehended as unchanging and thus adequately 
planned for since the capacity of the future to introduce new and unforeseeable circumstances 
would be greatly, if not entirely diminished. Discourses on time travel during the early 
Republic consoled a nation unable to cope with the pace of change, offering Americans an 
imaginative means of retroactively repairing the revolutionary tear in historical time.451 In 
France, literary experimentations with time travel provided the intellectual backdrop to one of 
the most momentous events of the Revolution.  
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III. Time Warps 
 
“All these terrible events will fall one over the other with the fatal gravity and rapidity of a 
stone which descends into the abyss. Barely an interval of four months separates each of 
these revolutions, which, in the ordinary course of things, would have made ages in the 
world. Each interval, here, is longer than a century. […] There are no more centuries, nor 
years, nor months, nor days, nor hours… Time no longer existed; time had perished. The 
Revolution…seemed to have begun by exterminating time.” 
 
Jules Michelet, Histoire de la Révolution Française (1849)452 
 
“Hours – half hours – minutes, are of importance in examining such a crowd of events 
occurring within so short a limit both of time and space.” 
 
John Wilson Croker, Essays on the Early Period of the Revolution (1857)453 
 
For both eighteenth century philosophes and nineteenth century positivistes, linear time 
suggested a continuous, non-retrogressive flow of historical progress; to the revolutionaries, 
by contrast, it represented an interminable sense of duration.454 If, as Mona Ozouf observes, 
the revolutionaries were becoming aware of the notion of “time as duration [durée],” as an 
expanse that would inevitably prolong the revolutionary project of renewal, then the purpose 
of the journée was to circumvent time, by violent means if necessary.455 As a consequence, 
the “spatial” categories of experience and expectation were both simultaneously effaced by 
this event, propelling the Revolution instantaneously through history by obliterating 
intervening time.456  
The journées of the French Revolution were expressions of political impatience; they 
represent the concerted rejection of an alternative temporality.457 This may be seen both in the 
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way the problem of duration was discussed and how the aftermath of the revolutionary 
journée was experienced.458 More broadly, it points to how, during this transitional period, 
alternative visions of historical time were used to challenge the two temporal metaphors, the 
circle and the arrow, that have dominated historiographical discourses on revolution and 
modernity. For the revolutionaries, the shape of history was malleable. The journées of the 
French Revolution – in particular 10 August 1792, the day the Parisian sansculottes besieged 
the Tuileries Palace, forcing the suspension and eventual abolition of the monarchy – were 
characterised by a form of collective political participation that displayed a capacity for time-
warp thinking.459 What was realised on 10 August was a new way of conceiving of 
revolutionary action that, through immense demonstrations of popular violence, could 
circumvent the ordinary gradations of historical time, warping its linearity, and piercing a 
time-tunnel through duration towards a radiant future.460  
 
≈ 
 
Between the passage of the Le Chapelier law in June 1791 – which repressed the political 
rights of collective bodies such as the sections and guilds, and firmly resituated the Assembly 
as the exclusive arbiter of the national will – and the collapse of the monarchy in August 
1792, a series of events convinced many observers that the progress of the Revolution was in 
peril.461 Following the flight of the king to Varennes and the subsequent massacre of anti-
royalist petitioners on the Champ de Mars, Isaac René le Chapelier appeared before the 
Assembly to call upon the deputies to double-down upon the external expression of political 
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will emanating from the sections – in effect, to finalise the Revolution.462 “When a nation 
changes the form of its government, every citizen is a public official,” he declared, “everyone 
deliberates and should deliberate on matters of public import.” The speedier this could be 
achieved the better: “everything that hastens, everything that ensures, everything that 
accelerates a revolution should be put into use.” Revolution, however, was “a momentary 
unrest” that enrolled popular participation so that it “might encounter fewer obstacles and 
might reach its goal more promptly.” “When a revolution is finished,” however, “when the 
constitution of the empire is fixed,” then it was “necessary for the safety of this constitution 
that everything return to the most perfect order, that nothing hinder the action of the 
constituted powers, that deliberation and power exist nowhere but only where the constitution 
has placed them.”463  
 As Le Chapelier resumed his seat, Robespierre arose, turning towards the gallery, and 
addressing the people directly: “They say we no longer have any need for these clubs, because 
the Revolution is finished.”464 Yet “when I see on the one hand that the nascent Constitution 
still has its internal and external enemies;” when “I see intrigue, falsity, simultaneously raise 
alarm, sow strife and discord; when I see the leaders of opposing factions fight less for the 
cause of the Revolution than to grasp the power dominated under the name of the monarch; 
when I see the exaggerated zeal with which they prescribe blind obedience, but proscribe the 
word liberty…I do not believe that the Revolution is over!”465 Whilst the deputies of the 
National Assembly may have disagreed on the detail of the constitution, very few disagreed 
that the constitution itself would be the end-point of the Revolution.466 What Robespierre had 
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Bodies and Theatricality in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press, 2002), 
pp.258-94; on revolutionary street culture, see: Laura Mason, Singing the French Revolution: Popular Culture and 
Politics, 1787-1799 (Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press, 1995), pp.104-29. 
465 AP, XXXI, p.620: “Pour moi, quand je vois d'un côté que la Constitution naissante a encore des ennemis 
intérieurs et extérieurs; quand je vois que les discours et les signes extérieurs sont changés, mais que les actions 
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liberté; […] je ne crois pas que la Révolution soit finie!” 
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instead suggested was that the mere constitutional renovation of France was an insufficiently 
‘revolutionary’ conclusion. His remark “that the exterior discussions and signs are changed, 
but that the actions remain the same,” prefigured the impossible civic demands that would 
later be made of French citizens under the Jacobin Republic – the great (and unending) task of 
unmasking false patriots.  
 
≈ 
 
In April 1792, France declared war on Austria and suffered immediate humiliation at Longwy 
and Verdun. The pressure upon the Legislative Assembly to cleanse the state of its internal 
enemies escalated. Fraudulent citizens and fanatical priests, declared Vergniaud, were busy 
assisting the return of émigrés and counterrevolutionaries, these “audacious satellites of 
despotism” who carried “fifteen centuries of pride and barbarism in their feudal souls.”467 One 
consequence of the flight to Varennes, of course, was the royal promulgation of the 
constitution, without which Louis could not possibly have reclaimed his throne, but that made 
it possible to believe that the Revolution had been concluded.468 By early 1792, however, the 
king was resolutely refusing to display his support for the constitution. As the invective 
levelled against the intransigent monarch grew and the deadlock between executive and 
legislative powers intensified, a fear emerged amidst the Parisian sections and radical 
deputies that the Revolution – far from having reached completion, as Le Chapelier had 
suggested – was in fact coming to a halt. 
On 20 June, an irate crowd of sans-culottes swarmed the Tuileries. Encouraged by the 
radical sections of Paris to overturn the royal veto – in particular, upon the decrees outlawing 
non-juring priests – and to see the demand the recall of the recently dismissed Girondin 
ministry, the demonstrators pinned the king up against a window seat and harangued him for 
three hours.469 Over the ensuing forty days, the Revolution seemed to become an 
uncontrollable force, possessed of its own velocity and volition. “Things were going faster 
and farther than the Girondins wished,” observed Pierre-Louis Roederer, the procurer-
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général-syndic of Paris: “they were terrified at the rapidity of the popular movement.” By 
saluting the efforts of the demonstrators, by hailing their impatience, Vergniaud and Roland 
had hoped to weaken the intransigence of their monarch, and solidify their own political 
position, without affecting any substantive change to the constitutionality of the veto. By “at 
once protecting and menacing” the crown, recalled Roederer, by forcing it between “the 
alternative of being crushed by the Jacobins, or of throwing itself into [their] hands,” the 
Girondins appealed both rhetorically and strategically to a modality of historical time that 
seemed to delegitimise the actions of the monarchy. Their policy now was “to temporise – to 
gain time – to work upon the fears of the Court and on its gratitude.”470 
The sans-culottes were less inclined to wait. Horrified by the prospect of prolonging 
the present, which they polemically characterised as “oppressive” both in terms of its 
obstruction of liberty and its interminable duration, the sections wished to see the present 
yield to the future – in effect, to see the present become past. Yet as the impatience of the 
sections grew, so too did the time gulf separating them from their goal. On 3 July, Vergniaud 
had called upon the Assembly to act immediately:  
 
Our fortunes, our lives, our liberty are menaced, anarchy approaches with all the 
scourges that disrupt political bodies; despotism alone raises its long-since humiliated 
head, rejoices at our miseries, and awaiting to devour its prey. Appeal, it is time: 
appeal to all France to save the patrie; show them the gulf in all its immensity. It is 
only by an extraordinary effort that they may cross it…471  
 
The empty homogeneity of the temporal abyss that separated the present from the future 
presented a daunting prospect. But whilst Vergniaud acknowledged the “gulf” in all its 
menace, he nevertheless believed it to be surmountable. By calling for popular action, for a 
general movement throughout “all France,” he declared that the “time” had now arrived for 
an “extraordinary” human “effort” to traverse it. The pathway of historical progress was not 
predetermined and its pace was not pre-set; the speed of historical time could be modulated 
by sheer force of human will. During the winter of 1793, Camille Desmoulins would upbraid 
those “false patriots” who winced at such expressions of revolutionary impatience. “We well 
know that the present state is not that of liberty; but, patience, you will be free one day,” he 
                                                
470 Roederer, Chronique de Cinquante Jours, p.299: “Les choses marchaient plus vite et allaient plus loin que ne 
voulaient les députés de la Gironde. Ils étaient effrayés de la rapidité du mouvement populaire. […] Temporiser, 
gagner du temps, espérer quelque chose de la détresse de la cour, et de sa gratitude en la soutenant et en la 
menaçant tout à la fois, la serrer dans l’alternative de succomber sous les coups des jacobins fougueux…” 
471 Pierre Vergniaud, Opinion de M. Vergniaud, député du département de la Gironde sur la situation actuelle de 
la France, prononcé le 3 juillet 1792… Imprimée et envoyée aux 83 départemens par ordre de l’Assemblée 
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fléaux qui désorganisent les corps politiques ; le despotisme seul soulevant sa tête longtemps humiliée, jouit de nos 
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scoffed: “Those apparently thinking that liberty, like infancy, needs to pass through screams 
and tears in order to arrive at the age of maturity” had sorely misunderstood the operation of 
popular sovereignty. The people “are free at the moment they desire to be so,” Desmoulins 
insisted, recalling the sudden “return to the fullness of their rights from the 14 July.” Liberty 
“possessed neither a decrepitude nor an infancy; it has only one age, that of force and 
vigour.”472 It was, in this sense, timeless; the actualisation of liberty did not imply a need to 
wait.  
Popular patience quickly ebbed. On 15 July, Jacques Nicolas Billaud-Varenne, 
appeared before the Jacobin Club to declare that if action was not immediately taken, then the 
“gulf” adumbrated by Vergniaud would become insurmountable and a stationary people 
would witness the past re-engulf the present. Invoking the spectre of cyclicality, Billaud-
Varenne asked whether the French people had “undertaken a revolution in order to conquer 
liberty, or only to pass from despotism to anarchy, and to fall from anarchy back into a new 
slavery?” “Have the people overturned the towers of the Bastille in order to partake in the 
benefits of their victory, or to consent to remain eternally in the misery of their abasement?” 
As the completion of the Revolution slipped ever further into the future, it seemed probable 
that the present would be confined to such a gradual process of amelioration that it would 
resemble an endless historical reiteration. If nothing were done to overcome the growing gulf, 
warned the radical sans-culottes leader, Pierre-Gaspard Chaumette, “the ancien regime would 
be resuscitated,” and France would once again suffer beneath the oppression of “the dime, the 
gabelle, the aides, the feudal rights, [and] the mainmorte.” It was therefore possible to 
rationalise “the slow notification of useful decrees,” and the “counterrevolutionary vetos” 
issued by a king “impregnated with inherited prejudices,” as a manifestation of treachery, as a 
bid to place the Revolution in reverse.473 By seeming to frustrate the innate tempo of 
revolution historical progress, the monarchy had essentially declared itself illegitimate. 
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≈ 
 
In July, the patience of the people began to crack. Troops of petitioners now began 
interrupting Assembly proceedings on an hourly basis. They were unanimous in their desire 
to see the suspension of the monarchy; they were uniform in their belief that the time 
available to save the Revolution was running out. On 23 July, a fédérés delegation entered the 
legislative chamber to denounce the continued “dissimulations” of the Assembly: 
“Legislators, the peril is imminent; the reign of truth must commence.” Calling upon the 
deputies to “suspend the executive power,” the delegation insisted that there was “not a 
second to lose.” Seven days later, the citizens of Beaucaire made their own unannounced 
appearance: “Legislators, the present time is pregnant with the future! Do not disdain to save 
us, there is still time; but soon you will have no more.” The justification for these 
interventions – and for the bold demand to suspend the monarchy – were articulated in 
temporal terms, legitimated by the notion that popular patience had elapsed. Later, on 6 
August, the fédérés would return to the tribune of the Assembly to announce that the nation 
was entirely exhausted:  
 
For three years we have been in revolution, how many conspirators, how many 
cowards, how many traitors, perjurers, prevaricators have you observed; and still the 
blade of national vengeance remains suspended! The people grow weary; they 
recognise the guilty; they are outraged! 
 
The “blade of national vengeance,” suspended precariously above the heads of the culpable, 
may be read here as a reference to the velocity of the Revolution itself, which also seemed to 
have jammed.474 
During the preceding months, the Assembly had been recast as a body of time-
wasters. In its efforts to bend to royal whim, Chaumette portrayed the legislature as 
“consuming precious time in order to regulate the ceremonial and etiquette between it and the 
king,” often passing “entire sittings deciding if deputations to the king would be composed of 
twenty, thirty or sixty members.” “It was this Assembly which, instead of taking vigorous 
measures against the enemies of liberty, fatuously passed its time hearing declamatory 
reports, all of which ended with…messages to the king – for shame!”475 The Assembly 
                                                
474 Wahnich, La Longue Patience, p.383: “Législateurs, le péril est imminent; il faut que le règne de la vérité 
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appeared to waste yet more time as it began deliberating the fate of Lafayette, who, during a 
protracted trial, was accused of having violated the constitution on 28 June when he 
threatened to “clear the chamber of factions” and lift the political malaise.476 The invective 
surrounding the veto, meanwhile, was exacerbated by the belief that the king was intriguing 
with counterrevolutionaries.477 In a fiery petition of 29 July, the citizens of Rouen declared 
that France “had wanted a Constitution which would fix the duties and rights of the people 
and monarch: it was necessary to eradicate prejudices, destroy habits, annihilate abuses.” A 
“renovation was necessary,” but this was now being placed in peril, if not reverse, by the 
temporising application of the royal veto.478 Outright refusals in June to sanction legislative 
decrees strengthening penalties against émigrés and recalcitrant clergymen further implicated 
Louis in the rumour mill of counterrevolutionary intrigue. “[M]uch more delay,” Roland 
warned, “and a grieving people will see in its king the friend and accomplice of 
conspirators.”479  
For many of the radical Parisian sections, the application of the suspensive veto had 
become synonymous with counterrevolutionary conspiracy: executive authority was being 
used in order to delay the “renovation” of France. Many of the petitioners portrayed the 
temporary obstruction of vital patriotic measures – such as the recruitment of fédéré soldiers 
to defend Paris against invasion – as an attempt to allow enough time for the external enemies 
of France to overrun the Revolution. As Claudia Verhoeven has observed, political 
impatience of this sort is more than a merely “essentialized psychological category.” It must 
instead be understood as “a physical category grounded in unique historical conditions” – as a 
yearning, almost aching experience, akin to hunger, and constitutive of anger and anxiety.480 
Within the context of the summer of 1792, impatience with ordinary political progress was 
itself founded upon the historical hyperconsciousness engendered by events.481 Faced with the 
“ever memorable vengeance” promised by the Duke of Brunswick should people dare to 
harm their monarch, Parisians could justifiably comprehend their impatience as historically 
consequential.482 
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With the political present becoming unendurable, the time that remained until the 
advent of the idealised future seemed to augment. On 4 August, the section des Gravilliers 
descended upon the Assembly and presented a petition beseeching the deputies to suspend the 
monarchy – the source, as they saw it, of historical stasis and revolutionary unfulfillment. 
Their tribune was Léonard Bourdon, who declared that if action were not immediately taken, 
and the impatience of the people not instantly satisfied, then the Revolution would be 
subsumed, perhaps irrevocably, by this ever-widening time gulf: 
 
Legislators, circumstances are pressing; the executive power knows the wish of the 
nation. If it conspires against a nation that is too generous and too patient, what will 
be the limit of its conspiracies? War is declared between Louis XVI and France; 
every day, every hour, every minute are becoming centuries, becoming eternity; one 
instant lost, [and] France may be lost.483 
 
The section des Gravilliers had evoked a common sense that the ‘now’ of the Revolution, a 
space of action saturated with limitless possibility, was about to become a part of the ever-
accumulating ‘history’ of the Revolution; that it too was about to pass into the past, and that 
France would be condemned to suffer the protracted political ameliorations offered by the 
ordinary pace of historical progress. The real-time realisation of the Revolution would 
become forever too late. On 9 August, the Assembly “completed the general discontent of the 
people,” observed the Englishman, Richard Twiss, “by appearing to protract the question 
relative to the king’s decheance at a time when there was not a moment to lose.” The sections 
determined to finally force the hand of history. From then on, Twiss wrote, “the fermentation 
increased every minute, in a very alarming manner.”484 
 
≈ 
 
On 10 August 1792, fourteen centuries of French monarchy fell in fewer than two hours.485 At 
midnight the tocsin of the Faubourg St. Antoine rang out, calling upon the sectional clubs to 
take to the streets. The pressure of popular impatience was at last unleashed. “The officiers 
municipaux that I had sent into the different sections brought me word of the impatience of 
the people,” recalled the mairie, Jérôme Pétion: “I saw the necessity, and foresaw the success, 
of the insurrection.” There was now nothing more to be done: “the attack could be no longer 
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deferred.”486 By mid-morning more than 20,000 armed protestors and National Guardsmen 
had gathered at the square outside the Tuileries Palace. From his besieged vantage point, 
Roederer observed the last remaining units of power drain from the monarchy. “I saw an 
insurrection that with every minute rendered itself more general, and consequently more 
legitimate.” The legitimacy of the insurrection, it seemed, had become coefficient to its 
velocity. Asked whether martial law ought to be declared, Roederer simply shrugged: “this is 
a revolt, which is stronger than martial law, or than the power which should proclaim it.”487 
As the royal family crossed the courtyard of the Tuileries, the silence that had momentarily 
descended upon the crowd was itself interrupted by the telling cry: “No more veto!”488 The 
veto, the royal instrument that, since 1789, was popular portrayed as a political time-block on 
the Revolution was, till the last, central to the collective temporal consciousness of the 
people. This “changes all the ideas, all the opinions of patriots,” remarked Nicolas Ruault: “A 
new career offers itself before them. The canon has overturned the constitutional throne and 
the constitution itself.”489 
With the king and his family despatched to the loge of the Assembly, the frenzied 
crowd descended upon the former royal residence. In L’An 2440, the time traveller had 
awoken to “broad and beautiful streets,” “spacious intersections where such perfect order 
reigned.”490 On 11 August, Paris rose to a scene of unspeakable horror.491 “The victims of the 
people’s fury climb to eleven hundred,” wrote the medical student Edmond Géraud in his 
diary. “One cannot take a step without stumbling over a head, a corpse, some limbs that are 
still palpitating; the streets are strewn with this hideous debris.”492 In the course of two hours, 
more than one thousand people were killed, six hundred of them Swiss Guards [Fig. 7]. 
According to the recollections of Chaumette, the Tuileries Palace, the primary site of the 
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“Les victimes de la fureur du peuple se montent, dit-on, à onze cents. L’on ne peut faire un pas sans rencontrer une 
tête, un cadavre, des membres encore palpitants ; la voie publique est jonchée de ces hideux débris.” 
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struggle, was “littered with corpses.” It resembled “a vast slaughter house of sliced and 
palpitating chunks of limbs,” of “the fuming entrails of horses,” all “scattered amidst a sea of 
human blood.”493 
Within the context of revolutionary progress, of course, this carnage was both 
inevitable and necessary. “The brusque passage from the old state to the state of liberty,” 
Adrien Duport later remarked, “was necessarily accompanied by violent convulsions.”494  
Violence was justifiable – it was legitimate. The events of 20 June had demonstrated that 
forceful yet peaceful protest was ineffective. The intensity and duration of that violence, 
meanwhile, was essential if France was to break through the historical speed barrier. There 
was simply no more time for the gradualist prognostications of the pre-revolutionary 
philosophes. In order to efface the vast, empty expanse of time which confronted the nation, 
and through which generations of the oppressed might otherwise have to travel, this violence 
needed to acquire time-bending qualities. The more compressed the initial impact, the more 
instantaneous and extensive the subsequent progression. Violence on this scale could 
therefore fold or pleat the timeline of history, bringing about the temporal imbrication of 
present and future, and thereby effacing the intervening time – or duration. Vast historical 
                                                
493 Chaumette, Mémoires de Chaumette, p.60: “Le carnage est horrible. Toutes les cours sont jonchées de 
cadavres, le vestibule, l’escalier, la chapelle, tous les appartements ne présentèrent bientôt qu’une vaste boucherie 
de tronçons de membres coupés et palpitants, d’entrailles fumantes, de cheveux, d’armes brisées, de meubles, de 
glaces, de tapisseries en pièces et répandues dans des mares de sang humain.” On the desecrated interiors of the 
Tuileries, see: Bernard Jacqué, Kristel Smentek, ‘Wallpaper in the Royal Apartments at the Tuileries, 1789-1792,’ 
Journal of Decorative Arts, Design History, and Material Culture 13 (1, Winter 2005), pp.2-31; John Hardman, 
The Life of Louis XVI (New Haven, CT., Yale University Press, 2016), pp.406-26. 
494 Miller, A Natural History of Revolution, p.53. 
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transformations could thus be experienced instantly. When Géraud warily wandered the 
streets of Paris on 12 August, for example, he found the city almost entirely unrecognisable. 
“Here we are, without suspecting it and without anyone being aware of it, under a republican 
government.” France had hurtled through historical time, seemingly relieved of the historical 
weight anchoring it in situ. It would take some time for human consciousness to catch up with 
the speed of change. “A few more moments,” Géraud observed, “and the sincere friends of 
freedom will soon sense the difference that exists between such an order of things and an 
hereditary monarchy under a counterrevolutionary king.”495 
Insurrectionary violence was also temporal violence; it ruptured the perception of 
linear historical time and provided a short-cut towards the future, circumventing the “gulf” 
that separated it from the present. France consequently bypassed the gradations of temporal 
experience by warping the horizon of historical expectation. On the third anniversary of the 
journée, Joseph Vincent Dumolard, the president of the Council of Five Hundred, depicted 
the violence of 10 August as historically catalytic. The insurrection “blew to smithereens an 
antique throne and the feeble constitution which underpinned it,” and “preceded, so to speak, 
this long sequence of memorable events which seem to have squeezed ages into the narrow 
framework of a few years.” “[T]he cannon fire of 10 August” – in effect, the violence of just a 
few hours – would “resound throughout the centuries,” the hollowed out expanse of time, 
condensed into a single day, through which France had traversed. All this had “opened to 
France new destinies.”496 Violence thus imparted such an immense historical force that it 
enabled the insurrectionary crowd to momentarily levitate the weighty historicity of France. 
“Royalty is no more,” crowed the enragé journalist, Étienne Psaume: “only a few minutes 
were needed to destroy this idol that our ignorance and stupidity had praised for fourteen 
centuries.”497 With the baggage of the past forcibly lifted, the French were transported 
through history at a vastly accelerated rate. “The journée of 10 August,” wrote a jubilant 
Géraud, “advances us ten years down the bright road to freedom and public prosperity.”498 
                                                
495 Géraud, Journal, p.276: “Nous voilà, sans nous en douter et sans que personne y fasse attention, sous un 
gouvernement républicain. Encore quelques instants et les sincères amis de la liberté ne tarderont pas à sentir la 
salutaire différence qui règne entre un tel ordre de choses et une monarchie héréditaire, avec un roi contre-
révolutionnaire.” 
496 Joseph Vincent Dumolard, ‘Anniversaire du 10 août: Discours prononcé par Dumolard, president du Conseil 
des Cinq Cents, le 23 thermidor, an 5 de la République,’ in Guillaume Lallement, ed., Choix de Rapports, 
Opinions, et Discours, prononcés à la Tribune Nationale depuis 1789 jusqu’à ce jour: Année 1795-1799. Le 
Directoire et les Conseils, (20 vols., Paris, A. Eymery, 1821), XVI, pp.13-14, here: p.13: “Représentants du 
peuple, le canon du 10 août retentira dans les siècles: il mit en poudre un trône antique et la faible Constitution 
dont on l’avait étayé ; il ouvrit à la France des destinées nouvelles ; il préluda pour ainsi dire à cette longue suite 
d’événemens [sic] mémorables qui semblent avoir pressé les âges dans le cadre étroit de quelques années.” 
497 Étienne Psaume, Réponse aux objections des Monarchistes contre le possibilité d’une République en France 
(Paris, J. J. Rainville, 1792), p.3. 
498 Géraud, Journal, p.282:“La journée du 10 août nous avance de dix ans dans les routes brillantes de la liberté et 
de la prospérité publique.” 
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France had passed through a decade of history in a single day. 
 
≈ 
 
The pressure of popular impatience that built over the summer of 1792 warped the linear 
shape of history, until its violent force seemed to spear a tunnel through time, opening the 
possibility for France to travel immense historical distances almost instantaneously. One such 
witness to this process was Rosalie Jullien, the bourgeois revolutionary, who observed 
proceedings from the window of her Saint-Germain apartment.499 
On 10 August, in a bid to keep pace with the accumulation of events, Jullien hastily 
penned a series of hour-by-hour letters and diary entries.500 Fearful that to await the end of the 
day would be to risk overlooking – or even forgetting – important episodes, themselves 
epocha in history, her letters consistently allude to the speed of historical change. “The 
circumstances in which we find ourselves,” and which easily formed “the most violent crisis 
of the Revolution,” were of such magnitude and consequence that they amounted to “the most 
astonishing and terrible tremor” to have struck “the monarchy in the fourteen centuries of its 
existence.”501 Although she claimed to have spied a “storm growing” since June, even Jullien 
found her predictive faculties confounded. On 8 August, she had reflected that the 
“importance” of Lafayette’s trial necessitated a deliberative “slowness,” and still foresaw “a 
fortnight before the terrible blow which will decide the fate of the empire, at least for some 
time.” On 10 August, the rate at which France appeared to be travelling through historical 
time was incomprehensible: the insurrection “holds us for twenty-four hours in a kind of 
frenzy.”502  
Yet when “the deadly struggle” was over, Jullien observed, “safety, no, serenity, was 
restored.” It was almost as though she had emerged – disorientated but intact – at the other 
end of the time tunnel opened by the awesome, violent force of the journée. The “frenzied” 
collision of opposing forces had given way to the most perfect calm. Four days later, Jullien 
                                                
499 Lindsay A.H. Parker, ‘Family and Feminism in the French Revolution: The Case of Rosalie Ducrollay Jullien,’ 
Journal of Women’s History 24 (3, Fall 2012), pp.40-61. 
500 In fact, this is how many contemporary witnesses would record their experiences of the journée, in historically 
condensed micro-moments, hour-by-hour, not day-by-day: Camille-Hilaire Durand, Détails particuliers sur la 
journée du 10 août 1792, par un bourgeois de Paris, témoin oculaire, suivis de deux Notices historiques… (Paris, 
J.-J. Blaise, 1822), p.xxxix: “J’adopterai, dans ma narration, une forme plus rapide, et mieux appropriée, je crois, à 
la nature des événemens que j’entreprends de décrire.” 
501 In only a few hours, for example, the Louvre was “besieged” and victory made “certain.” During the night, the 
Commune had “all of a sudden” been “purged of its aristocratic venom”: Jullien, Journal, p.221. 
502 Ibid, p.230-31: “La circonstance où nous nous trouvons est non seulement la plus violente crise de la 
Révolution, mais aussi la plus étonnante et la plus terrible secousse qu’ait éprouvée la monarchie depuis près de 
quatorze siècles qu’elle existe,” p.219: “comme l’importance de la délibération [sur Lafayette] nécessite la lenteur, 
je vois encore une quinzaine avant le coup terrible qui décidera du destin de l’empire, au moins pour quelque 
temps,” p.226: “Une second révolution, aussi miraculeuse que celle qui a vu prendre la Bastille ; mais qui nous 
coûte du sang et qui nous tient depuis vingt-quatre heures dans un espèce de frénésie.” 
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compared the “triumph” of the 10 August to the experience of “fainting [tomber en 
syncope],” a blackout from which she had awoken to behold a nation regenerated overnight. 
“If you saw Paris now, and the history of what happened on the 10th was recounted to you,” 
she informed her son Jules, “you would judge the thing impossible.” France had been 
rendered unrecognisable, and the people, rejuvenated by the experience, “finally sense that 
they are humans and not slaves.” “Posterity itself will refuse to believe it.” The 10 August had 
warped French historical spacetime: “It seems that I have lived centuries in four days.”503 
 
≈ 
 
In order to disencumber France of its historical drag-weight, and thereby simultaneously 
regenerate the constitutional and moral basis of the nation, the Revolution would not merely 
need to move faster – it would need to move at warp speed.504 It would, in fact, need to 
eradicate time altogether. The historical order of progress, therefore, would be in no order at 
all: history would simply fly past instantly, bereft of the temporal coordinates stipulated by 
clock or calendrical time. This warping of historical time was only possible because the 
violent velocity of 10 August had lifted the density of the French past. France “saw the 
antique edifice of an almighty monarchy collapse within just a few hours,” recalled Daunou: 
“the weight of the old thrones was confounded and dissipated in a single day.”505 The advance 
of the future was rendered instantly realisable since the past had ceased to exert its historical-
gravitational force upon the present. The historical translocation of France would only 
happen, however, if the ordinary duration of historical time were reduced to an experiential 
triviality. The journée would need to destroy durée.  
This is why, on 10 August, it was not time but history that was perceived to have 
accelerated: in fact, the velocity of lived time decreased as the pace of ‘progress’ quickened 
beyond all comprehension. Thus with time slowed down, but history speeded up, it became 
possible for the Parisian crowds to elongate the perceived duration of days, hours or even 
minutes in order to fit huge swathes of historical change into comparatively tiny temporal 
units. Fourteen centuries of French monarchical history was concluded within the course of 
an afternoon, remarked Mercier, who observed how, all of a sudden, “the word tyrant 
                                                
503 Ibid, p.223: “Ce qu’il y a de frappant c’est qu’à midi la funeste guerre était finie, et que la sécurité, non la 
sérénité était rétablie,” p.233: “Quand je considère, dans le calme de la méditation, les maux auxquels nous venons 
d’échapper par le triomphe de vendredi, l’effroi me saisit au point de tomber en syncope,” p.245: “Mon cher bon, 
si tu voyais Paris et que l’on te fît l’historique de ce qui s’y est passé le 10, tu jurerais la chose impossible,” p.237: 
“[I]l semble que j’ai vécu des siècles en quatre jours.” 
504 The notion of speed and political action is briefly theorised in, Paul Virilio, Speed and Politics (Cambridge, 
MA., MIT University Press, 2006), pp.44-45, and Le Grand Accélérateur (Paris, Éditions Galilée, 2010), pp.1-30. 
505 Pierre-Claude-François Daunou, Discours prononcé par le Président de la Convention nationale, pour la fête 
du 10 août, le 23 thermidor, l’an troisième de la République française, une et indivisible (Paris, l’Imprimerie 
Nationale, Thermidor l’an III), p.2. 
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replaced that of king in every mouth.”506 The suspension, and eventual abolition, of the 
Bourbon monarchy confirmed the rapidity of this transformation. “You have decreed the 
abolition of royalty,” declared the commune de Bléré in a congratulatory address to the 
Assembly: “You have advanced the Revolution by several centuries!”507 Observations such as 
these undermined time as a meaningful measurement of human events. The 10 August would 
take the French nation, threatened by the endless duration of linear time, to a space beyond 
time: the ‘future’ that many of the insurrectionary agitators foresaw, after all, was not 
chronologically distinctive or temporally measurable; it was directed towards a timeless 
future.  
 
≈ 
 
Three days after the suspension of the monarchy, Condorcet presented a report on the journée 
to the Assembly. Whilst it was “the duty” of the Assembly, he declared, to make laws only 
after “mature and prudent examination,” on 10 August “the patience of the people was 
exhausted,” and “all of sudden, they appeared entirely united with the same aim and the same 
will.” The suspension of the executive power “appeared to the representatives of the people” 
as the “soul means of saving France and liberty.”508 For Condorcet, who was desperate to 
retroactively legitimise the Assembly’s extra-constitutional position, the political momentum 
unleashed by the people on 10 August was designed to affect the consolidation and, 
ultimately, the completion of the Revolution.509 Now “that the people have taken charge,” 
agreed the Jacobin deputy, Jacques Pinet, the nation – purged of its prevaricators and 
temporisers – could move forward “in giant strides.” “We must profit from the situation and 
complete the revolution.”510  
                                                
506 Louis Sébastien Mercier, Le Nouveau Paris (6 vols., Paris, chez Fuchs, 1797), I, p.200: “Le mot tyran 
remplaçoit celui de roi dans toutes les bouches.” 
507 AP, LXVIII, p.234: “[V]ous avez décrété l’abolition de la royauté. Vous avez avancé la Révolution de plusieurs 
siècles!” 
508 AP, XLVII, p.97: “Il était de son devoir de ne prononcer qu’après un examen mûr et réfléchi, après une 
discussion solennelle, après avoir entendu et pesé toutes les opinions; mais la patience du peuple était épuisée: tout 
à coup, il a paru tout entier réuni dans un même but et dans une même volonté. […] [R]ien ne put arrêter la 
vengeance du peuple qui éprouvait une trahison nouvelle, au moment même où il venait se plaindre de celles dont 
il avait longtemps été la victime. […] [I]l faut du temps pour assembler de nouveau représentants du peuple ; et 
quoique l’Assemblée nationale ait pressé les époques des opérations que cette convocation nécessite ; quoiqu’elle 
ait accéléré le moment où elle doit cesser de porter le poids de la chose publique, de manière à éviter le plus léger 
soupçon de vues ambitieuses, le terme de quarante jours aurait encore exposé la patrie à de grands malheurs, et le 
peuple à des mouvements dangereux, si l’on eût laissé au roi l’exercice des pouvoirs que la Constitution lui a 
conférés ; et la suspension de ces pouvoirs a paru aux représentants du peuple le seul moyen de sauver la France et 
la liberté.” 
509 On Condorcet and constituent power, see: Lucien Jaume, ‘Citizen and State under the French Revolution,’ in 
Bo Stråth, Quentin Skinner, eds., States and Citizens (Cambridge, CUP, 2003), pp.131-44; Williams, Condorcet 
and Modernity, pp.81-88; Anne Elizabeth Burlingame, Condorcet: The Torch-Bearer of the French Revolution 
(Seattle, WA., Stratford Company, 1930), pp.140-42. 
510 Tackett, The Coming of the Terror, p.196. 
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In the days and weeks that followed, little was achieved by way of revolutionary 
conclusion: the Republic still moved too slowly. When Roland appeared before the Assembly 
on 17 September, for example, demanding that “measures be taken to ensure the force of the 
law” – to punish those who had voted to spare Lafayette before 10 August, and to restore 
order across France – he reminded the deputies that as long as “eight days ago” he had asked 
for something to be done, “and in the circumstances in which we find ourselves, days are like 
centuries.”511 Although France continued to experience the temporal aftershocks of the 
journée, the uchronia – the timeless terminus of the Revolution – that 10 August was 
supposed to herald continued to drift into duration. By the spring of 1793, as grain prices 
climbed and the assignats collapsed, the National Convention was once again host to hordes 
of Parisian petitioners.512 On 23 May, a register of the deliberations of the section de la 
Fraternité was read aloud before the Convention, in which the deputies were called upon “to 
affect another journée of 10 August.”513 Eight days later and an impatient people got their 
wish as an insurrectionary mob descended upon the chamber.514  
As the demonstrators filed in, Chaumette began his address. “Citizen legislators,” he 
declared, “the citizens of Paris, tired of seeing their destinies forever floating in uncertainty, 
wish to finally fix them invariably.” 
 
Everyday we learn of new betrayals, of new crimes; everyday we are disturbed by the 
discovery and reanimation of new conspiracies; everyday new troubles agitate the 
Republic, and are ready to drag it into their tempestuous whirlwinds, to hurl it into 
the immeasurable abyss of the centuries to come. 
 
The past, in other words, would pre-empt the future by folding itself back in upon the present 
and consigning the nascent Republic to “the immeasurable abyss” of the forthcoming 
“centuries.” The radiant future of the Revolution would thus be consumed by the oppressive 
emptiness – the duration – of time itself. Such rhetoric made the journée coterminous with a 
certain political speed. The revolutionaries would need to defeat their enemies before they 
themselves were defeated: “If we do not outpace them, they will outpace us.” The 
counterstrategy was simple: the Convention, with the support of the French people, would 
need to once again warp time. Citing the “the wicked struggle which has continued since 
1789 between the children of the nation” – the regenerated citizen – “and those who have 
abandoned it” – the counterrevolutionary – Chaumette declared: “Let us hurl between them 
                                                
511 Réimpression de l’Ancien Moniteur (17 September, 1792), XIII, p.722. 
512 Marc Bouloiseau, The Jacobin Republic, 1792-1794 (trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum), (Cambridge, CUP, 1972), 
pp.64-82. 
513 AP, LXV, p.221: “faire une journée du 10 août” 
514 On the 31 May to 2 June insurrection, which consumed the Girondin faction and installedd the Jacobins in 
power, see: Morris Slavin, The Making of an Insurrection: Parisian Sections and the Gironde (Cambridge, MA., 
Harvard University Press, 1986), pp.76-109. 
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and us the barrier of eternity!”515 The idea that the accomplishments of the Revolution could 
not only be overturned but also actively reversed suggests that Chaumette, like many of his 
fellow enragés, could not conceive of a unidirectional linearity to historical time. As Billaud-
Varenne had warned back in July 1792, time’s arrow was pliable. The only means of saving 
the Revolution was therefore to establish a time barrier – “eternity” – between past and 
present, and to jettison the Revolution’s enemies into the untraversable void.516 The Girondin 
faction made a suitable sacrifice; they were expunged from the Convention on 2 June.  
 
≈ 
 
More than a year after the events of 10 August, then, the radical Parisian sections were 
rethinking the “gulf” presented by linear revolutionary time as a distinct advantage. It was a 
means of blocking the historical time tunnel through which France had seemingly travelled, 
and through which the forces of counterrevolution wished to drag it backwards. Once again, it 
would require an inordinate level of violence. As one supportive deputy declared, there was 
“no more time to temporise”: “Paris, like Mount Etna, must vomit the carbonised aristocracy 
from its core,” rupturing the political landscape of the nation in a single, pyroclastic belch.517 
The purpose of the revolutionary journées was to repudiate the linear, progressive flow of 
time imagined by the philosophes of the liberal Enlightenment.518 The temporal structure of 
human history was warped by the violent manifestations of the popular will; the people 
thereby sought to reshape the future-orientated trajectories and prognostications of the 
National Assembly, which, prior to the 10 August, had primarily apostrophised a lay-
Turgotian reading of historical speed. The pace of Enlightenment progress, however 
inexorable, was rejected as simply too slow.  
 
 
                                                
515 AP, LXXIII, p.411: “Citoyens législateurs! Les citoyens de Paris, las de voir leurs destinées trop longtemps 
incertaines et flottantes, veulent enfin les fixer invariablement.” “Tous les jours nous apprenons de nouvelles 
trahisons, de nouveaux forfaits; tous les jours nous sommes inquiétés par la découverte et la renaissance de 
nouveaux complots; tous les jours de nouveaux troubles agitent la République, et sont prêts à l’entraîner dans leurs 
tourbillons orageux et à la précipiter dans l’abîme insondé des siècles à venir.” “Il est temps, législateurs, de faire 
casser la lute impie qui dure depuis 1789, entre les enfants de la nation et ceux qui l’ont abandonnée,” p.412: “Si 
nous ne les devançons pas, ils nous devanceront. Jetons entre eux et nous la barrière de l’éternité!” 
516 On Hebertistes extremism, see: Michael L. Kennedy, The Jacobin Clubs in the French Revolution, 1793-1795 
(New York, NY., Berghahn Books, 2005), pp.71-87; Paul Mansfield, ‘Collot d’Herbois at the Committee of Public 
Safety: A Revaluation,’ The English Historical Review 103 (408, July 1988), pp.565-87. 
517 AP, LXXIII, p.414: “Il n’est plus temps de temporiser. […] Paris, comme le mont Etna, doit vomir l’aristocratie 
calcinée, de son sein.” 
518 On the liberal Enlightenment (and its betrayal) and the conceptualization of progress: Jonathan Israel, 
Revolutionary Ideas: An Intellectual History of the French Revolution from The Rights of Man to Robespierre 
(Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 2014), pp.1-5, 695-708; Anne Sa’adah, The Shaping of Liberal 
Politics in Revolutionary France: A Comparative Perspective (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1990), 
pp.78-146; Genevieve Lloyd, Enlightenment Shadows (Oxford, OUP, 2013), pp.155-68, which also includes a 
useful bibliographic essay on the matter of the liberal vs. radical Enlightenment(s), pp.169-81. 
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IV. Liquid Time 
 
It was widely accepted that the United States would disintegrate upon the conclusion of the 
Revolutionary War.519 “It was taken for granted,” Joseph Priestley observed, “that the 
moment America had thrown off the yoke of Great Britain, the different states would go to 
war among themselves.”520 By 1783, a confluence of circumstances – the defeat of the impost 
in 1781, a national tariff that would have given Congress the power to impose a 5% duty on 
imports in order repay crippling war debts; the near-miss Newburgh mutiny in 1783, where 
exhausted and unpaid soldiers threatened violent action against Congress; the collapse in the 
system of requisitions – imperilled the political stability of the Republic.521 This would 
remain so, warned the marquis de Chastellux, “till you order your confederation better, till 
you take measures in common to pay debts, which you contracted in common, and till you 
have a form of government.”522  
As the war reached its conclusion, temporal metaphors shifted in their descriptive 
detail, displacing the sensation of compression or acceleration that was common to the 
Revolution, and instead coming to connote the liquid changeability of historical experience.523 
In October 1780, as winter closed in on the military encampment at the Passaic Falls in New 
Jersey, George Washington wrote a despairing letter to Lafayette. Outlining his displeasure at 
the slow sanctioning of military provisions by Congress, he observed: “Time slides away so 
fast and we have so little before us,” that “every moment” has become “infinitely 
precious.”524 In a further letter to George Mason, Washington observed how, in order to 
“continue our struggles,” America would need to “have a permanent force – not a force that is 
constantly fluctuating, & sliding from under us as a pedestal of Ice would leave a Statue in a 
summers day.” The efficacy of political power rested precariously on the fluidity of time and 
history. This was because “we have lived upon expedients ’till we can live no longer, and it 
                                                
519 Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States, 1783-1795 (Dallas, 
TX., Southern Methodist University Press, 1969); John Francis Mercer, a Virginia lawyer, observed how “the 
judicious Men who have lately return’d from Europe, all agree, that the prevalent opinion there is that we are 
verging fast towards anarchy & confusion, & some of them say, they were frequently asked by men otherwise well 
informed, whether we have any thing like Government yet remaining among us…”: to James Madison (12 
November, 1784), Letters of Delegates to Congress, XXII, p.16.  
520 Joseph Priestley, Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke: Occasioned by His Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (London, J. Johnson, 1791), pp.146-7: Priestley added, with hindsight: “But the event has not 
verified the prediction, nor is it at all probable that it ever will.”  
521 Donald Stabile, The Origins of American Public Finance: Debates over Money, Debt, and Taxes in the 
Constitutional Era, 1776-1838 (Westport, CT., Greenwood Publishing Group, 1998), pp.22-48; E. Wayne Carp, 
To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783 
(Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1984), pp.153-68, 189-218. 
522 Marquis de Chastellux to Gouverneur Morris (8 December, 1784), in John Catanzariti, E. James Ferguson, eds., 
The Papers of Robert Morris, 1781-1784 (7 vols., Pittsburgh, PA., University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984), IX, 
p.611. 
523 The liquefaction of post-revolutionary perceptions of temporality has briefly been discussed with reference to 
the political thought of Thomas Jefferson: Spahn, Thomas Jefferson, Time and History, pp.76-77. 
524 Washington to Lafayette (19 May, 1780). 
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may truly be said that the history of this war is a history of false hopes, & temporary 
devices.”525 For Washington, the prevalent sense of chaos was not so much the product of 
acceleration as multi-direction. History seemed structureless, directionless – subject, at “every 
moment,” to be knocked off course by mere circumstance. After the Revolutionary War, this 
came increasingly to be expressed in temporalised terms. Living upon “expedients” until “we 
can live no longer,” whilst clinging to “temporary devices,” had sent the experience of the 
present “sliding” through “a history of false hopes,” ceaselessly swerving past near misses 
and constantly confronting disintegration.  
 
≈ 
 
When the novelist Margaret Bayard Smith visited Thomas Jefferson at Monticello in 1809, a 
year after he had retired from the presidency, she found him in a pensive mood. Asked for his 
reminiscences of the Revolution, he mused: “The circumstances of our country at my 
entrance into life, were such that every honest man felt himself compelled to take a part,” and 
“when once engaged, new circumstances were continually arising […], which has never since 
allowed me to leave the course into which I had been impelled by the force of events.”526 
Jefferson was not merely alluding to the content (the events) of that era, but to the 
quality (the experiential nature) of history itself. Under the impact of revolution, as “new 
circumstances” were seen to be “continually arising,” America was plunged into the 
“irruptive violence of time.”527 History could no longer cohere to the chronological or linear 
unification of temporal successions that had previously delineated a classical taxonomy of 
time; the interrelation of past, present and future was now subject to “the force of events,” 
which had the effect of “breaking up time.”528 Between the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 
1783 and the convocation of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the once interconnected, 
successional hierarchy (or chain) of historical time, which charted causality along 
chronologically coherent (time-)lines, deteriorated. The connection between time, history and 
power was rendered “rhizomic” – it no longer possessed any discernable network-like 
structure. There consequently emerged, amidst the private writings and public utterances of 
the revolutionary generation, the sense of a continual historical happening.529 
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During the 1780s, the future “course” of American history no longer appeared 
certain, or solid, but rather replete with “multiplicities.”530 The experience of the present was 
plunged into a continually shifting matrix of multiplying potential futures, which, upon 
appearance, did not seem to reference a prior unity, either in historical experience or temporal 
structure. When the tempo at which the future supplanted the present reached a critical 
velocity, the experience of change was no longer perceived as a form of transformation in the 
fixed structures of existence, but as a form of ceaseless indeterminacy.531 In his circular letter 
of 8 June 1783, in which he made the first of his numerous farewells, Washington conjured an 
image of the American “present” as a single moment saturated by an infinitude of 
consequential choices. For the citizens of the United Stated, it was “their choice,” and it 
depended upon “their conduct,” whether “they will be respectable and prosperous, or 
contemptable and miserable as a Nation”:  
 
This is the Time of their political probation, this is the moment when the eyes of the 
whole World are turned upon them, this is the moment to establish or ruin their 
national Character forever, this is the favourable moment to give such a tone to our 
Federal Government, as will enable it to answer the ends of its institution, or this may 
be the ill-fated moment for relaxing the powers of the Union, annihilating the cement 
of the Confederation.532 
 
It was “yet to be decided, whether the Revolution” – which Washington implicitly portrays 
here as an ongoing act – “must ultimately be considered as a blessing or a curse.” The 
liquefaction of the present was “annihilating the cement” of the union, and contributing to the 
diminishing belief that there was any attainable telos to history.  
 
≈ 
 
Within this “fluctuating” present the authority of long-termism collapsed, heightening the 
(especially Federalist) fear that political temporariness would soon see the republic 
“insensibly glide” into “Anarchy,” as Edward Carrington wrote, when “the present fabric 
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gives way.”533 In the context of a “continually arising” historicity of events, the institutional 
framework of American power was seen to lose its solidity, especially by those who felt that 
they had done most to ensure its establishment. Imposing order upon this ceaselessly shifting 
perception of time proved beyond the capabilities of Congress. The members of Congress, 
meanwhile, “are so constantly changing,” remarked Josiah Bartlett, “that before they get 
acquainted with the business they leave Congress and new members totally ignorant of the 
past transactions are appointed in their stead.”534 Annual alterations in the composition of 
congressional delegations was further undermined chronic absenteeism; between 1785 and 
1786, for example, the congressional turnover rate reached fifty-eight percent; committees, 
meanwhile, regularly disintegrated as delegates drifted in and out of Philadelphia, often 
departing, completely unannounced, for months at a time.535 After 1779 no single member 
occupied the presiding chair for longer than twelve months, and sessions were considered a 
success if the body managed to reach a quorum.536 This eroded the institutional memory of 
Congress, causing a “great uneasiness,” abbreviating the accumulation of political experience. 
Yet a “speedy remedy” to the problem seemed impossible, observed Bartlett, given “the 
multiplicity of business that is daily crowding on Congress and the time it takes to transact 
matters” in an Assembly filled with “lawyers and other gentlemen who love to talk.”537 As 
Hamilton noted in February 1783, it was “a body not governed by reason [or] foresight, but 
by circumstances,” incapable of charting a course towards futurity. Reeling from Newburgh 
and confronted by the collapse of both federal and state finances, Congress would probably 
“[not] take the proper measures,” Hamilton sighed, “and if we do not, a few [months] may 
open an embarrassing scene.”538 As the farewell circular attested, Washington did not believe 
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that this ceaselessly “shifting” experience of time was a peculiarity of war: it had become the 
new normal.  
 
≈ 
 
Contemporaries regularly portrayed themselves as passive, powerless observers to this 
process, as if they too were “sliding” or “gliding” over thawing ice. In June 1786, David 
Humphreys described how his fellow citizens had become “uneasy” and begun to 
“prognosticate” further political ruptures, yet they could not attribute a cause or source, much 
less an outcome, to this gathering sense of multiplicity – “they hardly know how or why.”539  
A month later, Stephen Higginson, a former Massachusetts delegate to the 
Continental Congress, was convinced that America was “verging fast to a Crisis.” The 
problem, as he saw it, was that “the people at large have for several years lived in a manner 
much more expensive and luxurious than they have Ability to support.” During the 
Revolutionary War the printing of paper money had enabled the colonies to inflate 
themselves out of debt.540 When Congress attempted to rid the states of paper currencies, and 
restore government credit, the repayment schedules of state debts acquired a sudden urgency. 
For Higginson, the contraction of liquidity that occurred during the early 1780s mirrored a 
simultaneous contraction in the liquid qualities of time: as the former dwindled, so too did the 
latter, tightening political manoeuvrability in the present, and setting the scene for the Union 
to become “unhinged, and [a] revolution [to] take place.”541 Interest rates rocketed: usually 
capped at between 5 to 6 percent per year, by 1784-85 they were increasing at around 12 
percent per month, which spelt ruin farmers and simple artisans.542 In turn this created vocal 
demands, particular in rural Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, for further issuances of paper 
money.543 
By demanding the states meet their requisitions in “hard-cash” repayments, Congress 
caused credit liquidity to dry up, in turn squeezing the time spans available for debt 
repayments themselves. This is how metaphors of liquid time operated: they could connote 
streams, circulations, or a gushing onset of events, but they also evoked sudden stagnations, 
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evaporations; the common factor is instability, and the ways in which the connection of 
events across historical time seemed never to achieve fixed connections. As William Manning 
later observed, “the creditor in paper money times would take neither principal nor interest,” 
but by the mid-1780s, “debtors were called on for five or six years’ interest” in a single 
repayment.544 The prognosticated processes by which the American Republic would 
disintegrate were therefore charged with an unpredictable, unruly tempo. James Warren 
acknowledge this fact in a gloomy letter to John Adams, written in the autumn of 1786. 
During the Revolution, he observed, “my small Efforts were Joined with yours, & others for 
many Years in rearing A Glorious Fabrick on Foundations that should have been as 
permanent as Time,” yet now that “Fabrick” had “suffered to fall into ruin in less than half the 
Time it took to Build it.”545  
 
≈ 
 
“Never was a poor fly more completely entangled in a cobweb than Congress in their paper 
currency.” This problem, as the North Carolina delegate Samuel Johnston observed, was “the 
daily subject of conversation.”546 During the war, obligations amounting to $266,000,000 
were eradicated by currency depreciation.547 Franklin compared the issue of bills of credit to 
“a wonderful Machine,” which “performs its Office when we issue it; it pays & clothes 
Troops, & provides Victuals & Ammunition; and when we are oblig’d to issue a Quantity 
excessive, it pays itself off by depreciation.”548 In view of the political difficulties of levying 
taxes upon a citizenry who had recently pronounced a revolution over the matter, the fiat 
currency issued by Congress, which so rapidly depreciated in the hands of its holders, was a 
substitution for taxation. Congress resorted to printing a paper medium of exchange, backed 
by a promise of a future redemption, in the form of tax anticipation notes. “[T]here is no 
nation that is able to carry on war by the taxes which can be raised within the year,” remarked 
Adams.549 Paper money offered the government a far speedier form of raising revenue.550  
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 By 1779, however, the purchasing power of the “Continental currency” had dwindled 
to a point of near worthlessness.551 “A wagon-load of money will scarcely purchase a wagon-
load of provisions,” moaned Washington.552 This rapid depreciation of paper money, and the 
concomitant explosion in the price of basic commodities, was a disorientating experience. 
When Congress sought to address the “excess in its quantity,” observed one diarist, the 
resultant damage to public credit forced the value of the circulating medium to “fall in a few 
weeks from four to ten, and in a few months to twenty to one.” Prices began rising on a daily 
basis. In Boston in 1779 a pound of butter sold for $12, a barrel of flour for $1,575. 
“Hundreds suffered by it.”553 Washington scolded his stepson, Jacky Custis, for repeatedly 
stalling in meeting his debt obligations so as to be able to repay stepfather in depreciated 
currency: “You might as well attempt to pay me in old newspapers and almanacs, with which 
I can purchase nothing.”554 Total uncertainty as to the future-value of money meant nothing 
could be taken for granted nor nothing adequately predicted; yet still the financial demands of 
the war grew, and still Congress continued to print.555  
Paper money deranged financial temporality.556 In a circular letter, issued to the states 
in 1779, John Jay declared that Congress had “resolved to stop the press,” calling upon the aid 
of the states “for supplies by loans and taxes.” This was “the price of the liberty, the peace, 
and the safety of yourselves and posterity.” The task of “forming a strong chain of 
connection” binding “yourself and posterity,” creating a coherence between present and 
future, was undermined by the paper money means of meeting debt obligations, which 
undercut American credit and threatened to reduce the duration of American “liberty” and 
“safety” to a mere historical moment: “Let it never be said that America had no sooner 
become independent than she became insolvent.” In a prefiguration of Montesquiou’s 
financial report to the National Assembly, Jay predicted that if the “infant glories” of America 
were to become “obscured and tarnished” by “broken contracts” and debt defaults, then the 
Republic would be ruined “in the very hour when all the nations of the earth were admiring 
and almost adoring the splendour of her rising.”557  
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By the early 1780s, America was awash with paper currencies. In 1777, Congress, in 
despair at the speed of depreciation, produced “certificates of indebtedness” designed to cover 
the costs of confiscation (though they carried no firm date of future redemption). In 1781, 
Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance, issued “promissory notes” which, although 
redeemable in a definite time scale (often between thirty to sixty days), foundered on the 
evaporating credit of Congress.558 By 1783, Congress relinquished the basic sovereign 
functions of minting a national medium of exchange: a smorgasbord of separate currencies 
proliferated amongst the states.559 
Towards the end of the War, in an attempt to settle the financial instability created by 
these depreciative monetary spirals, many colonial legislatures sought to eliminate paper 
currencies altogether. Even those who had once lauded its virtues now lamented its 
deleterious consequences. In a Dissertation on paper money, published in February 1786, 
Thomas Paine located “its uncertain and fluctuating value,” as “continually awakening or 
creating new schemes of deceit.” Whilst the issuing of paper bills of credit was easy “at first,” 
observed Paine, it served “as a trap to catch people in the last.” Because it “operates as an 
anticipation of the next year’s taxes,” eating into future revenues, it was also “the dearest 
money there is.” In an alternative liquid metaphor, Paine even compared the temporality of 
paper money to “dram-drinking,” for whilst “it relieves for a moment by deceitful sensation,” 
it quickly “diminishes the natural heat, and leaves the body worse than it found it.”560 
In July 1782, Morris presented delegates with his proposals to consolidate the war 
debts of the various states into a single debt, the retirement of which would rest with 
Congress. Whilst this amounted to a programme of “liquidation,” insofar as it verified both 
the financial liabilities of the Republic and the assets available to discharge them under 
Congressional supervision, it would also “provide Solid funds for the national Debt.” The 
consolidated debt obligation was to be underwritten by the sale of interest-bearing “public 
securities,” which would, in turn, restore confidence in government credit because nationally 
levied taxes would enable Congress to meet a regularised schedule of debt interest 
repayments. Repayments were to be made gradually: according to his estimations, the debt 
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assumed by Congress would be approximately $30 million, but provisions for the payment of 
interest to service the debt would only reach £2 million per year. The revenue required was to 
be derived primarily from duties on imports, a land tax, and an excise tax on distilled 
whiskey. “A Public Debt supported by Public Revenue,” he insisted, “will prove the Strongest 
Cement to keep our Confederacy together.” Thus the “Cement” of “Solid money” was 
preferable to the liquid unpredictability of paper since it provided a firm foundation upon 
which to establish “credit in the future.”561 This was a cause of perennial peril: “the Political 
existence of American depends on the Accomplishment of this plan,” observed Morris, who 
several times confessed to “hourly Apprehensions” of the collapse of credit. “In this Situation 
not having Money, the States neglecting to raise Taxes,” and Congress burdened by “heavy 
Demands,” Morris “hourly expected” to see the entire financial edifice of the United States – 
and his own personal credit – “sink under.”562 Developing a consolidated national debt, 
financed by a centrally supervised system of taxation, would enable Congress to accumulate 
“credit in the future,” stabilising the trans-historical relationship between past debts, future 
obligations and present revenues. Morris therefore hoped that the regularity and predictability 
of his servicing mechanism would, in effect, de-temporalise government debt.  
The plan required the power to tax, and therefore an amendment of the Articles of 
Confederation, which Morris ultimately failed to attain. Unable to provide “Solid funds,” 
Congress devolved its debt onto the states, where the individual obligations continued to be 
liquidated separately. Devoid of a debt consolidation and servicing programme grounded in 
specie tax revenue, the state governments were free to mortgage the future of the Union on 
the non-collateralised liquidity of paper money. 
 
≈ 
 
The fluctuating liquidity of paper money situated the United States within a contingent 
temporality. The institutional mechanisms of debt redemption remained unconsolidated under 
Congressional supervision, forcing the Republic to strive “to maintain itself in a time not 
created by it, but rather given to it” by the unverifiable value durations of paper money.563 
This “temporary device” allowed the states to repay their separate debts through a general 
currency depreciation, which sacrificed the financial and political credit of the Union to the 
present whims of debtors and the past miscalculations of speculators.564 For Paine, this was a 
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form of financial practice that mirrored the practices of political power derived from the 
experience of revolutionary contingency:  
 
We have been so much habited to act in committees at the commencement of the 
dispute, and during the interregnum of government, and in many cases since, and to 
adopt expedients warranted by necessity […], suited to the spur and exigency of the 
moment, that a man transferred from a committee to a seat in the legislature, 
imperceptible takes with him the ideas and habits he has been accustomed to, and 
continues to think like a committee-man instead of a legislator, and to govern by the 
spirit rather than by the rule of the constitution and the principles of the republic.565 
 
Meeting debt obligations by mere “expedients” such as paper money undercut the 
maintenance of public credit central to “the principles of the republic.” Furthermore, this 
trapped America within an experience of time “suited to the spur and exigency of the 
moment,” within a present unmoored from long-term commitments, both financial and 
constitutional.   
Insolvency beckoned in the spring of 1787, when, in the six months before March, 
the treasury received just $663 in requisitions from the states.566 On 8 February 1787, 
Congress approved a report from the Board of Treasury, declaring that, “the Crisis has 
arrived”: the people “of these united states” would now need to observe “whether for want of 
a timely exertion in establishing a general revenue…they will hazard…the existence of the 
union.”567 By the autumn, New York was the latest state to reject Congressional plans for a 
programme of debt repayment when it obstructed the proposed impost.568 “[W]hat will be the 
situation of our national affairs,” Hamilton told the state assembly, “if they are left much 
longer to float in the chaos in which they are now involved?”569 As government credit was 
swallowed by the immense liquidity of the American economy, any belief that the future was 
controllable or calculable evaporated. The perception of historical time was reduced to a 
random, disconnected sequence of moments, all of which pointed to the disintegration of the 
Union. By mid-summer, rural Massachusetts was in open rebellion.570 The travails of the 
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Republic, Washington wrote, had “brought our politics and credit to the brink of a precipice 
[and] a step or two further must plunge us into a Sea of Troubles.”571 John Jay expressed 
similar fears for the future:  
 
Our affairs seem to lead to some crisis – some Revolution – something that I cannot 
foresee, or conjecture. I am uneasy and apprehensive – more so, than during the War 
– Then we had a fixed Object, and tho the means and time of attaining it were often 
problematical, yet I did firmly believe that we should ultimately succeed…The Case 
is now altered – we are going and doing wrong, and therefore I look forward to Evils 
and Calamities, but without being able to guess at the Instrument nature or measure 
of them.572 
 
The union existed within a “State of uncertainty and Fluctuation”: the historicity of the 
Republic was essentially formless – it was not fixed in time. Rather, as Jay implied, America 
was buffeted by time, adrift, the subject of potentially daily change. “A continuance of our 
present feeble political form is pregnant with daily evils,” wrote a despondent Henry Lee Jr., 
as he observed the Shays’s Rebellion gather speed: “Every day brings new information of the 
designs & preparations of the Malcontents.”573 The extraordinary mobility – the liquidity – of 
such consequential events scrambled the sequential coherence of historical experience. In this 
sense, the passage of historical time seemed more like a “torrent” than a “flow.” The “course 
of human events” seemed multi-directional: whilst events had been thrown into “fluctuation” 
by the Revolution, the Republic remained afflicted by onrushing “affairs,” the source, 
velocity and direction of which Jay could not “conjecture,” much less “foresee.” For 
Federalist observers America was like a sailboat in a storm, tossed about on “a Sea of 
Troubles,” without any obvious anchorage, constantly afflicted by the imminent anticipation 
of wreckage.  
 
V. Time Control:  
 
The institutions and instruments devised by the National Convention, and later administered 
by the Committee of Public Safety, between March 1793 and June 1794 were meant to re-
impose a sense of sequential coherence upon the passage of revolutionary events.574 In reality, 
                                                
is analysed in depth in chapter 4; see: Sean Condon, Shays’s Rebellion: Authority and Distress in Post-
Revolutionary America (Baltimore, MD., Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), pp.5-34. 
571 George Washington to Thomas Johnson (12 November, 1786), in Abbott, ed., The Papers of George 
Washington. Confederation Series, IV, pp.359-60. 
572 John Jay to George Washington (27 June, 1786), in Abbott, ed., The Papers of George Washington. 
Confederation Series, IV, pp.130-31. 
573 Henry Lee, Jr. to George Washington (11 November, 1786), in Abbott, ed., The Papers of George Washington. 
Confederation Series, IV, p.357. 
574 The classic study of the legislative programme of the Terror remains, R. R. Palmer, Twelve Who Ruled: The 
Year of the Terror in the French Revolution (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1941); the best recent 
study is, Timothy Tackett, Coming of the Terror in the French Revolution (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University 
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they confined the operations of the state to a single speed setting: acceleration. Despite an 
increasingly desperate desire to conclude the Revolution by stabilising the expression of 
political power under the aegis of a Republic of Virtue, revolutionary finality continually 
drifted into the future. Thus in order to reach this future, much heralded in the uchronic 
paeans of the Jacobins, the Republic would need to increase its historical tempo.575 During the 
Terror, the Jacobin state devised a variety of artefacts and institutions for regulating the 
temporality of the Revolution. Historians have focused upon clock and calendrical reforms 
only because they are the most obviously time-related; in reality, huge swathes of 
governmental apparatus were turned towards time control. The Convention had “divided the 
day and the night according to decimal calculation,” scoffed the royalist, Bertrand de 
Molleville, “but, despite the new timepieces ordered by republican artists, despite the law of 
suspects and the inquisition of the revolutionary committees,” nothing could convert the 
French people to institutions which “upset them without enlightening them.”576 What is 
intriguing about these remarks is not the general tone of derision for the calendrical and 
horological reforms of 1793, but the invocation of the legal apparatus of the Jacobin Republic 
as synonymous with the artefacts of temporal control.577 Molleville intimates that 
revolutionary law, and the institutions devised to impose it, possessed a purpose similar to the 
construction of decimal watches: namely, to remake time. 
 
≈ 
Ultimately, of course, it was time – or the way its vicissitudes affected the practice of politics 
– that remade the state and the individual [Fig.8]. “We must make the laws conform to 
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575 Ozouf, ‘La Révolution Française au Tribunal de l’Utopie,’ in De Révolution en République, pp.738-54. 
576 Bertrand de Molleville, Anecdotes du temps de la terreur (Paris, L. Hachette, 1863), pp.26-7: “Un article du 
décret divisait le jour et la nuit suivant le calcul décimal; mais, malgré les montres nouvelles commandées à des 
artistes républicains, malgré la loi des suspects et l’inquisition des comités révolutionnaires, jamais on n’a pu plier 
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577 Little has been written about the horological reforms of the French Revolution, interest has instead focused on 
the calendar; see: Catherine Cardinal, ‘L’Heure Républicaine,’ in Catherine Cardinal, ed., La Révolution dans la 
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circumstances,” remarked the enragé journalist, François Desfieux.578 This process began 
with the trial of Louis XVI.579 The machinations of the monarchy, Robespierre observed, had 
“forced” the nation “to resort to the right of rebellion,” to return “to the state of nature,” to 
chaos. The representatives had necessarily to invoke “that law which is the very foundation of 
society: the safety of the people.” The trial, meanwhile, was without historical precedent: the 
prosecuting entity was the timeless body of the sovereign people; the defendant was a 
corrupted monarchy whose reign represented the fetid accretions of centuries of oppression. 
Under the guise of its legal forms, the Convention thus performed a kind of popular mimesis: 
“the trial of the tyrant is the insurrection,” marvelled Robespierre.580 Many of the institutions 
of the Terror, such as the Revolutionary Tribunal, would also become (regulated) judicial 
                                                
578 François-Alphonse Aulard, ed., La Société des Jacobins: receuil de documents pour l’histoire du club des 
Jacobins (6 vols., Paris, 1889-97), V, pp.67: “Il faut faire des lois conformes aux circonstances, sauf à les modifier 
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579 David P. Jordan, The King’s Trial: the French Revolution vs. Louis XVI (Berkeley, CA., University of 
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580 Robespierre’s address is detailed in Walzer, Regicide and Revolution, pp.178-93; see also: Jesse Goldhammer, 
The Headless Republic: Sacrificial Violence in Modern French Thought (Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press, 
2005), pp.66-67; Marie-Hélène Huet, Mourning Glory: The Will of the French Revolution (Philadelphia, PA., 
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simulacra of (unpredictable) popular agitations. In the winter of 1793, in a letter to the local 
revolutionary committee of Moulins, Gabriel Perrotin, public prosecutor of Lyon, observed 
how the “revolutionary commission” of the city was “going to repeat the septembrisade of 
Paris by the same procedures, and with the approval of an order from the representatives 
which will promote its work.”581 
According to Sophie Wahnich, the anarchic, incoherent platform of public terror 
waged by the Parisian sans-culottes after the autumn of 1792 was derived from a widespread 
sense of fear. The charge sheet was lengthy, encompassing a sensation of imminent 
destruction at the hands of external enemies, and a fear of internal betrayal, dissension, or 
simply further disruption – from the defection of Dumouriez in April 1793, and the nascent 
civil war in the Vendée, to the continued threat of revolutionary upheaval in the capital. By 
the summer of 1793, France was a Republic unified by a single emotion: effroi.582 The 
unregulated expression of the popular sense of dread forced the Convention to reterritorialize 
the sphere of public emotions by declaring a state-sanctioned Terror on 5 September 1793. 
Popular anxiety would thus be assuaged by the state monopolisation of fear. “We can only 
govern through fear,” observed Danton.583 This may seem like a justification of Terror, yet as 
Marisa Linton rightly observes, “to explain is not to justify.” With the perceived speed of 
historical time racing beyond comprehension, Terror was the only viable system of temporal 
– and thus political – regulation available to the state. Whilst Wahnich is surely correct to 
state that Terror “was aimed at establishing limits to the sovereign exception,” she is mistaken 
in assuming that it was successful in “putting a brake on the legitimate violence of the 
people.”584 It unquestionably gave the public an “institutionalized form” of vengeance, but it 
simply made the state an instrument of a gargantuan, and ultimately self-destructive form of 
historical acceleration. As a legal simulacrum of popular agitation, the Terror eventually 
recreated the sense of constant crisis that characterised the impatience of the summer of 1792. 
The regime of historicity imagined by the curators of Terror was certainly “prompt” and 
“inflexible,” but it was not meant to be endless, nor endlessly accelerative.585 
                                                
581 Gabriel Perrotin, cited in Abbé Guillon de Montléon, Mémoires de M. l’abbé Guillon de Montléon (Paris, 
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32 (4, Fall 2009), pp.697-706; David Andress, ed., Experiencing the French Revolution (Oxford, Voltaire 
Foundation, 2013); Lloyd F. Mason, ‘The Psychology of the Terror,’ Social Science 26 (2, April 1951), pp.110-16. 
583 Georges Danton, cited in François Bluche, ‘La Terreur dans la Révolution Jacobine,’ in Germain Sicard, ed., 
Justice et Politique: La Terreur dans la Révolution Française (Toulouse, Place Anatole France, 1997), pp.29-37, 
here: p.31: “Nous ne pouvons gouverner qu’en faisant peur.” 
584 Wahnich, In Defence of Terror, p.65. 
585 David Andress, ‘Living the Revolutionary Melodrama: Robespierre’s Sensibility and the Construction of 
Political Commitment in the French Revolution,’ Representations 114 (1, Spring 2011), pp.103-28; for discussions 
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≈ 
 
“The enemies abroad coalesce with the enemies at home; a Revolutionary Tribunal is 
established for more than fifteen days, yet not a single head of a conspirator has fallen 
beneath the blade of the law.”586 So read the petition of the section des Tuileries, presented 
before the Jacobin club in March 1793. Amongst many of the Parisian sections, popular 
impatience reflected a continuing displeasure with the slowness of revolutionary governance. 
Impatience was also one emanation of a mentalité obsidionale, a pathological preoccupation 
with encirclement, which, in the context of the autumn of 1792, heightened a commonplace 
concern that the Revolution was in a race against time – and losing.587 With the external 
forces of counterrevolution lining along the frontiers of France, apparently in active 
communication with their internal counterparts, the levers of justice remained impassive.588 
As the section des Tuileries intimated, a fortnight was sufficient to create a choking sense of 
panic. 
This perception of legal paralysis was a temporal problem. As Sanja Perovic has 
observed, the period that separated the fall of the monarchy on 10 August and the declaration 
of the Republic on 22 September formed a curious “lag-time” between the old regime and the 
new Republic.589 During this forty-three day period, the Revolution – which so many 
observers believed had been historically accelerated by 10 August – seemed to belong to no-
time. “I must tell you,” wrote a concerned Adelaïde Mareux to her brother on 6 September 
1792, “that since the journée of 10, only three people have been guillotined and that this has 
disgusted the people.”590 Referencing the obsidionale fear of encirclement, Mareux added: 
“We are being sold out on every side!” Even the barely functioning National Assembly 
                                                
of the metaphors of speed, in particular lightning, during the Terror, see: Marie-Hélène Huet, ‘Thunder and 
Revolution: Franklin, Robespierre, Sade,’ The Eighteenth Century 30: The French Revolution 1789-1989: two 
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Presses Universitaires de Mirail, 1991), pp.91-106. 
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German border: David Andress, The French Revolution and the People (London, A & C Black, 2006), p.83; on 
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et al, Conspiracy in the French Revolution, pp.150-71. 
589 Perovic, The Calendar, p.88. 
590 Louis de Launay, ed., Une famille de la bourgeoisie parisienne pendant la Révolution; Toussaint Mareux, 
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seemed complicit. The people had taken this matter into their own hands, observed Le 
Thermomètre du jour on 5 September, because conspiracy and legal incapacity had “arrested 
all the measures that the urgency of the moment demanded.”591 The massacres of 2-5 
September, then, were not merely the acts of a mindless mob (even if they were accompanied 
by an unnerving degree of recreational butchery); they were an emanation of impatience with 
the ordinary speed of judicial procedure.592  
This is perhaps why Danton, in declaring the necessity of an extraordinary tribunal on 
10 March 1793, claimed that, in view of the dangers to “public safety,” he could no longer see 
a “middle way between the ordinary forms and a revolutionary tribunal.” Liège had just fallen 
to Prussian forces, the French had withdrawn from Maastricht, and Paris was, once again, in 
insurrectionary mood.593 There was no time to spare, Danton told the Convention: “If, as soon 
as I had asked, you had developed the necessary forces, today the enemy would already be 
repelled far from your borders.”594 The Convention immediately decreed the establishment of 
an extraordinary criminal tribunal, later re-baptised “revolutionary.” 
 
≈ 
 
At first, the Revolutionary Tribunal went slowly. Trials often lasted days or weeks, 
defendants were permitted a legal counsel and were regularly found innocent and set free. In 
the six months from April to September 1793, the Tribunal issued 63 death sentences, 13 
transportation orders and 38 acquittals.595 The pressures of popular impatience hastened its 
operations. Until its suppression in May 1795, reform of the Revolutionary Tribunal primarily 
addressed its velocity. During the trial of the Girondins in October 1793, Fouquier-Tinville 
complained of “the slowness with which the instructive procedures of the tribunal 
progresses.” “We are obstructed by the procedures prescribed by the law,” he told the 
Convention: “For five days, the trial of [the Girondin] has been ongoing, and only nine 
witnesses have been heard. Each of them, in making their depositions, wish to recount the 
entire chronicle of the Revolution, the accused then respond to the witnesses, which is 
                                                
591 Pierre Caron, Les Massacres de Septembre (Paris, Rue Félibien, 1935). 
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replicated in turn.”596 Implicit in this complaint was the belief that the proceedings of the 
Tribunal and the relative completion of the Revolution were interdependent. The vague 
category of “counterrevolutionary” contained within the Law of Suspects, which had been 
passed on 17 September 1793, empowered the Convention to convict anyone who, “by their 
conduct, by their relations, by their conversations or by their writings, have shown themselves 
to be partisans of tyranny or federalism and enemies of liberty.” The prison population 
consequently exploded, reaching approximately 7,043 by June 1794.597  
Yet far from assuaging the perceived threat of counterrevolution, the Law of Suspects 
actually exacerbated the fear of conspiracy. As in September 1792, the prisons were once 
again thronged with “traitors,” awaiting an invading army to set them loose upon a free 
people. Thus by merely collecting, but not deliberation upon the guilty, the Convention was 
merely “maintaining the race against time against the counterrevolution.”598 If the velocity of 
justice were, at any point, to decrease, the Revolution might be lost in an uncontrolled repeat 
performance of the September massacres: the legal mimesis of the sovereign will, which is 
how Robespierre characterised the activity of the Convention after the execution of the king, 
was structurally dependent upon speed. If it were to decelerate, the Tribunal would be 
overwhelmed by the growing back-log of counterrevolutionary suspects; it would be unable 
to accelerate the tempo of its judicial deliberation and of thus regulating the expression of 
popular vengeance. “It is up to the Convention to abolish all the formalities which obstruct 
our progress,” concluded Fouquier-Tinville.599  
After the Girondin trial, the Convention did indeed grant the public prosecutor the 
right to sequester proceedings by asking jurors if, after a period of three days, they felt 
sufficiently “enlightened” to issue a verdict. Soon even this concession seemed inadequate. 
“Instead of delaying the Revolution through a criminal slowness,” Robespierre told the 
Jacobin club, “justice must be active like the crime itself, and all trials ought to be concluded 
within twenty-four hours.” By quickening the proceedings of the Tribunal, the legal “delays” 
that seemed to be contributing to the “slowness” of the Revolution would be lifted. Legal time 
was to be accelerated so as to pre-empt extra-legal (counterrevolutionary) activity and 
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alleviate the temporal asymmetry that had long afflicted the Revolution. On 22 Prairial, 
Georges Couthon appeared before the Convention on behalf of the Committee of Public 
Safety, to announce a sweeping reform of the Tribunal. France might “clear away the absurd 
and fatal shackles which might arrest the progress of national justice.” Urgency had reached 
an historical register, Couthon contended, since the “crimes of the conspirators directly 
threaten the very existence of society and our liberty.”  
 
The life of criminals is placed in the balance with those of the people; here all 
affected slowness is culpable, all indulgent or superfluous formality is a public 
menace. The delay in punishing the enemies of the patrie must only take the time 
required to recognise them; this is less about punishment than annihilation.600 
 
From its inauguration in April to the imposition of Terror “as the order of the day” in 
September 1793 – a six month period – approximately 114 individuals appeared before the 
Revolutionary Tribunal. Between 22 Prairial and the collapse of the Jacobin Republic on 9 
Thermidor – 47 days –1,703 appeared.601 During the post-Prairial period, 43 separate 
audiences were held, each taking no more than five hours, which means that the average 
duration of an individual trial was eight minutes, although some were recorded as lasting no 
longer than five or six.602 In fact, at the trial of Fouquier-Tinville in 1795, the “batches” of the 
accused were found to have often been “so considerable” that “the time of the audience was 
not sufficient to quiz [the accused] on their names, last names, ages, profession or 
addresses.”603  
The Revolutionary Tribunal was therefore charged with processing the entire 
historicity of the extant ancien regime. It became the legal forum for the accelerated 
judgement of centuries of corruption. The time pressures this exerted upon the court were 
phenomenal. After the passage of the Law of 22 Prairial, the rate at which new “conspirators” 
were discovered (or “unmasked,” to use the revolutionary vernacular) outran the physical 
capacity of the Tribunal’s clerks to transcribe new indictments.604 This hurry is made material 
in the records and documentation of the Tribunal itself: eventually, the registers of the 
audiences were reduced to a simple list of dates, the hastily scrawled names of the accused, 
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pages upon pages left blank in the rush to despatch the guilty to the guillotine.605 “The 
ministry is a world of paper,” admitted Saint-Just, but prompt administration was “impossible 
with too many words,” and when “the demon of writing makes war on us, government 
stops.”606 This expression of frustration with bureaucratic procedure was mirrored by the 
impatience that Fouquier-Tinville would display towards formal, written testimonies.  
 
≈ 
 
“The Guillotine, we find, gets always a quicker motion, as other things are quickening. The 
Guillotine, by its speed of going, will give index of the general velocity of the Republic. The 
clanking of its huge axe, rising and falling there, in horrid systole-diastole, is portion of the 
whole enormous Life-movement and pulsation of the Sansculottic System!” 
 
Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution (1837)607 
 
By the spring of 1794 the blade of the guillotine was falling with a tedious regularity. The 
machine was initially erected on the Place du Carrousel, outside the Tuileries, in late-August 
1792; but as the Terror began, and the guillotine went into near-permanent operation, its 
location shifted constantly: shopkeepers along the rue Saint-Honoré understandly complained 
that the stench of blood streaming through the streets was bad for business.  
Contemporary observations of the guillotine invariable made reference to its speed.608 
The blade fell “avec la vitesse du regard,” remarked the physiologist, Pierre Cabanis; it 
despatched the guilty “in the blink of an eye,” observed its inventor, Joseph-Ignace Guillotin. 
According to René-Georges Gastellier, the “plummeting acceleration” of the blade was akin 
“to the speed of lightning.” “From the first point of contact to the last, there is no distance; it 
is an invisible point; the blade falls and the patient no longer exists.” The moment of death 
almost seemed to pre-empt the actual visual reality of decapitation, just as the flash of 
lightning prefigured the ominous murmurs of a distant storm. “The rapidity,” as one official 
from Falaise observed, “was like a lightning bolt which foreshadows thunder.”609  
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and Present (Oxford, OUP, 2016), pp.65-76, here: p.67. 
607 Thomas Carlyle, The French Revolution (3 vols., London, James Fraser, 1837), III. The Guillotine, p.268. 
608 Grégoire Chamayou, ‘The Debate over Severed Heads: Doctors, the Guillotine and the Anatomy of 
Consciousness in the Wake of the Terror,’ Revue d’histoire des sciences 61 (2, 2008), pp.333-365. 
609 Cabanis and Gastellier are cited in Daniel Arasse, The Guillotine and the Terror (trans. Christopher Miller), 
(London, Allen Lane, 1989), p.52, 36; Guillotin is cited in Croker, Essays on the early period of the French 
Revolution, p.525; the municipal administrator from Falaise is cited in Paul Friedland, Seeing Justice Done: The 
Age of Spectacular Capital Punishment in France (Oxford, OUP, 2012), p.248; as a means of executing nobility 
and peasantry alike, the machine provided civic equality before the law: it affected “the simple deprivation of life,” 
observed Louis-Michel Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau in his report on capital punishment, delivered before the 
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If, as the Convention acknowledged on 10 October 1793, following an intervention 
by Saint-Just, that “revolutionary laws must be executed rapidly,” then the guillotine – “by its 
speed of going” – provided the most expeditious means of realising revolutionary justice. 
This valorisation of speed also meant that the machine offered a conceptual model for 
revolutionary governance itself. It was in this sense that Mme de Staël could later identify the 
political apparatus of the Committee of Public Safety and the political artefact of the 
guillotine as indissociable: “The government resembled the hideous instrument employed on 
the scaffold,” she wrote, the “springs of which had been prepared for action by events.”610  
By 1794 the rate of decapitation had become an index of government efficacy in 
itself. “Heads fall like tiles,” marvelled Fouquier-Tinville after the passage of the law of 22 
Prairial, “but it must go faster still next decade; I must have four hundred and fifty at least.”611 
Observers had begun measuring the progress of the Revolution according to a new unit of 
time: the head count. One police report, compiled in February 1794, claimed to have 
overheard impatient citizens demanding the execution of “fifty people a day…until there were 
no more conspirators.” In “a revolutionary government,” they murmured, parroting Saint-Just, 
“you have to act revolutionary.”612 This accorded neatly to the political vocabulary of virtue, 
in which the completion of the Revolution was coterminous with the final extirpation of civic 
corruption (“until there are no more conspirators”). Little wonder, then, that such a violent – 
and, ultimately, impossible – ambition was measured by the relative fullness of a basket of 
suppurating heads. “These infernal cannibals,” recalled one pamphleteer in 1795, “counted 
the rapid hours of time according to the number of victims sacrificed [immolées] to their 
ferocity.”613 Descriptions of this sort, however, were not confined to the retroactive 
condemnations of the Thermidorian reaction; the head count that the guillotine provided 
offered a tangible means of measuring “the rapid hours of time” that demarcated a Terror-
induced progression towards the terminus of the Revolution.614 This made sense since the 
                                                
National Assembly in May 1791, which is discussed in Friedland, Seeing Justice Done, p.233; the guillotine 
satisfied what Foucault later described as the conceptual shift from the punishment of crime as “an art of 
unbearable suffering” to an “economy of suspended rights”: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison (trans. Alan Sheridan), (London, Vintage Books, 1977) p.11. 
610 Germaine de Staël, Considerations on the principal events of the French Revolution (1818), ed., Aurelian 
Craiutu (Indianapolis, IN., Liberty Fund, 2008), p.371. 
611 Thiers, The History of the French Revolution, III, p.421. 
612 Arasse, The Guillotine, p.36. 
613 AN, D/38/3: “Ces cannibales affamés comptaient les heures rapides du tems par le nombres des victimes 
immolées à leur acharnement.” 
614 On post-Thermidor responses to the Terror, see: Jainchill, Reimagining Politics after the Terror, pp.1-13; 
Ronald Schechter, ‘Gothic Thermidor: The Bals des victims, the Fantastic, and the Production of Historical 
Knowledge in Post-Terror France,’ Representations 61 (Winter 1998), pp.78-94; Howard G. Brown, ‘Echoes of 
the Terror,’ Historical Reflections/Réflexions Historiques 29 (3, Fall 2003), pp.529-558; J.B. Sirich, ‘The 
Revolutionary Committees after Thermidor,’ The Journal of Modern History 26 (4, December 1954), pp.329-339; 
James M. Donovan, Juries and the Transformation of Criminal Justice in France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (Chapel Hill, NC., University of North Carolina Press, 2010), pp.23-48. 
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temporal thickening caused by the historically compressed experience of the Revolution had, 
to some extent, rendered pre-existing units of time meaningless.  
The guillotine may therefore be imagined as an alternative timepiece: in the context 
of the Terror, it offered a more material means of measuring the “progress” of the Revolution 
relative to its ambitions, namely the inculcation of virtue and the eradication of “past habits.” 
Essential to this vision of civic purification was the speed with which the basket could be 
filled. On 31 October, 1793, the prestesse of the guillotine reached a salutary velocity as the 
twenty one Girondin “conspirators” were read their collective sentence, despatched to the 
scaffold and individually decapitated – all in the space of thirty-eight minutes.615 
Despite robbing the public execution of its spectacle, the velocity of the guillotine 
nevertheless satisfied the exigencies of popular impatience. According to Condorcet, 
Guillotin had “given his name to an instrument of death which served the impatience that 
enabled the Convention to kill off a huge numbers of the innocent in but a few moments [en 
peu d’instans].”616 A process that had previously unfolded over the course of hours was 
reduced to an almost invisible moment. The timescale of ancien regime punishment acted as a 
ceremonial for the spectacular, transhistorical authority of the crown. Revolutionary justice, 
by contrast, had to be “prompt,” and to operate with “swiftness,” because the Republic was 
confronted by an irruptive, non-linear schedule of historical events. Unforeseen events could 
– at any moment – destroy the Revolution; and, as long as the Revolution proceeded, external 
and internal threats would remain imminent and omnipresent, multiplying and hardening at a 
bewildering rate. As one anonymous placard, pinned on the walls of the rue Mouffetard and 
rue Saint-Médard in August 1793, declared: “It is necessary that the guillotine be permanent,” 
that “agitators,” “intriguers,” and “conspirators” be “judged instantly,” for “as long as these 
villains exist, the Republic will be in danger and the blood of patriots will not cease to gush.” 
Public safety could not be ensured “if we do not exterminate without delay all the 
conspirators who wish to destroy us and to make us slaves again by toppling the Republic and 
restoring the monarchy.”617 Once again, it was not guilt or innocence that mattered, but sheer 
numbers: herein lay the Jacobin measurement of revolutionary progress.618 
                                                
615 Hector Fleischmann, La Guillotine en 1793 (Paris, Librarie des publications modernes, 1908), p.63. 
616 Condorcet, Mémoires de Condorcet, sur la Révolution Française, extraits de sa correspondance et de celles de 
ses amis (2 vols., Paris, Ponthieu Libraire, 1824), II, p.292. 
617 Albert Mathiez, ‘La Révolution et les Subsistances. L’agitation sectionnaire à Paris en août 1793. L’affaire 
Cauchois,’ Annales révolutionnaires XIV (1, Janvier–Février, 1922), pp.27-54, here: p.41, 40: “il faut que la 
guillotine soit permanente,” “soient jugés sur-le-champ,” “tant que ces scélérats existeront, la république sera en 
danger et le sang des patriotes ne cessera de couler.” “si nous n’exterminons sans délai tous les conspirateurs qui 
veulent nous détruire ou nous faire redevenir esclaves an anéantissant la République et en rétablissant la 
monarchie.” 
618 In order to satisfy the “impatience of the patrie,” and “the sovereign people who compose it,” wrote Collot 
d’Herbois in a letter to Robespierre in November 1793, it would be necessary “to forge thunder.” Yet dispatching 
“twenty guilty individuals” every day – the rate of attrition that d’Herbois oversaw in Lyon where, following the 
purge of the Girondins, the spectre of federalism threatened to collapse the Republic – was “still too slow for the 
justice of an entire people who must blast their enemies at once.” Collot d’Herbois to Maximilien Robespierre (3 
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≈ 
 
During the Terror, the credentials of the virtuous citizens were in a constant state of flux.619 It 
was not merely that personal political virtue had to be ceaselessly and publicly performed, but 
the nature of that public performance was also subject to ceaseless change.620 At his trial in 
1795, Fouquier-Tinville would lament that, “what was virtuous a year and six months ago, is 
today an unpardonable crime.”621 In December 1793, Collot d’Herbois, recently returned from 
butchering recalcitrant revolutionaries in Lyon, admonished his fellow members of the 
Jacobin club for their growing indulgence of civic corruption: “Two months ago when I left 
you, you were burning with the thirst for vengeance against the infamous conspirators of the 
city of Lyon. Today, I hardly recognise public opinion; if I had arrived two days later I would 
perhaps have been put under indictment myself!”622 Thus the temporality of virtue in a time 
of Terror seemed to shift constantly, in turn saturating the experience of the revolutionary 
present with an overwhelming sense of both personal and political uncertainty.623 In the 
spring of 1794, Pierre Campmas, a Jacobin deputy to the Convention, received a letter from a 
constituent asking him for a favour. Campmas immediately declined, responding 
incredulously that, if he were to agree, “within twenty-four hours I would perhaps no longer 
exist.” Appearing to publicly assist someone on the basis of private friendship could provoke 
immediate suspicion, sudden arrest, instant condemnation, a perfunctory trial (followed by 
perhaps an hour in prison), and then a fast-tracked rendezvous with the guillotine.624 The 
vicissitudes of republican virtue during the Terror deranged even the most basic measurement 
                                                
Frimaire, 1793), cited in Montléon, Mémoires de M. l’abbé Guillon de Montléon, p.405: “L’impatience de la patrie 
et du peuple souverain qui la compose, retentit sur toutes mes fibres et dans mon cœur. Plusieurs fois vingt 
coupables ont subi la peine due à leurs forfait le même jour : cela est encore lent pour la justice d’un peuple entier 
qui doit foudroyer ses ennemis à la fois ; et nous nous occupons à forger la foudre.” On French federalism, see: 
Malcolm Crook, ‘Federalism and the French Revolution: the Revolt of Toulon in 1793,’ History 65 (1980), 
pp.383-397. 
619 In such “stringent times,” observed Adrien Lezay-Marnézia, “everything that recalled the ancien regime was an 
almost certain route to the scaffold”: Adrien Lezay-Marnézia, Des causes de la Révolution et de ses résultats 
(Paris, Desenne, 1797), p.45: “Dans ces temps rigoureux, où tout ce qui rappeloit l’ancien régime étoit un titre 
presque certain à l’échafaud…” 
620 Conforming to the archetype of the virtuous citizen was a means of legitimizing public self-expression, even if 
the meaning of that virtue was subject to such delicate change: Linton, in Choosing Terror, demonstrates how 
even what restaurant or café politicians dined at could determine their fate with public approval, pp.223; see: 
Rebecca Spang, The Invention of the Restaurant: Paris and Modern Gastronomic Culture (Cambridge, MA., 
Harvard University Press, 2001). 
621 Georges Lecocq, Notes et documents sur Fouquier-Tinville (Paris, Libraire des bibliophiles, 1885), p.32: “Ce 
qui était vertu il y a six mois et un an, est aujourd’hui crime irrémissible.” 
622 Schama, Citizens, p.688. 
623 It was also conceived as the means of inculcating virtue: “La guillotine,” crowed the conventionnel François 
Buzot, “is today the great spring of the French government. The people are suddenly republican thanks to the 
guillotine: C. A. Dauban, ed., Mémoires inédits de Pétion et mémoires de Buzot et de Barbaroux, accompangés de 
notes inédites de Buzot… (Paris, Henri Plon, 1866), p.33: “La guillotine…c’est aujourd’hui le grand ressort du 
gouvernement français. Ce peuple est républicain à coup de guillotine.” 
624 The essential work on friendship and virtue is Linton, Choosing Terror, esp. ch.9.  
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of human time – the distance separating life and death – to the point of blurred uncertainty. 
“None of us can be certain of avoiding [death],” remarked Ruault, “since it strikes anywhere 
and everywhere.”625  
Far from regularising the temporal life of the Republic, then, the Terror – and, in 
particular, the Law of Suspects and the Law of 22 prairial – reinforced the radical 
unpredictability of future events. “I spoke at that time to a few conventionnels friends about 
their personal anticipations [calcul personnel], which encompassed the future of a month,” 
recalled the memoirist Marc-Antoine Baudot: “They greatly mocked me for my presumption 
of counting upon a single month of life in these stormy times.”626 The belief that the patrie 
was in danger, that the life of the Republic itself existed under constant, imminent threat, was 
transformed into a personal, daily reality for both citizen and conventionnel by the institutions 
and instruments of the Terror.  
Without recourse to tradition or custom – the historical coordinates provided by 
ancien regime society – the French Republic developed a regime of legitimation that was 
simultaneously dependant upon, and threatened by, the regularisation of time. “It was 
undoubtedly here,” writes Wahnich, “that the project became impossible.” Devising and 
maintaining a process of justice with “a form that was at the same time controlled – and to do 
so at lightning speed,” made the efficacy of the Terror dependent upon a perceived judicial 
acceleration.627 There is a simultaneous note of panic, however, in the public pronouncements 
and private writings of the terrorists; a fear that the Revolution was in danger of becoming 
interminable, that the speed of revolutionary progress would never reach critical velocity. 
Amidst the myriad documents discovered at Robespierre’s lodgings following his execution 
in June 1794, there is a single scrap of paper that encapsulates this panic.628 Across a 
meandering and occasionally incoherent series of questions, Robespierre attempts to construct 
a chronology for the completion of the Revolution, and attempts to identify the “obstacles” 
that might be responsible for prolonging its duration. “What is the aim of the Revolution?,” 
he asks. “The execution of the constitution in favour of the people,” comes the response. He 
continues: 
 
Who will be our enemies? The vicious and the wealthy. What means will they 
employ? Calumny and hypocrisy. What factors could promote the use of these 
                                                
625 Pierre Campmas and Nicolas Ruault are both cited in Tackett, The Coming of the Terror, p.334. 
626 Marc-Antoine Baudot, Notes historiques sur la Convention nationale, le Directoire, l’Empire et l’exil des 
votants (Paris, Megariotis, 1893), p.260: “Je parlais dans ce temps à quelques conventionnels de mes amis d’un 
calcul personnel qui embrassait l’avenir d’un mois. Ils se moquèrent beaucoup de ma présomption de compter sur 
un mois de vie dans ces temps orageux.” 
627 Wahnich, In Defence of the Terror, p.67. 
628 On the wave of recent biographies of Robespierre, see, in particular: Jean-Clément Martin, Robespierre: le 
fabrication d’un monstre (Paris, Perrin, 2016); Ruth Scurr, Fatal Purity: Robespierre and the French Revolution 
(London, Vintage, 2007); Peter McPhee, Robespierre: A Revolutionary Life (New Haven, CT., Yale University 
Press, 2012). 
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means? The ignorance of the sans-culottes. […] The people… what other obstacle is 
there to the instruction of the people? Poverty. When will the people thus be 
enlightened? When they will have bread, when the wealthy and the government cease 
to bribe journalists in order to deceive them; when their interest will be aligned with 
those of the people.” 
 
And when would these objectives be achieved, Robespierre finally asked himself. The answer 
was simple: “NEVER.”629 They would never be achieved.  
It is this potential non-finality of the Revolution that renders the Terror truly 
grotesque. If the state orchestrated violence of 1793 and 1794 was not directing the 
Revolution to term – indeed, if the endpoint of the Revolution was actually unreachable – 
then the acceleration of judicial executions possessed no other function that to intensify the 
torment of historical experience. Robespierre had come to realise (although it is unclear at 
what point, since his jottings remain undated) the political horror implicit in the 
conceptualisation of revolution as “ongoing act.”630 In this sense, Terror is not constitutive of 
historical progress since it cannot coordinate itself in relation to a realisable future; it is 
simply the ceaseless iteration of a flawed project. Yet still the terrorists pressed the 
accelerator: and as the velocity of the Terror increased, so its capacity to regulate 
revolutionary time dwindled, which, in turn, provoked further calls for an even greater 
political velocity. As Saint-Just insouciantly observed, a mere four months before his own 
execution, it was far “better to hasten the progress of the Revolution than to follow it.”631 
 
* 
 
                                                
629 Papier inédits trouvés Chez Robespierre, Saint-Just, Payan, etc., supprimés ou omis par Courtois; précédés du 
rapport de ce député à la Convention nationale… (3 vols., Paris, Baudouin frères, 1828), II, pp.13-14: “Quel est le 
but? L’exécution de la constitution en faveur du peuple. Quels seront nos ennemis? Les hommes vicieux et les 
riches. Quels moyens emploieront-ils? La calomnie et l’hypocrisie. Quelles causes peuvent favoriser l’emploi de 
ces moyens. L’ignorance des sans-culottes. […] Le peuple… quel autre obstacle y a-t-il à l’instruction du peuple? 
La misère. Quand le peuple sera-t-il donc éclairé? Quand il aura du pain, et que les riches et le gouvernement 
cesseront de soudoyer des plumes pour le tromper; lorsque leur intérêt sera confondu avec celui du peuple. Quand 
leur intérêt sera-t-il confondu avec celui du peuple? JAMAIS.” 
630 Baker, ‘Revolutionizing Revolution,’ in Baker and Edelstein, eds., Scripting Revolution, pp.71-102. 
631 Antoine-Louis Saint-Just, Œuvres de Saint-Just, représentant du peuple à la Convention nationale (Paris, 
Prévot, 1834), p.217: “Il vaut mieux hâter la marche de la Révolution que de la suivre.” On Saint-Just’s callow, 
immature attitude to life and death, see: Bernard Vinot, Saint-Just (Paris, Fayard, 1985), ch.21; Mona Ozouf, ‘The 
Terror after the Terror: An Immediate History’, in Baker, Political Culture, IV, pp.3-18, here: p.15; see also: 
Benjamin Constant, ‘Des effets de la Terreur,’ in De la force du government actuel et de la nécessité de s’y rallier 
(1797), (Philippe Raynaud, ed., Paris, Flammarion, 1988), pp.27-89; and Germaine de Staël, Des Circonstance 
Actuelles qui peuvent Terminer la Révolution et des Principes qui peuvent Fonder la République en France 
(1798), (Lucia Omacini, ed., Geneva, Droz, 1979), who characterised the slide into Terror as a consequence of the 
French Revolution having been “thrown off balance by its rush toward the future, not the weight of the past”; in 
reality, the two were indistinguishable: it was the perceived “weight of the past,” the drag-force it seemed to exert 
upon revolutionary completion, that created the conditions for an ever-accelerated “rush toward the future,” p.2: 
“L’avenir n’a point de précurseur. Le guide de la vraisemblance, de la probabilité n’existe plus. L’homme erre 
dans la vie comme un être lancé dans un élément étranger. Ses habitudes, ses sentiments, ses espérances, tout est 
confondu.” See: Biancamaria Fontana, ‘The Thermidorian republic and its principles,’ in Biancamaria Fontana, 
ed., The Invention of the Modern Republic (Cambridge, CUP, 1994), pp.118-138. 
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The single speed setting of administrative acceleration proved unsustainably self-destructive. 
In an attempt to institutionalise – to canalise and control – the extreme tempo of constituent 
power, the terrorist state had undertaken a form of temporal mimesis, an institutional 
impersonation of popular impatience, which ultimately proved paradoxical.632 It was 
impossible to reconcile (legitimate) popular spontaneity with the (illegitimate) duration of 
durable governance. In America, meanwhile, the revolutionary disjuncture of past, present 
and future, liquefied historical experience, sending the possibility of political control 
“sliding” over a temporal plane that was constantly disrupted by the multiplication of 
potential futures. In this context, it was difficult to identify the Confederation with any 
verifiable historical trajectory because it was impossible gain traction, to impose order, on 
events for any sufficient length of time. This was not so much a problem of tempo; 
circumstances saturated by contingencies produced a form of historical experience possessed 
of variable – and unpredictable – velocities. As the Confederation staggered on, the Jacobin 
Republic disintegrated, consumed by yet another popular journée.633 The American and 
French Republics now entered comparable regimes of contingency, in which the exercise of 
political power was frustrated by the sense of a continual historical happening. 
  
                                                
632 Lucien Jaume, ‘Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and Its Consequences,’ and Stephen Griffin, 
‘Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American Constitutionalism,’ in Martin Loughlin, Neil Walker, 
eds., The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford, OUP, 2007), pp.67-
85, 49-66. 
633 Colin Jones, ‘The Overthrow of Maximilien Robespierre and the “Indifference” of the People,’ American 
Historical Review 119 (3, 2014), pp.689-713; Jones is also working at present on a micro-history of 9 Thermidor, a 
history of a single journée, provisionally entitled: Thermidor: 24 Hours of Parisian Revolution (forthcoming). 
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4: Postrevolutionary Power and Reordering Historical Time at the Constitutional 
Convention, 1785-1787, and the Coup of Brumaire, 1795-1799 
 
The search for simultaneity can sometimes occlude the presence of similarity. Hunting for 
historical meaning in directly contemporary events often obscures comparable processes: the 
emergence of George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte as the inheritors of their 
respective revolutions is a case in point. Thus Chateaubriand – who could claim to have met 
both – wrote: 
 
18 Brumaire was accomplished; the consular government is born, and liberty dies. An 
absolute change is thus operated in the world: the man of the last century exits the 
stage, the man of this century enters it. Washington, following all his wonders, cedes 
to Bonaparte, who begins his own.634 
 
This trans-Atlantic baton-pass from liberty to autocracy was couched in familiar terms: both 
had “emerged from the womb of democracy,” both were “born to liberty,” yet whilst “the 
former remained faithful to her,” the latter “betrayed her.” This is misleading. Parallels should 
not be drawn from the simultaneous occurrences of 1799, but from the similar processes of 
1799 and 1787: between Brumaire and the Constitutional Convention. The regimes that 
Washington and Napoleon helped overthrow – the Articles of Confederation and the 
Directory – were hostages to historical time. Unable to pre-empt future “exigencies,” they 
constantly confronted present contingencies. They were afflicted by a ceaseless sense of 
historical happening, by an inability to coordinate themselves in historical time: it was the 
historicity of these regimes that undermined their capacity for governance.635 This was also 
the justification for their dissolution. 
For the Brumairian conspirators and for nascent Federalists, resuscitating the 
functionality of political power demanded strategies for controlling the experience of 
historical time. The Confederation and Directory were to be replaced with new institutions 
                                                
634 François-René, vicomte de Chateaubriand, Mémoires d’Outre-Tombe (4 vols., Paris, Classiques Garnier, 1992) 
II, livre 19, p.358: “[L]e 18 brumaire s’accomplit; le gouvernement consulaire naît, et la liberté meurt. Alors 
s’opère dans le monde un changement absolu: l’homme du dernier siècle descend de la scène, l’homme du 
nouveau siècle y monte. Washington, au bout de ses prodiges, cède la place à Bonaparte, qui recommence les 
siens.” In Mémoires, Chateaubriand said he met Washington during his travels through America, in Philadelphia in 
1791, possibly between 5 September and 26 November, although the marquis de la Rouerie claims this meeting 
never took place: Chateaubriand, Chateaubriand’s Travels in America (trans. Richard Switzer), (Lexington, KY., 
University of Kentucky, 1969), p.211-12, footnote 20; Chateaubriand met with Napoleon for the first time in 1802: 
Roger Pearson, Unacknowledged Legislators: The Poet as Lawgiver in Post-Revolutionary France (Oxford, OUP, 
2016), p.135; Anne-Sophie Morel, Chateaubriand et la violence de l’histoire dans les Mémoires d’outre-tombe 
(Paris, Honoré Champion, 2014). 
635 Unlike François Hartog, who examines shifts in “regimes of historicity,” I am more interested by the historicity 
of regimes, by the ways in which historical experiences are repurposed as a means of sustaining – and, ultimately, 
of legitimising – the operations of political power: see, François Hartog, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and 
Experiences of Time (trans. Saskia Brown), (New York, NY., Columbia University Press, 2003; reprint 2015), see 
esp., pp.15-20; here: p.xv. 
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and practices of power that might incubate political experience, investing political culture 
with a new sense of duration and imbuing political authority with a new sense of durability. 
This was different to simply recreating the continuity common to ancien regime society, 
which had been delegitimised as a modality of power on account of its apparent 
incompatibility with the exercise of liberty. Rather than simply forestalling the onset of the 
future through a ceaseless reification of tradition, the perpetrators of the Constitutional 
Convention and Brumaire aimed at the invention of political regimes that would create their 
own futures, thereby imposing order upon – rather than being continually reordered by – the 
“exterior time” of contingency.636 
 
 
I. Anxiety and Contingency: the lived experience of the present during the 
Confederation and Directory 
 
The United States under the Articles of Confederation (1781-1787) and France under the 
Directory (1794-1799) were both periods of anxiety.637 These nascent republics appeared 
ungovernable, as the prey to the unmanageable chaos of revolutionary historical experience. 
Human agency seemed nugatory, even moribund. Contingency ruled. “There are no longer 
men in France,” lamented the one-time conventionnel and soon-to-be Napoleonic conseiller, 
Antoine-Clair Thibaudeau, “there are only events.”638 In August 1786, the Massachusetts 
lawyer Theodore Sedgwick expressed similar despondency at the directionless drift of the 
United States. “If we do not control events, we shall be miserably controlled by them.” This 
                                                
636 Pocock, ‘Modes of political and historical time,’ p.92; it is the tension that exists between the “horizon” of 
future events and the “space” of present experience that generates historical time, and plunges political regimes 
into contingency, confronting them with an “exterior time” not governed by tradition; see: Michael Pickering, 
‘Experience as horizon: Koselleck, expectation and historical time,’ Cultural Studies 18 (2, 2004), pp.271-89; the 
very concept of “experience” was seen to degrade during this period, as Goethe observed in Elective Affinities 
(1809): “[I]t is terrible that one cannot learn anything for life anymore… Our ancestors held firm to what they had 
learned in their youth; but we have to learn everything over again every five years if we are not to be totally behind 
the times”: cited in Rosa, Social Acceleration (2013), p.108. 
637 The classic thesis that portrays “the five years following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all 
the history of the American people,” is found in John Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, 1783-1789 
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1888), see: p.55, where Fiske adds that, “the dangers from which we were saved in 
1788 were even greater than the dangers from which we were saved in 1865.” Gordon S. Wood, in The Creation of 
the American Republic, has observed how often contemporary references to “critical” circumstances or “crises” 
were framed in temporal terms, often to convey the imminent nature of the threat, see: pp.393-4; and Merrill 
Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States during the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New York, NY., 
Knopf, 1950); the various crises that engulfed the Directory are detailed in Denis Woronoff, The Thermidorean 
Regime and the Directory, 1794-1799 (trans. Julian Jackson), (Cambridge, CUP, 1984); Martyn Lyons, ‘Recent 
Interpretations of the French Directory,’ Australian Journal of Politics and History 27 (1981), pp.40-47; see, also, 
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crisis was both institutional and temporal in origin: “Even the appearance of a union,” wailed 
Sedgwick, “cannot in the way we are long be preserved.”639  
The Confederation and the Directory were ineffective time-shaping agencies. Whilst 
they were able to manipulate and perpetuate “simple domains of contingency,” ensuring only 
their near-term existence, barely surviving the onslaught of unforeseeable “events,” they 
proved incapable of charting verifiable historical vectors.640 These regimes were unable, in 
other words, of creating their own time or shaping their own history; they could not guarantee 
their own future continuation. They were consequently afflicted by the constant fluctuation in 
the transhistorical relationship between past, present and future, which resulted in a further 
inability to foreclose the multiple potential futures that seemed – on an almost daily basis – to 
confront the American and French Republics with imminent disintegration. Fidgety and 
fissiparous, the lived experience of the present appeared both interminable – as an unending 
stream of the unforeseen – and liable to sudden disintegration – as the always-at-hand 
potential collapse of the state. Contemporaries were consequently racked by a prevalent 
sensation of anxiety, a future-oriented fear derived from the temporalisation of crisis.641 
The Revolutions had transformed the present into a ceaseless historical ‘happening.’ 
In 1782, the French envoy to the United States, the marquis de Barbé-Marbois, depicted the 
political life of the nascent Republic as “ce tableau continuellement mobile.”642 The 
constancy of uncertainty would later provoke the ardent federalist, Fisher Ames, to liken the 
Confederation to a period when “the corn would not grow, nor the pot boil,” as an ongoing 
state of anxious anticipation, mercifully terminated by the promulgation of a federal 
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Constitution, but a crisis that would surely resume “if [the Union] should be broken.”643 
Under the Directory, meanwhile, the realities of daily life seemed to shift on an almost hourly 
basis. The effects of inflation and financial speculation, which had so rapidly depreciated the 
value of paper currency in the United States, had also sent the assignat into free-fall. At the 
end of Brumaire 1795, for example, the louis was valued at an estimated 2,000 livres; by 
early Frimaire (less than one month later), it was worth 5,500 livres.644 The “distressing 
circumstances only worsen with time,” observed one police report in July 1795: “the collapse 
of the assignats becomes faster and faster; the scandalous price inflation of all commodities 
makes, from hour to hour, such a terrifying progress that most citizens are forced into last 
expedients just in order to assure their daily needs.”645 This endangered the survival of the 
state since its functionality had come to depend upon the speed with which the increasingly 
worthless paper money could be printed. When, in May 1795, the workmen who operated the 
printing presses threatened to stage a strike, the Directory was confronted with imminent 
collapse (an outcome that was only averted when the government agreed to pay the printers in 
loaves of bread rather than bundles of cash). Despite gradual monetary reform, Le Moniteur 
was, as late as October 1797, still carrying “tables of depreciation” which enabled readers to 
calculate the daily decline in the value of their currency.646  
This continual sense of upheaval made the identification of historical meaning or 
causation impossible. As the conclusion of the American War and the Thermidorian Reaction 
had both subverted the future-oriented temporal horizons of their Revolutions, they plunged 
their respective Republics into a realm of contingent, vicissitudinal time. The present 
consequently became a zone of apparently endless historical accumulation; a space of 
experience in which experience itself was relentlessly rendered useless. Nothing could be 
foreseen and nothing could be planned for: “One does not know what will happen next,” 
observed one fretful Parisian diarist in 1796, “and can see no end to any of this.”647 “Bad 
news arrives every morning in the post,” lamented Ruault; yet the Directory, unable to govern 
for anything other than the exigencies of the present, resembled a group of men “groping 
                                                
643 Fisher Ames to George Richards Minot (23 July, 1789), in Seth Ames, ed., Works of Fisher Ames (2 vols., 
Boston, MA., Little, Brown & Co., 1854), I, p.66; see: John W. Malsberger, ‘The Political Thought of Fisher 
Ames,’ Journal of the Early Republic 2 (1, 1982), pp.1-20. 
644 Woronoff, The Thermidorean Regime, p.92; S. E. Harris, The Assignats (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University 
Press, 1930), p.53. 
645 ‘Rapport du 29 messidor, an III’ (16 July 1795), in Alphonse Aulard, Paris pendant la reaction thermidorienne 
et sous le Directoire, recueil de documents pour l’histoire de l’esprit public à Paris (5 vols., Paris, 1898-1902), II, 
p.86: “les circonstances pénibles du temps ne varient que pour s’aggraver. […] la chute des assignats devient de 
plus en plus rapide; la cherté scandaleuse de toutes choses fait d’heure en heure des progrès si effrayants que la 
plupart des citoyens sont réduits aux derniers expédients pour assurer leur subsistances journalière.” For similar 
reflections, see: ‘Rapport du bureau central du 25 pluviose, an IV’ (13 February 1795), ibid, p.767. 
646 Judith A. Miller, ‘The Aftermath of the Assignat: Plaintiffs in the Age of Property, 1794-1804,’ in Howard G. 
Brown, Judith A. Miller, Taking Liberties: Problems of a New Order from the French Revolution to Napoleon 
(Manchester, Palgrave, 2002), pp.70-91; Andrew Dickson White, Fiat Money Inflation in France: How it Came, 
What it Brought, and How it Ended (New York, NY., Appleton, 1876), pp.50-51. 
647 Cited in Spang, Stuff and Money, p.210. 
  
166 
around, as if in a cellar, with the light only shining from behind them.”648 They were 
incapable of governing for future potentialities since the temporality of the Republic remained 
dominated by the ceaseless appearance of unforeseen events. This, as Ruault’s metaphor 
indicates, left the directors with nothing more than the searchlight of past experiences, whose 
beams – “only shining from behind them” – failed to illuminate the path ahead, trapping them 
in a present-centred posture of constant anxiety. The reason the “political atmosphere” of the 
present “torments us,” wailed the Courrier français in July 1795, was that it seemed to 
“presage for us some distressing future.”649  
Living in a present saturated with contingency robbed individuals of their capacity to 
coordinate themselves historically. In his Almanach des gens de biens of 1797, the royalist 
pamphleteer Galarat de Montjoie forlornly wondered whether “these storms,” which buffeted 
the Republic and which had been “amassing for so long over our heads,” might ever dissipate:  
 
When will the fortuitous moment come when we will no longer have to bemoan the 
past, where we may enjoy the present, and no longer fear the future?650  
 
When, in other words, would history once again make sense? The radical dissimilarity 
between past and future, and the constant, politically-charged revision of these experiential 
spheres, invested the lived experience of the present with a kind of rumbling historicity – a 
limitlessly fluctuating series of possible futures derived from a repeatedly revised medley of 
multiple pasts.651 The present was simply too chaotic to be comprehended, much less 
“enjoyed.” 
 Anxiety bred exhaustion. Such “demanding circumstances,” read one report of the 
bureau central in February 1796, “agitate the public mind.” The citizens of Paris seemed 
“tired of the present and worried by the future,” and consequently engaged “in thousands of 
vague conjectures, for which the result is always grievous.”652 In the context of a contingent 
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and historically disjointed present, the collapse of society into anarchy represented a 
constantly imminent danger. It was not merely the case, as Pocock argues, that the Republics 
of France and America, tasked with “remaining morally and politically stable in a stream of 
irrational events conceived as essentially destructive of all systems of secular stability,” were 
forced to confront their own “temporal finitude.” Rather, as a consequence of revolution, 
“finitude” itself underwent temporalisation.653 The futile art of predicting this supposedly 
imminent disintegration undergirded contemporary anxieties – anxiety, indeed, became a 
temporalized psychological category, a means of giving expression to an erratic experience of 
history. By 1783, the citizens of the new United States had also seen their political energies 
stripped bear: “Seven years of war have entirely extinguished them,” observed Barbé-
Marbois.654 Political exhaustion was one expression of a widespread sense that the 
Confederation, like the Directory, was constantly ripe for collapse. In a petition delivered by 
the residents of Granby, Massachusetts, to General Lincoln, who, in early 1787, was directing 
a state militia against Shays’ rebels, the destruction of the state – and potentially the Union – 
was projected at a distance of days, even hours. “Sir, the alarming prospect which now 
presents itself to us” – and which had obliged the townsfolk to render an account “of the 
present distressing complexion of the times” – was “of our being daily or hourly involved in 
all the horrors of a civil war.”655 Joseph Hawley, in a letter to Caleb Strong, was stunned by 
the speed with which events were moving: “You would be astonished to know with what 
amazing rapidity the spirit of the insurgents propagates. Many are infected with it of whom 
you would never have the least suspicion.”656 In “this hour of their Confusion and distress,” 
observed the British consul, Sir John Temple, in a despatch from Boston, events clearly 
portended the dissolution of the United States.657  
Whilst historians have generally agreed that Shays’ Rebellion – an armed uprising in 
Massachusetts, led by the disaffected Revolutionary War veteran, Daniel Shays, in the winter 
of 1786 and spring of 1787 – influenced the convocation of the Constitutional Convention, 
the precise nature of that influence remains unclear.658 For both the enthusiasts and detractors 
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of a convention, the Rebellion was evocative of the peculiar temporality of the Revolution. 
According to ‘Centinel,’ writing in the Freeman’s Journal of Pennsylvania: 
 
The late revolution, having effaced in a great measure all former habits, and the 
present institutions are so recent, that there exists not that great reluctance to 
innovation, so remarkable in old communities…for the most comprehensive mind 
cannot foresee the full operation of material changes on the civil polity.659 
 
The shallow historicity of the American Republic, with its yet “recent” institutions, 
revolutionary erasure of “former habits,” and propensity towards “innovation,” that had 
undermined political authority because it created an entirely open future, wherein even “the 
most comprehensive mind” could not “foresee” changes in “the civil polity.”  
It is possible to enter the problem, as in the French context, through the peculiarities 
of the debate surrounding paper money. The Massachusetts rebels, bound to tightening debt 
repayment schedules and increasingly unable to secure their property, were, as Boissy 
d’Anglas observed of propertyless French citizens, unlikely to favour “the real good to the 
apparent good,” nor were they inclined to prefer “the interests of the future to that of the 
present.”660 Petitions advocating the expansion of paper money, which many rural inhabitants 
viewed as a form of debt relief, exemplified a desire to frustrate linear time.661 Paper money 
enabled them to defer the repayment of their long-term debt obligations until – in the 
intervening time – currency inflation rendered it manageable. In March 1786, the lawyer 
Benjamin Austin identified the debtors demanding paper money, and playing for time by 
obstructing – often violently – the operations of debt courts, “as practising the greatest art in 
order to delay every process” of repayment.662 According to Woody Holton, the opposition to 
paper money was less about macroeconomic concerns than about keeping impoverished 
farmers in endless debt cycles that the crisis-level shortage of hard currency prevented them 
from escaping.663 Yet this does not account for the apparently broad popularity of paper 
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money. “The people,” Elbridge Gerry observed during the monetary debates of the 
Convention, “are for paper money,” especially “when the Legislatures are against it.” The 
popular county conventions of Massachusetts, for example, “had declared a wish for a 
depreciating paper that would sink itself.”664 The perpetuation of debt cycles also meant a 
constant deferral of debt repayment deadlines. Writing in the Worcester Magazine, ‘A 
member of the Convention’ saw Shays’ rebellion as a reaffirmation of historical cyclicality: 
the rebels wished to “revert to the principles of the Constitution [of Massachusetts]” – in 
effect, to intervene in the course of political events in order to reassure their economic 
liberties, an act they regarded as “not only lawful, but a duty.”  
To perpetuate the present was also to preserve, unmolested, the liberty acquired 
during the course of the Revolution, even if this imperilled the future financial stability of the 
government.665 As Shays himself had declared in his petition of December 1786, “one 
moment of liberty” was “worth an eternity of bondage.”666 This statement testifies to the 
radical contrast emerging between duration (“eternity”), which was evocative of oppression, 
and instantaneous political participation (“one moment”), which connoted the unbridled 
exercise of liberty. It may also explain why the rebellion was often defended in a vocabulary 
redolent of the Declaration of Independence. “[T]he people may,” ‘A Member of the 
Convention’ further observed, “alter, change or destroy, when for the good of the people.”667 
That “when” was firmly embedded in a revolutionary “course of human events,” a course that 
was perpetually unfolding in the present. Thus the quasi-cyclical temporality – or perpetuity 
of present-centred historical experience – invoked by the rebels would foreclose the potential 
degradation of liberty in the future by re-enacting the revolutionary right to overthrow 
constituted authority in the present. 
The temporal politics of Shays’ Rebellion was not without partisan significance.668 
Those defending the rebels, who would later identify as “anti-Federalists,” dismissed fears of 
an instability in historical time. “Nothing in our circumstances,” warned ‘Brutus Jr.’ in a letter 
to the New York Journal from November 1787, could “justify” the convocation of a federal 
convention: “those who are anxious to precipitate a measure, will always tell us that the 
present is the critical moment; now is the time, the crisis is arrived, and the present minute 
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must be seized.”669 For anti-Federalists, the vigilant and the virtuous were concurrent civic 
categories; anxiety was a necessary component of republican life, it bolstered republican 
virility and vigilance. For the nascent Federalists, meanwhile, the historical experience 
garnered under the Confederation – and during Shays’ Rebellion, in particular – demonstrated 
the need to finally conclude the Revolution. Indeed, by categorising the violence as a 
“rebellion,” the Federalists could distinguish it from the American Revolution, which would 
henceforth be demarcated as a singular, irreversible rupture in linear time – as neither cyclical 
event nor “ongoing” act. The conceptualisation of revolutionary completion therefore 
necessitated the termination of revolutionary temporality.  
By the mid-1780s, the “now” that had once tried men’s souls had become a present-
oriented “phrenzy,” a threat to the future stability of the Republic. “Now is the time,” jeered 
one pamphleteer, “when men act before they reflect.”670 For the Union to end its apparently 
daily fight for survival the future of America would need in some sense to become governable 
– measures would need to be taken in the present that might pre-empt the conditions of the 
future. “Have we not reason,” the Rev. Thomas Thacher told the Massachusetts ratification 
convention, “to fear new commotions in this commonwealth?”671 Terminating revolutionary 
temporality, however, might enclose – and thus stabilise – the historical event of Shays’ 
Rebellion as an instructive space of experience. In his History of the Insurrections in 
Massachusetts (1788), for example, George Richards Minot cast this “period of misfortune” 
as a “most fruitful source of instruction.” It was only through “investigating the causes of 
national commotions,” by “tracing their progress,” and “carefully marking the means through 
which they are brought to a conclusion,” that “established principles” could be deduced “for 
preserving the future” of the Union.672 In 1787, however, neither the stabilisation nor the 
accumulation of “fruitful sources of instruction” – of experience, in short – could materialise 
since the Republic did not have enough time in which to complete these processes. Continued 
historical rupture situated the present within a seemingly endless concatenation of contingent 
events.673 In May 1787, James Warren wrote to John Adams to express concern the county 
conventions determined “to annihilate the Senate,” depicting their rejection of this 
deliberative body, and of experience in general, as a form of political infantilisation. “The 
Truth of the matter is, the People resemble a child.” Though denuded of acquiring experience, 
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the Republic was not somehow preternaturally protected from premature ageing; instead, “the 
People, who have no Stability,” were engaging in a temporal politics that did not prolong the 
present, but simply made it prey to contingencies. “Such is the situation of things here that no 
man can calculate the Events of the present year.”674 
Since 1793 the French Revolution had also been assailed by internal “rebels,” notably 
in the Grand-Ouest, where royalist and Catholic sentiment, antagonised by attacks on 
refractory clergy and the execution of the king, simmered. Here, the temporal reforms of the 
Revolution were anathematised: the fêtes nationales, the décadi, the “naturalised” allegories 
of republican time occupied only a “modest place” in rural festive culture.675 Renewed efforts 
at imposing the observance of the calendar after Thermidor thus underscored the continuing 
concern that a common experience of time had failed to settle across France.676 Although the 
Republican calendar theoretically dictated the rhythm of French festive life, it remained 
patchily applied, even during the Terror. Under the Directory, the calendar underwent what 
Sanja Perovic has termed “dematerialization” – it became an instrument for charting rational 
civil time, and no longer reflected the “presence of the people” in the political life of the 
Republic.677 Gone were the chialistic ambitions of the Cult of the Supreme Being, the 
“sansculottides,” the pretensions to uchronic, millennial revolutionary finality.678 The 
calendar nevertheless remained in place, even as it was emptied out of festive or historical 
significance. In Pluviôse, Year V (16 February, 1797), the municipal administrators of 
Saumur – a commune located between the Vendée and Sarthe, the flashpoints of royalist 
rebellion – reported “with sadness” to the Council of the Five Hundred that “the celebration 
of national festivals” was “absolutely non-existence in the countryside.”  
 
Citizen legislators! After 9 Thermidor, fluctuating opinion awaited a direction that 
has not been given to it: the enemies of the common good [la chose publique] seize it 
more and more: very soon it will be entirely out of your hands. […] There is nothing 
to await from time: wickedness spreads with a rapidity that is frightening to all the 
friends of the common good.679 
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pp.654-69. 
678 What was not gone, however, was the determination, as Perovic observes, to “transform the ongoing power 
struggles that threatened to capsize the new republic into a common experience of time itself,” which betrays the 
fact that contemporaries understood the translation of political legitimacy into time as a matter of public debate: 
Perovic, The Calendar, p.2; the failure to create common time is explored in chapter 5 in the context of the 
Napoleonic Empire. 
679 AN D/38/3, ‘Les Administrateurs Municipaux de la Commune de Saumur au Corps Législatif (28 Pluviôse, an 
V)’: “C’est avec doleur [sic] que nous vous déclarons le peu d’impression que font actuellement sur le peuple, vos 
décrets pour la célébration des fêtes nationales: ils sont absolument nuls dans les campagnes.” “Citoyen 
  
172 
 
There is a familiarity to these exclamations: the urgent, temporalized terminology, the 
gnawing sense of uncertainty, the fluctuations and declamations, the malignity of time itself.  
Debilitated by “fluctuating opinion” – by the post-Thermidor power vacuum – the municipal 
administrators was unable to suppress alternative experiences of time, in particular, the 
royalist and Catholic observation of l’ére vulgaire, which, in the surrounding countryside, 
connoted a rejection of republican time schemas.680 The Saumur address therefore positioned 
the perceived need to control time – conceived in terms of the festive and civic life of the 
nation – and the regulation of “the common good” as coterminous political efforts.  
The heightened enforcement of republican time undermined the political structure of 
the post-Thermidor republic. For all the rhetoric of the constitutional debates of Year III, the 
finished product did little to stabilise the concept of historical experience.681 Annual elections, 
and a mandate preventing citizens from becoming electors two years in a row, “put the people 
in a fever state at least six months out of twelve,” observed Pierre Cabanis.682 Whilst certain 
electoral mechanisms theoretically counteracted sudden modifications of political equilibria, 
if a single political force should ever gain a majority in both chambers, the Councils of the 
Five Hundred and the Ancients, the only means of restoring balance was by recourse to coup. 
As a consequence, the make-up of the legislative chambers swung like a pendulum between 
royalist and neo-Jacobin factions. “Oppositionists are constantly in confrontation,” lamented 
Lombard de Langres, “the conflicts of yesterday are rekindled, to be engaged in again 
tomorrow…and [the chambers] can attain neither consistency nor poise.”683 In the coups of 
Fructidor 1797 and Floréal 1798, elections were quashed, deputies exiled, and the constitution 
made repeatedly to bend to “exigencies” and “contingencies.”684 Reform, meanwhile, was 
impossible. Any revision, however simple, had to be ratified on three separate occasions by a 
                                                
Législateurs! Après le 9. Thermidor, l’opinion flottant attendait une direction qui ne lui a par été donnée: les 
ennemis de la chose publique s’en emparent de plus en plus: bientôt elle sera entièrement hors de vos mains…Il 
n’y a rien à attendre du tems: le mal augmente avec une rapidité effrayante pour les amis de la chose publique.” 
680 On post-Thermidor Catholic and royalist observances of alternative temporalities as well as efforts to impose 
republican time, see: Noah Shusterman, Religion and the Politics of Time: Holidays in France from Louis XIV to 
Napoleon (Washington, DC., The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), p.161-205, and, idem., The French 
Revolution: Faith, Desire, and Politics (New York., NY, Routledge, 2014), pp.235-54. 
681 The relevance of “experience,” as opposed to abstract, utopian “theorising,” is discussed in depth in Andrew J. 
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Cornell University Press, 2008), pp.32-5. 
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France, 1795-1799: The Road to Brumaire,’ in The Journal of Modern European History 51 (4, 1979), pp.734-59, 
here: p.737; on Directorial elections, see: J.-R. Suratteau, Les Elections de l’an VI et le ‘Coup d’État du 22 
Floréal’ (11 Mai 1798): Étude documentaire, statistique et analytique: Essai d’interprétation (Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 1971); Melvin Edelstein, The French Revolution and the Birth of Electoral Democracy (Surrey, Ashgate 
Publishing, 2014), p.317-32. 
683 Lombard de Langres, cited in Isser Woloch, Napoleon and his collaborators: The Making of a Dictatorship 
(New York, NY., W.W. Norton, 2001), p.7. 
684 Martyn Lyons, France Under the Directory (Cambridge, CUP, 1975), p.215-229; A. Meynier, Les coups d’état 
du Directoire (3 vols., Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1927-28); Isser Woloch, Jacobin Legacy: The 
Democratic Movement Under the Directory (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1970), p.311-68. 
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majority in both chambers at three-year intervals, and then presented before an extraordinary 
assembly at the end of a 9-year process.  
The constitutional debates of 1795 had appeared in Le Moniteur under the optimistic 
headline, “discussions on the means of terminating the Revolution.”685 Yet the Revolution 
would not end; and by 1799 the incessant sense of apprehension for the future had placed “the 
public mood in agony.” In March, French forces were sent into retreat across the Rhine; by 
April, the vassal republics in Italy had begun to disintegrate. The threat of invasion now 
seemed more real than at any point since 1793. In July, revitalised by the foundation of the 
Manège Club, the neo-Jacobin faction in the Council of the Five Hundred passed a Law of 
Hostages – in effect, a new Law of Suspects – raising the prospect of a further legislative 
coup; by August, with the département of the Haute-Garonne convulsed in a royalist uprising, 
the Directory approved a forced loan worth 100 million francs.686 “Day by day our state was 
becoming ever more alarming,” sighed Cambacérès in July.687 Yet the Directory was not 
moribund; in fact, by October, French forces had defeated an encroaching Anglo-Russian 
army in Holland and stabilised the Swiss frontier. “We have not seen a more perfect calm 
reign here for a long time,” observed the bewildered Prussian ambassador to Paris.688  
What truly robbed the Directory of long-term political viability was the 
temporalisation of political anxiety. Anticipations and apprehensions for the future – fears 
that, by 1799, had coagulated into vaguely articulated forebodings of imminent collapse – 
became accepted facets of revolutionary experience. Whilst “perfect calm” might pervade 
political life for a day, week or month, the perception that stability could not last long was 
overwhelming – and overwhelmingly exhausting. France, remarked Constant, a nation once 
“drunk on a revolution which not a single horror had sullied,” had, since 1795, laboured under 
a simple “feeling of exhaustion.”689 It was the failure of individual events to crystallise into 
history that gave the experience of time its ever-fluctuating, even liquid character. “Patriots,” 
observed one report to the bureau central in the months before Brumaire, “are uneasy and 
troubled; a cruel incertitude ravages them.” Whilst the “orders of superior authorities are 
poorly and slowly executed,” there seemed never to be enough time to employ “half-
measures,” the application of which would only provide “a palliative remedy to an evil which 
                                                
685 This ambition is contextualized by Ozouf, ‘Thermidor ou le travail de l’oubli,’ pp.664-5: “Discussion sur les 
moyens de terminer la Révolution.” 
686 Michael D. Bordo and Eugene N. White, ‘British and French finance during the Napoleonic Wars,’ in Bordo 
and Forrest Capie, eds., Monetary Regimes in Transition (Cambridge, CUP, 1993), pp.241-273. 
687 Jean-Jaques-Régis de Cambacérès, Mémoires inédits, Laurence Chatel de Brancion, ed., (2 vols., Paris, Perrin, 
1999), I, ‘Du 2 thermidor an vii au 1 vendémiaire an viii,’ p.419: “De jour en jour notre état devenait plus 
alarmant”; see, also: Bernard Gainot, ‘La légende noire du Directoire,’ in Napoléon: de l’histoire à la légende. 
Actes du colloque des 30 novembre et 1er décembre 1999 à l’auditorium Austerlitz du musée de l’Armée, Hôtel 
national des Invalides (Paris, Maisonneuve & Larose, 1999), pp.15-26. 
688 Philip G. Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power (London, Bloomsbury, 2007), p.455. 
689 Constant, cited in Bronislaw Baczko, Ending the Terror: The French Revolution after Robespierre (trans. 
Michel Petheram), (Cambridge, CUP, 1994), p.216. 
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is constantly growing.” Unable to quantify future conditions, the report wearily concluded 
that the Republic was at last slipping towards its final crisis. “Imperceptibly, everything is 
disintegrating, everything is decomposing.”690 
 
 
II. Governing Futurity: temporality, historicity and legitimacy at the Constitutional 
Convention (1787) and the coup of Brumaire (1799) 
 
Who can blame the Brumairians for depicting the Directory as a disaster?691 It may have been 
in their interests, of course, to condemn the previous regime as dysfunctional, but this does 
not account for the way in which they framed their criticisms, which repeatedly inferred the 
contingent temporality of the Republic as underlying impairment in political power. In the 
immediate aftermath of Brumaire, for example, the congratulatory addresses sent from the 
provinces to the provisional Consuls made repeated reference to the recently imminent, yet 
narrowly averted collapse of society. The French Republic seemed to have been standing 
before an “abyss,” contemplating its final extirpation. “The abyss was opening beneath our 
feet,” declared the municipal authority of Cahors, “[a] few more moments of dormancy, and 
we would perish.”692 The magistrates of the civil court in the Saône-et-Loire agreed: “We 
were on the edge of an abyss, when the events of 18 Brumaire occurred in the very nick of 
time.”693 The coup had pulled France back from the brink, rescuing the Republic from the 
onrush of annihilation [Fig. 9].  
At an analogous period in America, similar statements were being intoned. “You are 
on the brink of a dreadful precipice,” warned William Findlay who, despite his anti-Federalist 
leaning, could not help associating the obscured political future and the chaos of the present 
from the prognostication of disaster. “One step more, and perhaps the scene of freedom is 
closed forever in America,” a single step over a “precipice” that might entail “the ruin of 
millions yet unborn.”694 “No Morn[ing] ever dawned more favourable than ours did,” 
                                                
690 ‘Rapport du bureau central du 19 prairial, an VII (6 June 1799),’ in Aulard, Paris pendant la reaction 
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Bergeron, France Under Napoleon (trans. R. R. Palmer), (Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1990), p.88. 
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observed Washington in October 1786, yet “no day was ever more clouded than the present!” 
In less than a decade, the future had become hopelessly “clouded,” the promise of 
independence already seemed spent. “How melancholy is the reflection that in so short a 
space, we should have made such large strides towards fulfil[ing] the prediction of our 
transatlantic foes! – ‘leave them to themselves, and their government will soon dissolve.’”695 
“[B]ut the other day,” it seemed, “we were shedding our blood to obtain the Constitutions 
under which we now live,” yet now Americans everywhere were “unsheathing the Sword to 
overturn them!” “The thing is so unaccountable that I hardly know how to realize it, or to 
persuade my self that I am not under the vision of a dream.”696 In a context of historical 
compression, the future inevitably appears ungovernable, since the present, assaulted by the 
incoherent onset of events, becomes a restricted zone of political manoeuvre, a garbage heap 
of already out-of-date experiences. It was impossible to establish a durable political regime 
                                                
695 Washington to James Madison (5 November, 1786), in W.W. Abbot, ed., The Papers of George Washington, 
Confederation Series (6 vols., Charlottesville, VA., University of Virginia Press, 1995), IV, pp.331-32. 
696 Washington to David Humphreys (26 December, 1786), in ibid, pp.477-78. 
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“in so short a space of time,” as Washington observed, when the duration of the present 
seemed constantly to elapse.  
 The crises that befell both the Confederation and the Directory were simultaneously 
conceived as part of a general crisis in historical time. The Constitutional Convention and the 
coup of Brumaire may therefore be seen as analogous political events, borne of parallel 
desires to restructure historical experience, in particular to render the sense of rupture 
between the events of the present and the onset of the future less temporally abrupt. A 
capacity to control the perception of time therefore undergirded the justificatory logics of the 
Convention delegates and Brumairians. It also pervaded the invective levelled by opponents. 
As a consequence, the vocabulary of political legitimacy, which was deployed both to justify 
and to deride these events, was studded with historical and temporal allusions.  
It is here that a comparative account of the actions and motivations of George 
Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte becomes indispensible. Despite the historiographical 
firewall that has separated them, there is a curious resemblance in their respective ascents to 
power. According to Matthew Flynn and Stephen Griffin, their only dual biographers, “the 
steps that both Washington and Napoleon took on the road from military commander to 
civilian leader,” at the Constitutional Convention and following the coup of Brumaire, mark 
the moment at which their pathways most clearly “diverge.” Whilst the latter opted for a 
“sober and deferential” route to civilian governance, the former was guilty of having made a 
“bombastic and vain” grab for power.697 In reality, the Convention and Brumaire, when 
compared as efforts to establish post-revolutionary political regimes, share certain striking 
structural similarities. Washington, like Napoleon, played an indispensible role. His presence 
determined the competencies of the executive office itself. It is unlikely that the authority of 
the presidency would “have been so great,” remarked the South Carolina delegate, Pierce 
Butler, “had not many members cast their eyes towards General Washington as President.”698 
In his revisionist account of 1787, Eric Nelson wonders if the Philadelphia 
Convention, which “historiographical orthodoxies” have often characterised as a repudiation 
of the Revolution, ought to “be regarded as a sort of Thermidorian Reaction avant la 
lettre.”699 The better comparison is with Brumaire. 
 
i. Washington’s Brumaire 
 
                                                
697 Flynn and Griffin, Washington and Napoleon, p.79. 
698 Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (5 May, 1788), in Farrand, ed., Records of the Federal Convention, III, p.302. 
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From 25 May to 17 September 1787, the Constitutional Convention sat in session, furtively 
deliberating the future of the American Republic.700 The venue was familiar: Independence 
Hall had been the maternity ward of the Declaration and since served as the assembly 
chamber for the Continental Congress. If the coup of Brumaire has become indelibly 
associated with Bonaparte, then a similar association should be made between the Convention 
and Washington; and if, as Sieyès would later observe, every coup needed its “sword,” then 
Washington surely represented the heavy artillery. Indeed, at a civil assembly intended to 
resolve civil discord, Washington openly paraded his martial prowess: he was the only 
delegate in full military uniform. Whilst the former commanding general of the Continental 
Army may have viewed this as the most appropriate attire, it was certainly a statement of 
intent. For several months Washington had prevaricated, fearful that political events “have a 
tendency to sweep me back into the tide of public affairs.”701 Several times he had 
disappointed James Madison – the Convention’s most enthusiastic canvasser – by refusing to 
attend any assembly that might remedy the chronic dysfunctionality of the Confederation.702 
Ultimately, the arm-twisting proved irrelevant: Washington would eventually come to 
conclude that a federal Convention represented the last best opportunity to rescue the 
Republic.  
A central assertion of the Constitutional Convention was the commonplace claim that 
the Articles of Confederation were beyond reform. They did, in fact, contain provisions for 
constitutional amendment, just so long as those amendments were initiated by the Congress 
and approved by all state legislatures. In 1787, however, reform was very swiftly struck from 
the agenda. Instead, the Convention delegates sketched an entirely new blueprint for 
government, essentially abolishing the Confederation. When the Constitution was finalised, 
they set a ratification threshold of nine, and not a majority of states, and bypassed the 
legislatures by decreeing a series of extraordinary state conventions. “What they actually 
did,” observed the American political scientist, John W. Burgess, “was to assume constituent 
powers, ordain a constitution of government and of liberty, and demand a plebiscite thereon 
over the heads of all existing legally or organised power.” Had Napoleon – or some other 
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adventurer – committed similar acts, “they would have been pronounced coups d’état.”703 
This went far beyond what Congress had ordained when it specified powers to “correct and 
enlarge” the Articles. Thus when Washington finally decided to attend the Philadelphia 
Convention, he would do so fully aware that, “in strict propriety,” an assembly to alter the 
constitutional character of the Confederation “may not be legal.” His justification for its 
convocation would therefore need to reach beyond the law; in fact, Washington, like 
Napoleon, would locate the legitimacy of the undertaking within a context of revolutionary 
temporality.704  
For the coordinators of the Constitutional Convention, theirs was a paper conspiracy 
– a programme to overhaul political power, coordinated through carefully crafted letters and 
missives. The “legallity of this Convention,” Washington privately admitted to Henry Knox 
in February 1787, was deeply “problematical.” “The powers are wanting, none can deny,” he 
observed, but the process of deciding “through what medium” a renewal of governance was 
to take place had itself become a worrying cause of delay: 
 
That which takes the shortest course to obtain them, will, in my opinion, under 
present circumstances, be found best. Otherwise, like a house on fire, whilst the most 
regular mode of extinguishing it is contending for, the building is reduced to ashes.705 
 
By comparing the Articles of Confederation to a house on fire, Washington underscored the 
prevalent sense of impending political disaster. The comparison also afforded Washington the 
opportunity to contemplate extraordinary measures. The “present circumstances,” after all, 
had rendered the “regular mode” of political reform temporally impracticable: it was therefore 
necessary to take the “shortest course” towards averting the collapse of the Union, even if 
such as course might also appear legally “irregular.”706 The metaphor was temporally 
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charged, but it was also politically ambiguous: might it not be better to prevent any further 
damage done to a burned-out building by simply demolishing it and starting anew? 
Washington arrived at the conclusion that the constitutional model of the 
Confederation had moved beyond any capacity for timely self-reform.707 There were now no 
legal channels left through which the apparent imminent disintegration of the Union could be 
averted; and a convention that could not “ordain, but only recommend,” as Jay observed, 
would simply “produce endless Discussion.”708 As a consequence, extra-legal methods would 
be required to meet the urgency of a political situation that could no longer be remedied by 
mere recourse to the law. However hesitantly phrased, Washington made these observations 
long before Congress even considered lending its approval to a convention. In fact, by 
implying that the participants to a convention would be openly defying the constitutional 
authority of both Congress and the states, Washington was technically conspiring to commit 
treason.709 He was not alone in this view. “For a number of reasons,” wrote Rufus King to 
Elbridge Gerry in February, “and although my sentiments are the same to the legality of this 
measure” – that a convention would be illegal – “I think we ought not to oppose.” Despite his 
reservations, King seemed to imply that the prevalent sense of political urgency had changed 
the legal complexion of political deliberation: “Events are hurrying to a crisis; prudent and 
sagacious men should be ready to seize the most favourable circumstances to establish a more 
permanent and vigorous government.”710  
The “most prevalent idea” amongst the delegates, observed George Mason as the 
Convention got underway, was “a total alteration of the present federal system, and 
substituting a great national council or parliament.”711 Political urgency found immediate 
expression in the opening remarks of Edmund Randolph, delegate from Virginia, who, on 28 
May, introduced the Virginia Plan, which would create a tripartite model of government, 
divided between executive, legislative and judicial branches, and replace a confederation 
premised upon state-oriented representation with a federal government. This “was really 
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another coup,” observes Joseph Ellis, since only seven states were present for the majority 
vote, and none of the New England delegations had even arrived. Acknowledgement of the 
Virginia Plan effectively eliminated any prospect of amending the Articles of Confederation, 
the exclusive legal premise of the Convention.712  
From the very beginning, the legitimacy of extra-legal activity was defended on the 
basis of political urgency. The assembly had been convened to combat “the prospect of 
anarchy from the laxity of government every where,” declared Randolph, who implicitly 
associated the uncertainty concerning the future complexion of the American Republic with 
the inability of the Articles to provide the means of stable governance in the present.713 
Washington’s justification of the Convention was derived from a similar perspective on 
historical time. Any attempt to amend the Articles would be an empty exercise, he insisted, 
rather “like the propping of a house which is ready to fall, and which no shoars can support.” 
A convention, by contrast, might reorder the apparently fateful future course of the American 
Republic; it might, in fact, enable America to intervene in its own future, to extinguish the 
flames engulfing its constitutional edifice before it was “reduced to ashes.” It was therefore 
the temporality of the political crisis that persuaded Washington to give his backing to an 
“illegal” convention. As he told Jay in March 1787, it might be, 
 
the last peaceable mode of essaying the practicability of the pres[en]t form, without a 
greater lapse of time than the exigency of our Affairs will admit. In strict propriety a 
Convention so holden may not be legal.714 
 
There seemed to be no other choice – there seemed to be no more time. Remarkably, this is 
the same metaphor that Napoleon would later use to justify the coup of Brumaire. “When the 
house is crumbling,” he told his co-conspirator, August de Marmont, “is there time to busy 
oneself in the garden? A change here is indispensible.”715 That which activated political 
action could also legitimise it, since in the uncertain “lapse of time” – the locus of political 
anxiety – that seemed to separate perceived political deterioration and anticipated political 
destruction, legal remedies proved themselves too slow. By contrast, legal legitimacy could 
always be retroactively bestowed, when the “exigency” of “affairs” had been stabilised – or, 
in other words, when there was more time. Certainly the Convention was a usurpation of the 
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constituted authority of the Articles, yet, as Washington artfully put it, Congress “may give it 
a colouring by recommendation” after the Convention had concluded.716 The legal logic of the 
Convention would have to unfold achronologically – a prudent response, Washington 
believed, to the perceived pace of political deterioration.  
The viability of any coup, of course, depends upon the maximisation of political 
speed during the transitional phase.717 “The day for destroying the government was over,” 
remarked Bourrienne on 19 Brumaire: “the night had to be devoted to building a new one.” 
This embrace of intense political velocity enables the conspirators to outpace the potential 
coordination of oppositional forces, which is perhaps why the recollections of the 
Brumairians are replete with temporal allusions – “there was no time to lose,” recalled 
Bourrienne; those wavering in their support “must decide today,” insisted Napoleon, 
“tomorrow will be too late”; “Tell your General to be speedy,” announced Fouché, “if he 
delays, he is lost.”718 The appropriation of political speed, however, also legitimises the coup 
itself. In a context where time seems to be constantly elapsing, where a slipstream of events is 
created that places the future existence of the state in imminent danger, it becomes possible to 
replace the accepted parameters of legal political action for the logical velocity of the coup. A 
prevalent sense of urgency reconfigures the framework of “legal” action within the state, 
meaning that the coup adheres to an extra-legal modality of time that actually derives its 
legitimacy from the temporality of the ongoing revolutionary crisis.  
Overthrowing the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of Year III in order 
to rescue the republic from imminent dissolution suggested that political and legal 
temporalities moved at different tempos. The Brumairians deployed the rhetoric of 
imminence with the ease of old habits. At 7am on 18 Brumaire, the Council of Ancients was 
summoned into an extraordinary session. Bewildered and bleary-eyed, the deputies were 
immediately informed of an imminent Jacobin insurrection. There was no proof of this claim, 
of course – none was needed. In a political atmosphere pullulating with potential 
conspiracies, the deputies were habituated to anticipating intrigue.719 This enabled the 
Brumairians to frame the advent of political crisis in terms of its potentially abrupt 
actualisation: “subversives from all over Europe had been arriving in Paris in droves during 
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the past few days.”720 Once again, the continuing existence of the revolutionary state was 
situated inside an unstable time lag – the temporal asymmetry between the reception of 
information and its real-time realisation. Political events proceeded within a time frame 
whose scope and duration was unascertainable. Insurrection was thus imminent, and its 
perpetrators (whether fictional or not) already had a head start. For the sake of their safety, 
declared Claude Ambrose Régnier, the Councils were to be immediately relocated from Paris 
to Saint-Cloud under the supervision of General Bonaparte.721  
The manipulation of time is absolutely essential to the success of the coup. If quickly 
brought to term, the time span available for a coherent opposition to form and for alternative 
political futures to proliferate may be effectively reduced. By the morning of 19 Brumaire 
royalist agitators had already begun prophesising the return of Louis XVIII and the 
restoration of the Bourbon dynasty.722 Stretching the coup across two days was thus fraught 
with peril. The comte Miot de Mélito expressed his own sense of anticipation for the 
unforeseeable: “I floated amidst that agitation of the mind that always stimulates hardly 
known [mal connus] events.”723 In the rapidly truncating time frame of the coup, legitimacy 
constantly seeped away from the conspirators; hours or even minutes lost could prove pivotal.  
When the deputies arrived at Saint-Cloud, their designated assembly rooms were still 
filled with frantic carpenters fashioning makeshift benches and tribunes. Politics now began 
moving faster than logistics. The deputies were left to loiter in the gardens of the Orangerie, 
the venue allocated to the Five Hundred, and to speculate about the validity of the 
“conspiracy” against the Republic. During the hour-and-a-half that passed, a rearguard action 
formed, rallied by the neo-Jacobins, which meant that when Lucien finally declared the Five 
Hundred in session, the recalcitrant deputies were ready to pounce. By querying the validity 
of their relocation, they immediately seized the legal initiative; but by then demanding that an 
oath of loyalty be taken – in which every single deputy would need to climb to the rostrum 
and pledge their commitment to the Constitution – they just as swiftly forfeited the temporal 
initiative. Time swung back in favour of the Brumairians.  
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Meanwhile, gathered in the Gallery of Apollo, the upper chamber had already begun 
its deliberations by scrutinising the legality of Paul Barras’s decision to resign as director, and 
thereby dissolve the government.724 Discussion lingered; the Brumairians waited. When it 
was suggested that the defunct Directory simply be renewed, Napoleon could wait no longer. 
Bursting into the chamber, he announced:  
 
Citizens representatives, the situation in which you find yourselves is far from 
normal… Time is short; it is essential that you act quickly. The Republic no longer 
has a government. Four of the Directors have resigned; I have deemed it necessary to 
place the fifth under surveillance […]. There is no time to lose.   
 
This temporally charged invocation to action was meant to corral those deputies who, during 
their garden perambulations, had begun to doubt the veracity of the “conspiracy” confronting 
the Republic. When challenged on his support for the Constitution, Napoleon snapped back: 
“those who speak to you of the Constitution well know that, violated at every moment, 
mutilated at every page, the Constitution no longer exists.” In fact, continued deference for 
this discredited document was placing its “sacred foundations,” namely the “sovereignty of 
the people, liberty and equality,” in immediate danger – “they must be saved!”  
 
I repeat to you that you cannot take measures too promptly, if you wish to stop the 
movement which, perhaps in an instant, is going to kill liberty725  
 
Napoleon had dismissed the legally prescribed forms of deliberating upon the vague yet 
imminent threats to the Republic as simply too slow.726 Troops now filed into the Orangerie 
under the direction of General Murat, who casually informed the deputies that they were 
henceforth “dissolved.” During this brief “parenthèse militaire,” as Thierry Lentz has termed 
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it, the coup became incontrovertibly illegal.727 Yet on 19 Brumaire, the strict “legality” of 
proceedings was in a constant, almost minute-by-minute state of flux. Indeed, it was the 
temporal dimensions of the purported political crisis that enabled the Brumairians to justify 
the momentary transformation of a parliamentary procedure into a military manoeuvre. In 
order to “stop a movement which is going to kill liberty,” and which could strike “in an 
instant,” it had become necessary to subvert the law, which could not keep pace with the 
phantom insurrection, and thus to exchange a constitutional for a revolutionary logic of 
political action.728 
When the appearance of speed seems like hurry, however, the perception of panic 
may derail the coup. The ratification proceedings that continued amongst the several states 
during 1788 can be characterised as a dispute over the temporal politics of “haste.” At the 
Massachusetts convention, one representative, Jonathan Smith, pressed for the timely 
adoption of the Constitution as the only means of eradicating the lingering spectre of rural 
protest. If the state did not “do it now,” he feared that the American people “shall never have 
another opportunity.” If the United States did not quickly regain control over the historical 
forces that seemed to tear at its political cohesion and undermine its executive and legislative 
capacities, then it might be unable to avert its “temporal finitude.” To dither and delay over 
such an historic matter was, as George Clymer told the Pennsylvanian convention, to “run the 
risk of a final ruin.”729 This sensitivity to historical temporality heightened the divergences 
that were coming to define Federalist and Republican politics. In a ‘Letter of Caution,’ the 
anti-Federalist Samuel Chase warned the inhabitants of Baltimore town against “hastily” 
deciding upon a question of such “consequence.” The Constitution was freighted with 
transhistorical significance – it was a matter that involved “the future felicity of a whole 
people.” Written in response to a petition delivered to the General Assembly of Pennsylvania 
calling upon the state to approve the Constitution without delay, Chase derided the need to 
deliberate “in a few days” on a question involving “the happiness or misery of you and all 
your posterity forever,” as “rashness and folly.” The Federalist need for speed had aroused 
suspicion. “[W]hen men urge you to determine in haste, on so momentous a subject, it is not 
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unreasonable to require their motives; and it is not uncharitable to suspect that they are 
improper.”730 Similar sentiments were recreated throughout the ratifying conventions of the 
several states.731 Robert Whitehill, a representative from Cumberland County in 
Pennsylvania, could not see the need for “driving” a federal constitution “down our throats, 
without an hour’s preparation” – unless, of course, it was “a plan not fit for discussion.” 
“[N]o possible mischief or inconvenience can happen from delay,” concluded Chase, in a 
remark that would likely have bewildered Washington.732 
Yet delay – or, rather, the insertion of duration – was to become the central time trope 
of the new constitutional regimes. In this sense, the proceedings of the Convention and 
Brumaire were paradoxical. Whilst they adhered to a revolutionary logic of extra-legal time, 
they simultaneously derived their legitimacy from the declared aim of stabilising 
revolutionary temporality. Establishing a legal-constitutional framework that would cease to 
operate according to revolutionary time was tantamount to declaring an end to the Revolution. 
 
 
ii. The Historicity of Regimes 
 
In a ‘Letter on the Federal Constitution,’ published in October 1787, Edmund Randolph 
extolled the virtues of the “fraternal accord” borne by revolution, before abruptly calling upon 
his fellow citizens to strongly suspect whether independence had guaranteed their liberties in 
perpetuity. “Let us discard the illusion, that by this success, and this glory, the crest of danger 
has irrevocably fallen.” The “danger,” Randolph suggested, was derived from the shallow 
historicity of the fledgling Republic: 
 
Our governments are yet too youthful to have acquired stability from habit. Our very 
quiet depends upon the duration of the union. Among the upright and intelligent, few 
can read without emotion the future fate of the States, if severed from each other.733 
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If the binding agent of the Republic – the Union – were “severed,” the future would become 
so troublingly open and unknowable that the “duration of the union” would become a forfeit 
to mere “fate.” In this sense, Randolph made “stability” and “duration” synonymous, the twin 
outcomes of “habit,” or experience, and the foundation of “our very quiet.” A few months 
earlier, John Armstrong, a veteran of the Revolutionary War, and later a Pennsylvanian 
delegate to the Convention, had reached a similar conclusion. In a letter to Washington, 
Armstrong offered practical, experiential detail for Randolph’s more theoretical musings. He 
predicting that the “early refusal of some of the States, to admit the Impost” – the fiscal 
programme that might prevent the impending financial disintegration of the Confederation – 
would likely “bring on ruine,” and derided the Congress as “but a council of advice,” an 
assembly devoid of authority, “whose influence daily grows less.” It had become impossible 
“to tell how we shall be governed, when we cannot trust ourselves, or which is the same 
thing, the men of our own choice!” In a context where the future durability of the Union was 
confronted by the “daily” prospect of “ruine,” it became impossible to visualise institutional 
longevity. The “youthful” peculiarities of recently minted political regimes connoted an 
absence of political experience – and the experience, in particular, of neutralising existential 
threats. The political crisis that had provoked the Convention was thus rooted in the shallow 
historicity of the Confederation: it was not possible to “gain that knowledge of Government in 
general [and] that species we have adopted in particular,” wrote Armstrong, without the 
stabilising effects of historical experience; yet it was not possible to accrue the ballast of 
historical experience when the tempo of political life constantly abbreviated political 
duration. “We seem to require more Time,” Armstrong concluded.734  
Here, in short, was the purpose of constructing a new constitution: to produce “more 
Time” for the Republic, to enable its citizens to “gain that knowledge” essential to their own 
self-governance, and to ensure “the duration of the union.” The belief that America, 
conceived under whatever constitutional carapace, required “more Time” to erect its own 
durability presupposed that the categories of past and future were no longer affixed in any 
structural, interactive historical relationship. The overwhelming sense of historical 
‘happening’ had collapsed the prevalent regime of historicity into an event-saturated present, 
into “an unending now,” characterised by incessant constitutional and legislative 
alterations.735 In this meaningless historical melee, political power could never acquire 
enough time to acquire “stability from habit,” subject as it was to the potential revolutionary 
reacceleration of history.  
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Barely two weeks after the promulgation of the Constitution of Year VIII, the shallow 
historicity of the Consulate, and thus its visible political feebleness, was exposed on the floor 
of the Tribunat, the deliberative chamber of the new regime. The Tribunat met in the Palais-
Égalité, the erstwhile Palais-Royal and the once-fashionable haunt of the French haute-
bourgeoisie. It was there, at the Café du Foy on 12 July 1789, that Camille Desmoulins had 
urged the people of Paris to protest the dismissal of Necker, demand his recall, and adopt the 
tricolour cockade.736 By 1800, the Palais-Égalité had become a synonym for vice and 
dissolution, a complex of brothels and gambling dens – and, as many cynics speculated, a 
suitable location for a chambering of chattering “lawyers,” much despised by the First 
Consul, who hoped thereby to undermine their “deliberations.”737 Despite the debauched 
surroundings, memories of Desmoulins’s call for patriotic fervour lingered. In a spectacularly 
misjudged address, delivered just fifteen days after the installation of the Tribunat, Honoré 
Duveyrier sought to assuage concerns that the new chamber had been intentionally planted 
amidst a “theatre of vice” by invoking “the generous Camille.” By reminding his fellow 
deputies that it was upon “this spot” that “youthful liberty” had “despatched the old soldiers 
of the monarchy,” he warned the new regime that if it “dared talk of an idol of fifteen days,” 
then the representatives of the nation might “recall” how they had once “witnessed the 
destruction [vit abattre] of an idol of fifteen centuries.”738  
 The speech created a sensation throughout Paris.739 Napoleon was incensed: despite 
their subsequent declarations of fealty, the Tribunat – like so many of the deliberative bodies 
of the revolutionary decade – seemed to have misunderstood its purpose, which was to 
temper, not to inflame popular political energies.740 It was becoming difficult, Napoleon later 
told the Conseil d’État, “to work with an institution so productive of disorder.”741 Duveyrier’s 
remarks, however ill-judged, did not represent a serious threat to the legitimacy of the 
Consulate; rather, they exposed “the sheer visibility of the problem” of political legitimacy, a 
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problem that, as Christopher Prendergast has illustrated, was “distinctive” to the Napoleonic 
regime and a stimulant to so much of its artistic and propagandistic efforts.742 The new regime 
lacked historical ballast and as such it remained prey to the still-supple spontaneity of 
constituent power, rhetorically invoked here by Duveyrier as a force measured according to 
the relative historical destruction it could wreak. In post-Directorial France, the implicit, 
iniquitous configuration of historicity and illegitimacy suggested that, beyond irruptive force 
of constituent power, there could be no simultaneously legitimate and durable constituted 
authority. Impervious to ageing, “youthful liberty” operated outside the bounds of historical 
time, outliving constitutional government. Even if there were enough time to compress 
“fifteen centuries” of experience into “fifteen days,” this would require an exercise of 
historical violence liable to undermine, not bolster consular authority.743  
In the immediate term, the historicity of these new regimes was too shallow – and too 
time-poor – to be self-sustaining. The task that the Federalists and Brumairians had assigned 
themselves was therefore immense: they intended to create a constitutional edifice that would 
not only endure, but that might actually create duration. This would terminate the experience 
of the Confederation and Directory as a period of perpetual time-loss – the sense that there 
was never enough time in which to incubate political stability or verify the reliability of 
recent experiences. The constitutional regimes ratified in 1788 and 1799 were therefore 
conceived as time-creating agencies – as political timepieces, in effect – that might elongate 
the space of experience and stabilise history.744  
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pp.107-118; H. Trevor Colbourn, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the 
American Revolution (1965), (Indianapolis, IN., Liberty Fund, republished: 1998). 
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iii. Constitutional Duration 
 
The lifespan of the revolutionary constitution was limited. It could be drafted, altered, 
revised, overthrown, and reinstated as shifting political circumstances demanded. On 19 
Brumaire, in his concluding address before the soon-to-be-defunct Council of Five Hundred, 
Lucien Bonaparte described how the “incoherent organisation” of the Constitution of Year III 
had “necessitated a political tremor every year.”745 Constitutions reflected, but were 
apparently incapable of regulating, the temporal politics of the revolutions that had spawned 
them. As Cambacérès wryly observed, the Constitution of Year VIII was “the fourth attempt 
at the genre in the space of ten years.” In 1792, the constitution had “crumbled along with the 
throne that it had raised and that it was destined to support.” In 1793, a further constitution 
“was subsumed by revolutionary government,” suspended on account its incapacity to cope 
with the piling up of revolutionary crises. The third iteration “came to die at Saint-Cloud” – 
and was mourned by no one. “Few people believed in their duration,” Cambacérès concluded, 
which was scarcely surprising, since “[g]ood laws are the work of time.”746 
 For James Madison, political instability was inexplicable without this consideration 
of constitutional time. In his ‘Vices of the Political System of the United States’ (1787), he 
argued that the Confederation offered a failed constitutional framework because, far from 
securing legal and political duration, it relentlessly accumulated and discarded experience:  
 
Try the Codes of the several States by this test, and what a luxuriancy of legislation 
do they present. The short period of independency has filled as many pages as the 
century which preceded it. Every year, almost every session, adds a new volume.747 
 
The constitutional life of the Confederation was saturated with “precipitancy,” lamented 
Madison: “We daily see laws repealed or superseded, before any trial can have been made of 
their merits.” Indeed, laws were made and remade in state legislatures “even before a 
knowledge of them can have reached the remoter districts within which they were to operate.” 
                                                
745 Réimpression de l’Ancien Moniteur, depuis la réunion des États-Généraux jusqu’au Consulat (1789-1799) (32 
vols., Paris, Rue St-Germain, 1843) XXIX, p.896: “Cette organisation incohérente nécessite chaque année une 
secousse politique, et ce n’est pas pour avoir tous les ans des secousses que les peuple se donnent des 
constitutions.” Emphasis added. 
746 Cambacérès, Mémoires, I, pp.448-9: “C’était la [sic] quatrième essai de ce genre dans l’espace de dix ans. La 
constitution de 1792 coula le 10 août avec le trône qu’elle avait relevé et qu’elle était destinée à soutenir. Celle de 
1793 fut engloutie dans le gouvernement révolutionnaire. La troisième venait d’expirer à Saint-Cloud. […] Peu de 
personnes avaient cru à leur durée. Les bonnes lois sont l’ouvrage du temps…” On the prevalence of 
“constitutionalism” in popular and insurrectionary discourse, see: Peter McPhee, ‘A Social Revolution? 
Rethinking Popular Insurrection in 1789,’ in David Andress, ed., Oxford Handbook of the French Revolution 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.164-79. 
747 James Madison, ‘Vice of the Political System of the United States; April, 1787,’ in Ralph Ketcham, ed., 
Selected Writings of James Madison (Indianapolis, ID., Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), pp.35-41, here: p.39; 
see, also: Stephen L. Elkin, Reconstructing the Commercial Republic: Constitutional Design after Madison 
(Chicago, IL., University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp.74-109. 
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The pace of political change facilitated by the state constitutions, and by extension the 
Articles of Confederation, seemed to move at a higher tempo than the means by which the 
information relative to that political change could be disseminated or comprehended. “This 
may be the effect,” Madison opined, “of the situation in which the revolution has placed 
us.”748  
The absence of constitutional duration had begun to visibly stretch the tensile strength 
of the Union. If a constitution could be devised that created its own time – that facilitated 
deliberation, vitiated democratic passions, and augmented the interval separating popular 
impulse and political action – then the steady accumulation of experience might transpire, and 
the structure of history stabilised. Greg Weiner has convincingly argued that it was James 
Madison, the diminutive Virginian lawyer, who conceived of the Constitution as a time-
creating artefact. For Madison, the document was to function as a metronome, “setting the 
proper tempo for republican politics.”749 The pace of political life, which the Revolution had 
transformed into an accelerando, would be regularised through a variety of constitutional 
mechanisms. This amounted to a “temporal republicanism,” claims Weiner, in which the 
natural power of time – implicitly conceived here as duration – was deployed to defuse the 
passion of the masses that, according to historical and classical precedent, had always 
decimated republics. The Constitution, at least as Madison envisaged it, would thus decelerate 
the speed with which impassioned majorities were formed, decompressing the period 
separating deliberation and action by institutionalising intervals in the political life of the 
Republic. The formation of stable, “reasonable” majorities was impossible within an 
abbreviating schema of political temporality. “If time be allowed for the discussion of 
differences,” observed Priestley, “so great a majority will form one opinion,” that “reason” 
would eventually interceded to “extinguish” political dispute.750 The Constitution itself would 
become the guarantor of constitutional continuity.  
The institutional devices of the Constitution would manufacture spaces of political 
experience. In Federalist No.63, Madison observed how the creation of a Senate might stretch 
                                                
748 Madison, ibid, p.39; During the final deliberations of the Five Hundred on 19 Brumaire, Cabanis would draw 
similar conclusions regarding the deceased Directory: “Do the French people live at present in a real republic? Do 
they enjoy real liberty? Do they taste the happiness that they both assure? No! The people are not free or happy 
when thousands of laws, produced by the disorder of events, constantly suspends the axe above their heads…” 
There could be no exercise of liberty, Cabanis concluded, “when the laws and the government themselves are in a 
state of continual flux.” This merely “feeds and anxiety and alarm in every imagination”: L’Ancien Moniteur 52 
(22 brumaire an VIII), (12 November 1800), p.897: “Le peuple français a-t-il dans l’état présent une véritable 
république? jouit-il d’une liberté réelle? goûte-il enfin le bonheur que l’une et l’autre doivent assurer? Non! Le 
peuple n’est pas libre et heureux là où des milliers de lois, produites par le désordre des événements, tiennent la 
hache toujours suspendue sut toutes les têtes…” “où les lois et le gouvernement lui-même sont dans un état 
continuel d’instabilité qui ne présente nulle garantie solide aux citoyens, et nourrit l’inquiétude et les alarmes dans 
toutes les imaginations.” 
749 Greg Weiner, Madison’s Metronome: The constitution, majority rule, and the tempo of American politics 
(Lawrence, KS., University Press of Kansas, 2012), p.4. 
750 Joseph Priestley, Letters to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke: Occasioned by His Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (London, J. Johnson, 1791), pp.146-7. 
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those “particular moments in public affairs, when the people, stimulated by some irregular 
passions” may call “for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to 
lament.” In such “critical moments,” the interference of a “salutary,” “temperate” and 
“respectable body of citizens,” might “suspend the blow mediated by the people against 
themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority of the public mind.” This 
institutional device would therefore inject time into the Republic, guaranteeing the future 
sustainability of liberty by punctuating the blurry concatenation of “circumstances” and 
“temporary errors.”751 Government would be drained of its hypersensitivity to the immediate 
authority of revolutionary constituent power.752 It would likewise contravene classical 
example, since, as Madison opined, had Athens possessed such an institution “[p]opular 
liberty might have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same citizens the 
hemlock on one day and statues on the next.”753 A properly constituted Senate would thus 
provide one mechanism for stabilising “the perpetual vibrations” that blasted out from 
classical precedent.754 
Under the Articles, these defects had been reinforced by the electoral rhythms of the 
several states. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, for example, where representatives were 
elected on a bi-annual basis, the political body was so “changeable” that it was often 
“warped” by “momentary interest.”755 The future “reputation and prosperity of the 
community,” Madison insisted, could only be safeguarded by an assembly “durably invested 
with public trust,” and not by a transitory body confronted with the daily changeability of the 
“popular passions.” The regularity of elections institutionalised the unrelenting pace of 
political change, but even these sometimes seemed too infrequent. During the pre-Convention 
period, the legislatures of the states were often disrupted by discontented crowds of 
                                                
751 On the temporality of the construction of the Federalist Papers themselves, see: Cindy Weinstein, Time, Tense, 
and American Literature: When is Now? (Cambridge, CUP, 2015), pp.36-7. 
752 Andreas Kalyvas, ‘Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power,’ Constellations 12 (2, 2005), 
pp.223-44; Jason Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Post-revolutionary America (Durham, NC., 
Duke University Press, 2010), pp.67-100. 
753 James Madison, ‘Federalist No.63,’ in Terence Ball, ed., The Federalist, with Letters of Brutus (Cambridge, 
CUP, 2003), pp.305-12; Weiner, Madison’s Metronome, p.48-51; Martin Diamond, ‘Democracy and The 
Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers’ Intent,’ American Political Science Review 53 (1, 1959), pp.52-68, 
esp.: pp.65-66. 
754 Walter Benjamin identified the revolutionary fixation with classical history when he portrayed Robespierre’s 
vision of historical time as “a past charged with now-time, a past which he blasted out of the continuum of 
history.” As Andrew Jainchill has observed of the Thermidoreans, and as Madison himself noted of the 
Confederation era, new constitutions were to be devised in order to neutralize the “now-time” of classical 
precedent that ceaselessly exploded open historical continuities: see Walter Benjamin, ‘On the concept of History,’ 
in Howard Eiland, Michael W. Jennings, eds., Selected Writings (trans. Edmund Jephcott et al.), (4 vols., 
Cambridge, MA., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), IV, pp.389-400, here: p.395. 
755 On the justifications for the use of annual elections in the Rhode Island legislature: David Sherman Lovejoy, 
Rhode Island Politics and the American Revolution, 1760-1776 (Providence, RI., Brown University Press, 1958), 
pp.21-22. 
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petitioners – some of them angry mobs – demanding that deputies pass laws favourable to 
their cause instantly.756 
Mid-way through the Convention, the delegates received a timely reminder of this 
defect. On 14 July 1787, residents of the rural towns surrounding Philadelphia congregated in 
the state capital for market day. When traders and bank tellers began declining paper money 
as an acceptable form of payment, public order very nearly collapsed. The precipitant, 
observed the Pennsylvania Herald, was the “sudden” worthlessness of paper money. “Many 
causes have been assigned” for “the panic, which prevailed on Saturday last,” but accounting 
for such a “sudden event” beyond the fickle stability of paper currency seemed to evade all 
“rational investigation.” Manipulating a depreciating currency was an easy task for 
“hucksters,” who derived “a livelihood from the exchange between the current mediums,” and 
who, “without any regard to the relative value” of that exchange, “keep it in constant 
fluctuation, and, from day to day, pronounce upon the rate at which paper-money shall be 
taken for specie.” The daily alteration in the potential value of paper currencies, and the sense 
of constant uncertainty this created, almost provoked rioting outside the very building in 
which the Convention was meeting. Three days later, on 18 July, Madison wrote a panicked 
letter to Jefferson. When the paper money – a specious, valueless, “imaginary money” – 
“ceased to circulate very suddenly a few days ago,” the immediate result was “stagnation,” 
followed by the potential for violence. It was only the “timely interposition of some 
influential characters,” and “their willingness to receive” paper as payment once more, that 
“prevented a riot” and “stifled the popular rage.” Political order could only resume, in fact, 
when the people “got the paper into circulation again.” This was no longer a matter of 
deferring debt repayments; the “sudden stagnation” of a viable circulating medium augured 
the disintegration of public order.757  
For Jefferson, who observed the proceedings of the Convention from his ministerial 
post in Paris, erecting institutions capable of creating political duration was anathema. In one 
of his missives to Madison, Jefferson outlined his concept of generational sovereignty.758 
                                                
756 On mob participation during the Revolutionary, Confederation and post-Convention periods, see: Gordon S. 
Wood, ‘A Note on Mobs in the American Revolution,’ The William and Mary Quarterly 23 (4, 1966), pp.635-42; 
Pauline Maier, ‘Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America,’ The William and Mary 
Quarterly 27 (3, 1970), pp.3-35; Wayne E. Lee, Crowds and Soldiers in Revolutionary North Carolina: The 
Culture of Violence in Riot and War (Gainesville, FL., University Press of Florida, 2001); Jeffrey S. Selinger, 
Embracing Dissent: Political Violence and Party Development in the United States (Philadelphia, PA., University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), pp.28-53; on female participation in violent culture, see: Susan Branson, Simon P. 
Newman, ‘American Women and the French Revolution: Gender and Partisan Festive Culture in the Early 
Republic,’ in William Pencak, Matthew Dennis, Simon P. Newman, eds., Riot and Revelry in Early America 
(Philadelphia, PA., University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), pp.229-54. 
757 These events, including Madison’s letter to Jefferson, are carefully reconstructed in Weiner, Madison’s 
Metronome, pp.65-6; on the fiscal and monetary reforms debated at the Convention, see: Farley Grubb, ‘The US 
Constitution and Monetary Powers: An Analysis of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and the Constitutional 
Transformation of the US Monetary System,’ Financial History Review 13 (1, 2006), pp.43-71. 
758 “Whether one generation of men has a right to bind another,” Jefferson observed to Madison in September 
1789, was “among the fundamental principles of every government.” The belief that the earth belonged “in 
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With the passage of every generation, “every constitution and every law” had necessarily to 
be “extinguished,” for if a constitution were to be “enforced longer,” this would be “an act of 
force, and not of right.” Under governments “wherein the will of every one has a just 
influence,” as was the case in the Confederation, the “mass of mankind…enjoys a precious 
degree of liberty & happiness.” And whilst it “has it’s evils too,” the “principal of which is 
the turbulence to which it is subject,” it nonetheless “nourishes” and “prevents the degeneracy 
of government.” Establishing a government premised upon an enduring framework of 
constitutional law was therefore illegitimate since it prevented the “ruptures” common to 
participatory democracy. It was for this reason, Jefferson insisted, that “a little rebellion now 
and then is a good thing,” like a thunderstorm that pierces the oppressive atmosphere.759 Here 
again, suffusing revolutionary discourse, was the belief that the expression and experience of 
liberty could only be realised and sustained within an ongoing present, unhampered by the 
hereditary claims of the past, and protected from degeneration, or simply alteration, in the 
future.  
The opponents of the Constitution could therefore characterise this attempt to govern 
transhistorical time as a potential infringement of liberty. In his address ‘To the Free Citizens 
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,’ the anti-federalist pamphleteer, John DeWitt, asked 
whether the Constitution was to establish “a government for a moment, a day, or a year?” “By 
no means,” he responded, “but for all ages!” It was “not TEMPORARY, but in its nature, 
PERPETUAL. It is not designed that you shall be annually called, either to revise, correct or 
renew it; but, that your posterity shall grow up under, and be governed by it, as well as 
ourselves.” By seeking to regulate the future “course of human events,” whilst simultaneously 
rendering any further future intervention unnecessary, the delegates to the Convention were 
attempting to draw the ruptural temporality of the Revolution to an end, and thus end the 
Revolution entirely. In this sense, the temporality adumbrated by the Constitution was in 
direct conflict with the temporality of the Declaration of Independence.760 A constitution 
designed for “future generations,” and not merely for “the peculiar circumstances of the 
                                                
usufruct to the living,” that the dead possessed “neither powers nor rights over it,” and that generations to come 
could not be bound by the laws of today, sequestered the present from both past and future, perpetuating the 
revolutionary experience of unending immediacy. “No society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a 
perpetual law,” since the present “generation” could only authorise “appropriations and establishments for their 
own time, but no longer”: Jefferson to James Madison (6 September, 1789), in Charles F. Hobson, Robert A. 
Rutland, eds., The Papers of James Madison, Congressional Series (17 vols., Charlottesville, VA., University of 
Virginia Press, 1979), XII, pp.382-88; on the concept of generational sovereignty, see: Spahn, Jefferson, Time and 
History, pp.2, 3, 6, 171-76, 182; Herbert Sloan, ‘“The Earth Belongs in Usufruct to the Living,’” in Peter S. Onuf, 
ed., Jeffersonian Legacies (Charlottesville, VA., University of Virginia Press, 1993), pp.281-315. 
759 Jefferson to Madison (30 January 1787), in Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (40 vols., 
Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 1955), XI, pp.92-97. 
760 Mikael Spång, Constituent Power and Constitutional Order: Above, Within and Beside the Constitution 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp.12-44; David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp.205-242; on Jefferson and constituent power, see: Frank, Constituent Moments, 
pp.174-75. 
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moment,” stretched the potential constituent power of the people across such an expanse of 
time as to render it insensible. It was “to bind you hereafter,” warned Chase, since the 
political institutions it contained would prevent active citizens from altering or abolishing a 
government at any moment.761 By stabilising the “turbulence” that Jefferson believed was 
central to the protection of liberty, it abrogated the right – enshrined in the Declaration and 
essential to the Revolution – that enabled citizens to “alter or abolish” a state “whenever any 
Form of Government becomes destructive” to “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” In 
other words, it neutralised the potential “precipitancy” of popular political participation by 
reintegrating the present “moment” into a longer chain of historical time. The Constitution 
saluted the “when” of the Declaration, whilst neutralising its “whenever.”762  
The Constitution was designed to restabilise historical time by preventing the 
“precipitancy” of present political whims from perpetually reforming the political prospects 
of the future. It was for this reason that Madison would later take issue with Jefferson’s desire 
to regularise constitutional review on the grounds that it would “in great measure deprive 
government of that veneration, which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps 
the wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability.”763 The 
“generational” modality of political time devised by Jefferson would simply institutionalise 
rupture, Madison claimed, inhibiting the accumulation of historical experience, and 
preventing the government from producing – and thereby governing – its own time.  
 
 
iv. Reordering historical time 
 
It was in order to break the awesome power of contingency that Hamilton, in his Federalist 
No.34, called upon the constitutional ratifying conventions to “look forward to remote 
futurity.” It was foolish “to confine our view to the present period,” he pleaded: “There ought 
to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen.” Thus the 
Constitution, which was not “framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a 
combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried 
course of human affairs,” offered the real possibility of reordering historical time.764 As a 
                                                
761 Chase, ‘Letter of Caution,’ p.328. 
762 On the temporal semantics of the Constitution, the Declaration and the Federalist Papers, see: Nicholas 
Rombes, ‘Speculative Discourse: Uses of the Future in the Declaration, The Federalist Papers, Jefferson and 
Paine,’ in Arthur Robert Lee, W. M. Verhoeven, eds., Making America, Making American Literature: Franklin to 
Cooper (Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1996), pp.77-92; Elizabeth M. Renker, ‘“Declaration-Men” and the Rhetoric of 
Self-Presentation,’ Early American Literature 24 (2, 1989), pp.120-34. 
763 Jefferson wanted to overhaul the Constitution every 19-years, see: Jefferson to Madison (6 September, 1789), 
in Hobson, Rutland, eds., The Papers of James Madison, XII, pp.382-88; in a letter to Samuel Kercheval in 1816, 
Jefferson reiterated his demand for constitutional review, in J. Jefferson Looney, ed., The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson, Retirement Series (10 vols., Princeton, NJ., Princeton University Press, 2013), X, pp.222-28. 
764 Hamilton, ‘Federalist No.34,’ in Ball, ed., The Federalist, p.153. 
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political document, an artefact of power imprinted with the “tried course” of past “affairs,” 
but built to withstand the “exigencies” of forthcoming “ages,” it was time-proof.765 
The proclamation issued by the Council of Five Hundred on 19 Brumaire (10 
November) made similar claims for the new Consular regime. Whilst the “constitutional 
regime” of the Directory “was only a succession of revolutions,” which had left “the most 
sacred rights” of liberty and equality “exposed to all the caprices of factions and events,” 
henceforth liberty would find “refuge in the arms of a constitution which promises it some 
repose.”766 Creating this “repose,” of course, could not be a present-oriented undertaking: the 
Directory and the Confederation had been reactive regimes, confronted by an accelerated 
stream of historical time in which there could be no preparation for, or pre-emption of, the 
unforeseen. As James Wilson instructed his fellow Convention delegates: “we are providing a 
Constitution for future generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the 
moment.” Merely regulating “existing exigencies,” as Hamilton characterised the 
Confederation, was to fundamentally misdirect constitutional energy, since this would turn 
legislative and executive activity into an always-already too-late concoction of out-of-date 
solutions.767 The purpose of civil governance was to regulate “the probable exigencies” to 
come, which ultimately meant making the unforeseeable foreseeable.  
Whilst the constitution ratification process was subject to criticism, the plebiscite on 
the Constitution of Year VIII, undertaken in December 1799, was farcically undemocratic.768  
The figures were undeniably fiddled by Lucien – but this did not render the impression 
created by the vote illegitimate. Never mind the staggering abstention rates; for the tribunes 
Jean-Baptiste de Champagny and Jacques-André Émery, it was the social make-up of those 
who had supported the new regime that mattered most.769 According to their calculations, the 
most enthusiastic approval for the Consulate had come from “that concerned class of fathers 
[classe intéressante de pères] who, living in the future even more than in the present, wanted 
a government to protect the present and guarantee the future.”770 The purpose of the plebiscite 
– and the retroactive purpose of the coup – was the stabilisation of history. Little more than a 
                                                
765 On Hamilton’s keen appreciation of “duration” as a central function of the new Constitution, see: Harvey 
Flaumenhaft, The Effective Republic: Administration and Constitution in the Thought of Alexander Hamilton 
(Durham, NC., Duke University Press, 1992), pp.133-57. 
766 “Frenchmen! Once more, the Republic has just escaped the violence of rebels,” the proclamation began, 
invoking a common frustration with contingent time: ‘Proclamation of the Council of Five Hundred, 19 Brumaire 
VIII (10 November 1799),’ in John Stewart Hall, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (New York, 
NY., Macmillan, 1951), pp.765-67, here: p.766. 
767 Alexander Hamilton, ‘Federalist No.34,’ in Ball, ed., The Federalist, p.153. 
768 The discovery of electoral fraud was made by Claude Langlois, ‘Le Plébiscite de l’an VIII ou le coup d’État du 
18 pluviôse an VIII,’ Annales historiques de la Révolution française 207 (1972), pp.43-65.  
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A Political Life (Cambridge, MA., Harvard University Press, 2004), p.485. 
770 M. J. Mavidal, M. E. Laurent, eds., Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860, Recueil complet des débats 
législatifs & politiques des chambres françaises. Second series (127 vols., Paris, P. Dupont, 1862-1913), I, pp.177-
180: “cette classe intéressante de pères de famille qui, vivant dans l’avenir plus encore que dans le présent, 
voulaient un gouvernement conservateur du présent et garant de l’avenir.” 
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year after Brumaire, however, and the “guarantee” of future order was once again in 
unexpected doubt. On 3 Nivôse Year IX, Christmas Eve, 1800, as the First Consul was 
journeying to the opera, his carriage was struck by an incendiary device, which killed several 
bystanders and sent instant alarm through the city.771 Despite clear evidence linking royalist 
agitators to the so-called machine infernale, Napoleon – in a pique of paranoia – chose 
instead to locate the plot within a narrative of revolutionary violence.772 The attempt upon 
both his life and the new regime was the work of “septembriseurs,” he insisted, who had been 
“in permanent conspiracy, in open rebellion,” against “each succeeding government.”773 This 
prototype terrorist attack was comprehensible as a revolutionary event. Its unforeseen quality 
– “a crime without any historical example,” claimed Napoleon – was clearly designed to once 
again explode open the question of legitimate authority, an extra-constitutional bid to return 
the Republic to the churning sense of historical ‘happening’ that had done for the Directory. 
The perpetrators, as one justice of the peace from l’Aude observed, were attempting to “bring 
back the days of mourning and desolation,” to “plunge us back into the horrors of anarchy.”774 
The new regime would seek to repress further rupture in political authority by reintegrating 
the past, present and future of the Republic. Days after the assassination attempt, Joseph 
Fouché, the minister of police, outlined the purpose of public safety and surveillance. On a 
sheet of government paper – upon which the original heading ‘Au Directoire Exécutif’ is 
scratched over with the words, ‘Rapport aux Consuls,’ as though to underline the period as a 
time of ongoing regime transfer – he declared: 
 
Today, it is not only about punishing the past, but guaranteeing all social order for the 
present and for the future. It is about saving the state and transmitting the Republic 
across the generations to come – reassured, purified, honoured.775 
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By finally “terminating” the “atrocious war” raging between various factions, the past of the 
Revolution could be reconciled with its present and reintegrated into the future. The 
Consulate would reorder the chain of historical time and re-impose continuity by bringing the 
past, present and future of the state back into a structural relationship, “transmitting the 
Republic across the generations to come.”776  
A desire for “generational” – or transhistorical – interconnection was a common 
theme of the Convention. During a debate on the potential strength of the nascent western 
states, and the possibility that they might one day overpower the founding states, Roger 
Sherman of Connecticut reminded his fellow delegates that, “We are providing for our 
posterity, for our children & our grand Children, who would be as likely to be citizens of new 
Western States, as of the old States.”777 The system and structure of federal government 
would glance deep into “futurity,” an ambition that understandably unnerved many anti-
Federalists who, adhering to a nascent form of “generational sovereignty,” reeled at the 
prospect that the present might dictate the terms of the future. Michael Lienesch, paraphrasing 
Pocock, points to the Convention as a moment when American revolutionaries “took up the 
unprecedented task of transcending time,” reaching “beyond precedent to create a present-
oriented politics.”778 It is more likely that the framers of the Constitution, like the perpetrators 
of Brumaire, embraced a future-oriented politics, basing their deliberations on a fixation with 
the unnerving openness of near- to long-term history, as well as a general suspicion of the 
reliability and shelf-life of recent historical experience. 
 
* 
 
The French Revolution came to a formal end at approximately 3am on the morning of 19 
Brumaire.779 In his final address to the Council of Five Hundred – which, during its twilight 
session, had been reduced to a rump quorum of thirty – Lucien began narrating the passage of 
events in an unusual tense, the present-historic, almost as though the histoire – quite literally, 
the story – of the Revolution were concluding before his eyes. “Representatives of the people, 
French liberty was born in the Jeu de Paume at Versailles. Since then…it had laboured along 
as far as you, prey by turns to thoughtlessness, weakness, and the convulsive disorders of 
                                                
776 In some sense, this represents a temporalised version of what Michael Broers has termed amalgame, the 
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American history, p.119. 
779 As the declaration of the plebiscite results, delivered on 15 December 1799, announced: “Citizens! The 
Revolution has remained faithful to the principles from which it sprang. It is now at an end”: p.11. 
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infancy.” The Revolution could be declared concluded because, as Lucien observed, “[a]ll the 
convulsions of liberty have come to an end today.” Liberty had been guaranteed by Brumaire 
– and the future would attest to the fact: “Listen to posterity’s cry: if liberty was born in a 
tennis court at Versailles, it was consolidated in the Orangerie at Saint-Cloud.”780 The 
Revolution was over. 
The Brumairians, like the Federalists, traded in a rhetorical vocabulary freighted with 
temporality because, in an attempt to justify their undertakings, they sought to make the 
establishment and verification of political legitimacy coterminous with the ending of the 
temporal chaos that marred the Directory and Confederation. However, the theoretical 
constitutional capacity of these new regimes to create their own time – to create “more Time” 
– was untried in practice. The task of transforming a rhetorical legitimacy derived from 
political urgency, which had justified the interventions at Philadelphia and St Cloud, into a 
practical legitimacy premised upon the experience of constitutional durability – the duration 
in which political experience could be safely incubated – was incomplete.781 Quelling the 
pulsations of politics would fall to the post-revolutionary regimes of George Washington and 
Napoleon Bonaparte.  
  
                                                
780 Gueniffey, Bonaparte, p.572. 
781 For the post-Convention debates on the legitimacy of the new Constitution, with particular reference to 
temporal consciousness, see: Lienesch, New Order of the Ages, pp.159-83. 
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5: The Washington Administration, 1789-1796 the Napoleonic Empire, 1800-1815, and 
the Legitimacy of Temporal Manipulation 
 
Under the Articles of Confederation and the Directory, the practice of power became 
dependent upon “the capacity to act in response to contingency.” Their institutional structures 
and political cultures, meanwhile, entailed “a continuous capacity for action rather than a 
continuous transmission of legitimacy.”782 What the Napoleonic regime and Washington 
administration therefore attempted to do was to extricate America and France from an 
historically conditioned existence, from an experience of history that affected daily, even 
hourly preoccupations. These regimes nevertheless remained precariously established, having 
rejected the ephemerality of revolutionary legitimacy, but as yet incapable of pointing to a 
durable historicity. Through a variety of performative and rhetorical strategies, Washington 
and Napoleon created a buffer time – meantime – that, by providing a form of artificial 
duration, would enable recent institutional innovations to endure. Howsoever adept their 
capacity for duration-creation, the institutions of the Constitution or Conseil d’État, for 
example, would require an incubation period.   
This task was undermined by the territorial entities that Washington and Napoleon 
governed, which were not merely spatially unstable, expanding or contracting according to 
the vicissitudes of migration or warfare – they were also temporally unstable. These empires 
– the Napoleonic and the American “Empire of Liberty” – were a concoction of divergent, 
space-specific historicities, where the texture and tempo of history – its lived experience – 
varied, unbound by any notion of absolute temporal uniformity.783 In other words, they were 
subdivided not by interstitial time zones, but by incoherent, overlapping zones of time. This 
heterotemporality produced an uneven – and often ungovernable – distribution of political 
interest and sentiments, which contributed towards a series of crises, from the Pennsylvanian 
Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 to the perilous administration of the satellite kingdoms 
established by Napoleon after the victory of Austerlitz in 1805. The incompatible dynamics of 
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these zones of time rendered the complexion of legitimacy kaleidoscopic.784 Different spaces 
were capable of displaying or carrying different dynamics or perceptions of time: historical 
time at the “periphery” – which, in this context, might mean the western frontier, for example, 
or the rural reaches of the Italian peninsula – could move slower or faster; it could seem 
somehow freighted with an overwhelming weight or accelerate under the slightest impulse. In 
America, these zones of time would provide the intellectual underlay of the Louisiana 
Purchase and the Jeffersonian vision of spatial aggrandisement, in turn dictating the entire 
discursive framework of ante-bellum historical time in the United States.785 The expanding 
scope of these Empires stretched their circulation speeds: communication, information, 
transportation, migration – everything transpired at an unpredictable tempo, investing daily 
life with a randomness, a sense of haphazardness. The application of political power had to 
confront the non-simultaneity, the incommensurability of political dangers. The overarching 
historicities of these regimes – still dependent, as Washington observed during his Farewell 
Address of 1796, upon “yet recent institutions” – continued to be threatened, even as they 
“matured” in meantime, by the prevalence of chance. 
 
I. Haphazard Empires 
 
In January 1787, the Scottish clergyman Charles Nisbet portrayed America as a Republic 
saturated by chance. Nisbet, who was appointed as the first Principal of Dickinson College in 
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, arrived during the sweltering midsummer heat of 1785, whereupon his 
children immediately contracted a fever, a consequence of the proximity of the family home 
to a swamp. Life in the nascent United States, Nisbet observed, was governed by an 
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unpredictable randomness – by haphazardness.786 On 10 January, he wrote to a friend back in 
Scotland: 
 
As this new world is unfortunately composed…of discordant atoms, jumbled together 
by chance, and tossed by unconstancy in an immense vacuum, it greatly wants a 
principle of attraction and cohesion. Such may come in time, but it has not yet taken 
place. 
 
What seemed to characterise “the fate of this country,” Nisbet concluded, was “uncertainty.” 
Nothing could be taken for granted since nothing seemed to endure for any length of time. 
The variables of life fizzed and collided, constantly producing new and unforeseen situations, 
which, no sooner had they formed, seemed to dissolve once more into the “immense 
vacuum.” A sense of certainty might “come in time,” but the prevailing sense of uncertainty 
prevented any rational prediction of the intervening duration. “Some people are beginning to 
think, and I hope better times are approaching. […] But things must go on slowly.”787  
Ensuring the principles of “attraction and cohesion” across such a vast, unwieldy and 
ever-shifting territory was problematic. The first major turnpike road, which connected 
Philadelphia to Lancaster, was not completed until 1795, and America possessed fewer than 
one hundred miles of canals before the early nineteenth century.788 Such a rudimentary 
infrastructure network did not merely inhibit commercial activity, however; it drastically 
delayed the circulation of information.789 “Yours, of the 9th of August,” Nisbet complained to 
his correspondent, “reached Philadelphia on the 22d of November, but did not reach me for 
three weeks afterwards, as we have no post yet established on this road.” The geographic 
scope and climatological extremes – “communication is difficult this hard winter” – of the 
new Republic further exacerbated the dissemination of news: “I imagine that the want of 
genius among our news-writers, and the barrenness of events in our papers, are likewise 
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partial causes of that stagnation of the human faculties which prevails in this country; as well 
as the want of cross posts, and readiness of communication.”790  
As an emigrant to the fledgling United States Nisbet considered himself “as engaged, 
with others, in the inglorious but useful labour of digging under ground, and laying the 
foundation of a building that may rise and make some figure in another age.”791 The task of 
establishing the Republic is here conceived as a process in time – a “useful labour” – whose 
duration, which “must go on slowly,” ties the present in steady diachronic lockstep to the 
future – “another age” – for which it naturally provides the “foundation.” The gradualism and 
linearity of this transhistoricity stabilised – and thereby legitimised – human endeavours, such 
as the exercise of political power, in the present because it drained the future of its unforeseen 
properties, and thus lessened the possibility of sudden, irruptive change.  
 A sense of transhistorical stability was undermined by the appearance of chance, 
which, in temporal terms, may be conceived as “a pure category of the present.” As Koselleck 
observes, chance “cannot be derived from a horizon of future expectation, except as its 
sudden manifestation; neither is it possible to experience it as the outcome of past causes: for 
if this were possible, then it would no longer be chance.” Suited solely to “the startling, the 
new, the unforeseen,” a regime of chance imbued the present with the sort of haphazardness 
that Nisbet considered characteristic of the early American Republic. As an essentially 
ahistorical category, impervious to past precedent and antithetical to future prediction, chance 
indicated “an inadequate consistency of given conditions,” and “an incommensurability in 
their results.”792 It frustrated decision-making processes, already upended by revolution. 
 Although the Convention of 1787 had provided America with a constitution, a 
political “metronome” seemingly imbued with the capacities for regulating historical time, the 
republic continued to be confronted by “unconstancy,” “uncertainty,” and – above all – by 
“chance.”793 Despite the desire – articulated on a micro-scale in Nisbet’s letter – of “creating 
its own time,” the United States could never gain enough time in which to fulfil this 
imperative. The pace of change was incessant. “It is a country entirely in flux,” observed the 
duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt during his thirty-three month journey, undertaken 
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between 1795 and 1797, throughout the new nation: “that which is true today regarding its 
population, its establishments, its prices, its commerce, was not so six months ago, and will 
not be so six months from now.” Indeed, the information that he had collected “in the present 
period” would very soon be rendered into little more than “sites of memory.”794 The 
consequences of this economic and demographic change, of course, were entirely aleatory. 
The expansion of this “infant empire,” observed Washington, also stretched the predictive 
capacities of the newly constituted federal government. If, as he “candidly” confessed to 
George Plater, he could “foresee no evil greater than disunion,” then the multidirectional 
movement and unregulated rhythm of territorial expansion continually enrolled new and 
unfamiliar hazards into the core of the Union. Washington looked out upon the western 
frontier as a kaleidoscope of ever-shifting dangers. With “the flanks and rear of the united 
territory” possessed “by other powers, and formidable ones,” the geopolitical sympathies and 
interests of the western settlers remained in a state of constant doubt. “For what ties let me 
ask, should we have upon those people,” he wrote in his diary, “if Spaniards on their right, or 
Great Britain on their left, instead of throwing stumbling blocks in their way as they now do, 
should invite their trade and seek alliances with them?” Under these conditions, the western 
expansion of the “rising” empire was directly proportional to the accumulation of risk. The 
dimension of chance inherent in such territorial fluctuation was the possibility that, at any 
moment, the Union might fracture at its fringes. “The western settlers stand as it were on a 
pivet – the touch of a feather would almost incline them any way.”795 Even the most 
innocuous occurrence could tip the “pivet” and, at an instant, plunge the Republic into crisis. 
It was the constant incalculability of the hazards radiating from the frontier, encouraged by 
“the spirit of adventure” and the instability of political loyalties, which, as Henry Knox 
observed in 1787, made “the dangers of usurpation on a large scale extremely imminent.”796 
The primitive communication and transportation routes of the empire could not keep 
pace with its spatial enlargement. In 1789, Washington presided over a nation that barely 
possessed a road network; mail shots, including government decrees, were often delayed or 
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simply lost altogether; a bureaucracy barely existed.797 It was only after the passage of the 
Post Office Act in 1792, for example, that Congress properly designed national postal 
routes.798 If the purpose of “wisdom & patriotism,” as Washington had observed shortly 
before the Constitutional Convention, was “[t]o anticipate & prevent disasterous 
contingencies,” then the absence of duration in any part of American life made political 
predictions impossible, leaving the orderly governance prey to precisely the sort of 
unforeseen hazards that the Convention was meant to obviate.799 In order to ensure the 
territorial integrity of the existing Union, instability at the periphery would need to be 
eliminated; the completion of commercial routes, such as canals, would tip the “pivet” 
towards the seaboard states, binding the “interests” of the settler communities to the centre, 
and thereby lessening the likelihood that the “touch of a feather” would precipitate sudden 
disintegration.800  
The western frontier was thus a conduit for rapid change – but it was not conducive 
of unilinear historical progress.801 As Talleyrand and Crèvecœur had observed, the new 
territories contributed to the perception of temporal acceleration whilst simultaneously 
conveying the appearance of historical retrogression: vast tracts of untrammelled land 
suddenly began churning under the weight of wagon trains; and yet the rusticity and rurality 
of the proliferating settlements suggested that time was processing in reverse. Spatial 
expansion was deranging the uniform temporality of the Republic, producing pockets of 
diverse, often mutually exclusive “interests.” For Washington, the continued unchecked pace 
of territorial growth contravened what would become the central contention of his Farewell 
Address of 1796: namely, that America should travel as a unity through time.802 
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Consequently, Washington advised against any further negotiation with Spain concerning 
navigational rights over the Mississippi River. It ought to be “no object with us,” he 
remarked: “On the contrary, until we have a little time allowed to open and make easy the 
ways between the Atlantic states and the western territory, the obstruction had better 
remain.”803 The distinct zones would first need to reach a degree of developmental 
homogeneity before the Union could withstand further territorial enlargement. The fluvial 
“obstruction” of the Mississippi inserted a natural de-abbreviation – “a little time” – into the 
progress of this enlargement, which might enable the political infrastructure of the federal 
government to catch up, to “make easy the ways” that connected the commercial and 
informational networks of the nation. 
 
≈ 
 
“No period of war has been so astonishing as the present,” declared the Morning Post in June 
1800, “at no time have we felt ourselves so unable to develop the views of the enemy, to 
reconcile their movements with common prudence and common sense.” Following the 
disastrous campaigns of the Directory, France mounted an unexpected turnaround; in May, as 
General Moreau advanced across the Rhine, repulsing an enormous Austrian army, Napoleon 
swept over the Alps, decimating the Austrians at Marengo.804 Such astounding military 
manoeuvres, the Post concluded, had simply “overset all our speculations.”  
In Europe, like in America, it was the conquest of territory that seemed to imbue life 
with such haphazardness. The nature of that conquest, however, differed from the settlement 
of undisturbed land: unlike the migration across the western frontier, warfare on a hitherto 
unimagined scale engulfed Europe.805 “No other human activity,” observed the Prussian 
military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, “is so continuously or universally bound up with 
chance.” And “through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part 
in war.”806 The cataclysmic scale and pace of Napoleonic warfare altered the status of 
knowledge itself, overturning the “operational logic” of political life and undermining the 
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predictive faculties of the early modern state in the process.807 It infected political calculation, 
as Clausewitz famously observed, since “chance makes everything more uncertain and 
interferes with the whole course of events.”808 Whereas Frederick II could confidently claim 
that “luck and chance” were merely “empty words” obscuring explicable occurrences as yet 
possessed of knowable causes, given the unlimited scope of Napoleonic warfare, there were 
now “so many concatenations of circumstances with fortuitous events” that it was unclear 
whether causes or consequences could ever be certifiable identified.809  
On the battlefields and inside the state councils of Europe, epistemic conditions 
degraded.810 War no longer entailed the limited possibilities of territorial reorganisation; it 
now risked the total decimation of states and a rupture in the historical identities that they 
sustained. As Friedrich von Gentz observed, Napoleon’s campaigns had thrust the newly 
created German Confederation into a vortex of randomly arising events, governed by the 
unpredictable variables of “military probabilities.” The monarchy of Franz I, already 
downgraded by the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, confronted a completely 
open, temporally unstable future.811 “The idea of peace, of any sort of peace, makes me 
shudder,” Gentz wrote in November, 1809; “but the idea of the final destruction of this 
monarchy – an event which could be realised in fewer than two months, and which would 
deprive us of the totality of the future, after which even a resurrection would become 
impossible, – this is what overwhelms me, wracks me, devastates me!”812 The advent of “final 
destruction” could be seen to happen at such an intensified speed because the geometric 
limitations of warfare had been overturned. Whereas eighteenth century armies could not 
outpace the movement of their operational base without also breaking their provision lines, 
during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, requisitioning practices were completely 
overhauled. Soldiers were instructed to forage for food, to liberate the army from the fixed 
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tempo of the supply wagon and to lighten baggage trains.813 Military manoeuvres were thus 
“de-naturalized” as military logistics were unbound from spatiality.814 
“Abandoning the quest for universals, for certainty, and the transcendental mapping 
of the permanent fixtures of the cognitive machinery within speculative philosophy,” writes 
Anders Engberg-Pedersen, military and political observers turned their attention “outward, to 
the temporary, the local, the unstable, the fluid.”815 Confronted with unfamiliar, unstable, 
uncontrollable webs of anxieties and expectations, the Napoleonic Wars represented a crisis 
of both tradition and innovation, which played out as an abbreviation in temporal perceptions 
– as the sensation characteristic to a state of emergency. History as a “form of static time 
capable of being experienced as tradition,” as a handbook of time-tested exemplars, though 
conclusively overturned in France, was now exported under arms to Europe.816 By 1800, 
historical meaning had been dissolved into a temporality of chance. 
 
 
II. Zones of Time 
 
Before the chronometric standardisation of time zones during the late nineteenth century, the 
American and French Empires stretched across several zones of time.817 Within these zones, 
the lived experience of time seemed to differ both qualitatively and historically, producing a 
spatiotemporal incoherence that could not be adequately stratified or standardised by 
chronometric measurement. The multiple textures of historical time undermined the temporal 
– and, ultimately, the political – unity of these regimes. Whilst the global grid of time zones 
would see the conclusive “emptying out” of temporality, the post-revolutionary regimes of 
America and France were forced to find political functionality across myriad temporal planes, 
each of which was saturated with historical specificities. Political disorder stemmed directly 
from temporal disorder, since neither the Napoleonic Empire nor the American “Empire of 
Liberty” were chronotopically contiguous – individuals and institutions at the centre and 
periphery imagined, experienced and discussed time in distinct and often mutually 
contradictory ways. If political “simultaneity” is, as Benedict Anderson observes, dependent 
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upon a type of “transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfilment, but by 
temporal coincidence,” and measured according to “clock and calendar,” then the empires of 
post-revolutionary America and France were non-simultaneous, or rather heterotemporal 
entities.818 As such, an assessment of the zones of time that composed these empires takes us 
into a pre-industrial, chronometrically nebulous time world – as yet untrodden by E.P. 
Thompson – where the imposition of political and social “discipline” could not yet rely on the 
ubiquity of a verifiable clocktime.819 Alternative temporal strategies were required. 
 
≈ 
 
The Napoleonic Empire was a patchwork of overlapping historical planes. As the Grande 
Armée fanned out across the continent, a medley of different territories were submerged 
beneath the French imperium.820 In 1806, the Grand Duchy of Berg, the Principality of 
Regensburg, the Kingdom of Saxony were all collapsed into the Confederation of the Rhine; 
Bavaria and Württemberg became client kingdoms of France; the Kingdom of Holland was 
created several months later. After the crushing victory at Austerlitz in December 1805, 
Napoleon held near total dominion over European space, free to remould it as he pleased. 
“Roll up that map,” William Pitt is supposed to have remarked: “it will not be wanted these 
ten years.”821 
In 1807, Jacques Claude Beugnot was appointed finance minister of the Kingdom of 
Westphalia, a vassal state contained within the Confederation and placed under the 
supervision of the puppet monarch, Jérôme Bonaparte.822 Charged with modernising its civic 
and economic structure, Beugnot was aghast by the backwardness he encountered. The 
historical accretions of feudalism remained so prevalent in the lands consolidated under 
Westphalia, he remarked, that “one could not find such examples in France without going 
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2013), pp.29-30. 
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back four or five centuries.”823 More than a decade of revolutionary upheaval had altered the 
French perception of the temporal dimensions of political change. “[I]n a revolution,” 
Beugnot wrote in his memoirs, recalling 10 August, 1792, “a month, a day is a century.”824 It 
was scarcely surprising, then, that when many of the French imperial prefects encountered the 
inhabitants and institutions absorbed by the Empire they should have commented upon their 
temporally and historically distant qualities.825 The “system of feudalism” in Croatia, 
observed one imperial prefect, “still exists there as it existed in France in the fifteenth 
century.”826 Despite their relative geographic proximity, the territorial acquisitions of the 
empire and the imperial centre itself seemed separated by centuries of time. Such descriptions 
were not burdened by chronometric accuracy: they instead displayed a more approximate 
criterion of time, which evoked the divergences in the lived experience and historical qualities 
of regional temporalities. The zones of time that chequered the Napoleonic Empire were, in 
fact, zones of historical time insofar as their divergent temporal dynamics and textures did 
not correspond to any meaningful divergences in clock-time.  
Consequently, the speed of potential reform – which included the abolition of 
serfdom and soccage, the introduction of trial by jury and the metric system – had necessarily 
to be tempered by the differing historicities of imperial localities.827 According to the sub-
prefect of the Westphalian province of Stendal, for example, the abolition of local forced 
labour responsibilities would proceed only gradually since the “majority only reacts 
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intuitively,” their appreciation of rational reform being conditioned by a peculiar sensation of 
historical time that suffused their immediate environment: “everywhere the matter is still too 
recent to have offered the opportunity to comprehend such notions.”828 Time moved more 
slowly. Feudalism in Westphalia, Beugnot admitted in a report to Jérôme, was “not the mild 
and almost extinct feudalism that existed in France in 1789,” but rather had a “hold on the 
social order, it is at its root.” The “reforms must be slow and measured,” he insisted: “this is 
one of those matters where time is needed for success.”829 This technocratic temporal logic 
frustrated the ambitions of the Napoleonic imperial programme, the administrators of which 
harboured a genuine belief that the satellite states could be brought into the slipstream of 
French administrative time without undergoing the concomitant chaos of revolutionary 
upheaval.830 In 1808, Louis-Guillaume Otto, imperial representative to the Bavarian court of 
the Prince-Elector Maximilian, observed how “all the cogs of government, which have 
already produced such marvellous effects in France,” could be “introduced step by step into 
this country,” and thereby enable the inhabitants to “profit from our experience without 
undergoing the shocks” that had riven the Revolution.831  
Any attempts at standardisation, then, had to confront the divergent historical tempos 
– the heterotemporality – of the provinces incorporated under the empire. The reorganisation 
of European space into new administrative units, whilst representing an attempted flattening 
of regional historical topoi, proved ineffective in imposing temporal uniformity across the 
empire. The varying historical dynamics of these zones of time resisted rationalisation. 
Synchronising the multiple temporal planes of the Empire by bringing them into material, 
institutional and, ultimately, historical conformity would therefore require time – more time 
than Napoleon could tolerate. Yet haste entailed dangerous political consequences. To the 
west of the Balkan peninsula, observed one prefectorial report, the inhabitants were “too 
ignorant,” “too poor,” but, above all, “too distant from civilization,” to “be able to suddenly or 
without commotion arrive at perfection.” Introducing an entirely new legal code to 
Westphalia, reflected Beugnot in 1810, would “require a transition,” since the subjects of the 
vassal kingdom were “so far removed from those of France that we would expose ourselves 
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to more than one type of danger if we suddenly demanded of them the same services.” It was 
already a great task to “take our institutions to neighbouring peoples,” he insisted, “but it 
remains always a difficult thing to form men for these institutions, until the time comes when 
they will be born from these institutions themselves.”832 Restructuring the historical texture of 
a given zone of time would take a generation.  
As the pace of reform modulated wildly across the Empire, political unity splintered. 
In Berg and Bohemia, the lower Rhine Valley and the Trentino, there existed a developed 
manufacturing base, one capable of rivalling the most economically dynamic regions of 
France. In southern Spain, meanwhile, the feudal infrastructure – and the Inquisition in 
particular – proved impervious to reform; in the Duchy of Warsaw, the abolition of noble 
estates was not even attempted.833 Napoleon had not always been so adamant for temporal 
uniformity. During the Egyptian campaign of 1798-99, he proved sufficiently pragmatic to 
drop the terminology of the Republican Calendar and instead adopt (for nakedly political 
purposes, of course) local measurements, even penning a letter to the Turkish pasha in Cairo, 
dated “the month of Muharrem, the Year of the Hegira, 1213.”834   
The most cataclysmic casualty of Napoleonic territorial reorganisation was the Holy 
Roman Empire, which received its death notice on 1 August, 1806.835 Its obituaries, however, 
began appearing as early as July, when, according to one French envoy in Bavaria, news of 
the imminent demise of the Empire provoked outbreaks of “nostalgia” across Mitteleuropa. 
Evocations of nostalgia mirrored the melancholia of historical dispossession and dislocation 
that accompanied revolutionary rupture, and offered emotional expression to the sense in 
which the past had been suddenly rendered unrecoverable. This experience of history as “the 
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continual production of the new,” writes Peter Fritzsche, exhausted tradition, devalued the 
applicability of memory whilst nonetheless intensifying a sensation of loss, and uncoupled the 
future from the ontological tutelage of the past.836 The primary response was often despair: in 
Jena, for example, nostalgia provoked a kind of social sickness, a fearfulness that, as Goethe 
observed, made it “difficult to maintain one’s own equilibrium when people’s feelings are so 
unstable.”837 For witnesses to the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, what heightened this 
disorientation was the pre-existing spatial spread of different types of time.838 In this sense, 
nostalgia was a response to a sudden assault upon a long-standing temporal identity.839 The 
landscape of the Rhine Valley, for example, which was framed by towers and turrets, erected 
across the centuries, provided a visual representation of a living historical continuum.840 The 
enormity of dissolution shattered this zone of time. In the course of a few years, the castles 
that loomed along the Rhine were blasted by French cannonade into a distant, ruined past.841 
The future, meanwhile, was instantly exploded open. “The fluctuating and uncertain character 
of the immediate future,” wrote the Westphalian historian, Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, in 
the days after dissolution, “has consequences which will exercise an incalculable influence.” 
More important, however, was the perceived qualitative shift that occurred in the regional 
dynamics of historical time. “Although one is accustomed to expect the speediest progress, 
that which actually happens always outstrips our boldest imagination. Who would have 
believed, even only a few weeks ago, that the total dissolution of the German Empire – 
including its formal aspects – was so imminent?” The immensity of historical events had 
altered the familiar tempo of time. This political assault upon the zone of time once 
                                                
836 Peter Fritzsche, ‘Specters of History: On Nostalgia, Exile and Modernity,’ The American Historical Review 106 
(5, December 2001), pp.1587-1618, here: p.1589; Jürgen Overhoff, ‘Benjamin Franklin, Student of the Holy 
Roman Empire: His Summer Journey to Germany in 1766 and his Interest in the Empire’s Federal Constitution,’ 
German Studies Review 34 (2, May 2011), pp.277-86. 
837 Goethe, cited in Wolfgang Burgdorf, ‘“Once we were Trojans!” Contemporary Reactions to the Dissolution of 
the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation,’ pp.51-78, in R. J. W Evans, Peter H. Wilson, eds., The Holy 
Roman Empire, 1495-1806: A European Perspective (Leiden, Brill, 2012), p.58; Burgdorf conclusively 
demonstrates how Goethe’s dismissive remark that the “contention between the servant and the coachman on the 
box provoked more passion…than the dividing up of the Roman Empire,” does not adequately summarise 
contemporary feelings of shock and despair, pp.53-4. 
838 “Cologne,” observed Johann Kaspar Riesbeck, in his journey through central Europe, seemed “at least a 
century behind the rest of Germany,” since “every thing,” from “the speech, dress, furniture of the houses,” was 
“so different from what is seen in the rest of Germany, that you conceive yourself in the middle of a colony of 
strangers”: Travels through Germany in a Series of Letters; written in German by the Baron Riesbeck (trans. Rev. 
Maty), (3 vols., London, T. Cadell, 1787), III, p.268. 
839 Lutz Klinkhammer, ‘Kontrolle und Identität. Die Grenzen der Freiheit im Rheinand und in Piemont unter 
französischer Herrschaft,’ in Guido Braun, Gabrielle B. Clemens, Lutz Klinkhammer, Alexander Koller, eds., 
Napoleonische Expansionspolitik, Okkupation oder Integration? (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2013), pp.120-37. 
840 On ruins and landscapes in early-nineteenth century Germany, see: Günter Hartmann, Die Ruine im 
Landschaftsgarten: Ihre Bedeutung für den frühen Historismus und die Landschaftsmalerei der Romantik (Worms, 
Werner’sche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1981); Joseph Leo Koerner, Caspar David Friedrich and the Subject of 
Landscape (New Haven, CT., Yale University Press, 1990). 
841 The rate of ruination was staggering, which wrought its own immediate-term sense of historical compression: 
Chateaubriand likened the landscape of Europe “to the collection of ruins and tombstone of all ages which were 
heaped pell-mell…in the cloisters of the Petits-Augustins: only, the ruins of which I speak were alive and 
constantly changing”: Sophie Thomas, Romanticism and Visuality: Fragments, History, Spectacle (London, 
Routledge, 2007), p.66. 
  
213 
administered by the defunct Empire was reinforced by unrelenting warfare. “Almost at the 
same moment that I received certain information about this,” Dohm hastily scribbled, “I also 
hear that the French troops are marching upon Saxony.”842  
The logic of Napoleonic administrative rationalisation, which necessarily had to 
confront the entrenched traditionalism of the Holy Roman Empire, sought to create a 
common, trans-imperial appreciation of time. It did so by depicting the historicity of the Holy 
Roman Empire as perilously unresponsive to the exigencies of modern time, as institutionally 
incapable of absorbing the unforeseen, the hazardous and the mere chance.843 The regime of 
tradition could not, after all, account for the appearance of non-iterative historical scenarios. 
According to the declaration of dissolution: “For a long period successive changes have, from 
century to century, reduced the German constitution to a shadow of its former self.” “Time,” 
the declaration further observed, had “altered all the relations in respect to the size and 
importance which originally existed among the various members of the confederation,” 
placing “people and princes alike under the delusive protection of a system contrary both to 
their political interests and to their treaties.” As a consequence, the kingdoms and 
principalities of Germany had “resolved to form a confederation” that was designed explicitly 
to “secure them against future emergencies” – the precise prescription of political legitimacy 
that undergirded the Napoleonic regime.844  
Whilst the speed of expansion made the synchronisation of historical time across the 
Napoleonic Empire difficult to achieve, it was the variegated dynamics of localised 
temporalities – the regional historicities – that made the Empire itself potentially unstable. 
This splintered the legitimate exercise of power across the Empire, Beugnot observed, 
because it came up against historically entrenched interests: the nobility in Düsseldorf, for 
example, believed that “they could regain all that they had lost” through Napoleonic 
rationalisation in a coming war that “would be entirely feudal.”845 For the sake of 
administrative functionality and fealty, then, the multiple zones of time would need to be 
harmonized; yet the only common time cutting across these zones was the time of war.  
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As Natalie Petiteau has noted, “the time of the Empire [was] above all a time 
punctuated by war.”846 Some sense of simultaneity – a common time, in effect – was created 
throughout Napoleonic Europe by the relentlessness of war.847 The Bulletin de la Grande 
Armée, a propagandistic newssheet that appeared after 1805, recounted the essential details of 
military operations, often on an hour-by-hour basis.848 The ongoing activity of campaigns 
determined the pace of its publication, thus the Bulletin circulated with a greater regularity as 
warfare intensified and ceased once hostilities had concluded. The tempo of news circulation 
throughout the Empire therefore mirrored the dynamics of military conquest. Indeed, 
Napoleon even used military couriers [les estafettes] in order to better circulate information 
around imperial domains: “a more rapid means of correspondence,” the Emperor told his 
brother, Joseph, the king of Naples, “will benefit your administration.”849 The Bulletin was 
carried in the Moniteur universel, and though transmission times could vary (it sometimes 
took weeks to reach remoter provinces), the consumption of this time-specific – and often 
hourly specified – information synchronised the Empire’s various zones of time according to 
the historic significance of the operations of the Grande Armée. Unlike the rational 
delineation of imperial space, the multiple topoi of imperial time were only brought into 
(occasional) coordinated distribution by the framework of historical events, by the military 
achievements of Napoleon. In 1807, for example, the baron Marbot recalled how French 
troops stationed outside Friedland arose one morning entirely unaware, until the Bulletin 
arrived, that the day marked the anniversary of Marengo, the glorious victory over Austria in 
1800.850 Few of the soldiers had any sense of the universal references to the date and hour of 
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victory, which seemingly offered no coordinating function along the remote, barren Baltic 
coastline; it was, rather, the historical significance of Marengo to the Empire that bestowed a 
sense of place in time. Unlike the prototypical technology of optical telegraphy, which was 
devised by Claude Chappe in 1792 – and which Napoleon used on 19 Brumaire to assure 
public opinion in the capital, before alternative interpretations could proliferate, that “Paris is 
calm and all good citizens are content,” – the circulation of glorious anniversaries in the 
Bulletin created a common appreciation of history amongst the ordinary soldiery.851 Whilst 
the speed of telegraphic messaging could create a sense of event simultaneity across extensive 
spaces – “the time required for the communication does not increase proportionally with the 
distance,” Chappe observed in 1792, – it could not cohere the divergent historicities spanning 
the Empire.852 That was the work of war. 
 
≈ 
 
In the political imagination of the nascent American Republic, the textures of time and history 
also diverged according to space, in particular at the frontier, which was conceived as both a 
temporal and spatial phenomenon.853 Life along the frontier was protean and erratic: the 
conditions and circumstances of material existence seemed to be in a constant state of flux. 
Between 1787 and 1788, Mary Dewees, a well-to-do Pennsylvanian matron, kept a journal of 
her journey through the western territories, from her home in Philadelphia to the rural reaches 
of Kentucky. In October 1788, at a small settlement “about a mile from Pittsburgh,” Dewees 
recorded the sudden unpredictability characteristic of daily life at the frontier:   
 
October 23d  – Drank tea at the French ladys with several ladys and gentlemen of  
this place. 
October 24th – The Town all in arms, a report prevailed that a party of Indians within 
twenty miles, coming to attack the Town. The drums beating to Arms, with the 
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Militia collecting from every part of the Town, has I assure you a very disagreeable 
appearance.854 
 
One day, Dewees was politely taking tea in a fashionable drawing room; the next, she was 
suddenly under siege, a hostage to the hazards of frontier life. Veering from gentility to 
emergency with such rapidity underscored the “unconstancy” that made the western 
settlements seem so prey to chance events. In July 1788, Colonel John May penned a letter to 
his wife, kindly hoping that she would “never have such a time of risk and suspense as I am 
having,” as he journeyed across the sparsely populated, treacherous terrain of the Ohio 
country.855 After the Revolution, the frontier remained a site of territorial contention, and 
whilst the Allegheny Mountains represented a natural barrier with northerly Indian territories, 
it remained unstable, bolstered only by a tenuous treaty struck with the Six Nations of the 
Iroquois in 1784.856 Western inhabitants had therefore to be alive to the sudden appearance of 
“a party of Indians,” ready to “attack” their property and family.857 Interestingly, the time 
available to react to this perceived threat was measured in space. Thus the town was instantly 
placed “all in arms” because the Indians were reportedly “within twenty miles.” News of this 
attack was entirely unconfirmed, of course, and Dewees does not subsequently mention its 
materialisation. The geographic context of the frontier, however, meant that the information 
relative to a variety of dangers could often travel at a slower pace than the dangers 
themselves. In this sense, the temporal measurement of danger was almost meaningless since 
by the time the information of “twenty miles” had circulated, the attack might in fact be 
imminent. The sense of alarm was instant. As Dewees recorded, the “disagreeable” response 
of a militia “beating to Arms” was thus premised upon a probability calculus derived from an 
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assessment of the topographic, informational and temporal realities of frontier life – a life 
saturated by sudden chance. 
The sporadic distribution of settlements strained the information infrastructure 
connecting the zones of times that constituted the early American Republic, such that distance 
in space stretched the perceived distance in time separating west and east, centre and 
periphery.858 This presented problems for the energetic exercise of political authority. When 
the capital of the United States had been New York, remarked Samuel Henshaw, the citizens 
of the Connecticut Valley keenly followed the debates of Congress; in 1790, however, with 
the capital relocated eighty miles south to Philadelphia, “we scarce know you are in 
session.”859 If the decrees and directives of the federal government – and even news of 
congressional deliberation – could not reach distant regions of the Union before the political 
circumstances of those regions altered, then the temporal structure of the Republic would be 
forever out of synch, diminishing or deranging the application of political authority. It was 
not until 1796, for example, that the general post office established an hour-by-hour 
stagecoach schedule that could communicate information across the nascent Republic at a 
regularised rate.860 The coexistence of these overlapping zones of time would reach a crisis 
point in 1794.  
The Whiskey Rebellion was a rural uprising centred upon western Pennsylvania, 
where aggrieved frontiersmen sought to resist a federal excise tax, passed in 1791, on distilled 
alcohol.861 Although sporadic incidents of disobedience had been recorded since the initial 
levy of the excise, it was on 17 July 1794 that events “burst forth with an explosion,” and 
“electrified the whole United States.” To the sound of drumbeat, seven hundred militiamen 
descended upon the estate of John Neville, the regional intendant for tax collection, and 
threatened to torch his property if he refused to resign his post. When Neville relented, the 
blaze began. By August, several thousand rebels were marching upon Pittsburgh, ready to 
stage a military assembly. The insurrection began to spread. In Kentucky and western 
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Virginia, counties prepared programmes for independent self-governance; the “infatuated and 
frantic” inhabitants of Washington County, Pennsylvania, were reported to “prefer a civil war 
to a submission to the excise laws.”862According to Chief Justice John Marshall, the rebellion 
represented the most potent existential threat to the United States since the Revolutionary 
War.863 For Washington, it struck “at the root of all law & order,” since “if such proceedings 
were tolerated there was an end to our Constitution & laws.”864 
The separate zones of time that spanned the American Republic created logistical and 
political chaos. When these zones stretched perceived historical distances, however, the crisis 
of political authority become dangerously ideological, presenting the Union with mortal 
dangers. “We are too distant from the grand seat of information,” remarked the Kentuckian, 
John Breckinridge, in September 1794, at the height of the Rebellion; the western settlers, 
meanwhile, were,  
 
too much hackneyed in the old fashioned principles of 1776, to receive much light 
from the…new fashioned systems and schemes of policy, which are the offspring and 
ornament of the present administration.865 
 
Relative distances from the information hub of the federal government caused a 
fragmentation in the dynamics of historical time that encompassed the Republic. Outwardly, 
the western settlements certainly seemed to occupy a simpler age. Log cabins lined uneven, 
earthen streets, many of which were transformed into quagmires during heavy rainfall. The 
sense of seclusion was heightened by the rudimentary roads – in effect, dirt tracks – that made 
wagon journeys injury-prone experiences. The inhabitants, meanwhile, seemed to live at the 
edge of civilization. “The people,” observed Dewees, were “very kind but amazing[ly] 
dirty.”866 Many second-generation migrants – the children of the westward settlers – actually 
underwent intellectual decline during the first few decades on account of the absence of 
educational institutions and the distracting labour demands involved in erecting farmsteads.867 
The historicity of the frontier was thus conditioned by the temporal dynamics of a poorly 
                                                
862 William Findley, History of the Insurrection in the Four Western Counties of Pennsylvania in the Year 1794: 
with a recital of the circumstances specially connected therewith, and an historical review of the previous 
situation of the country (Philadelphia, PA., Samuel Harrison Smith, 1796), p.67, 308. 
863 Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, p.5. 
864 Richard H. Kohn, ‘The Washington Administration’s Decision to Crush the Whiskey Rebellion,’ The Journal 
of American History 59 (3, December 1972), pp.567-84, here: p.573. 
865 John Breckinridge to Samuel Hopkins (15 September, 1794), cited in Patrick Griffin, American Leviathan: 
Empire, Nation, and Revolutionary Frontier (New York, NY., Hill and Wang, 2007), p.233. 
866 Dewees, ‘Mrs. Mary Dewees’s Journal,’ p.185. 
867 Russell J. Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics (Pittsburgh, PA., University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1938), p.17; as the Pittsburgh Mercury would report, as late as November 1813: “The first exertions of the colonist 
will be directed toward the attainment of the necessaries of life and the struggle against wild nature,” which must 
“for a long time retard the progress of the human mind, and the liberal culture of science and literature”: Richard 
C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830 (Urbana, IL., University of Illinois Press, 
1996), p.39. 
  
219 
connected information framework. The Western territories, remarked the Carlisle Gazette in 
July 1794, presented a landscape “uncontaminated with Atlantic luxury” and “beyond the 
reach of European influences.” The frontier remained at centuries remove from “the 
pampered vultures of commercial countries” who had “not yet found access” to it.868  
Access was further exacerbated by a concerted campaign of obstruction; rural 
inhabitants, determined to reinforce the peculiar temporality of the frontier, created blockages 
in the transportation and information networks of the Republic. Aggrieved Pennsylvanians 
felled trees, dug ditches, engineered avalanches – all in the hope of subverting tax collection 
or property repossession. Blockades on roads that led to courthouses, for example, slowed 
legal processes by obstructing the prosecution of tax rebels or debtors. In 1792, when 
Congress passed a law expanding the scope of “delinquent” accounts to include the 
repayment schedules to the land bank, road barricades rapidly proliferated across the western 
Pennsylvanian counties of Cumberland, Dauphin and Washington.869 Frustrating the 
communication networks of the nascent Republic enabled rural citizens to delay the 
administration of justice, which, in the political imagination of the frontier, was increasingly 
seen as illegitimate. 
Unlike the administrative corps of the Napoleonic Empire, then, the agents of the 
federal government – notably, those who were assigned to the increasingly lawless lands of 
western Pennsylvania after 1791 – were not charged with the ponderous task of reforming 
sclerotic feudal societies. In the American Republic, synchronising the divergent political 
velocities of the various zones of time was primarily a problem of “speedup.”870 Power 
relations at the frontier played out at a variable velocity, which, on account of its distance 
from the constitutional core of the Republic, made political life susceptible to sudden 
acceleration. The zone of time encompassing the western frontier was characterised by a 
temporal agility, a precipitancy: as Rochefoucauld-Liancourt observed, time at the frontier 
was fleeting; the structures of society were mutable, forming and reforming in the course of 
weeks or months; its inhabitants, meanwhile, were entirely itinerant, pushing ceaselessly into 
undeveloped space and constantly re-establishing – and thus re-energizing – “the old 
fashioned principles of 1776.”871 As a consequence, the frontier was chronopolitically situated 
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within a “revolutionary” present. If many Federalists such as Hamilton and Fisher Ames had 
hoped that the constitutional regime conceived at the Convention would foster a post-
revolutionary society, then the political culture of the frontier may be described as peri-
revolutionary – it continued to exist within the ongoing present that had once constituted 
Paine’s revolutionary “now.” 
As a consequence, the 1794 uprisings were about a lot more than the price of 
whiskey. In their conflict with the federal centre, the inhabitants of the frontier, and western 
Pennsylvania in particular, imagined the   
 
Invoking a modality of time premised upon the “principles of 1776” legitimated the right, for 
example, to speedily assemble at any moment in order to overthrow any constituted authority 
that “the people” suddenly deemed illegitimate.872 Thus the rebels of Franklin County 
boasted, in August 1794, that it would take them only “six hours [to] raise 500 men,” and to 
replace every “damned rascal” in the federal government.873 In this sense, the temporal 
perspective of the insurgents directly recalled that of the Shays’s rebels. As Abigail Adams 
observed to Jefferson, in January 1787: “Instead of that laudible spirit which you approve, 
which makes a people watchfull over their Liberties and alert in the defence of then, these 
mobbish insurgents are for sapping the foundation, and destroying the whole fabric at 
once.”874 According to one Pittsburgh judge, the momentum of the rebels, “like a torrent, 
would increase more and more in their rapid course towards the seat of government.”875 
Along the frontier the use of the liquid metaphor to describe the temporality of “the people” 
remained disturbingly relevant.876 Several days after the assembly at Braddock’s Field, Hugh 
Henry Brackenridge, a Pennsylvanian Federalist, compared the unequal tempos of the 
insurgency and the federal government by reaching for an aqueous analogy: 
 
Should any attempt be made to suppress these people, I am afraid the question will 
not be whether you will march to Pittsburgh, but whether they will march to 
Philadelphia, accumulating in their course, swelling over the banks of the 
Susquehanna like a torrent, irresistible and devouring in its progress.877 
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This imagery of a torrential stream that acquires an “irresistible” mass as it proceeds, 
engulfing the capital and “devouring” political authority, underscored the disconcerting 
suddenness with which “the people” could “accumulate.” Perhaps more disorientating, 
however, was the similar speed with which “the people” could evaporate. In late August, 
observed William Findley in his contemporary History of the Insurrection (1796), “the 
insurrection progressed for a few days like the paroxism of an inflammatory fever,” but it 
soon “spent its force in frequent irregular convulsions, and finally subsided almost as 
suddenly, and to many as unexpectedly, as it commenced.”878  
Washington would draw upon this temporality when, during his Sixth Annual 
Address to Congress, he wilfully – and largely without evidence – combined the activities of 
the Whiskey Rebels with the ambitions of the Democratic-Republican Societies.879 Whilst 
“the greater part of Pennsylvania” was “conforming” to the excise, certain “societies” were 
“resolved to frustrate them.” When these societies contrived to create “further delay” and 
therefore an “opinion of impotency or irresolution in the Government,” he intervened.880 
Washington would no longer tolerate the staccato of the popular sovereign will. These “self-
created societies,” he told Jay in November, had fomented extra-constitutional violence 
“hoping to effect some revolution in the government.”881 His designation of “self-created” 
drew upon the perceived impermanence of popular political participation, and portrayed “the 
people” – at least as they were constituted by the Democratic-Republican Societies – as a 
mercurial force, capable of suddenly appearing to overthrow a constitutionally ordained 
government. Federalists feared that the static unity of sovereign power – which, according to 
constitutional law, allowed “the people” to manifest itself according to the fixed durations of 
the electoral process – was dissolving along the frontier. Michelle Sizemore has demonstrated 
how it became increasingly difficult, two decades after the start of the Revolution, to conceive 
of “the people” as an aggregate, as a sum of all parts, because those parts seemed to undergo 
continual rearrangement: “the extemporaneous and shifting formations on the frontier proved 
that the people could never be the total of their wills because they are constantly changing.” 
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They were “a force always in motion.”882 In order to better attune the political process to the 
characteristics of the frontier zone of time, for example, the citizens of the district of 
Hamilton had even devised a local constitution in which a legislative council would be 
elected every six months and presided over by a single magistrate elected every nine.883 In 
this “kinetic setting,” observes Robert Wiebe, western settlers felt little respect for the 
distantly delivered diktats of eastern governments. Since the conditions life were constantly 
fluctuating, “hierarchic tiers had no chance to form,” and so any “sense of a contained, 
personally integrated whole” also failed to materialise.884 As the frontier shifted in space, so 
the tempo of its political culture altered too. 
For Federalists, the Democratic-Republican societies, “which have spread themselves 
over this country,” were the information medium operating between the insurgent counties of 
the frontier.885 They thereby facilitated the runaway possibilities of popular sovereignty by 
enabling the dissemination of information relative to the rebellion to spread at a tempo greater 
than that which the federal government could administrate for order. The separate zone of 
time inhabited by the rebels set federal agents at a disadvantage because, under the sluggish 
circulation of information and the obstacles impeding travel, their activities were constantly 
rendered too late. In August, when the Attorney General, William Bradford, led a negotiation 
delegation into western Pennsylvania, circumstances in the backcountry had deteriorated, 
almost beyond repair – in the time taken just to get there.886 Despite riding forty miles or more 
on horseback everyday, for nearly three weeks, they arrived at Bedford only to be greeted by 
a shaken John Neville who told them to turn back, citing the escalation of violence in the 
surrounding settlements. On 17 August, Bradford informed Washington that the insurgents 
were delaying their negotiations in anticipation of winter, which would provide “time to 
strengthen themselves – to circulate the manifesto they are preparing – to tamper 
with…Kentucky – to procure Ammunition…”887 Winter would therefore create an ice wall 
between east and west, by which time the Union would have all but cracked apart. Two days 
later, federal envoys recommended an immediate mobilisation of federal troops. 
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If the politics of the frontier continued to operate outside constitutional time, then it 
would be impossible for the Union to endure. “My mind is so perfectly convinced,” 
Washington wrote in October, “that if these self created societies cannot be discountenanced 
[they] will destroy the government of this Country.”888 The duration-creating mechanisms of 
the federal constitution were undermined by the instantaneity with which popular sovereignty 
appeared to operate at the frontier.889 The deliberative velocity of the rebels was exemplified 
during a meeting at Mingo Creek in July, when, according to Brackenridge, “[t]here was but a 
moment between treason on the one hand, and popular odium on the other.”890 There was 
simply no time to decide between the wrath of the mob or the “legally wrong” rebellion. Soon 
after concluding his conciliatory (and completely unsuccessful) speech, Brackenridge 
scarpered, fearful for his personal safety. The constituent power of the people, thought to 
have been injected with “intervals” by the pausing power of the Constitution, now led once 
again to a wave of “precipitant,” destructive passions. The temporal pressure exerted by this 
constituent power – which, at the frontier, was largely beyond the reach of any constitutional 
limit – reduced the duration of popular deliberation to “a moment.” As Findley observed, it 
was “owing to [these] circumstances of a local nature,” that violence so precipitously broke 
out across the backcountry, “and drew many into the vortex of riot, who would have been far 
from engaging in it, if they had had time to deliberate on the consequences.”891 According to 
Albert Gallatin, a sympathetic though moderate voice, the political disorder sweeping western 
Pennsylvania was primarily a problem of the absence of duration: 
 
Time was essentially requisite in order to enable the friends of government to 
disseminate amongst the body of the people both information and sentiments of 
moderation, and from time alone might it be expected that those violent passions, 
which still inflamed so many, would subside. 
 
In the zone of time of the frontier, time itself proved sparse. “Indeed, during the whole course 
of the transactions that followed,” surmised Gallatin, “it was, upon every occasion, equally 
experienced that time alone was sufficient to obtain a progressive restoration of order, and 
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lamented that a sufficient delay could not, from the general situation of affairs, be always 
obtained.”892 
Still, these “circumstances of a local nature” – circumstances peculiar to the “local” 
zone of time – would strongly inform the federal investigation into the nature of the rebellion 
and the ongoing instability of the frontier. In the fourth and final report compiled by 
Bradford, the localised characteristic of lived time and the historicity of the frontier were 
collapsed into the same category: the continued threat posed by “several unruly and turbulent 
spirits” amongst the western citizenry was attributable to the fact that “these men, having 
little or no property to lose, may possibly create new disturbances.” Only “reasonable hope” 
could be entertained that the inhabitants of the western frontier would become “dutiful 
citizens in the future.”893 The perception of historical time in frontier communities therefore 
conditioned frontier politics. After all, lives lived exclusively in the present, divested of any 
political or commercial interest in the future and habituated to the haphazardness of frontier 
existence, had created a category of citizen that equated participation in political instability 
with the ongoing expression, and thus the defence, of liberty.  
This rebellion, snarled Washington, was “fomented by combinations of men” who 
were “careless of consequences.”894 From a Federalist viewpoint, the management of future 
“consequences” guaranteed order in the present by containing the proliferation of chance; 
from the perspective of the rebels, “consequences” merely denoted the deleterious progress of 
history and the gradual degradation of liberty. As such, the causal structure of historical time 
subscribed to by Federalists, in which the decompressed transition from present to future 
supposedly precluded the sudden, unforeseeable collapse of constitutional authority, 
precluded the spontaneous exercise of liberty too. It prevented the reactualization of the 
“principles of 1776” – namely, the Revolution’s spontaneous reallocation of sovereign power 
from constituted authority to constituent people – and contributed, in an American context, to 
similar sensations of the dread of duration that had motivated the Parisian sansculottes to take 
time into their own hands in August 1792. 
 
≈ 
 
In late October 1794, faced with the overwhelming military force assembled by the President, 
the rebellion melted away. By personally leading the charge across the western frontier, 
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Washington had deployed himself as the moving emblem of a Republic hopelessly out-of-
synch. The sheer constancy of his presence – from the trenches of Valley Forge to the chair of 
the Constitutional Convention – meant that Washington was able to imbue the otherwise 
inchoate “history” of the Revolution with a narrative coherence.895 To this end, he sometimes 
understood his role as that of an “actor” whose appearance on the “mighty scene” of the 
Revolution demanded that he “preserve a perfect constancy of character through to the very 
last act, to close the drama with applause.”896 It was only through this “perfect constancy” that 
the beginning, middle, and end of the “drama” could lead from one to the other and thus make 
sense. Washington made this statement during his first farewell to public life at Annapolis in 
1783, when he had optimistically believed that the conclusion of the “mighty scene” of the 
American Revolution – namely, the war – had also brought the Revolution to the end of its 
“last act.”897 As the subsequent decade demonstrated, Washington was unable to abandon the 
stage without the sequential coherence of “American history” repeatedly deranging.898  
To scan the several zones of time that spanned the American Republic in 1794 was to 
deduce that the revolutionary modality of historical time, far from returning to a sense of 
“constancy,” had simply splintered. As a constant corporeal representation of the Revolution, 
Washington could incarnate the sovereign authority inaugurated by the Revolution whilst 
containing it within the stipulations of the Constitution.899 In other words, Washington 
represented revolutionary spontaneity translated into constitutional constancy. In October 
1791, the engraver Amos Doolittle captured the temporality of this mode of power in a 
presidential print, entitled ‘A Display of the United States of America’ [Fig. 10].900 Fourteen 
interlocked rings, each representing a state of the Union and the crest of the Republic, 
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encircle the figure of Washington – “the protector of his country” – whose central, centripetal 
force keeps the rings in fixed rotation. Despite Doolittle’s imagery, which vividly recalls the 
clock face, this visual metaphor of political authority did quite resemble clockwork. Rather, it 
is better to talk of Washington’s temporal torque: by making manifest his personal authority, 
Washington could impress a single force upon the Union’s disparate zones of time, around 
which they might rotate and be brought into a common developmental – that is, historical – 
momentum. In the present, time would need to move at a fixed rate if, in the future, these 
zones were to acquire some historical similitude. Thus, in 1791, Washington began a 
gruelling 1,900-mile journey across the inhospitable terrain of the new nation.901 Undertaken 
at breath-taking pace, the President contrived to appear everywhere simultaneously. 
“Washington’s presence,” as David Waldstreicher notes, “exerted a centralizing pull,” 
reassuring a vast, unwieldy Union that rested, above all else, “on sentiment.”902 This desire to 
impress upon the Republic the simultaneity of national “sentiment,” despite its “geographical” 
dispersal, was further reinforced when Washington re-visited the celebrated sites of the 
Revolutionary War – from Philadelphia to Savannah, Lexington to Yorktown, – as if re-
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enrolling the people into the collective, ongoing, but now constitutionally-contained exercise 
of liberty.903  
The presence, or torque, that Washington imparted upon the political interactions of 
the new nation was not therefore about bringing stasis or even balance; it was about imbuing 
the several states with a stable, interdependent historical momentum. It was for this reason 
that Washington, like many Federalists, felt so queasy about unrestricted spatial expansion, 
which threatened to stretch the historical distances of the Republic. In a letter to Randolph, 
written before the military expedition to quell the rebels, Washington argued that unless the 
separate “interests,” the sentiments, of the separate states could be resynchronised, it would 
be impossible for the United States to cohere into a single history. But if this admittedly 
“distressing” despatch of Union forces could sustain “the pleasing spirit which it has drawn 
forth” – and which had flummoxed the insurgents, “who had no conception that such a spirit 
prevailed,” – then the demonstration of both federal authority and fealty to the Union might 
“immortalize the American character,” and provide “a happy presage” for obstructing the 
“future attempts of a certain description of people” who were determined to “sow the seeds of 
distrust & disturb the public tranquillity.”904 Following the election of Jefferson in 1800, this 
Washingtonian strategy of enabling the continental convergence of “sentiments” in time was 
discarded as unsustainable and deleterious to virtue and liberty. Instead, the purchase of the 
Louisiana territories by Jefferson in 1803 enabled the Republic to charter a different course: 
the replication of founding principles across space.905 
 
≈ 
 
In such unstable circumstances, the linear transition towards the future became a political 
process in itself, one that Marcel Gauchet describes as the “obligatory temporal orientation” 
of the modern political regime, as “legitimacy converted into time,” in which duration and 
                                                
903 T. H. Breen, George Washington’s Journey: The President Forges a New Nation (New York, NY., Simon & 
Schuster, 2016), pp.108-9; on Washington and the creation of national, and particularly military, memory: Sarah J. 
Purcell, Sealed with Blood: War, Sacrifice, and Memory in Revolutionary America (Philadelphia, PA., University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), pp.97-98; Simon Newman, ‘Principles or Men? George Washington and the 
Political Culture of National Leadership, 1776-1801,’ Journal of the Early Republic 12 (4, Winter 1992), pp.477-
507; see: Douglass Adair, ‘Fame and the Founding Fathers,’ in Trevor Colbourn, Fame and the Founding Fathers: 
Essays by Douglass Adair (New York, NY., W. W. Norton, 1974), pp.3-36. 
904 George Washington to Edmund Randolph (16 October 1794), in Hoth, Ebel, eds., The Papers of George 
Washington. The Presidential Series, XVII, pp.72-73. 
905 These ideas of space and time after the Washington presidency will developed below; see: Peter J. Kastor, The 
Nation’s Crucible: The Louisiana Purchase and the Creation of America (New Haven, CT., Yale University Press, 
2004); Peter S. Onuf, ‘The Expanding Union,’ in David T. Konig, ed., Devising Liberty: Preserving and Creating 
Freedom in the New American Republic (Stanford, CA., Stanford University Press, 1995), pp.51-80; Thomas M. 
Allen, A Republic in Time: Temporality and Social Imagination in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill, NC., 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008), pp.17-58; Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, ‘La Louisiane en 1803: terre 
d’expansion, terre d’exploration, ou comment les sciences naturelles et la diplomatie se mêlent,’ Revue française 
d’études américaines 48/49 (April-July 1991), pp.125-35; Major L. Wilson, Space, Time, and Freedom: The Quest 
for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815-1861 (Westport, CT., Greewood Press, 1974), pp.22-30. 
  
228 
stability are maintained by regimes that are themselves seen to govern “a society containing 
its own ordering principle.” The “legitimate obligation” of political authority is no longer “to 
renew what used to be,” but rather “to create what does not yet exist and what ought to 
happen.”906 In the spring of 1801, the journal La Décade Philosophique could claim that the 
Consulate had taken control of “time,” which “we used to devote to combating errors” and 
which seemed constantly to elapse, by implementing “projects of public utility” that now 
matured with time: 
 
Political news daily loses some of the pressing interest we used to feel when, each 
morning, we learned of some crime or conflict or read the announcement of a great 
law that had been conceived, drafted, and adopted in the space of fifteen 
minutes…Today, the most fervent of every party have adjusted to a new 
tranquillity.907 
 
A similar phenomenon can be traced in post-revolutionary America. In 1796, in his American 
Universal Geographer, Jedidah Morse observed how, “[f]or several years after the 
establishment of the new constitution,” and under the presidency of Washington in particular, 
“the United States were happily distinguished by affording few materials for history.”908 
These regimes rejected the continuous breaking with the past by focusing their efforts upon 
the continual absorption of the future, a gentle process that, given sufficient time, would de-
essentialise the legitimacy that revolutionary power had derived from historical rupture. 
 Thus the exercise of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century legitimate power 
was charged with “creating its own time,” by the need to make time “the dimension of 
continuity.” The regime of “continuity,” as Pocock has argued, envisages its own future by 
“ensuring that no future ever comes into existence.”909 This claim, which might as easily 
characterise the static historicity of ancien regime legitimacy, requires contextualisation. The 
future of legitimate post-revolutionary power does not materialise – at least as it is perceived 
– because the injection, or “creation,” of time de-abbreviates the temporal transit between the 
ontological realms of present and future, bringing about a sensation of historical 
decompression that, in turn, softens the experience of rupture.  
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III. Meantime 
 
American and French Revolutionaries had placed the relative lifespan of revolutionary 
regimes in direct proportion to their ethico-political nefariousness. “If suicide or exile became 
signs of political ‘purity,’” during the Thermidorian Republic, observes Jean-Luc Chappey, 
then “conversely, political duration often appeared suspicious.”910 By devising rhetorical and 
performative strategies designed to decompress the sequential speed of revolutionary 
historical experience, Washington and Napoleon set about creating meantime.911 The lived 
experience of the present was opened up and expanded from within – time underwent 
dilation; the transition period between present and future also underwent a process of 
temporal blending, which reintroduced a common sense of duration adequate to the human 
capacity for processing information and gathering experience. Even institutions and 
constitutions intended to create duration could not, in the immediate term, gain enough time 
to survive the headwinds of chance. Meantime, which became structurally dependent upon 
the political performances, upon the persons, of Washington and Napoleon, provided the new 
regimes with a kind of time buffer, producing an artificial sense of duration that, in the 
immediate term, enabled the maturation of duration-creating institutions. 
 
≈ 
 
In 1792, as Washington traversed America, Jefferson wrote him a despairing letter. The 
“division of sentiment and interest happens unfortunately to be so geographical,” sighed 
Jefferson, that the “confidence of the whole union is centred in you.” “North and South,” 
hopelessly divided by political economies and historical trajectories, “will hang together, if 
they have you to hang on to.” If forthcoming legislative elections did not return “a numerous 
representation” of sympathetic republicans, what Jefferson termed “the first corrective,” then 
“your presence,” he told Washington, “will give time for trying others not inconsistent with 
the union and peace of the states.”912  
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To “give time” to the Republic was also the self-proclaimed purpose of the president 
– it underwrote the immediate-term exercise of post-revolutionary political power. In his 
Farewell Address, first published in September of 1796, and then disseminated throughout the 
nation, Washington declared: 
 
With me a predominant motive has been to endeavour to gain time to our country, to 
settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to 
that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly 
speaking, the command of its own fortunes.913 
 
If the creation of the American Republic demanded the “interruption” of revolution, then the 
need to “settle and mature” the Republic was a process that could only be realised in an 
uninterrupted, progressive stream of time. Whilst the Constitution could create duration, 
punctuating the breathless grammar of American political discourse, it had also undergone 
several body blows in the first few years of the new regime, notably along the western 
frontier.914 The radicalisation of the French Revolution also sent reverberations through the 
nascent constitutional regime. In 1793, Edmond-Charles Genêt, the French ambassador, 
arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, where he began rallying extra-constitutional sentiment, 
particularly amongst the Democratic-Republican societies, in favour of breaking American 
neutrality in the war between France and Great Britain.915 Popular “passions” resurfaced.916 
John Adams would later “the terrorism excited by Genêt,” when “ten thousand people in the 
streets of Philadelphia, day after day, threatened to drag Washington from his house.” In fact, 
it was only the chance epidemic of “yellow fever,” which swept the city in the autumn, 
claiming more than five thousand lives, “that Saved the United States from total Revolution 
of Government.”917  
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The machinations of “citizen Genet” partly explain why Washington warned 
Americans against implicating themselves in the “vicissitudes” of European politics. By 
“interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,” he warned, America would 
“entangle” its “peace and prosperity” in the “rivalship,” “interest,” and “caprice” of outside 
events. “Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a reasonably 
defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies.”918 The construction of meantime, which became dependent upon the person of 
Washington, was meant to convey “strength” upon “yet recent institutions,” limiting the 
sudden appearance of hazard and chance by investing the United States with “the command 
of its own fortunes.” With time, chance itself would become governable. Washington had 
hoped, then, to affect a de-abbreviation in the spaces of historical experience, to decelerate 
the time of the nascent United States by trying to “gain” more of it. The presence of duration 
would force the historical planes of present and future to merge in time, enabling America to 
“progress without interruption” from the former to the latter. This, in turn, would create the 
time in which to accrue the historical experience necessary to provide stabilising ballast for 
the Republic’s “recent institutions,” in particular the legitimate practice of constitutional 
authority.  
 
≈ 
 
Napoleonic statecraft, unlike Napoleonic warfare, sought to minimise – and not to 
instrumentalise – the prevalence of chance. This has often been depicted as control-freakery, 
if not outright despotism. Yet, as Philip Dwyer – a scarcely sympathetic observer – has 
explained, the embrace of “heredity” as an organising political principle of the Napoleonic 
regime was not “a sop to Bonaparte’s vanity and ambition,” but an attempt to construct “a 
durable political system.”919 Nor was the elevation of Napoleon to Emperor a sudden or 
opportunistic move; it was incremental and largely improvised. Seldom is it noted, moreover, 
how initially reluctant Napoleon was to entertain extensions to his authority. He found the 
notion of heredity, for example, “absurd.” Even “if it would secure the stability of the State, it 
is impossible nowadays in France,” he told the Conseil d’État in August 1802; the Revolution 
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had “swept away” the “whole range of institutions” that had supported the principle.920 When, 
in 1801, he declared heredity impossible, since “I do not possess a child,” he had to be told by 
his conseiller, Pierre-Louis Roederer, what its true purpose would be: “This provides security 
for the future.”921 It is a common, almost uncontested claim that the threats to the political 
order after Brumaire were the inventions of a cynical gang of apologists – collaborators, in 
effect – who were determined to justify the regime’s repeated incursions into civil liberties by 
capitalising upon phantom threats.922  
When Letizia Bonaparte was congratulated on the imperial elevation of her second 
son in 1804, she languidly replied: “Oui. Pourvu que ça dur” – “Yes. Provided it lasts.”923 
Throughout the various iterations of the Napoleonic regime – from consulship to empire – 
there persisted a peculiar sensation of impermanence, a general suspicion that endurance was 
uncertain, that time was short. In the summer of 1802, Napoleon convened the Conseil to 
consider this fear of political ephemerality. Brumaire may have given France “a government 
and a source of authority,” but the Revolution had reduced “the rest of the nation” to mere 
“grains of sand.” Despite the “world of talk…during these last ten years about institutions,” 
scarcely a single one had survived intact: with “no common aims, no system, no bond of 
union,” it would take time to re-stabilise the nation, to “plant on the soil of France some 
masses of granite,” and thereby guarantee the durability of the new political settlement. It 
simultaneously seemed pointless appealing to the people themselves since the nature of 
popular legitimacy was too irregular. “Do you think you can count on the people?” asked 
Napoleon; not at all – the changeability of constituent power meant that they were “as ready 
to shout ‘Vive le Roi’ to-day as ‘Vive la Ligue’ to-morrow!” In order “to turn them the right 
way” – to regulate the pace of political life – it was necessary to “have the proper 
institutions.” For these institutions to become properly embedded, however, would require 
Napoleon to act as time buffer; it would require meantime. “As long as I am here I can 
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answer for the Republic, but we must make provision for the future. Do you believe that the 
Republic is definitely established? If so, you are very much mistaken.”  
Expanding the meantime of the regime – which entailed an extension in the duration 
of the First Consul’s authority – meant, as Napoleon observed, that, “we would have plenty of 
time before us.” The circumstances under which Napoleon had “accepted the position of 
Supreme Magistrate did not allow sufficient time for calm consideration,” he readily 
acknowledged: when the Republic was “rent asunder by civil commotion,” and “the enemy 
threatened our frontiers,” the “choice of the nation” might well have seemed “to be the 
sudden result of panic.” But “today everything is changed.”924 In May 1802, Napoleon had 
established forty-five lycées, institutions that would produce the future soldiers, 
administrators, and technicians of the state. They were “the most important of all 
institutions,” Napoleon boasted, “since everything depends upon it, the present and the future. 
It is essential that the morals and political ideas of the generation which is now growing up 
should no longer be dependent upon the news of the day or the circumstances of the 
present.”925 The treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, brokered in February 1801 with Austria 
and March 1802 with Britain respectively, had returned Europe to a state of peace and 
tranquillised French domestic politics.926 
The peace, however, would prove precarious; and the inculcation of institutional 
stability would require time. It is perhaps for this reason that the constant quest for legitimacy 
coincided with the repeated extension in the lifespan of the regime. The consulship was first 
bestowed upon Napoleon for ten years, then for life, and then, under the empire, as a form of 
hereditary authority. The continuity of the regime was increasingly dependent upon the 
corporeality of Napoleon himself. The body of the First Consul was deployed to absorb the 
sense of imminent collapse still assailing the Republic. According to François-Louis Marguet, 
who penned a letter to the First Consul as a pseudonymous ‘citizen from Besançon’ several 
months before the coronation, the death of Napoleon would have been “a public calamity,” 
since the “fatal day which takes you from the French people will also be the last day of their 
liberty and their happiness.”927  
For Roederer, who had already witnessed at first hand the disintegration of one 
political regime, this was intolerable.928 “It is feared that the death of Bonaparte will happen 
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at any time, that it will happen prematurely, and that it will be hastened by crime.”929 In this 
event, the regime would crumble: as one Bonapartist pamphleteer observed, France would 
once again be left to hurtle through historical time with neither guidance nor guardianship, 
“stumbling rapidly from error to error.”930 The post-revolutionary French state was still 
encased in scaffolding: “Nothing is yet firmed up,” observed Roederer: “A hundred things 
have only been knocked together. A hundred other things are not yet prepared. There are 
barely any institutions. Barely any habits are yet developed or rooted.”931 So long as France 
was bereft of time-tested institutions and remained dependent upon the lifespan of the First 
Consul, she would continue to exist within a regime of chance. “[S]he distrusts her own 
fortune,” lamented Roederer, for although France was “surrounded by happy circumstances, 
her state [was] not one of happiness.” The political prospects of the nation remained too 
saturated by contingency, since “barely having averted the precipice…she fears seeing yet 
another before her.” France, Roederer observed, 
 
pressed between the too recent memories of the past and fears for the future, only 
sees in her ascent the danger of collapse. She asks for a barrier between herself and 
the abyss, a support, an aid at the summit of her glory.  
 
By “conserving the First Consul,” by making his appointment permanent, “the institution 
would leave assurances for the future.” Time would no longer be the medium of rupture; 
rather, the Consulship for Life “would give to time the means of reforming itself.”932 
Constructing the political symbolism of the Napoleonic regime was smash-and-grab 
operation. At various times and to varying degrees, Napoleon mimicked Caesarean, 
Carolingian and even Bourbon models and motifs of power, as and when circumstances 
demanded.933 The coronation was perhaps the most visible demonstration of the instability 
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and artifice of Napoleonic political legitimacy.934 At the centre of the ceremony was the 
coronation oath, or sacre, a divine anointment that Napoleon entertained – probably in the 
hope of appeasing Catholic sentiment – whilst nevertheless reaffirming the secular essence of 
the French state; the Pope, meanwhile, had little more than a walk on part: Napoleon would 
crown himself.935 Under the oxymoronic title, “Emperor of the French Republic,” he pledged 
to “maintain the integrity of the territory of the Republic” and the “irrevocability of the sale of 
national lands.”936 The Revolutionary past was finally consolidated under the aegis of a new 
institution: the Empire. Unlike the Republic, however, the Empire was borne not of rupture, 
but instead attempted to span multiple continuities. The legitimacy of the Empire was anti-
ruptural: it wilfully and opportunistically claimed continuity with multiple historical 
timelines: “from Clovis to the Committee of Public Safety,” Napoleon slyly remarked, “I feel 
solidarity with them all.”  
The coronation performance, however, was perfunctory. Napoleon seemed bored by 
the proceedings – the duchesse d’Abrantès even claimed to have seen him “several times 
check a yawn.”937 For those who braved the cold, ecclesiastical air of Notre Dame on 2 
December 1804, the vortex of historical reference points was both bewildering and 
intoxicating.938 “The past, the present and the future,” observed the young artillery 
commander, Jean-François Boulart, “seemed to simultaneously absorb my thoughts, and to 
hold my mind in a sort of fascination.” The ceremony, which was “so extraordinary, and 
which seemed to us so pregnant with the future,” seemed to offer assurances for the 
present.939As the ceremony concluded, d’Abrantès approached the Emperor to recount how 
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her husband, general Jean-Andoche Junot, had once described Napoleon armé. “He is one of 
those men whom Nature creates sparingly, and who appear in the world now and then, in the 
lapse of ages.”940 Under the Napoleonic Empire, the history of the present was crammed with 
the histories of the past; and, much like the battlefield comportment of Napoleon, the Empire 
– until it could acquire an historical resonance of its own – was forced to exist within “the 
lapse of ages,” leaping promiscuously from century to century, accruing historical experience 
here, dispensing with it once superfluous.  
The self-representations of the Napoleonic regime were therefore designed to re-
normalise political duration and to repudiate the ephemerality of revolutionary constructions 
of legitimacy. A week after the coronation, Dominique Vivant-Denon, the director-general of 
museums and another primary propagandist of the regime, called upon French artists to 
immortalize “the tableau of the oath” so that it might implant itself in the national memory 
“until a distant epoch!”  
 
Painters of the French school, may your art compensate us for the rapidity of so many 
august and moving scenes. Prolong in our memories the hours, the moments that call 
to mind so many years; your paintbrushes could not depict with the same success the 
many festivals that happened amidst the storms of the Revolution, and within which 
so often those storms were prepared. The canvas had barely taken on the outline of 
the success of one of these festivals before its popularity…was stripped from it by the 
same impetuous inconstancy.941 
 
Unlike revolutionary self-representation, which had concentrated “so many years” into 
“hours,” the purpose of imperial aesthetics was to “compensate” France for the passing 
“rapidity” of previous political regimes. By prolonging the memory of the coronation oath, 
the foundational “moment” of the Empire, the present of the regime might coordinate its 
future,   
This was easier said that done. If the political instability of revolutionary government 
had, in part, derived from the asymmetrical dynamics of time and history, then in a regime of 
reordered historical time it would be destabilising to accrue historical experience at an 
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accelerated temporal rate. The purpose of meantime, therefore, was to ensure political 
continuity whilst the space of experience re-expanded. This would also protect the slowly 
strengthening historicity of the new regime by subordinating the logic of rupture to the 
accumulation of historical experience and, consequently, the solidification of new institutions. 
Over the course of this meantime, Napoleon contended, the people would therefore “have had 
time to test by actual experience the results of their choice,” unmolested by unforeseen 
events.942 The fog of hazard began to lift over the horizon of expectation. In a proclamation 
issued in August 1801, Napoleon hailed the Code Civil as a document that had been carefully 
“matured [mûri] by the sage slowness of deliberations.” Unlike the legal steeplechase that 
was revolutionary legislative deliberation, where laws were sometimes devised, realised, and 
revised all in the same day, the apparent “slowness” with which the Code “matured” offered 
certain guarantees. As a consequence, it would “be the safeguard of your prosperity for a long 
time.” The prospect of transhistorical certainty, the knowledge that laws devised yesterday 
would govern legal interactions tomorrow, offered the prospect of happiness: “[e]njoy,” the 
proclamation concludes, “enjoy your position, your glory, and your aspirations for the 
future.”943  
Motifs of legitimacy became obsolete once they ceased to serve the purpose of 
meantime. Appeals to Charlemagne, for example, festooned the loyal addresses delivered to 
Napoleon upon the announcement of the imperial coronation. According to the citizens of Le 
Marne, a ceremony “that must inaugurate a great Emperor, a new Charlemagne,” would also 
invest France “with the hopes of a happy future.”944 Once the glorious achievements and 
military conquests of the present superseded those of the past, however, Charlemagne 
gradually fell out of the Napoleonic repertoire of legitimising metonyms. After 1806, plans 
for a monument at the Place de Vendôme in honour of the Frankish king were replaced by 
proposals for a bronze-clad column, fabricated from captured enemy cannon, and eventually 
completed in 1810, to celebrate the victory of Austerlitz. “[W]e no longer have need of the 
illusions of centuries to search in the past for the heroes of France,” Vivant-Denon explained 
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to Napoleon in March 1806.945 In this sense, Charlemagne was a temporal placeholder, a site 
of spectacular, if illusory commemoration that, before the Napoleonic regime could establish 
itself in time, counterbalanced the “rapidity” of revolutionary legitimacy and imbued the 
Empire with an historicity that, in the meantime, it palpably lacked.  
It was the lingering fear that time was short – a habit of thought borne by the 
experience of revolution – that influenced the activity of the regime. The work-time discipline 
of the Conseil mimicked Napoleon’s own extraordinary industriousness. Under the force of 
his hyperactivity, meetings regularly lasted ten or more hours, often not concluding until 
sunrise. Napoleon hurried and harried his advisers: the conseiller d’état responsible for roads 
and bridges, Emmanuel Crétet, was frequently taken to task about the deadlines of the various 
grands projets – “Where are we with the Arc de Triomphe?” – “Will I walk on the Jena 
bridge on my return?”946 Jacques-Louis David captured on canvas this irrepressible capacity 
for work in ‘The Emperor Napoleon in his Study at the Tuileries’ (1812). In this portrait, 
meantime is nighttime: Napoleon toils to candlelight, drafting decrees and laws – the Code 
Napoléon lies unfurled on his bureau – whilst the French slumber. The tall-case clock behind 
him reads 4.13am: Napoleon maximises the value of every minute of the day, even shirking 
sleep so that France may be securely governed – that it may “gain time” on the forces of 
disorder arraigned against it.947 “You have indeed caught me this time, David,” crowed 
Napoleon at the unveiling: “At night I work for the welfare of my subjects; in the daytime for 
their glory.” Time was being put to administrative use; it had ceased to be a medium of chaos: 
“For three years,” observed Roederer in 1802, Napoleon was “in charge of everything; he 
governed, he administered, he negotiated,” giving “each every day eighteen hours of solid 
work.” “He has governed more in three years than kings do in a century.”948   
The implication, of course, was that the time of the regime was never “empty.” “In 
order to astonish France,” Napoleon once told Roederer, “I must constantly do.”949 This 
invested the regime with a sense of momentous continuity. Warfare was central.950 “Victories 
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which are past soon cease to strike the imagination,” Napoleon told Thibaudeau, and though 
he wished “to multiply the works of peace,” in “the present nothing is so resonant as military 
success.” This was “an unfortunate position,” he admitted, but also an inevitable one: “a new-
born Government like ours can only be solidified by dazzling and astonishing the world.”951 
Continuous warfare showered the regime in military glory and reconfirmed its historical bias: 
a present securitised by the certain knowledge of future glory. As Robert Morrissey has deftly 
argued, the Napoleonic Empire developed an “economy of glory,” which orientated the 
French towards the future since the active accumulation of gloire952 relied upon “mechanisms 
of emulation.”953 Once again, an institution – the Légion d’honneur – was devised to dispense 
titles, benefactions, “baubles,” all of which primed this “economy,” and imbued political 
participation in the present, as Morrissey phrases it, with a “logic of fleeing forward.”954 The 
Légion displaced the precepts of tradition with a future-facing, meritocratic “practice of 
glory,” which contributed towards the concealment of the transparent historicity of the 
nascent regime.955 As General Pelleport, the first recipient of the Légion, observed: 
“Certainly, I would be proud and happy to descend from the generous citizens who managed 
to maintain their titles nationally, just as we have acquired ours on the field of battle – but it is 
not to be: I date only from myself.”956 Napoleon hoped to create the sense of durability once 
characteristic of the old regime without actually recreating the ancien regime: a new old 
regime, in effect, one that dated from the present. If Thibaudeau could fret that the Légion 
was “ostensibly founded as destructive to the old noblesse,” but that it might “soon produce a 
new noblesse which would rehabilitate the old,” then he had clearly not contemplated the 
parvenu swagger of a regime bolstered by the pursuit of glory – a swagger summed up by the 
low-born General Lefèbvre-Desnoëttes, who, during a soirée at the imperial court, offered a 
rebuke to one of the grand seigneur of the ancien regime: “You are only proud because you 
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have ancestors: so what! I am an ancestor!”957 The Légion did not look backwards to “the 
revival of old prejudices,” it was designed to orientate the Empire towards a future garlanded 
in glory, and away from the mere “circumstances of the present.”958 
As the Empire expanded and battlefield engagements grew gargantuan, however, the 
ancestor-less Napoleonic regime increasingly became strategically and structurally dependent 
upon military glory. War – that colossal game of chance – could never produce certainty; the 
frontiers of the nascent Empire thus remained prey to military incursion. And recently 
established satellite regimes, institutions borne by war, could also be flattened by war.959 In 
this context, as Metternich observed, the campaign on Russia in 1812 looked like “the va 
banque of a gambler maddened by former gains.”960 Va banque, a term derived from the 
eighteenth-century card game Pharo, referred to a participant who, by placing their entire 
stake into play, may win – or lose – everything.961 The regime, of course, had always seemed 
governed by this sense of chance. Napoleon had attempted to drain the unpredictability of 
revolutionary politics – and had largely succeeded – by tying the legitimacy of the empire to 
its military conquests.962 Napoleonic militarism was akin to a displacement technique: chance 
was exported to a continent in the form of constant warfare. In 1800, for example, as an 
exhausted British public watched France convulse itself through yet another experiment in 
revolutionary government, Pitt characterised the new First Consul as “this last adventurer in 
the lottery of Revolutions.”963 By 1809, Dorothea Schlegel could survey a continent that had 
been made a hostage to the newly unpredictable experience of history: “I feel like I am 
watching the most diabolical card tricks.”964  
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Whether trick or bet, as the cards repeated failed to fall in Napoleon’s favour the 
sense of chance that Napoleonic warfare had once carried across Europe began rebounding on 
the regime itself. The distant disaster of the Russian campaign rekindled the viability of 
speculation.965 At 4am on 23 October 1812, General Malet, an inveterate conspirator and 
opponent of the regime, appeared at the Popincourt barracks. Napoleon was dead, he 
declared, killed at the hands of a Cossack beneath the walls of Moscow; the Senate had 
dissolved the Empire; a new provisional government was in place, and the soldier was to 
announce its fealty to the new regime.966 For less than twenty-four hours, the conspirators 
took control of state ministries; soon, however, they found the levers of power inoperable. 
Anne-Jean Savary, duc de Rovigo, the minister of the Police-Générale, and Cambacérés, on 
behalf of the Conseil, could not verify the rumour of Napoleon’s demise; yet they held their 
posts, carried out their duties, seemingly unmoved by the prospect that the Emperor may have 
perished in the Russian snow. The Empire, Broers observes, continued to “fly on auto 
pilot.”967 The sudden reappearance of chance, the non-curated circulation of verifiable 
knowledge, did not undermine the functioning capacity of the Empire: the crisis was simply 
absorbed by the well-tuned regularity, the sheer bureaucratic functionality, of the regime.968 It 
was not until 6 November – two weeks after the coup – that Napoleon, in his approach to 
Smolensk, received news of its failure. Meantime had elapsed: the institutional framework of 
the Empire was now capable of outliving its Emperor.969 
 
IV. Timebombs  
 
“Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to 
import slaves.”970 As early as 1787, James Madison had conceived of the institution of slavery 
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as a problem pregnant with future peril. During the Convention deliberations on the slave 
trade it had became increasingly evident that the southern delegates would never accept 
abolition. “The people of these states,” remarked John Rutledge, “will never be such fools as 
to give up so important an interest.”971 The Constitution consequently offered a temporising 
compromise: Congress would be prevented from prohibiting the slave trade for twenty years. 
The slave question began to confuse the Federalist commitment to political duration: the 
decade immediately following the ratification of the Constitution saw more slaves imported 
into America than any other single decade of the eighteenth century.972 The problem did not 
dissipate with delay. In 1787, George Mason told Convention that by allowing this “nefarious 
trade” to continue for “twenty odd years,” the Constitution “adds daily to our weakness,” 
endangering “our domestic safety,” because, as he later observed, “the Western people are 
already calling out for slaves for their new land, and will fill that country with slaves if they 
can be got through South Carolina and Georgia.”973 The notion, then, that slavery, conceived 
as a problem of both morality and political economy, could be ameliorated across time was 
undermined the visible expansion of America across new territories. Despite the renewal of 
the Northwest Ordinance in 1789, which banned the importation of slaves, and the 
organisation of the Southwest Territory in 1790 with similar stipulations, the Washington 
administration could not contain the spread of slavery across the frontier.  
Federalists, of course, were not averse to the continued territorial expansion of the 
American Republic. On the contrary, the cultivation of western land would strengthen the 
federal centre, but only if expansion was gradual: only if operated in accordance with, and not 
defiance of, the historical dynamics of the Republic.974 Federalists envisaged a slow, robust 
territorialisation of the frontier. America would move millimetrically westward, purposefully 
pausing to oversee the systematic development of newly acquired territory, bringing these 
new lands into historical conformity with the seaboard states, and preventing the haphazard 
dispersal of peoples. Time would alter space.  
Territorial expansion was not meant to bend the dynamics of historical time. The 
programme of the Jeffersonian Republicans, by contrast, repudiated Washington’s vision 
whereby the nation inducted new territory into a commonly conceived historical time, one 
that would bind, not stretch the variegated “interests” of the Union. For Republicans, the 
                                                
971 John Rutledge before the Convention on 22 August, 1787, in Elliot’s Debates, V, p.460. 
972 Michael Tadman, Speculators and Slaves: Masters, Traders and Slaves in the Old South (Madison, WI., 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), pp.11-46; Walter Berns, ‘The Constitution and the Migration of Slaves,’ 
Yale Law Journal 78 (December 1968), pp.198-228; the law prohibiting slave importation, passed in 1807, failed 
to prevent the slave trade entirely: William W. Freehling, ‘The Founding Fathers and Slavery,’ American 
Historical Review 77 (1, February 1972), pp.81-93, here: p.88. 
973 George Mason addressed the Convention on 11 June and 22 August, 1787: in Elliot, ed., Elliot’s Debates, 
pp.269, V, p.458; on the slave trade debates at the Constitutional Convention and the state ratifying conventions, 
see: Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge, 
LA., Louisiana State University Press, 2000), pp.32-40. 
974 Cayton, The Frontier Republic, pp.15-25. 
  
243 
recourse to fresh land was meant to stymie the rapid development of a commercial republic – 
commonly conceived as a route towards political vice – by repeatedly replotting the virtuous 
rusticity prevalent in the revolutionary period.975 The absorption of new territory replenished 
the wellspring of liberty. Space would alter time.976 
 In the wake of the Convention, this matter had never seemed more pressing. “In 
1775, there was more patriotism in a village than is now in the 13 states,” rued David Ramsay 
during the ratification debates.977 A mere twelve years since independence and the momentum 
of liberty and virtue had stuttered to a halt. The intellectual underpinnings of the Jeffersonian 
programme for spatial expansion were derived from a classical-republican formula of the 
instability of virtue over time. When Jefferson contemplated the purchase of Louisiana in 
1803, then, he began pondering the improbable: what if the “patriotism” that circulated 
amongst those “villages” of 1775 could be recreated on virgin land? What if the “moment” of 
independence could be endlessly repeated in space, and thus forever prevented from 
degrading? What if virtue could be placed beyond time?978 Expansion through space might 
enable America to break “the closed cycle of virtue” that so assailed classical republican 
thought.979 The virtue embedded within the historical “moment” of independence would thus 
be carried along the event horizon of spatial expansion, daily recreating itself and ceaselessly 
dragging the itinerary of American history back to its foundational political ethic. Thus, for 
Jefferson the “shape” of history was not strictly cyclical (and classical), nor was it linear (and 
modern): rather, it was pliable – the arrow of time bending back upon itself as it confronted 
the obstacle of space.980 
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The capstone of this “spatial policy” was the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. Jefferson 
acquired the vast territory, approximately 827,987 square miles that ran from the Mississippi 
and Yazoo Rivers to the Rocky Mountains, and the Gulf of Mexico to Canada, from 
Napoleon at the fire-sale price of fifteen million dollars – or two cents per acre. As he 
declared in his first inaugural address, America was in possession of “a chosen country,” a 
nation “with room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and thousandth generation.” 
Room enough, in fact, for America to evade the degradations of time. The addition of a 
territory as “extensive” and “fertile” as Louisiana, “by enlarging the empire of liberty,” would 
“multiply its auxiliaries, & provide new sources of renovation, should its principles at any 
time degenerate in those portions of our country which gave them birth.”981 The Republic 
would remain agricultural, even primitive in its historical and civilizational bias, constantly 
eluding the iniquities of luxury and commerce in its advance west. In Louisiana, America had 
found a source of “renovation,” a means of returning to that pristine state of virtue that, 
during the Revolution, had marked “those portions” of the nation “which gave them birth,” 
and which, as Jefferson believed, had begun to “degenerate.” 
The purchase of the Louisiana territories was thus conceived as a means of governing 
the historical time of the American Republic. In January 1803, the New York Evening Post 
offered a full-throated defence of the prospective land deal: “It belongs of right to the United 
States to regulate the future destiny of North America. The country is ours; ours is the right to 
its rivers and all the sources of future opulence, power and happiness.”982 Federalists, by 
contrast, counselled against the purchase. “By adding an unmeasured world beyond that 
river,” sighed Fisher Ames, “we rush like a comet into infinite space,” a space bare but for 
“wolves and wandering Indians,” which would further destabilise the already ungovernable 
tracts of territory.983 For Hamilton, such explosive expansion meant that the United States 
would rapidly acquire “all the injuries of a too widely dispersed population,” leading 
eventually to the “dissolution of the Government.” In a prefiguration of what John L. Sullivan 
would immortally term “Manifest Destiny,” Hamilton characterised the cession of Louisiana 
as presenting America with a “manifest and great danger.”984 Far from imbuing the federal 
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government with the administrative or infrastructural means of governing futurity, it deferred 
to the future the task of tackling contingency.985 If the renewal of republican virtues 
demanded a constant movement across unchartered territory, leading America forward in 
space but back in time, and towards its revolutionary origins, then the essence of those origins 
– the prospect of both revolutionary upheaval and the “dissolution” of constituted authority – 
would remain constant, too.986 “Manifest danger,” unlike Manifest Destiny, was a temporal 
epiphenomenon of the American Revolution, one that would be exacerbated, not ameliorated, 
in space. 
Jefferson had hoped that slave emancipation, leading eventually to abolition, would 
happen “in the order of events,” and “with the consent of the masters, rather than by their 
extirpation.”987 His policy with respect Louisiana, however, demanded that “the order of 
events” be scrambled, that the historical space separating the virtuous present of America 
from its classical-republican fate be stretched across the physical space of the expanding 
Republic.988 In combination, there emerged an obvious tension: the institution of slavery, far 
from being ameliorated over time, was left unresolved, left to expand over space. As Hannah 
Spahn has shown, Jefferson’s writings during the 1790s were replete with predictions of 
imminent race war, but by the early-nineteenth century his arguments for “a gradualist reform 
receded into a more and more remote future.”989 In a letter to St George Tucker, the Bermuda-
born emancipationist, Jefferson had located the time pressures of slavery – and the probable 
consequences of its delay – in an entangled geopolitical context.990 The “first chapter of this 
history,” he observed, had already “begun in St. Domingo,” where, in 1797, the French 
colony erupted into revolution following a bloody slave insurrection. The “sooner we put 
                                                
United States (Lincoln, NE., University of Nebraska Press, 2004); on Sullivan himself, see: Julius W. Pratt, ‘John 
O’Sullivan and Manifest Destiny,’ New York History 14 (3, July 1933), pp.213-34. 
985 On Jeffersonian conceptions of national futurity, see Brian Steele, Thomas Jefferson and American Nationhood 
(Cambridge, CUP, 2012), pp.18-52; on Hamiltonian fears for spatial expansion, see: Andrew Shankman, ‘“A New 
Thing on Earth”: Alexander Hamilton, Pro-Manufacturing Republicans, and the Democratization of American 
Political Economy,’ Journal of the Early Republic 23 (Autumn, 2003), pp.323-52, and ‘Hamilton on the Louisiana 
Purchase: A Newly Identified Editorial from the New-York Evening Post,’ The William and Mary Quarterly 12: 
Alexander Hamilton: 1755-1804 (2, April 1955), pp.268-281. 
986 Peter Onuf writes that many Republicans, unlike the Federalists, were elated by this prospect, including 
Jefferson, whose “vision of westward expansion projected that glorious struggle into the future and across the 
continent. It was a kind of permanent revolution, re-enacting the nation’s beginnings in the multiplication of new, 
self-governing republican states”: ‘The Revolution of 1803,’ Wilson Quarterly (Winter, 2003), pp.22-29, here: 
p.29; James R. Sofka, ‘Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of World Politics,’ in Kastor, ed., The Louisiana 
Purchase, pp.51-63. 
987 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State Virginia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill, NC., University of North 
Carolina Press, 1982), p.163. 
988 By the 1850s this policy had seemingly recreated the sense of historical boredom that Jefferson once associated 
with colonial America: William Kingsford, Impressions of the West and South during a six weeks’ holiday (A.H. 
Armour & Co., Toronto, 1858), observed “a painful monotony” amidst southern life, p.48. 
989 Spahn, Jefferson, Time and History, p.13. 
990 On Jefferson and Haitian Revolution, see: Donald R. Hickey, ‘America’s Response to the Slave Revolt in 
Haiti,’ Journal of the Early Republic 2 (4, Winter 1982), pp.361-79; Robin Blackburn, ‘Haiti, Slavery, and the Age 
of the Democratic Revolution,’ The William and Mary Quarterly 63 (4, October 2006), pp.643-74; Tim 
Matthewson, A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian-American Relations during the Early Republic (Westport, CT., 
Prager, 2003). 
  
246 
some plan under way” for emancipation, Jefferson wrote, “the greater hope” there was that it 
would “proceed peaceably” to its “ultimate effect.” In an arresting prognostication of the 
probable consequences of delay, Jefferson stated bluntly: “If something is not done, and soon 
done, we shall be the murderers of our own children.” Slavery perverted generational 
sovereignty; it devoured the future of the United States because it bequeathed the descendants 
of the Revolution civil turmoil. Events across the Caribbean, meanwhile, contributed towards 
the temporalisation of the slave question, especially if America remained an Atlantic-facing 
commercial entity.991 Given “the present state of things,” Jefferson panted, the “day which 
begins our combustion must be near at hand, and only a single spark is wanting to make that 
day tomorrow.”992 In the two decades that followed the purchase of Louisiana, the imminence 
of “combustion” appeared to fade: American space had reset the timer, “diffusing” the 
problem of slavery and transforming its abolition into a “peaceably” gradual process. “Time,” 
Jefferson could contentedly remark in 1826, “which outlives all things, will outlive this evil 
also.”993  
The time bomb carried on ticking, accumulating more explosive material as slavery 
spread across the mid-west. In believing that the two major political quandaries of the 
American Republic – the temporality of virtue and the moral horror of slavery – could be 
resolved by recourse to a single remedy – spatial expansion – Jefferson had mistaken a cure 
for mere palliative treatment. The notion that the institution of slavery would undergo 
diffusion, then decline and eventually disappear as it spread through American space proved 
delusory.994 Instead, an engorged stream of slaves flooded over the frontier, into the 
Mississippi River Valley and the Red River Valley of Arkansas. The institution steadily 
solidified. The wealth and, ultimately, the entire political culture that slavery spawned in 
these territories produced a geography of divergent “sentiments” and “interests,” which 
hardened over time. By believing that his “spatial policy” and a “gradualist reform” of slavery 
                                                
991 Laurent Dubois, ‘The Haitian Revolution and the Sale of Louisiana; or, Thomas Jefferson’s (Unpaid) Debt to 
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could co-exist, Jefferson had implanted a time bomb at the core of the United States.995 The 
history of ante-bellum America may be characterized as a series of controlled explosions – 
the Missouri Crisis of 1819; the Compromise of 1850 – that lead, eventually and bloodily, to 
a final detonation.996  
 
* 
 
Following defeat at Leipzig in 1813, the Napoleonic Empire went into free-fall. As Anne-
Jean Savary, the duc de Rovigo, observed, “confidence disappeared: the future no longer 
afforded the prospect of consolation, and men’s minds were filled with all sorts of conjectures 
respecting the changes which it was foreseen must take place in consequence of the inability 
to prevent them.” As the institutions of the Empire crumbled, Napoleon was obliged to offer 
his (first) abdication at Fontainebleau, on 11 April 1814. History rapidly re-entered an 
aleatory state. “Time,” the duc de Rovigo observed, “was once again flying fast.”997 Although 
many of the practices and institutions of historical time control devised during the Consulate 
and Empire were intended to outlive Napoleon, the reemergence of chance after 1812 
invalidated the experiences garnered during the meantime of the regime. The same may have 
be so of the constitutional settlement supervised by Washington if America had not 
subsequently embraced expansion through space rather than the continued attempt to regulate 
political time. Fisher Ames summoned up similar doubts about the integrity of the United 
States when, in 1805, he observed how the Jeffersonian platform of entrusting the future of 
American liberty to its expanding territorial scope deferred, but did not address, the divergent 
temporalities of the Republic. “[W]e have all the time floated, with a fearless and unregarded 
course, down the stream of events, till we are now visibly drawn within the revolutionary 
suction of a Niagara, and every thing that is liberty will be dashed to pieces in the descent.”998 
  
                                                
995 This idea of the “time bomb” is briefly used as a literary device, but not as a means of examining the qualities 
of American temporality and slavery, by William Freehling, ‘The Louisiana Purchase and the Coming of the Civil 
War,’ in Sanford Levinson and Bartholomew H. Sparrow, eds., The Louisiana Purchase and American Expansion, 
1803-1898 (New York, NY., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp.69-82, see: p.74. 
996 On time and the American Civil War, see: Cheryl A. Wells, Civil War Time: Temporality and Identity, 1861-
1865 (Athens, GA., University of Georgia Press, 2005). 
997 Anne-Jean Savary, duc de Rovigo, Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo, M. Savary, written by himself and 
illustrative of the History of the Emperor Napoleon (4 vols., London, Henry Colburn, 1828), III, p.132; Karen 
Hagemann, ‘“Unimaginable Horror and Misery”: The Battle of Leipzig in October 1813 in Civilian Experience 
and Perception,’ in Alan Forrest, Karen Hagemann, Jane Rendall, eds., Soldiers, Citizens and Civilians: 
Experiences and Perceptions of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1790-1820 (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009), pp.157-180; on the military dimensions of imperial disintegration before Napoleon’s first 
abdication, see, passim, Jacques-Olivier Boudon, Napoléon et la champagne de France: 1814 (Paris, Armand 
Colin, 2014). 
998 Fisher Ames, The Works of Fisher Ames (Boston, MA., T. B. Wait, 1809), p.380. 
  
248 
CONCLUSION: The resumption of “ordinary history”? 
 
“I conclude my work with the year 1815, because everything that came after that belongs to 
ordinary history.”999 From his eminence as the foreign minister of the Austrian Empire, 
Klemens von Metternich looked back upon more three decades of political chaos. In 
retrospect, he was amazed that he had managed to “withstand the storms of time,” when so 
many of his generation had been swept away by the “whirlwind” of war of revolution. A 
witness to the “overthrow of centuries of ancient institutions,” Metternich had watched 
France, in ten years, exchange fourteen centuries of French kingship for the transient Jacobin 
Republic; he had been present when, in 1806, Napoleon dismantled a millennium of dynastic 
tradition by declaring the Holy Roman Empire defunct. In late 1815, however, as the 
erstwhile French Emperor sailed for St. Helena, exile and obscurity, the dizzying historical 
experience of the preceding decades seemed to subside. “We have fallen upon a time, when a 
thousand small calculations and small views on the one side, gross mistake and feeble 
remedies on the other, form the history of the day.”1000 Historical experience, Metternich 
contended, had been decelerated, decompressed, detemporalised: it had, to some extent, 
become “ordinary” again. 
 The political “eventfulness” of 1816 would swiftly betray such wishful thinking.1001 
These remarks are nevertheless instructive: the revolutionary era was widely considered to 
have been a time of extraordinary time. The starting point – the deterioration of British 
imperial authority in the American colonies in 1774 – and the finish line – the disintegration 
of the Napoleonic Empire at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 – demarcate a four-decade-long 
period of unfathomable change: it represents a transition from one type of time to another; in 
fact, it represents a change in the nature of change itself. Time became an agent in history, 
restructuring the pace, pattern, and proportions of historical experience.1002 The central 
contention of this thesis is that time, more than merely altering the dynamics and dimensions 
of history, also became the chief assassin of political legitimacy, complicating and deranging 
the exercise of political power, ceaseless reproducing the sense of instability that was itself 
characteristic of revolutionary historical time. Between 1774 and 1815, then, a single process 
of change in the nature of historical change begins to emerge, one that blends the preceding 
chapters into a general narrative of time and power. 
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The historicity of the ancien regime contributed to its own collapse. A conviction in 
the essential iterability of history, in which past, present and future operated in structural 
lock-step – the future inevitably reflecting and reproducing the ontological complexion of the 
past, the transhistorical validity of present-term experience – produced a time temperament 
that desensitised the ancien regime to political urgency. The consequent emotional response 
was ennui, an extreme and often psychologically deleterious form of monotony, which was 
particularly prevalent at the court of Versailles. By the 1780s, both ennui and the belief that 
history, supervised and regularised by the traditional, sacral, rhythmic authority of the crown, 
was incapable of producing unfamiliar experience, were combined to produce a toxic cocktail 
of complacency. The “temporisations” of the crown, meanwhile, had begun to invest the 
otherwise ordinary problems of royal finance and authority with increasingly epic historical 
consequences. It was the time pressures of fiscal crisis that forced the convocation of the 
Estates-General, an archaic institution that, despite its historic pedigree, proved wholly 
incapable of coordinating the unforeseen events that began to defamiliarise the pre-existing 
patterns of historical experience. By the midsummer of 1789, the past and future began 
drifting apart at a bewildering rate. 
In the American colonies, the notion of a “monotonous” course of history was 
expressed as a form of temporal elongation in which the prognosticated processes of 
historical change unfurled across centuries. The acceleration of the imperial crisis after 1774, 
and the convocation of the Continental Congress, foreshortened – “abbreviated” – the space 
of historical experience. Unlike in pre-revolutionary France, however, the Koselleckian 
categories of the “space of experience” and the “horizon of expectation” did not drift apart; 
they began rushing together, contorting the deliberative space of the present and creating a 
crushing sense of temporal claustrophobia. The emergence of historical time during the 
American Revolution therefore jostled with pre-existing formulae of historical sequences, 
largely derived from the classical precedents of civic republicanism, and which gave the 
shape of future events an ominous hue. It was only after the Declaration of Independence that 
the “horizon” of history was obscured. Revolutionary deliberative processes were kairotically 
charge, infesting every aspect of lived experience with an unfamiliar time pressure, in turn 
transforming time from an absolute or constant conceptual presence into an historical actor in 
its own right.1003  
 After the initial time tear of revolution, rupture became a constitutive, even 
commonplace element of the lived experience of history. Political power during the 
revolutionary era, under the Articles of Confederation and during the pre-Thermidor period, 
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was temporally experimental. The practice of power became indistinguishable from the 
manipulation of time: neither could be stabilised. The onset of revolution had thrown the 
interdependent experiential spheres of past, present, and future into a state of relative flux; 
they remained inextricably bound together, of course, but in fungible, changeable, and non-
linear forms. Koselleck contended that the late-eighteenth century was the gestation period of 
modernity, which birthed “Neuzeit” – new time. It is perhaps more accurate, at least in the 
immediate context of American and French Revolutionary events, to speak of Neue Zeiten, 
new times.1004 In France, the perceived absence of total historical rupture created the 
conditions for political radicalisation as Parisian sans-culottes and Jacobin agitators began to 
reconceptualise time as duration, as a continuous flow of events inimical to the present-term 
exercise of liberty. Consequently, revolutionaries did not embrace historical acceleration, but 
a far more extreme form of progress – historical instantaneity, in effect – that invested the 
people, and their spontaneous demonstration of sovereignty, as a force of such awesome 
constituent power that it was capable of warping time and history. As the overthrow of 
monarchy dragged centuries of traditional experiences and sources of legitimate authority into 
the void, the recently warped linearity of history jettisoned the Republic into a timeless future. 
The legitimacy of revolutionary power, however, remained coefficient to its historical 
movement: speed thus became the default setting of political authority, and the attempt to 
institutionalise historical velocity during the Terror ultimately proved unsustainably self-
destructive. In America, by contrast, the ontological disjuncture of past, present and future, 
produced a liquefaction of historical experience. Political control appeared to “slide,” as 
Washington observed, over a temporal plane that was constantly disrupted by the 
multiplication of potential futures, yet unable to gain traction for long enough – like a 
“pedestal of ice on a summers day” – to acquire any sense of historical trajectory. 
 The promise of progress was collapsed into an era of political exhaustion. Under the 
Directory and prior to the Constitutional Convention, any sense of historical direction 
morphed into a ceaseless sense of historical happening. Contingency consequently saturated 
every aspect of revolutionary society; the American and French Republics appeared as if at 
the edge of an “abyss” or perched perilously on a “pivet”: the dominant emotional response 
was anxiety, which fostered a foreboding of the future and produced paralysis in the present. 
The participants to the Convention and the coup of Brumaire instrumentalised this anxiety-
ridden form of historical experience as a means of justifying their quasi-legal take-overs. Pre-
existing constitutional arrangements had invalidated themselves on account of their inability 
to regulate – and, in some cases, having institutionalised – temporal instability. Both were 
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designed to reinvigorate the exercise of political power by creating new regimes – new 
institutions and practices of power – that could create political duration, investing 
contemporaries with the time to gather experience, and thereby detemporalise the experience 
of history. The revolutions were declared to be over. 
Contingency had robbed contemporaries of their capacity to coordinate themselves 
historically; indeed, by 1787 and 1799 historical meaning had seemingly been dissolved into 
a regime of pure chance. Even after the Convention and Brumaire, recently devised 
institutions repeatedly buckled under the pressure of a temporalised form of historical 
randomness that, during the early 1790s and 1800s, threatened to abbreviate the “space of 
experience” and destabilise political power in the face of an obscured “horizon of 
expectation.” There were also structural affinities between the temporalities of post-
revolutionary America and France As the primary protagonists in the post-revolutionary 
regimes, George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte could sustain their own authority, and 
by implication the authority of government, by deploying their own charismatic capacity to 
act as shock-absorbers. In short, they set about creating meantime, an immediate-term form of 
political duration, which enabled American and French society to “gain time” in the present, 
to incubate historical experience, and thereby fortify political and institutional capacities for 
confronting the rapid onset of the unforeseen, the contingent, the random.  
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